Author: Veronika Barankovych crucial support: Prof. Mirosław Sułek, Ernest Szymala
Introduction
The Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine and the expanding tensions in Central and east Europe have refocused the attention of researchers and decision-makers on the real deal
forces in the North-East Europe region. The public debate is frequently simplified
comparisons of the number of tanks, army size or nominal military spending, excluding long-term economical and structural conditions which find the ability of states to carry out military activities in the longer term.
The intent of this analysis is to compare quantitatively the possible of the North-East European countries – hereinafter referred to as the east Flanka + Scandinavia (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Finland, Sweden and Norway) – with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, utilizing the Mirosław Słuk powerometric model. The analysis covers the period from the end of the Cold War to 2024 and allows to measure how different economical and military improvement strategies translated into modern military and strategical resilience of individual actors.
This summary enables not only to measure the current balance of forces, but besides to draw lessons applicable to NATO states, in peculiar in the context of the prevention of structural errors which reduced Ukraine's defence capacity before 2022.
Methodology
The methodology presented is rooted in the achievements of the explanation of global relations and geopolitics, with the support of cybernetics and praxeology.
The part model allows to calculate, among others, 2 key types of power of the state applicable for this study:
Economic power is simply a synthetic expression of the collective capacity of a given population in a given time and space. Its value is determined in relation to the global strategy of forces, which makes it comparatively "free". This is due to the fact that economical power reflects the balance of power, shaped in a long historical process, which gives it a feature of advanced inertia. As a result, it is not possible to make a extremist change in the short word (except for the global earthquakes specified as war). For this reason, economical power is 1 of the most nonsubjective indicators that de facto politicians have limited influence over the short term. Thanks to this stableness it is possible to forecast comparatively reliable changes in the global power strategy even in the long run.
Economic power is operated through management results measured by gross home product (GDP), supplemented by demographic (population) and spatial (area).
The military power, which is the second key expression of the power of the state, is closely linked to the economical power which can be considered as its foundation. In another words, military power is simply a militarized form of economical power. It has a dual dimension of militarisation: economic, resulting from the decoupling of military spending from GDP, and demographic, linked to the allocation of part of the population to military service. The military burden may be significant, during peacetime military spending usually amounts to 1% to 10% of GDP, and the participation of military personnel in the population from 0.1% to 1.5%. During times of threat of war, and especially during wartime, these indicators are expanding significantly.
Military power is more subjective than economical power due to the fact that it is straight dependent on political decisions. These decisions, although not arbitrary, are subject to various restrictions, specified as public opinion, alliance commitments or available production capacity.
Because military power is part of economical power, it should be much little than economical power. It is indeed. However, in the analysis we adopted a convention according to which both types of power mention to the world, i.e. that both the world's general power and the world's military power equals 1,000.
In terms of military power, 3 groups of countries can be distinguished. The first are countries with akin economical and military powers. The second is countries that have clearly greater economical power than military power. The 3rd group are countries with much higher military power than economical power – they are heavy militarised countries
Military power includes military-economic factors (military spending as part of GDP), demographic-military (number of active service soldiers) and spatial (area of territory).
Indications:
Pe – economical power; Pm – military power; GDP – gross home product;
L – population; a – territory; WW – military expenditure; S – number of soldiers in active service.
This model is easy to realize and apply, besides for non-specialists. It is based on a essential and adequate number of constant factors in past inherent in the existence and functioning of human groups, including political units. As such, the model's author considered: people operating in a peculiar space and at a certain time, representing certain organizational and production skills or the ability to collective action, i.e. the social processing of matter, energy and information. due to the fact that people act, they have certain results. From the political unit's point of view, GDP (Gross National Product) can be considered a good synthetic result. another possible measures, specified as GNP (Gross National Product), may be considered, but this is not applicable at this phase of consideration. It cannot be excluded that in the future there will be a better indicator, more adapted to measurement the effects of humans. So the variables that we will consider are people, space, time and the results of collective actions.
In addition, we separate 3 types of militarisation: economical militarisation (also called "economic-demographic militarisation"), the militarisation of GDP (also called "production-service militarisation") and demographic militarisation. Militaryization indicators are dimensionless.
The indicators of economical militarisation are the ratio of military power to economical power, or:
It can besides be interpreted as mobilisation rate, as it shows how much of the resources were allocated (mobilised) for military (defensive) purposes and as an indicator Defense preparedness. It is the product of 2 indicators, which is illustrated by the following formula:
After simplification, the pattern will take the form of:
In another words, this is the product of 2 indicators. First indicator (mGDP) expresses the militarisation of GDP, while the second (m)d) — demographic militarisation:
We number militarisation of power in 3 forms: economical militarisation as a share of military power in economical power, militarisation of GDP as a share of military spending in GDP and demographic militarisation as a share of the number of active service soldiers in the general population (with appropriate power exponents – according to the model). In all 3 cases, the rate of militarization of the planet is 1. We treat countries with militarization greater than 1 as powerfully militarized; little than 1, as poorly militarized.). This militarisation is of a comparative nature, as it refers to the militarisation of the planet (world=1).
