"The planet under tension" is an first series of talks created by an apprentice of the Institute of fresh Europe. Its goal is to describe the most crucial challenges of the modern planet – from wars and crises to information safety and geopolitical change. The publications are created on the basis of discussions with people active in global affairs – analysts, diplomats, researchers and practitioners – in order to combine reliability with accessibility.
In the face of a full-scale war in Ukraine and increasing geopolitical tensions, Polish east policy faces a historical challenge of redefining. After more than 3 decades of transformation, it inactive lacks a coherent, long-term doctrine – actions frequently trust more on historical resentiments than on the cold calculation of interests. From the request for a strategical turn towards the North, through a painful diagnosis of interior disputes weakening Poland's position, to the future of relations with Ukraine and Belarus – these are key topics of the 3rd discussion in the cycle "World under tension". The guest is Wojciech Kozioł – editor of Defence24, global affairs analyst and co-author of the book “Between Bug and Truth”. In the conversation, the expert uncompromisingly diagnoses the biggest errors of Polish politics after 1989 and explains why an alliance with the Nordic countries may prove more crucial to our safety than the existing cooperation formats.
Veronica Barankevy: It has been almost a year since your publication with Bartłomeij Wypartowicz of the book "Between Bug and Truth". Looking from today's perspective, which of the most fresh ones, and which, in your opinion, would require clarification or improvement today?
Wojciech Kozioł: I think you can point out 3 of these. 1 of them is immediately linked to what would surely require clarification and broader consideration – it is simply a northern policy. We have addressed it in the book as 1 of the pioneering examples of solutions in Central European politics to draw attention to this direction. present we can see that the actions of our government, as well as the interest of the full region, have begun to decision north. So this is definitely worth expanding.
The second issue that has gained importance is the direction of Belarus, which involves events following Donald Trump's victory. We observe that both Belarus and the United States are trying to find an agreement. It is not known how much this is just a political game, and how much a real effort to distract Belarus from Russian influence. Undoubtedly, however, this direction has gained its importance recently.
The 3rd thing is Polish-Ukrainian relations. In time, we see that historical issues have become more and more discussed, with the subject of the Volyn crime at the head. There were examples of a more real, transactional approach of Warsaw to Kiev. The authorities in Poland began to emphasize their own interests more strongly, utilizing the question of membership of NATO and the European Union as a bargaining chip. There has been a clear transition from a very selfless approach from 2022 to 2023, to a strategy based on the vital interests of the state. I believe that this is better in the long term. If we build Polish-Ukrainian cooperation on resentiments, it will be shallow and artificial. But if it is based on honest, sometimes brutal, but real foundations – specified as arms cooperation or in the safety sector – it will be a percent for years. So this is simply a more forward-looking direction. It can origin any tensions on the Warsaw-Kiyów line, but in the future it can bring better fruit. These are the 3 issues I would definitely stand out for.
VB: As far as Polish-Ukrainian relations are concerned, how do you measure the consequence of the Ukrainian side to the resulting tensions?
WK: We had an example late during the drone attack on Ukraine – about a week before our conversation – erstwhile respective drones entered Poland. At the time we received Kiev's response, which, in my opinion, underestimated the importance of the situation. It was suggested that Poland would not be able to defend itself against the attack on the scale of the 1 that took place in Ukraine. Meanwhile, we saw that NATO systems worked properly: early informing systems and AWACS aircraft were in place. We were able to identify which drones were decoys and which posed a real threat. Moreover, the unity of the Alliance worked. Poland did not carry out this mission alone; the operation was coordinated between all NATO allies who were deployed to the area and assigned to circumstantial tasks. In this respect, the strategy passed the test.
I think Kiev should approach relations with Poland in a different way. The vital Polish interests in the east – meaning the importance of politics towards Ukraine, but besides towards Belarus, which we frequently forget – are much more crucial than, for example, the interests of Paris or Berlin towards east Europe. Germany and the French have always looked at these countries as second- or even third-rate partners. Even Poland and another countries of our region are treated in a secondary way by Berlin, and Ukraine or Belarus are even little crucial players in the geopolitical arena. Poles look at it differently. Ukraine and Belarus are a key component of the safety of the Polish state and the full east flank.
If Ukraine wants to look for a partner for years who will share her opinion on most safety issues, it must realize that Poland is the key ally for it. It is Poland, Romania and another east countries that NATO flanks are the most crucial partners who will talk with 1 voice much more than Western partners.
