Russia is not threatening the existence of Poland or its fundamental interests today. The Polish-Russian reset and de-escalation of tensions in east Europe are in the interests of both countries.
Historical fields of dispute between Poland and Russia were settled after planet War II and after the dissolution of the USSR.
Incompetent elites
The elites of the III Polish Republic have shown that they are incapable to see key changes that bring back to favors, specified as a performance of powers, a projection of forces or a region of influence. The thought and intellectual horizon reaches no further than the goal of anchoring Poland in the institutions of the collective West, while respecting its own political and intellectual independence.
In the context of Polish-Russian relations, our elite of power and leading commentators have consciously reduced Poland's sovereignty to service the interests of the “eastern flank” of the imagined collective republic of the West. This failure is peculiarly exposed now that Donald Trump it does not intend to face various spells, specified as those with inviolable borders in Europe. Meanwhile, the geopolitical reflection over the Vistula river replaces simple slogans, and this besides applies to relations with Russia. From Warsaw perspective, relations with Moscow require a thorough revision not only in the name of reconciliation with reality, but above all in order to specify the Polish national interest again. This will not be done by the current elite of the III Republic, which already has sufficiently compromised its attitudes, including against the background of the Ukrainian War.
A thorough revision of Polish abroad policy is all the more essential due to the fact that we are observing the dusk of American presence in Europe, and possibly besides the beginning of NATO erosion. Bankruptcy suffered atlantism, and contrary to the dreams of local messianists and patriots alleged Intermarine, the Russian Federation did not break up.
From the West to the East – and back
Even during planet War II, the Grand 3 of the victorious powers decided to decision the Polish state to the west, while accepting Curzon's line as a postwar Polish-Soviet border. Not by accident the most zealous supporter of far-reaching territorial growth in Poland at the expense of the defeated The German was alone Josif Stalin. The russian dictator, yet uncertain of decisions in the area of later GDR, sought to extend the scope of the satellite Polish state, and thus the east block. This was peculiarly the case by the British, who can add to the extended list of "deservations" for Poles the pushing for us a territorial minimum programme in the west, so that only the post-war east bloc does not get besides strong. The paradox is that the failure of the east Borders and the annexation of the Recovered Lands led to the shift of the state's borders to the west, but in a geopolitical dimension it placed Poland in the east. In the name of combating russian influence in Europe in September 1946 in German Stuttgart American Secretary of State James Byrnes In turn, it will undermine the scope of post-war territorial achievements of the Polish state. Thus it will become essential to warrant the Polish western border before the revisionist tendencies of the national Republic of Germany, or alleged Western Germany. At the same time, in the substance of defence of the state of possession in the west, the People's Poland will nevertheless represent the national interest. ‘In this respect, the interest of the Polish people and the peculiar interest of Polish communists overlapd" – noted Tomasz Gabiś (quoted for Dr. J. Siemiątowski).
The unification of Germany in 1990, and actually the absorption of the territory of the GDR by the German national Republic, ended with a comparatively soft landing for Poland. It was under the influence of the USA and the UK that the united Germans were forced to confirm the existing Polish-German border and to declare it binding. Poland passed comparatively painlessly from 1 block to another, retaining territorial conquests from the time of belonging to the then competitive socialist camp. The interests of the British and Polish interests coincided exceptionally. London was then not curious in the existence of a strong and united German state on the European continent, and the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher She even objected to joining the GDR to the West Germany. However, in the face of the evacuation of the russian Union from east Europe and the subsequent self-solvation of this country, the existence of the unprotected GDR lost its right to exist. The 3rd Republic inherited territory after the Polish People's Republic, and in the face of the liquidation of the USSR gained fresh neighbours in the east and north: Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.
