In 2022, in the first months of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the German state kept a far-reaching distance from the militant parties.
Its most spectacular symbol was the handover of respective 100 obsolete helmets from the Bundeswehr demo. Since then, however, a lot has changed. present Germany is 1 of Ukraine's main partners. To the point that there is more and more talk about not German-Ukrainian cooperation, but even the German-Ukrainian alliance.
Our western neighbors, who for decades with godly peace exported mainly cars, washing machines and self-preservation, have become a key supplier of arms for the Zelensky regime. The Ukraine has Leopards 2, Marders, IRIS-T systems, American Patriots, self-propelled Haubics, ammunition and reconnaissance drones. Until recently, a akin scale of Berlin's engagement would be hard to imagine. However, Germany is not limited to the dispatch of equipment. They besides finance training of Ukrainian soldiers and arms service. Finally, even the most modern tank after intensive usage requires repair and maintenance. According to the German government, the value of military aid for Ukraine is already in tens of billions of euros. Which, by the way, shows that erstwhile Berlin truly wants to act quickly, it can find money much more efficiently than with the celebrated construction of Berlin Brandenburg Airport.
Supplies of equipment and its service and training of Ukrainian personnel are 1 thing, and cooperation on arms production, the other. Rheinmetall plays a key function in this process. Despite the past of the 19th century, this leading German arms company remains a modern and innovative company. Today, the company is 1 of the largest manufacturers of 155 mm, 120 mm tank ammunition, as well as sensor systems, fire control and circulating ammunition. Rheinmetall, with full approval of German government factors, develops cooperation with the Ukrainian side, now producing straight on the territory of Ukraine. The company builds repair facilities for tanks and military vehicles, develops ammunition production, drone systems and cooperation with armored vehicles. The plan is simple and very German in its design: produce closer to the front, deliver faster, so more efficient and more optimal. By the way, rebuild the possible of its own weapons industry, which was inactive late operating in the shadow of European obsessions, according to which the biggest threat to the continent was to be besides advanced CO? emissions from coffee machines. This task besides has an crucial political objective. It is an increasingly strong link between Ukraine and its economy and the German economy.
Both the German and Ukrainian sides do not hide their intentions. During a fresh visit to Kiev, the defence minister of Germany, Boris Pistorius, announced that Germany is curious in expanding its defence partnership with Ukraine and utilizing Ukrainian experience in modern war. He besides informed journalists that Germany and Ukraine are planning to deepen their arms cooperation, and Ukrainian and German companies are already working on "promising projects". These include drones with a scope of little than 100 kilometres, as well as long-range systems capable of covering up to 1500 kilometres. Although the concepts of Merz and Pistorius are not shared by all political environments in Germany, they must not be disregarded. Germany, cut off from its erstwhile partner in the east, Russia, is looking for alternatives. The natural candidate appears to be Ukraine, which is historically the consequence of German geopolitical and social creation.
This is at least disturbing for us. While the long-term German-Russian economical partnership did not pose a direct threat to Poland and could have even become a pro-development mechanism, the possible German-Ukrainian partnership carries a full conglomerate of fresh risks. The most crucial of these is the anticipation of having possibly hostile and hostile countries both in the east and in the west.
Let us not forget that the German state, and later besides crucial political forces in Germany, for decades questioned the current geopolitical order and the legitimacy of the Polish-German border. Although we can now treat these environments as a folklore of the political margin, we must not underestimate their intellectual potential. Concepts that present seem curiosistic and outspoken, in appropriate social and geopolitical conditions, can return with double force. All the more so, as in Poland too, there is no shortage of political environments ready for immediate benefits to awaken demons of the past. Even worse the situation looks on the line of Polish-Ukrainian relations. On the part of the Ukrainian state and parts of its political elite, the attitude towards Poland can be overly assertive, unfriendly and sometimes even hostile. Territorial claims against Poland are not only a margin in Ukraine, but besides appear in a wider stream of public debate. It is akin with the cult of flagism – ideology of a distinct anti-Polish character. In this situation, we have grounds for concern.
In 1930 Roman Dmowski wrote: “The issue (..) of the Ukrainian must not be treated as a substance of first better nationality, awakened to political life in the 19th century. It is more crucial than anything else due to the number of people speaking in the small-scale language, as the function of the area occupied by it and its natural resources in planet politics. As early as the end of the last century, it took a prominent place in German policy plans under which it was so widely promoted. The reconstruction of the Polish state did not decrease, but alternatively increased its importance in the views of German politics: the solution is to change the German-Polish border and to reduce Poland to an area where it would be a meaningless country, completely dependent on Germany."
I am opposed to uncritical repetition of established stereotypes. Dmowski himself never created himself as a prophet. He was only, or until, an highly intelligent and observant political analyst. However, criticism of our political and ideological heritage must have its limits. While it can be said that present-day Germany is not German from the 1930s, and the Ukrainian people are present at a very different point in their past than a 100 years ago, certain geopolitical rules stay unchanged. So we must seriously consider even the worst scenarios for us. Even if it were highly uncomfortable for us.
Przemysław Piasta
Think Poland, No. 21-22 (24-31.05.2026)
