Death of maneuver? – about “revolution” on the battlefield in Ukraine

Introduction

Droneization and sensoryisation of the battlefield led to a forced process of centrifugaling troops in case of static fighting. The crucial presence of reconnaissance and impact elements prevents the accumulation of forces for larger military operations. The attack on the battlefield is increasingly lacking an crucial component of mass, and this is besides associated with the accumulation of anti-tank agents on the battlefield. Droneization changes the battlefield, but war in Ukraine should not be regarded as oracles, as future wars will be waged. The current war itself is simply a hybrid of planet wars in the 20th century, as well as modern technological solutions known for wars in the 21st century. In the author's opinion, the solutions presently being tested and implemented during the war in Ukraine are not RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) – a revolution in military matters, or alternatively an evolution, the most effective usage of presently available solutions and the democratisation and economicisation of the battlefield. It is crucial to draw conclusions from the current conflict, but it is not essential to go to extremes and to treat this war as a complete determinant of the appearance of future wars. It is the same mistake that analysts have made by drawing conclusions from the Spanish civilian War 1936-1939. Due to the deficiency of crucial influence of tanks on the wartime activities and their sensitivity to anti-tank agents, it has been reported that they will not prove crucial on the battlefield.

Operation in the Semiposition War

There is no peculiar reason why the current war in Ukraine took its peculiar form. The main reason here is the characteristics of the fighting parties, then the capabilities of those parties [1]. Both sides are able to hold their positions, cover the flanks and hold the debris at tactical level. Problems begin on an operational scale, a long front line, many inflammatory points, and both sides' reconnaissance and impact capabilities make it impossible to accomplish the schwerpoint. Removing tactical relationships from another sections of the front in order to accomplish an advantage and break the defence elsewhere is simply a advanced risk. For this reason the gaps on the front line are frequently patched and not exploited by either side. In addition, penetration attacks are costly, so the usage of breaches is hampered, especially in the failed Ukrainian offensive in Zaporozh in 2023 [2]. Ultimately, the robust defensive positions utilized by both parties prevent the effective usage of conventional means of impact.

Conducting operations with considerable force in the environment of modern technological conflict is greatly hampered by:

1. The accumulation of sensors and effectors on the battlefield,
2. Drone the battlefield,
3. Economizing the conduct of strikes with ammunition circulating at operational and tactical level,
4. Development of radio-electronic war equipment – both offensive and defensive,
5. Economics and accumulation of portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft agents.

Russian regiments of motorized shooters are presently losing their maneuver space. The activity of these units is frequently reduced to traffic, masking and endurance and harm in a favourable situation [3]. The concentration of subdivisions is greatly hampered by susceptibility to deep impacts. The classical concept of manoeuvre is replaced by dislocation, treating the maneuver as its subset [4]. The mass itself is besides replaced by concentration of abilities. In contrast to the classical principles of war art about the pursuit of schwerpoint (domination in mass in a given operational direction), the advantage is sought in terms of capabilities that mimic and replace the classically understood mass. The collapse of classical mechanized operations occurred between 2022 and 2023. There was a control to position clashes. After the fiasco of mechanized operations, the Russians mention to the known for 100 years infantry infiltration tactics. The maneuver itself goes to lower levels of operations. The maneuver did not die, but it changed its form, adapting to the conflict.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the specificity of the war in Ukraine is caused by many external factors (outside the battlefield) preventing operations from being carried out with crucial forces to break the front lines. These factors include among others:

1. Problems in replenishing forces (both surviving and armored vehicles) on both sides of the armed conflict,
2. Aversion to the demolition of forces and measures in ineffective attacks (e.g. in the case of Russia, reluctance to send the latest vehicles to Ukraine).

The very transition to position clashes resulted from failure by sub-units of capacity to make force in a given operational direction. This was due to the very nature of the fighting to exhaustion.

In the area of tactics, tiny infantry troops known from the end of planet War I returned to the battlefield. It is worth recalling the basic principles of Prussian tactics of tiny infantry troops (Sturmtruppen), which were laid out in Erwin Romml's work “Piechota attacks” [5]:

1. A maneuver more crucial than a frontal attack (instead of hitting the most defended place, you should look for weak points and step against the opponent's wings or back),
2. Surprise and initiative (the attack should be rapid, abrupt and moving towards disorganization of the opponent before it can react),
3. The independency of the branches and the initiative of the lower-level commanders (small infantry groups receive targets but are free to act — it is about flexibility and pace, not rigid plan),
4. Disperse in attack (instead of mass columns — small, busy groups, hard to fire),
5. Use of the site (Rommel emphasized the continuous usage of the shield and shield – ditches, elevations, trees and a secretive approach),
6. Precise reconnaissance (before the attack occurs, it is crucial to accurately identify the position of the opponent and its weaknesses),
7. Short, violent strikes (attacks made rapidly to prevent the opponent from conducting an effective counterattack) [6].

