Yesterday, i.e. on 6 June 2024 he died from wounds sustained during the direct defence of the Polish border a young 21-year-old soldier of the Polish Army. We honor and praise him, at the same time expressing our condolences to the family, friends and soldiers of the 1st Warsaw Armored Brigade.
On this tragic day, on the media, they reported an event from the turn of March and April of that year, during which Polish soldiers from the 1st Warsaw Armored Brigade fired informing shots in defence of the border, for which they were detained and charged.
The assessment of the situation leads to reflection:
- One of the catalogue of targets conducted since 2021 by Russia and Belarus of hybrid operations based on the forced migration mechanics is the binding of as many divisions and units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to protective and police activities on the east border of Poland.
- Adversaries' activity carried out below the threshold of war caused the engagement of crucial forces of the Polish Army from many units of SZ RP. specified a condition forces indirectly to draw soldiers distant from training and training, involving considerable financial resources while besides imposing on armed forces police duties. It is worth emphasizing that the Polish Army is an armed formation, qualified to carry out military activities based on kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities of destroying the resources and forces of a surviving opponent alternatively than carrying out police prevention activities.
- From the very beginning of the operation there was a legal problem involving the usage of weapons by soldiers. If the state of safety of the border requires the engagement of the most crucial and strongest force in the state – that is, the military, then the widely understood state apparatus should act appropriately to the operational circumstances and with all the consequences. The soldier's tool is simply a combat weapon, so his commitment to border surveillance processes must be linked to clear rules for the usage of this weapon and a legally developed model for ensuring safety for soldiers.
- Another challenge is the expectations of the Polish SZ to apply direct coercion measures. The military is not a police formation. Soldiers who are rules (except for example soldiers of the Military Gendarmerie) are not trained to usage these measures, and the introduction into the training strategy practically throughout the SZ (because of the scale of engagement of sub-units of the WP) of rules and methods of utilizing means of direct coercion will distract soldiers from basic and full-time training – and the fundamental intent of preparing soldiers to carry out war activities.
- Since the beginning of the Russian-Belarusian hybrid operation, the state, decision-makers (no substance the political tone) loses this crisis in the information domain. At present, there is no strategical communication aimed at society, soldiers, officers, officials, which would mimic the manipulation and destabilisation activities carried out by the Russian and Belarusian influence apparatus. but for the engagement of the non-governmental sector in Poland, there are no efficient processes to prevent misinformation.
- In view of these facts, we soldiers, officers and members of the Association call on all decision-makers – regardless of political options – not to escalate the interior conflict that the opponent is counting on and start working on systemic solutions. If we consider that the aim of the opponent is to weaken the safety of Poland, weaken the defence potential, bind the forces and resources of the Polish Army at the border is correct, then the decision-makers should take into account the objectives of the adversaries and carry out border safety processes in a way that avoids the enemy's hidden objectives. Border safety should be ensured primarily by enhanced police and border defender forces in the armed forces' prepared backroom in case the safety situation requires the usage of their combat capabilities. Border safety besides requires an increase in non-kinetic measures specified as LRAD systems (acoustic) or microwave systems and intellectual and information activities.
Management Board of the Association