Poland wins with Germany
Such a extremist shift of territory to the west is simply a fundamental, epochal ethno-geopolitical change. The line of Odra and Nysa Lusatia, which then runs west of Szczecin and Świnoujście, demarcates the states and Polish and German elements, which is the fulfillment of the wildest dreams of many Polish Western thinkers. It puts an end to at least 600 years of German force to the East, thus depriving any German redevelopment of cultural base. He besides rewards the hard work and blood shed for Poland to scope back to the old Piastov lands: starting with activists of pre-war Polish Republic in Germany, on Polish soldiers of the east Front, including Kołobrzeg and Berlin conquerors. The fact that the 80th anniversary of this large event will most likely pass without echo proves the façade of the 3rd Polish country – states from dictatorship and Styrofoam. The Liberal Left will, in the course of the discourse of the "deconstruction of national myths", talk about "the alleged Recovered Lands", and the right in the name of "anti-communism" will destruct even the local monuments from the times of the Polish People's Republic, which attest about the Polishity of these lands without ideological burden. erstwhile Poland yet won with someone, and after talking about a long-term conflict virtually to death and life, it turns out that this triumph does not impress mainly on Poles themselves. So it cannot be amazing that we do not realize our own past as a nation and that we cannot play global politics. Jęrzej Giertych (grandfather of the infamous Roman), national activist, diplomat of the Second Polish Republic, associate of the Polish-bolshevik War and the 1939 defensive war, and later post-war emigration author emphasized for a change: "It is actual that the Polish-German dispute was settled in a triumphal way for Poland as a consequence of planet War II. The war with Germany Poland won after all, just look at the map to find out. There is no longer a free city of Gdańsk or the Pomeranian ‘corridor’, which so lay salt in the eyes of Germany both of the Weimar and Nazi era. The Polish Baltic coast extends from Frombork to Świnoujście, Poland has returned not only politically but even ethnically to borders close to borders Boleslaw Chrobry, Wrocław and Szczecin became fresh Polish cities”.
This does not mean that Germany has abandoned the subject of the vassalization of Poland. In economical terms, Poland is part of the German surviving space, and our western neighbours have besides skillfully supported the extinction of competitive sectors of the Polish economy (sugar industry, shipbuilding industry), while besides mastering a crucial section of the Polish media market. Pushing Poland to face Russia is besides a vital German interest – under the pretext of the construction of “Międzymorza” actually arises Mitteleuropa. The pro-German phrase of Kiev after obtaining all possible resources from Poland reflects the old fact – Ukraine in the form designed as anti-Polish, as anti-Russian, is doomed to be Berlin's client.
New border with Russia
Meanwhile, it is crucial for the fresh position of ethno-geopolitical Poland to destruct deadly German East Prussia. It was Jędrzej Giertych mentioned as an worker of the Polish consulate at the time in German Olsztyn describes in his account of the expedition in this state her capital – Królewiec. This is accompanied by a bitter reflection: “The first thought of a Pole in Królewiec is the depression that specified a German center could have been created here [...] Yet Poland allowed this. We walk on the Princess with a tight heart and full of amazement: why specified a German nest here in this place, so far to the east behind the Vistula? [...] The present is all German. The King feels unquestionably isolated from his German mother, but nevertheless he is the undeniable stronghold of the German man." – read in position Behind the northern cordon published in 1934. “Many more problems will come to Poland from this fortress” – he accurately prophesied about Gierty.
World War II swept the pre-war Königsberg from the face of the earth, turning it into a sea of ruins. The city never rose from them again, even erased its historical name, and the King became Kaliningrad, receiving rather repulsive russian superficiality. Officially Prussia as a political unit was liquidated in 1947, putting an end to the deadly German navis over our country. The full German population was replaced by Slavs – mainly Russians from the interior of the USSR.