However, like 100 years ago, there are problems with fire preparation of the attack, due to the short waiting period for counterbattery fire and accumulation of sensors. In direct contact, infantry fights undergo the Renaissance, forgotten over the past decades of asymmetric fights. The Russians focus on maneuvering and achieving a fire advantage in a given direction [7].

It is besides crucial that most of the problems of the Ukrainian battlefield are unique to the semiposition battlefield characteristic of Ukraine. In the case of manoeuvring battle, the usefulness of FPV drones to fibre optic cable decreases, due to the staticity of the command and drone control stations and the limited scope of fibre optic cables. The standard FPV drones will be more useful in the maneuvering battle, but they are easier to jam. In the case of a static front line, the usage of circular ammunition of this kind is much easier, allowing the separation of the “death zone” of drones, keeping constant work in the air of reconnaissance drones as well as impact drones, and setting and securing command and control stations. From the Russian point of view, this “revolution” is not a coherent, linear process. It does not control and manage change [8]. It's about adaptation and contraptation.

The current war provides lessons that maneuvering on circumstantial directions of action, aiming to gain the advantage in this episode, undergoes many operations of smaller units centered in a given area [9]. The structure of the units themselves is besides changed, alternatively of the full battery, frequently operating a single drum, supported by a reconnaissance drone. Russian military analysts offer smaller task force groups alternatively of large operating units.

Democracy of reconnaissance measures and their integration with sensors and effectors importantly reduced the time from mark detection to demolition [10]. Each second on the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) is key, both sides are striving to velocity up the cycle by posting tasks to a lower level [11]. In specified a war, the superiority of command based on Mission Command and Auftragstaktik over centralised russian models is evident. The ability to strike in the back of the opponent and to affect up to 70 km from the front line frequently prevents effective accumulation of forces for operations and the creation of debris. Decentralised defense, frequently based on opposition points, is promoted.

The Ukrainian offensive in Zaporozh in 2023 did not accomplish the expected results for many reasons. The Russian army in 2023 drew any conclusions from the defeats of 2022. Ukrainian units encountered pre-prepared defensive positions (Surovikina line), besides failed to mask operations. The Russians kept drones in the air which acted as an anti-surprise ability, preventing this effective approach to position. An example of this situation is the June 6 event, where over the village of small Tomaczek there were 3 Russian unmanned Orlan-10s, which detected a Ukrainian effort to penetrate the minefield, and then redirected the impact of artillery, FPV and helicopters [12]. The exploratory and sewage capabilities of the opponent's movements (due to many minefields), the disproportionate engagement of forces and resources and the deficiency of training proved crucial to the failure of this offensive [13]. Ukrainians drew conclusions from this defeat, which was applied in Kursk operations. Despite the democratization of ISR funds, an interesting example of erstwhile the operation was successful in the first phase was the operation of Kursk. Operational safety was very strict, the commanders of the Tactical Unions had to sign peculiar papers and the Syrian General took over the individual command of the operation [14]. Since then, both sides have not achieved crucial success in operations. Surprise is simply a key aspect of the success of offensives and military operations. The analysis of the 2 offensive operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2023 and 2024 provides an application – for an effective offensive operation on a modern battlefield it is crucial to mask the operation closely and to “mask” the operation.

Is the war in Ukraine RMA?

The main presumption of RMA is to change the conduct of war so that returning to the pre-existing state is impossible. Technological and tactical solutions utilized during the war in Ukraine are not fresh solutions. They are only implemented in a mass and economical way. The war in Ukraine is an innovation laboratory, formed mostly in a bottom-up way, responding to the demands of the front. The conflict drones themselves are frequently complementary goods along with artillery. For example – the defensive position hidden in the forest field, falls the artillery storm destroying the iris, then drones enter and precisely destruct the targets. The synergy effect between precision ammunition and indirect fire achieves astonishing results, but this is the consequence of the long-term evolution of reconnaissance and destruction.