VB: Let's go back north for a while. A key and innovative component of your concept is the inclusion of the Nordic countries in the thought of the Mediterranean. I would like to ask, what strategical logic stood for it in Scandinavia and not, for example, closer integration of the Visegrad Group, to look at the main direction for strengthening Poland's security?
WK: There were 2 factors to decide. The first is geography – 1 cannot escape from it. In the event of a large-scale conflict between NATO and the Russian Federation, the full east and Northern flank of the Alliance will in practice share 1 front line. From the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea and Turkey, there will be 1 common theatre of action. The countries of our region must be aware that operations will take place in this area, from the Arctic Ocean to the North Sea, strategical maritime areas between Greenland, Iceland and Norway (the alleged GIUK Pass) to the key Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Our safety interests are so convergent. I believe that the renewal of the strategical partnership between Poland and Sweden last year is an expression of the fact that the Nordic countries themselves realise that, in colloquially speaking, we are in the same boat. It's a good thing that consciousness grows slowly. In the book we have highlighted this direction as 1 example, and present we see that it is gaining importance, which shows that the situational awareness in the region is increasing.
A second element, beyond geography, is the current political situation in the Visegrad Group countries. While we are inactive able to build coalitions on any intra-EU issues, this becomes increasingly hard over time. The key difference, however, concerns the attitude towards Russia and the perception of the threat on its part. In Slovakia we have Robert Fico, an openly pro-Russian policy. In Hungary, Viktor Orban creates a "pro-peaceful" policy to end the conflict as shortly as possible. However, the actions of parts of his surroundings, specified as the minister of abroad affairs, indicate a strong pro-Russian attitude. Under specified conditions, it is hard to scope agreement on fundamental issues for security. They besides see the Russian threat differently due to geographical barriers. The barrier in the form of Carpathians gives them any intellectual comfort and conviction that they will not be Russia's first mark in case of escalation.
All of this makes it possible that if we want to look for common interests in the area of security, we have the natural partners of the countries of the east flank of NATO and the countries of North Europe.
VB: Could you indicate circumstantial lessons from Nordic patterns – specified as Finnish full defence or Swedish armaments manufacture – that Poland could successfully implement at home?
WK: Definitely yes, and these 2 examples are possibly the most expressive. If we are to draw from any patterns – and we see that this approach besides evolves in the Nordic countries themselves – this is the civilian defence and full defence strategy presented by Finland. erstwhile we realize that the Finns are only 5.5 million citizens, and in the event of war, they are able to prepare an almost 1 millionth army in a fewer weeks, this shows the scale and value of this pattern. civilian defence was developed there for decades due to the disastrous geographical position and neighbourhood – first with the aggressive russian Union and later with the Russian Federation. These patterns, as you can see after years, have been paid off. The preparation of citizens, implemented from an early age, from a school age, and continued throughout their lives, became 1 of the most crucial elements of full defence against possible aggression.
The second point is the Swedish example, namely the ability to make its own weapons manufacture to specified an degree that it becomes a model for others. Let us compare this with the situation in Poland, where the arms manufacture faces problems specified as company break-up or under-financing. The Swedes, on the another hand, were able to build a strong position in circumstantial areas and be successful in them.
So if we were to draw from these examples, then in terms of civilian protection Finland is simply a model, and in part Sweden, too, which late began to consider going back to teaching in schools in the field of full defence. As I recall, this concept was abandoned after the end of the Cold War. Swedish solutions in the arms manufacture are besides crucial. 1 can feel any regret for Polish governments after 1989 that they did not search closer cooperation and the creation of joint projects with Swedes. However, I hope that nothing is yet closed on this issue and that someday we will be able not to co-create so much as to adapt any of these patterns to Polish conditions.
VB: The war in Ukraine is frequently called the experimental ground for modern conflicts. In your opinion, what are the most crucial conclusions – for example technological ones, concerning drones or cyberwar – that Poland and the full region should draw now? How do you measure what has been achieved in this area over the last 4 years?