Meanwhile, while Stalin has maximized Poland's territorial growth in the west for strategical reasons, he manipulated the Polish-Soviet border in the erstwhile East Prussia for the same reasons in any way and unfortunately for us. Poles were rapidly deprived of illusions regarding the future of Królewiec himself, besides cutting off access to Piławska Strait, and the Polish administration evacuated from the border of Pruska Iławka (modern Bagrationovsk) and Gierdaw (Żelyeznodoróżna) who had to hand over the USSR. In view of these circumstances, it is not possible to lose sight of the fundamental fact of the geopolitical moving of this area – from Berlin to Moscow, which is the consequence of the post-war transfer of territory to the russian Union. Through the city we are adjacent to a comparatively close culturally and linguistically Slavic population, which in this case is an evenement in past never before unprecedented. It is an chance which the Republic of Poland does not even effort to use.
Meanwhile, the communication of erstwhile East Prussia with its current metropolis no longer requires transit through the territory of Poland – the pre-war problem of the "corridor" from Królewiec to Berlin disappeared besides in the context of the distance of modern Kaliningrad towards far Moscow or Petersburg. besides for the inhabitants of this Russian circuit, Poles neighbouring them are the closest geographically and culturally people. A glance at the map shows that it is asked that the Republic of Poland be active in this territory – that it should be a affirmative mention point for local Russians as a trading partner, a place of tourist travel, the usage of services, buying with us, so that learning Polish there is both fashionable and necessary, so that it is popular to discover Polish roots or to know the works of Polish culture, so that it is profitable to settle in Polish currency. However, alternatively of making ambitious and real plans, Polish public opinion is afraid with the ideas of armed taking Kaliningrad from the atomic power, preferably to pass it on to the Czech Republic, Lithuania or – o, horror – Germany.
Divided Homeland
The most crucial national interest of Poland in the area of centuries-old rivalry with Russia is the endurance and improvement of Polishness on the historical East Borders. In the III Poland it is not so obvious, and its ruling elite does not treat the Poles there and national heritage as a serious obligation. However, the Hungarian people have experienced a akin tragedy in the past of the country, losing their “times” not only east but surrounding territory from all sides. After more than a 100 years, however, this did not change the perception of the lost area as a native land. The example of the Madzers is instructive and inspiring.
“There are frequently colored saints in the chapels. Who? Most frequently St. Stefan (...) The plaques on buildings mean historical tenants. Petőfi, Jókay, Kossuth... Coronation Cathedral. Whose? Primate Palace. What kind? You're talking from the altar. What way? Hungarian. There's 2 bullies in a steep alley, a bunch of... What's the usage of boys? Hungarian. What's the street talking about? In Hungarian’ – in 1938, Bratislava was characterized by a writer and national activist Wojciech Wasiutyński. This occurred 18 years after the division of the historical Kingdom of Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, which was the consequence of the Austro-Hungary lost war. For centuries the present Slovak capital was called by Poles with German Pressburg or Pożoń, which in turn is simply a phonetic reflection of the Hungarian name Pozsona. Despite the trace of Madzers in this city, it is inactive not called otherwise in Hungarian. The old cemeteries, where there are quite a few German and Hungarian gravestones, besides preserved old inscriptions in German and Hungarian on historical buildings.
However, travel in time and space to the non-existent Kingdom of Hungary maps can besides be made today. For example, in Berehow (hist. Bereg Saski, Hungarian Beregszász), Mukaczewski (Munkacz, Munkács), Czopie (Hungary Csap) or even in the capital of Uzhhoroda (Ungwar, Hungarian Ungvár) can be heard in Ukraine. This unforgivable language can be found in local pubs, pizzerias, football fields, sometimes on the boxes of property informing against guarding dogs, or on information about the ban on entering a given building. It is besides everywhere where the Hungarian government has designated a grant for the local community, for example, for the needs of a local school.
The impression of going back to times before 1920 can besides be referred to in the Romanian Kluż-Napoka, which of course besides has a historical Polish name taken over from the Hungarian – Koloshwar (Kolossvár). As in Zakarpacie, Hungarian is not only present on historical inscriptions, for example in churches. rather contemporary posters inform in Hungarian about various events, advocates with Hungarian surnames advertise on the streets of the city, in the temples you can encounter Hungarian weddings or baptisms. 1 of the places in the centre of Kluż, where only Hungarian can be heard, is an evenement, and the culinary specialty is, of course, stew. The bilingual signs of shops are besides not uncommon, and under your feet you can encounter the covers of old sewer wells with the Hungarian name of the city.
