There has been simplification in Poland for years: “Who enters into relations with Russia is pro-Russian”. specified logic is simply a weapon for political accusations. However, in matters of strategical importance, specified as gas agreements, it is crucial that economical decisions are primarily the ones that make dependence.
So it is worth bringing together 2 issues that disagree in scale and consequences, but they show the same mechanism: erstwhile the state signs a long-term energy agreement, there is an area of influence that can later be utilized in politics.
Julia Tymoshenko and the Gazprom Agreement (2009)
In 2009, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Julia Tymoshenko She signed a gas supply agreement with Gazprom. The agreement was widely criticised as unfavourable to Ukraine, primarily due to the price and conditions that increased Ukraine's dependence on Russia. In 2011, Tymoshenko was sentenced to 7 years in prison for abuse of power in connection with this agreement. The judgement was judged by many observers as politically motivated, but the fact remains: the agreement was incriminating for the state and the political consequences were very serious.
Waldemar Pawlak and the Gazprom Agreement (2009)
At the same time in Poland decisions were made, which are present assessed as detrimental to the state's energy interest. In 2009, Poland signed a contract with Gazprom, which in public communicative is presented as an "unfavourable" agreement, especially in the context of prices and long-term commitments.
But the most crucial thing is that specified agreements are not a "political gesture". These are economical agreements that can be concluded with any supplier: Russia, Norway or Qatar. The question is not, then, ‘Is the agreement signed with Russia?’ but ‘What were the conditions, what was the price and what consequences for Poland?’. If the agreement was unfavourable, its effects affect citizens regardless of who the partner was.
Of course, the fact of signing a contract with a Russian supplier fits into the Polish anti-Russian rhetoric, which in Polish politics intensified after the Smolensk disaster, was sustained due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the escalation of the war in Ukraine since 2022. However, at a time erstwhile Waldemar Pawlak negotiated contract terms between 2009 and 2010, relations between Poland and Russia were not as tense as today. These were the years erstwhile Prime Minister Donald Tusk and representatives of the Polish government maintained relations with Moscow, and energy policy was an crucial component of bilateral cooperation.
In October 2010, the PO-PSL government, whose key negotiator on the Polish side was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Waldemar Pawlak, signed an annex to the Jamaican contract expanding the supply of Russian gas to 10 billion cubic metres a year until the end of 2022 and extending the anticipation of gas transmission through Poland even until 2045. The study of the ultimate Chamber of Control showed that the Polish side entered into negotiations without a negotiated strategy and without a real desire to get equivalent advantages for concessions against Gazprom; Minister Pawlak and PGNiG did not effort to get more favourable conditions, including a simplification in price.
The NIK study besides indicated that the government agreed that the Jamaican contract would be valid until 2037, even though it was previously said that the agreement should expire in 2014 due to the possible of alternate gas sources specified as the Świnoujście LNG terminal or Baltic tube plans. This extension of the contract was considered by NIK to be a crucial negotiating error, which lost Poland the chance of early independency from the supply of fuel from Russia.
During the negotiations, Pawlak sought to conclude contracts as rapidly as possible, presenting to the Council of Ministers projects not agreed with another ministries and pushing for their immediate approval, which was besides assessed in the study as part of unprepared negotiations.
Reflection
In the light of these facts, there is simply a question that should be made clear and without ideological raids: was Pawlak simply a passive contractor of the strategical decisions of the PO-PSL government, or his actions, in the absence of more favourable provisions and incomplete usage of the negotiating capacity, should he be regarded as his own political responsibility? And if so, why did no 1 effort to formally explain these decisions in the light of criminal work or at least deeper public debate?
When publicists and journalists began asking PSL politicians about Waldemar Pawlak's work for the gas contract, organization representatives sometimes reacted nervously. In an interview on Radio Zet Deputy talker of the Sejm Piotr Zgorzelski He decidedly cut himself off from the charges against Pawlak, saying, "Please separate yourself from Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and do not prosecute the policy of Law and Justice against this man all the time, due to the fact that Waldemar Pawlak did nothing incorrect against the Polish reason of the state."
This reaction shows not only that the subject is inactive alive in the public debate, but besides how PSL politicians effort to close Pawlak's responsibility. This message has become widely cited in the media as an example of a fellow party's defence against criticism of the energy contract.
This impact mechanics is not limited to energy. Similarly, the force of countries on Poland in another policy areas is working. A good example is the issue of the 2018 IPN Act. It was then that Poland was under strong force from Israel, who considered the provisions of the Act unacceptable and demanded changes. As a result, Poland had to retreat from the most controversial records and decision on to negotiations.
Read: “The judaic lobby prevailed. The Sejm amended the IPN Act".
This shows that countries can influence not only through gas, but besides through historical policy, diplomacy and global pressure. Thus, if individual present speaks of “prorossiness” as the main allegation, it is worth recalling that dependence and influence can have many sources and take different forms.
The comparison between Tymoshenko and Pawlak is not intended to indicate who is “more pro-Russian”. It is something simpler and more important: work for decisions that make dependence and an influence tool.
Gas agreements are not "politics", it is an economy. But the economy has political consequences. If the agreement is unfavourable, its effects affect the state for years. In the case of Ukraine, the consequences were dramatic and the trial against Tymoshenko became a symbol of political settlements. In Poland, akin decisions did not face legal work and stay part of public disputes.
So if individual wants to talk about “prorossiness” today, they should start with facts and responsibilities. Not easy labels.
→ M. Barrel
25.01.2026
• graphics: barma Tribunal newspaper
• read also: ‘10 years after Euromaidan. Ukrainian fire’