WK: First of all, all NATO countries should draw the conclusion from this war that a possible future large-scale conflict will not be conducted under the same conditions as in Ukraine. In an allied scenario, at least in theory, the full Pact would defend itself, so the means utilized would be completely different. Nevertheless, in Ukraine we could observe a return to fighting patterns that seemed anachronistic – for example, trench fights and position warfare. Experience with Operation Desert Storm and another activities in the mediate East in the 1990s suggested that specified forms of fighting would no longer return and future conflicts would be fast and comparatively short. However, Ukraine has shown that a positional struggle, sometimes resembling reality planet War I, it can again become a regular image of the front.
The second issue is the evolution of the battlefield itself in Ukraine. In 2022, armored troops, artillery and classical aerial activities dominated. After nearly 4 years, the shawl shifted toward radio-electronic combat and the gigantic saturation of the battlefield with drones that are utilized in thousands or even tens of thousands a day. This shows how much the conflict evolved. Of course, this does not mean that dense equipment or armored forces have lost importance, but the saturation of drones shows how much unconventional fighting methods play today.
It is clear that any European countries are starting to take these experiences personally. any time ago, during French military training, the local generals openly talked about the request to return to military concepts that had been put aside for years. The Czechs, on the another hand, have taken a very active approach to the issue of drones, sometimes claiming that they should be a permanent component of the equipment of each soldier. These ideas, born in Ukraine during the conflict, resonate throughout the Alliance. It seems to me that Poland will besides effort to decision in this direction, especially after fresh experience with Russian drones. It becomes clear that the fight in the air against specified threats will be in future conflicts on the agenda.
VB: How do you measure the hazard of the region's safety dependence on the US, especially in the context of changes in the White home and the increasing Indo-Pacific precedence for Americans?
WK: In my opinion, we must face the fact that sooner or later the Americans will gotta retreat any of their troops from Europe, if not all. 3 key actions should be taken in this context. First of all, it's in our best interests that these troops stay with us as long as possible. Secondly, we should strive for the centre of gravity of NATO – which I always effort to repeat – to be moved from Central Europe to the east flank, which should be a sign of our times. specified an thought should be actively enforced in Washington.
Thirdly, we must constantly show the American authorities that their vital interests depend on the safety of our region. Action in this direction has already been taken, inter alia, through the Tri-Sea Initiative. We can see that after the change of power in the White House, this subject has returned to the agenda. We have besides had examples of raising this subject during Karol Nawrocki's fresh visit to the White House. This shows that if we present a purely business case to the Americans, we have a chance to succeed. The Americans won't want to stay here unless they have vital interests to profit from. Without that approach, we can't convince them to stay longer.
From this perspective, our strategy should be based on 2 pillars: on the 1 hand, partial dependence and an effort to anchor American interests in the region, and on consistent building of their own regional defence capabilities, regardless of the United States approach.
VB: As far as the military dimension of the concept of Intermarine+ is concerned, how should it be linked to the economical agenda of the Trimorese, including, for example, investments in energy and transport?
WK: We gotta separate these 2 concepts first. Sometimes he's incorrect between the sea and the Trimorian, which is simply a fundamental mistake. simply put, the Trimor focuses primarily on economical aspects that are meant to connect our region and let it to catch up with the Western states. This is mainly about 3 segments. The first is infrastructure and transport connections. We have here any flagship examples, specified as Via Carpathia and Via Baltica, which prove that you can build connections on the north-south axis – a direction that has been neglected for years.
The second section is an energy policy and the creation of a common ecosystem, which, on the 1 hand, would defend us from crises and, on the another hand, independent of Russian influence. This is in the interests of virtually all countries, from Sweden, Finland and Norway to the north, to Greece or Croatia to the south. We see this even on the example of Hungary or Slovakia, which are very dependent on Russian natural materials. I think that their policy towards Ukraine would be completely different if this addiction were not so strong.
These 2 segments should focus on the Trim. In turn, as a military complement, Intermorze should focus on safety and industrial cooperation. The aim is that these components – economical and military – complement each other.
Another issue is to think of the region as 1 organism. We know very well that even in NATO there is no unanimity, even with respect to arms spending. An example was the attitude of Spain at the last summit, which, due to geography, is virtually not straight threatened by Russia and has a completely different approach to war than Poland, Romania or the Baltic States. The creation of a common platform in which the countries of the region could talk with 1 voice on the global stage, whether within NATO or within the European Union, would be an perfect complement to the concept of the Trimorese. In this way, we would focus on 3 basic pillars: security, infrastructure and economics. specified a complete way of working would surely benefit the full region.