Even more intensely, the Magistrates mark their centuries-old presence in the centre of Romania, where the Shekler Country is located – where Hungarians can make an absolute majority. The Hymn of Sheklers, or Hungarian mountaineers from Carpathians, is solemnly sung during Parliament meetings in Budapest, while the characteristic blue-yellow-blue flag of Shekler adorns the facade of this unorthodox beauty of the building with the state flag. In turn, the border Romanian Oradea has even the second authoritative name in Hungarian – Nagyvárad is virtually the large Varadyn, historically named in Polish. Ethnically Hungarian is almost the full confederate belt of Slovakia, the interstate border frequently divides the same nation there. A akin situation occurs in northern Serbia, while Hungarian is 1 of 4 authoritative languages of the autonomous Serbian state of Voivodina.
This state of affairs – hundreds of thousands of autochthonous Madzers in neighbouring countries, in the case of Romania counted in millions – is simply a powerful commitment he has taken on. Viktor Orbán. This statesman did not hesitate erstwhile he said years ago that Hungary was bordering all over itself, which is an allusion that is very understandable. For the century of the partition of Hungary in Trianon in 2020 before Parliament in Budapest, a memorial site was created – a sidewalk leading from the street level down between the walls on which the names of many cities lost by the Kingdom of Hungary were engraved. At the end, already underground, a symbolic eternal fire burns. We can forget about the akin and equally easy commemoration of the east Borders in the heart of the Polish capital for now – it would offend countries that can number on peculiar immunity in Poland as components of the east flank.
Viktor Orbán gave us an example
However, there is simply a tearful sentimentalism to which in Poland the memory of the Borderlands is being tried. The Hungarian Citizenship Act of 20 August 2010, which was 1 of the first legal acts adopted by the fresh parliamentary majority, proved crucial. Adopting the bill just on 20 August erstwhile Hungarians mention St. Stefana, the patron of its historical kingdom, further emphasized the importance of this legislative change. The wizards surviving in neighbouring countries could begin applying for citizenship from 1 January 2011, but implementing acts were already prepared. In addition, the applicable ministries and government agendas were required to include in their budgets the yearly costs of implementing the fresh law.
The importance of citizenship for compatriots in neighbouring countries is underlined by the fact that the economical costs of implementing the law were not taken into account at the time, even though Hungary was facing an economical crisis compounded by the inept governments of the left. This part of government has institutionalised the national identity of Hungarians surviving in neighbouring states, which has stimulated the exchange of staff in diplomatic institutions to be better prepared to implement fresh provisions. In the following years, Orbán besides focused on investing in the improvement of football clubs among the “dresses” of the Madzers, while the diplomatic law of his compatriots did not fall from the agenda of relations with Kiev.
Orbán, therefore, made the local right of the state a "presumption" of his fellow countrymen from neighbouring countries, although he actually rewritten the Constitution of the Hungarian Nation – he defined it for all time as a community of fates across state borders, whose collective interest is this condition's synonym. Certainly, an interesting thought experimentation would be the situation in which a politician like Orbán governs a country with the possible of Poland with its strategical position for Ukrainian conflict. Who knows if present “Polish Orbán” would sit at 1 table with Trump and Vladimir Putin, jointly discussing the future form of Ukraine's borders – and not only the east ones.