The Nature of Future War

The future war of the Russian Federation, depending on which area will be inflamed, may take on a different character, but due to NATO's doctrine of air-land war as part of multi-domain operations, and to the political-military intentions of the Russian Federation, the likely nature of the future war will be maneuverable, at least in the first stages of the conflict. According to the Natovian principles “speed, surprise,violence of action”, offensive, fire and maneuvering capabilities and C4ISR capabilities will be crucial. In the event of a future war, artillery will one more time origin the most losses, at least in the maneuvering part [15]. In the current nature of fighting, unmanneds act as a substitute for artillery fire, the effect of which is hard to replace – as the 20th century conflicts indicate.

The possible war between the Russian Federation and NATO would mean a clash with an opponent with a technological advantage at a very different level than the erstwhile opponents. There'd be a breach of the fighting patterns. Russia would one more time gotta adapt to the fresh conditions of the battlefield if it could last the first phase of losses and disorganization [16]. likewise the situation in Ukraine, after the first phase of losses and retreats in 2022, the Russian Federation had time from 2023 to 2025 to adapt industry, tactics and armed forces. In the event of a NATO conflict, there may not be time to learn and adapt due to the fact that their model is based on mass alternatively than on flexible command and adaptation [17]. In the future possible conflict of the Russian Federation troops will most likely prevail in a given theatre of operations, it will not be possible to wage war to exhaustion in this case.

The failure statistic (in peculiar from drones) by both parties in the war in Ukraine do not mean that in the future conflict the failure ratio will be similar. It is likely that artillery will take the first place again, especially in a situation of aggressive maneuvering war. Drones will become inseparable with artillery, they will act symbiotic [18].

The successful operation in an environment rich in resources belonging to the Russian reconnaissance and impact complex will be possible in situations where these measures are neutralised temporarily and locally. A maneuvering window appears. The synergies between WRE (radioelectronic war) and another anti-drone capabilities are crucial [19]. It will be crucial to mask the intention to carry out the maneuvers in an efficient manner. Surprise is inactive possible in the current battlefield, but requires a different approach than before.

Manoeuvring is not the other of exhaustion itself but of war to exhaustion [20]. The usage of maneuvering and fire is crucial to the task of overwhelming enemy losses to search ways to make peace, favours smaller, better trained and equipped armed forces. Countries with “mass” at a given theatre of war will like war to exhaustion. The maneuver is not conditioned by the environment, but it is the actor who should form the operating environment in his favour.

Recommendations

Key lessons in conducting the modern maneuvering war supply action in Ukraine from 2022 to 2023. The effectiveness of specified activities is crucial for the joint arms exercise [21]. Joint arms training should incorporate capabilities from each spectrum of multi-domain operation (MDO). The war in Ukraine is an innovation laboratory, but the implementation of all technological innovations will not consequence in increased capacity in the area of conducting operations. For the Polish Armed Forces, it is crucial to increase the frequency of field exercises at each level, and especially to focus on combined arms. The construction of the concept of neutralisation of the Russian reconnaissance and impact complex will be crucial for future operations. Drones (like any weapon) are susceptible to a number of inconveniences – limited burden capacity, the request to keep a team, the ability to shoot down (in contrast to artillery missiles) and weather and terrain conditions.

Summary

Changes in military and operational art should not be considered as revolutions in military matters, but alternatively evolution by means known from erstwhile wars. The conflict in Ukraine is strictly abrasion and semiposition, which encourages the usage of creative and technologically advanced means of destruction. This does not mean that the next wars will look precisely the same. The current war is in this case an “outlier” in the martial arts. Talking about the death of a maneuver is an exaggeration. There has been a change in its form, placing on the lower levels of fighting conduct and maneuvering a gripping and flexible defence [22]. The semiposition character of the current war can only be a break before moving on to the next (maneuver) stage.

Bibliography

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2. Ibid.
3. Col. dir. Maciej Korowaj, ANALYSIS OF study – "A Killed Space. Revolution in military matters in Ukraine", X, 21.10.2025, link: https://x.com/Maciej Korovaj/status/1980485932720987?t= imKa0f7BTVRcNBubl6 w&s=19 [accessed: 15.11.2025]
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5. Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks, Tetragon, Warsaw 2019
6. Ibid.
7. Андрей Маркин Обобщение боевого СВО до до 2024 года, Moscow 2025
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11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
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15. Ibid.
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17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
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