VB: Which script concerning Russia's future – further militarisation, interior chaos or decay – do you think the region should prepare itself first? And what would each of these scenarios mean in practice for Poland and its neighbours?
WK: I think we request to be prepared for all scenario, even the least likely one, which is the complete disintegration of Russia. Although the probability is low, it is never zero in politics. However, I believe that the threat of proliferation of atomic weapons, which would happen in the case of specified collapsible weapons, is adequate to guarantee that powers specified as the United States and China do not let the Russian Federation to fall.
The most likely script for which all countries of the region must prepare is Russia's continued constant aggression. There is no request for direct armed conflict. Russia will most likely proceed to effort to destabilise all the countries in the region, regardless of how the war will turn out in Ukraine. Military threats will proceed to be applied to Ukraine, undermining the very existence of the state. For Poland and the Baltic States, actions will be directed below the threshold of open conflict: terrorist acts, attacks on critical infrastructure and attacks in cyberspace – in peculiar banking systems or municipal infrastructure specified as waterworks. These seem to be the 2 key segments Russia will effort to hit.
The Baltic states are definitely in the worst situation due to the fact that they have an additional problem that is frequently forgotten: a Russian minority. Moscow can usage it in the same way as in Ukraine. We have besides seen akin mechanisms in Moldova, where pro-Russian sentiments among this number were very visible. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania must face specified a threat. This shows that these threats will proceed to be present on the east flank of NATO. We must be ready for this kind of action – centrifugal impacts and destabilization.
It is besides worth mentioning something that sometimes escapes: the cooperation of Russian peculiar services with organised crime in various countries, including Poland. If we focus on neutralising specified threats, Russia's impact on our region will be importantly reduced. I don't think there's a large confrontation between the Alliance and Russia, but hybrid action is almost certain.
Figure 1. National structure of the population of Estonia (2022)
Source: Own improvement based on statistic Estonia
Figure 2. National structure of the Latvian population (2022)
Source: Own improvement based on data from the Central Statistical Office of Latvia (CSB).
VB: An crucial tool that the Russian Federation is besides actively utilizing is disinformation. How do you measure the consequence of the countries of the region to this threat, and in peculiar its effectiveness?
WK: I think, unfortunately, we have very large problems here. This is primarily due to our political strategy and the way we have learned to function in the liberal-democratic world. Our system, in principle, rightly allows freedom of speech. This, however, opens the door to specified hostile actions. We must number on being much more susceptible to propaganda attacks with full freedom of speech. If we compare this with Russia, where there is absolute censorship and state media control, we will see a tight system, even concrete, which is very hard to break through.
The second problem is that we are inactive focused on defensive action. This is logical but ineffective in the long run. You can't just defend yourself all the time – you besides gotta attack. Western countries should conclude that in the war on cyberspace we must besides hit Russia with propaganda. We request to show what she is trying to hide: that she is simply a degenerated country, with immense shortcomings and social problems, destroyed by her own authorities and corruption.
Our message should emphasise that confronting the West is not a fight against the world's top evil, but a denial of the fundamental principles of the functioning of the global community, which is detrimental to Russia itself at economical and social level. If we were not to "attack" in this way, it was the incorrect word – but we were getting into the Russian infosphere with a message opposing their propaganda, it would be much more effective. I have the impression that specified awareness has not yet broken through in the Western countries and in NATO. Sooner or later, however, we will come to the conclusion that without active action, not just defence, we are incapable to win this information war.
VB: Finally, let us return to Poland and go back in time. In your opinion, what was the biggest mistake made after 1989 that weakened the Polish position in the East?
WK: any things can be mentioned here, although it can not be said that Poland suffered an absolute defeat in east politics, due to the fact that there are respective aspects that can be counted as a plus. We gotta remember that erstwhile we left the east bloc after the collapse of the russian Union, Poland was 1 of the weakest countries in the region. We had lower GDP per individual than even Ukraine, which shows that our situation was truly disastrous. The steps we took at the time were to the best of our abilities. In the 1990s Poland could not impress Ukraine, Belarus or the Baltic countries with economical potential, due to the fact that it had virtually no economical potential. president Aleksandr Kwasniewski's actions towards Ukraine were a maximum of what we could then achieve. In the case of Belarus, since Alexander Lukashenko took over, it has been much more hard due to the fact that he has constantly sought to strengthen relations with Russia, which has limited our area for manoeuvre.