Disasters of Polish east Policy
Meanwhile, the Polish east Policy is simply a hostage of the doctrinal anti-Russianity of the elites of the III Republic. The so-formatted priorities make it impossible to see in the Borders of the native territory, which would require certain responsibilities from politicians. In return, we have the appeasement of anti-Polish nationalisms of Lithuanians and Ukrainians or the maintenance by Polish taxpayers of an costly stick for those who for years neglect to overthrow in Belarus Aleksandra Lukashenka, then fleeing to Poland. However, if the Polish people are to return to the average course, or possibly erstwhile the size, then working lessons related to the Borderlands is simply a prerequisite for this.
"Dear Daddy, I'm going to the army today. I want to show that I will find the strength to service and endure. It's my work to go erstwhile I'm strong adequate and the troops are inactive missing to free Lvov. I've already done as much as I needed to. Jerzy’. These are the words 14 years old. Jurek Bitschan He said good-bye to his raising stepfather to volunteer in November 1918 to defend Lvov. In the same period Jurek is killed by a Ukrainian sphere in the area of Łychczak Cemetery, he is 1 of thousands of insignificant defenders of the city who have enrolled in past as Orlęta Lwowskie. Today, 1 of them rests in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw.
Poles in Lviv became a fistful today, after 1945 the russian power stripped the lions of their homeland and replaced them with Ukrainians. So they must talk the stones, and they will tell us a lot. The second Archbishopate on Polish lands is the Lvov Latin Cathedral, the close Hetmanian Wały adorns the theatre building designed by Zygmunt Gorgolewski, on the another hand, the walking position of the avenue closes an highly first monument Adam Mickiewicz of 1894. On the another hand, a tenement home stands at the Lviv marketplace Jakub Sobieski – the king's father John III, on the other floor, a burgher building owned by Baczewski, the makers of the celebrated Polish vodka. Here and there you can besides find better or worse preserved pre-war Polish inscriptions, street signs and another artifacts proving the Polish everyday life of the city before the tragedy of planet War II. In Lviv he was born Zbigniew Herbertwhose household lived in a building close Łychakovsky (“Every night I stand barefoot in front of the slammed gate of my city” – he wrote), the coach came from there besides Kazimierz Górski, the lions were composers Wojciech Kilar Or a world-famous author Stanisław Lem, the names of prominent Polish lions would occupy the full telephone book, distancing all another nationality.
It was yet in Lviv that a group of superb mathematicians met in the legendary “Scotka” cafe on Academica Street, headed by Stefan Banachwhich gave emergence to the celebrated Lviv Math School. The atmosphere of these meetings had to be unique, extraordinary minds bent over complex mathematical issues "at the cup" and not one. The city itself was sung and cheerful, created even a specific, joyful and carefree, though not always a legitimate way of being that we know by name baciara. This was all taken from us in 1945 by the russian Union. Or forever?
“Perhaps, but I wouldn’t be so certain due to the fact that I was diligently learning history, and past taught me, putting into my head that he doesn’t like anything that is ‘forever’ [...] past is unpredictable due to the fact that it is female. So don’t tell me that the Lions will never be ours again, due to the fact that anything else can happen.” – answered invaluable Waldemar Bald. “Lviv and Vilnius would like to chop back tanks and rockets, but I have no specified weaponry or political power, so I will do something else: I will sit on the river bank and calmly wait for the bodies of enemies to descend. In 50 years, in 100 winters, in 300 springs – sooner or later. I am as patient as past is unpredictable and inventive” – added the master pen. He did not gotta wait for decades, the corpses of the "enemies" flowed another year somewhere in the far steppe, although Lviv unfortunately will not give it to us.
However, East Crests are not only martyrdom and past enchanted in stone. Even if in Sopoćkiny in Grodzieże, we can hear Polish language in public space from local residents, although it is not common in the full region. It is different in the Catholic temples there, where the Polish inactive has the position of the Lithuanian language. On the another side of the border, in Vilnius, the Polish language is heard rather often, in the Podwileń state it is the regular speech of the ruthless majority of inhabitants. In total, the alleged Polish belt extends from the Polish-Belarusian border, through the Lithuanian-Belarusian border to Latvian Latgalia, or historical Polish Infinity. On any sections of these borders, Poles are adjacent to each another through the city.
However, hundreds of thousands of people behind the east border of the 3rd Republic do not have much to offer. The reverse paradigm of the Orbán introduced in Hungary applies. It was during the regulation of the Law and Justice that the Deputy Marshal of the Sejm Richard Terlecki announced at least that "Poland cannot be held hostage by its minority, for example in Lithuania or another countries". He added that "organizations of Polish national minorities in another countries must take into account the interests of the Polish State" – just as if the Polish state was expected not to support the interests of the Poles.
In turn, during the regulation of the current coalition, the public TVP Vilnius refused to issue a place of the Polish Electoral Action in Lithuania, and inactive in the distant July 2000 MFA under the direction of the late. Władysław Bartoszewski concluded under the alleged pretext of deficiency of volunteers that "The construction of the Polish school in Nowogródek is not in the interest of the Polish number in the Republic of Belarus". This was the case despite the fact that since 1992 the local branch of the Union of Poles in Belarus founded there further classes with the Polish language as a lecture, and inactive in 2003 respective twelve children were educated at the Polish Social School. Moreover, in 2015 the Ministry of abroad Affairs allocated more than 24 times as much resources to tv Belsat as to Polish media in Belarus. Meanwhile, Polish football club Polonia Vilnius collapsed, which integrated local Poles cheering him, thus stimulating patriotic activity among young people. Everything is written about the unsuccessful enforcement of the right to a worthy burial of the murdered in Volyn, and the “ministers of Ukraine” have long been ostentatiously ignored by Kiev. The symbolic culmination of the "Jagiello's idea" or of prometeism towards countries to the east of Poland is the bust Roman Shuchewycz walled in the building of the Polish school of St Mary Magdalene in Lviv. All of this takes place with a conscious deficiency of opposition from the 3rd Republic, which has many tools of emphasis on countries located between Poland and Russia.
The liquidation of the USSR. fresh hand in east Europe
"Poland lost the war with the russian Union, Hitler's 1939-41 ally [...] She lost specified strongholds of Polishness and the outbreaks of Polish culture as Vilnius and Lviv. She was pushed lower in the hierarchy of the world's nations, becoming a state and a nation lower than before, of lesser importance, lesser political function and little prestige" – wrote with fear quoted earlier by Jędrzej Gierty.
However, in 1991 the situation changed in favour of Poland, as the russian Union ceased to exist. Although the USSR is actually identified exclusively with Russia, at least in the case of Polish Borderlands this is simply a far-reaching abuse. Lviv was ukrainized by the Soviets, not russified, as Vilnius gained thanks to the USSR an inflowing Lithuanian majority alternatively than Russian. The real problem of linguistic rusification concerns Poles in Belarus, but – what is interesting – due to the function of Russian as lingua franca In the post-Soviet area, it is not a direct driver of their countrymen, it is not straight linked to the adoption of Russian identity. A much greater threat is, however, the Belarusian-speaking language of Liturgy in the Catholic Church in Belarus, which inactive functions as “Polish Church”, which makes Poland ask a question about the sense of stimulating the Belarusian national identity. In turn ‘Russian mir’ In east Europe, he has his own confession, which is Orthodoxy, in this respect not penetrating the Catholic-Polish planet and not competing straight with it. It is crucial that Orthodoxy – as he wrote Prof.Andrzej Skrzypek from the University of Warsaw – this is simply a traditionally crucial origin of Russianness. It is so hard to say that the Polish Catholics at the border endanger to Russify their national identity.