Figure 3. Transitional pathways: GDP per capita (PPP) for selected countries (1990-2024)
Source: Own improvement based on planet Bank data
However, this does not mean that our policy has been the summit of our capabilities. After 2004, erstwhile we were already in the European Union and in NATO, our will to act in the East was greatly self-limited. No 1 has forbidden us to prosecute an active east policy, but we lacked 1 coherent plan that would be implemented by all the centres of power.
Unfortunately, we ended up acting reactively, not strategically. Orange Revolution took place – there was a large mobilization in Polish politics to support Ukraine, but after a short time there was no coherent strategy. Euromaidan came from 2013 to 2014 and the strategy repeated: large euphoria, immense support and again no constructive, long-term plan. It was akin with Belarus. Prior to the 2020 protests, there was a chance of rapprochement, partially due to attempts to normalize relations on the Washington-Minsk line, but it besides failed. After 2020, relations were importantly weakened, and after Operation "Sluice" in 2021 practically died.
Finally a full-scale invasion in 2022 – a powerful outbreak of national unanimity to support Ukraine, a social reaction unprecedented anywhere in the world. But again, there was 1 circumstantial strategy that the Polish State could implement its policy. As a result, there have been problems that we inactive have: the unresolved issue of Volyn, the dispute over Ukrainian grain, in which both sides were blamed, or typical diplomatic arguments, as erstwhile president Zelenski at the UN was accusing Poland of supporting Russia.
This shows that there was no position in Warsaw. The cardinal mistake of Polish politics after 1989 is that no coherent political doctrine has been formulated towards Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. In half a joke, half seriously, if we want to look for any political thought towards these countries, we must go back not to the 1980s or 1970s, but fundamentally to the interwar period. The only exception is the doctrine of Giedroycia, which in a sense we stick to today. In addition, it is in vain to search an innovative thought. The fact that the 3rd Republic has not developed its own modern concept of east politics is our biggest mistake.
VB: From today's perspective, how much do you think the deficiency of a cross-party consensus in Poland limits our ability to conduct a long-term and effective east policy?
WK: In my opinion, this is 1 of our primary problems, which has late become very familiar. A crowning example of the inept conduct of abroad policy is the competency conflict between the government, with the Ministry of abroad Affairs at the head and the presidential camp. These problems have their roots in the unclear division of competences in the Constitution. In practice, both centres can conduct abroad policy and both will claim to be its main creators. The Constitution states that the government is liable for abroad policy, but at the same time it grants participation to the President.
It creates a gigantic chaos in which you don't truly know whose word is ultimate. We have an example of a relation with the United States, where president Nawrocki meets Donald Trump, while the ruling camp, which in the past defined Trump in unfavorable words, will not be able to build good relations with specified a White House. This competence dispute will proceed until the Constitution is amended in this respect or until the fresh constitution clearly determines that the competence in question belongs solely to the government or solely to the President.
This is not a fresh phenomenon. A akin conflict, between the president and the Prime Minister de facto from 1 political camp, occurred more than 20 years ago between Leszek Miller and Aleksandr Kwasniewski. This shows that the dispute does not gotta arise solely from the co-habitation of the 2 fighting camps, but may besides happen within the same formation. This problem has only intensified in the current crisis and sooner or later it will force us to change our constitution
VB: Finally, in a fewer sentences, what should be the main rule of effective Polish east Policy in the coming years?
WK: First to think about business, and only later on to think about Resentiments and Messianic politics. We must reject the reasoning taken out of the romanticist era – it never worked and will never come back. We must think of Ukraine as a key and equivalent partner in the safety sphere, not as a "younger brother". On the another hand, we must not forget Belarus as an highly crucial component of our security. If we let it to become even more dependent on Russia, we will make a problem not only for ourselves but besides for the Baltic States. The basis is to think about business and, most importantly, to yet make a long-term imagination of abroad policy in the East.
We invitation you to scope for the book “Between Bug and Truth” by Bartłomiej Wypartowicz and Wojciech Kozioł – many of the themes of our conversation find a broader improvement in it.
Wojciech Kozioł – postgraduate of the University of Silesia in the fields of National and global safety and Political discipline with the specialization “Modern global Relations”. Passionate of past and global relations.
Follow the website of the Institute and our social media – in the following editions of the “World under tension” cycle we will return to key topics for Poland and the region. The planet doesn't halt being power.