The Russian Federation is not presently an existential threat to Poland. Everything we could lose in the East took from us after planet War II the russian Union and modern Moscow has no reason to take any territory from Poland today. Currently, our erstwhile east lands are not within Russia's borders, and with this country the Republic borders only in the erstwhile East Prussia. Artificially, a substitute for the inter-war "corridor" is invented, disseminating the concept of the "Suval Pass" – as abstract as the "Indigenous" or the "Eastern flank of NATO". Poland is expected to have completely identical interests with Lithuania or even with not being in NATO Ukraine, although it is with these countries that we objectively have conflicting interests in the Kresów area – which in turn are the natural direction of expansion of Polish influences. Meanwhile, in 3rd Poland "Revocations to the Jagiello and Promethetic Concepts are a form of propaganda to tame Poles, that we proceed to implement the old Polish concepts erstwhile we actually meet the strategical objectives of Western powers" – says Dr. Mirosław Habowski from Wroclaw University.
Moreover, it is the historical lands of Poland and Russia that are at least within the borders of the same country in the case of Ukraine. It may be even more amazing that for Polish “anti-communists” the limits set by the Bolshevik commissioners are sacred, and even those imposed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Lithuanian “Vilnius” or Ukrainian Crimea became synonymous with the Polish national interest and no 1 asks what Poles gain from it. In the case of Lithuania, the transactional policy is very beneficial to it – we guarantee its safety and in return the Lithuanians discriminate against the Polish community there.
Meanwhile, Lithuania or Latvia can be protected by Poland, but with full respect for the proportion between the State liable for safety and individual protectorates. Especially in the case of Lithuania we should talk about ambitious goals – the Polish language as the second authoritative language, the cessation of anti-Polish historical policy, the symbolic rehabilitation of the nationalised Polish community from Kowna and Lauda during the interwar period and the condemnation of repression from that time, as well as crucial concessions for Poland in the port of Klaipeda. The protection of Lithuania is an old Polish tradition – Roman Dmowski He successfully sought to separate the Klaipedo Country from East Prussia in Versailles, not only to weaken Germany, but besides to join Klaipeda in Lithuania and Lithuania itself in Poland. Thus Poland was to environment and keep East Prussia in check. The independency of Lithuania and Vilnius as the capital was agreed in turn Józef Piłsudski, but provided that it will be a federation of Polish and Lithuanian cantons, besides associated with Poland. In our political tradition there has never been an appeasement of Lithuania as a creation limiting Polish influences in itself, and this is for the approval of Poland itself. This changed only in the times of the 3rd Republic of Poland and the time to radically reverse this trend.
In Latvia, too, our national number in the area of Dyneburg and Krasława, i.e. the erstwhile Polish Infinities, requires active politics from Poland and should be treated as an argument for the strategical subordination of this country of the Republic. If Lithuania and Latvia fear Russia, they have no area for manoeuvre. Furthermore, the dominance of Lithuania is possibly a useful argument against Kaliningrad then surrounded by Polish influences. For transit from Belarus and Belarus, we could make ourselves pay, for example, with so much needed concessions for the Polish number in the country governed by Lukashenko. If Lithuanians and Latvians like Russian influences to Polish protection, then the area should be discussed with Moscow at the request of the Baltics themselves. If so far Putin has allegedly enjoyed Polish-Lithuanian disputes about the position of our minority, as the Lithuanian propaganda says, then this can be reversed by emotional blackmail of reasoning – from now on Putin will enjoy the deficiency of Polish sovereignty over Lithuania. The fear of the Baltics against Russia should be exploited skillfully, without leading anti-Russian politics.
The discomfort that the Polish protectorate can give especially to Lithuanians is simply a renunciation for which Poland should be ready. We should not even defend the Baltics so much from Russia, but from their own highly confrontational abroad policy against Moscow, which they want to conduct for the account of Poland and another NATO allies, due to the fact that they themselves are incapable to defend themselves. Polish sovereignty is besides a tiny price to pay for the anticipation to preserve their language and culture or to play free basketball (Lithuania is simply a planet leader), if you have no arguments. For the Republic of Poland it is besides an chance to affect neighbouring Belarus through Vilnius. In fact, Vilnius besides covers the area on the Belarusian side of the border, due to the fact that among Poles on the 1 hand and on the another hand there are the same names (Mickiewicz, Mackiewicz), and frequently Polish relatives and members of the same household are citizens of 2 different countries, due to the fact that the Soviets, for their well-known reasons, set the border. This example indicates, in a sense, the voidness of the notion of “geopolitics”, which is of peculiar importance only if we supplement it with the name ethno-geopolitics. It is the nations, not just the derivatives of them that are drawn out on the map, that are subject to global relations in a peculiar space. After all, the scope of the presence of the Polish nation extends further than the borders of the 3rd Polish Republic, and it is the nation – all of which constitute a given country and give it any sense of existence – that it should be a real recipient of abroad policy.
Phantom “Russian threat”
Currently, the historical lands of Poland and Russia at least in the case of Ukraine are within the limits of the same state, which creates completely fresh geopolitical circumstances. On the Ukrainian issue, however, Poland only needs space separating it from the main territory of Russia – and that is all. The issue of the Russian-Ukrainian border or Ukraine's access to the sea is completely irrelevant to Poland.
Warsaw needs no another Ukraine for anything else, and in the process of strengthening the Russian-Belarusian alliance, and so debated is whether Ukraine inactive plays a buffer zone. It is crucial to take into account that in east Europe there may be either strong Poland or strong Ukraine – and in its own way the ongoing weakening of the Ukrainian state can be seen as an chance for Warsaw to dictate its conditions to Kiev – in the field of historical policy or in the area of the economy.
The reset of Poland with Russia and the determination of influences in the area of east Europe are possible thanks to the unique and objectively existing situation in which the lands which are the subject of the historical Polish-Russian dispute do not belong to Poland or Russia. The creation by the Bolsheviks of russian republics with capitals in Minsk and Kiev and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR created an exceptional situation which as if "conciliated" Warsaw and Moscow. Lithuanian, Ukrainian or possibly Belarusian nationalisms are aimed at both Poland and Russia. The current border with Russia, however, does not give emergence to any cultural or territorial conflicts – despite the fact that the Polish subjectivity is being violated.
Finally, it is in Poland's interest to de-escalate tensions in east Europe as much as possible. The Poles themselves request time of peace to repair a very bad forecasting demography. Moreover, cultural influences promoting anti-natalist attitudes or various deviations do not come to Poland from the east, but from the other direction. The reality in Russia inactive leaves much to be desired, but it consistently introduces more conservative legislation, and the Russian ambassador in Warsaw was never here for any rainbow parade.
However, it is simply a multi-vector abroad policy, which gives area for manoeuvre, that allows an assertive attitude towards the ideologicalized Western European elites, which in pro-family and conservative politics see not only alleged putinism, but even fascism. Viktor Orbán or Robert Fico After all, they have shown that loosening of Brussels corset is possible even in a not besides large country. It was not Russia that dominated the Polish media market, and it was not the Russians that ordered Poles to close mines or bear the costs of pseudo-organic energy policy. "Russian threat" is mostly an ideological construct, which is to justify the further parasitising of the elite of the 3rd Republic of Poland on its own nation and the progressive colonization of Poland by Western countries and by their capital, while besides making our country a multi-cultural waste for inexpensive labour. "There is no indication that Russia should invade Poland. Polish politicians' attitudes towards Russia are so based on hysterical fear, frustration, complexes and any incomprehensible desperation" – writes Prof. Stanisław Bielen from Warsaw University.
The deescalation of tensions in east Europe is besides a chance to usage the strategical position of Poland and to join the Chinese fresh Silk Road project, which additionally involves Chinese people in maintaining peace in the region, balancing the influences of another powers. The alternate is not encouraging – there is either a choice of reset with Russia in line with the trends promoted by president Trump's administration, or joining the group of "war hawks" at the request of London, Berlin and the elites of European Union power. However, the cost of winding up the war spiral as usual will be borne by Poles who have made their abroad policy a trademark of credulity.
Marcin Skalski