The statistic utilized in the analysis come from respective sources, the number of which was sought to be kept to the minimum necessary. Data on population, GDP by currency exchange rate and area of territory of the countries come first from the planet Bank (WB) database. Data on the number of soldiers in active service and military spending in US dollars were taken from the "The Military Balance" yearbooks published by the London global Institute for strategical Studies (IISS). The missing data from these sources were supplemented by data from the following sources according to the hierarchy: the global Monetary Fund (IMF), the Stockholm global Institute for Peace investigation (SIPRI) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The Context of safety After the Cold War
Before we decision on to appropriate analysis of economical and military powers, it is essential to scratch the basic historical-strategic background after the end of the Cold War. The explanation of quantitative data requires mention to the key points of the safety policy which have permanently influenced the budgetary, structural and doctrinal decisions of the actors surveyed.
After the dissolution of the USSR Russia for much of the 1990s and early 2000s. She faced limited financial resources and weaker combat preparedness. The 2008 military reform, launched after the Russian-Georgian conflict, aimed at reorganising the armed forces and their partial modernisation, which affected the gradual increase in military spending and the change in the structure of the army[1]. Russian military spending since the beginning of the 21st century has shown a sustained growth trend, which after 2022 became violent, reflecting the escalation of conflict and militarisation of the economy[2].
For east states, NATO's Flanka was a turning point in 2014 and Russia's annexation of Crimea, which led to an increased sense of threat and led allies to increase defence spending under the commitment to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence, which has since become a budget standard in NATO. According to NATO estimates cited by Reuters, in 2025 all NATO associate States meet the mark of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, which represents a crucial change compared to earlier years erstwhile any allies did not scope this threshold[3]. In addition, the Alliance has decided that by 2035 it should scope the mark of 5% of GDP of full defence expenditure, which shows a sustained change in the safety paradigm in Europe[4].
Ukraine gradually reduced its military possible at the end of the Cold War and in the first decades after its completion due to budgetary constraints and economical priorities. Only a full-scale invasion of Russia in 2022 caused Ukraine's defence spending to emergence as a percent of GDP rapidly – data from the planet bank show that the share of military spending in Ukrainian GDP was historically advanced after 2022, indicating the transformation of the economy towards a war effort[5].
The outlined processes show that the power shifts observed on the charts are not a simple function of current political decisions, but the consequence of a long-term change in the safety paradigm in North-East Europe – from the logic of "peace dividend" to the logic of sustainable resilience and deterrence.
The evolution of economical power in the region
Figure 1. economical power of Russia, Ukraine and the east countries of Flanka + Scandinavia during the period 1992-2024
Source: own development.
Figure 1 presents the economical power of the 3 groups of actors analysed and shows clear differences in both scale and stableness of economical development.
Russia experienced a deep collapse of economical power in the 1990s, followed by a partial reconstruction in the period 2000-2013, to a level exceeding 30 mM. After 2014, however, stagnation is apparent – neither global sanctions nor periodic increases in natural material prices have translated into a sustainable strengthening of the economical base. Although Russia has overtaken the east states of Flanka and Scandinavia for most of the period in terms of Pe, its economy remained more unstable, more susceptible to external shocks and dependent on natural materials.
The countries of east Flanka and Scandinavia present a different improvement profile. Their economical power continued for 3 decades at comparatively unchangeable levels, oscillating between 20-26 mM. After reaching the local maximum in 2008, there was a average decrease, which was not structural in nature, and after 2022 growth was again apparent. specified stableness demonstrates the advanced economical resilience of the region and is the foundation for the gradual improvement of defence capacity.
Against the background of another actors, Ukraine was characterized by a very low economical power. During the full period analysed, Pe did not exceed 3-5 mM, which meant respective times little of a resource base than for Russia and the flank states. The limited scale of the economy, the deficiency of structural reforms and the chronic underinvestment caused Ukraine to have tiny reserves in 2022 allowing for long-term war. The low level of economical power importantly explains the subsequent mobilization, fiscal and industrial difficulties.
The dynamics of military power
Figure 2. Military power of Russia, Ukraine and east Flanka + Scandinavia from 1992 to 2024
Source: own development
Figure 2 depicts the military power of Russia, Ukriana, and east Flanka + Scandinavia from 1992 to 2024. Russia entered the 1990s with a comparatively advanced level of military power (about 26-27 mM), followed by a sharp drop to below 20 mM in the late decade. Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, the country has embarked on a systematic restoration of military potential, entering a unchangeable growth path. From 2010 to 2016, p.m. reached 45-50 mM, the highest in the full analysed ranking. This indicates that Moscow has consistently treated the improvement of military capabilities as a strategical priority, investing both in the number of armed forces and their combat capabilities. Later stagnation does not change the fundamental conclusion of Russia's long-term orientation to build military power.
The countries of east Flanka and Scandinavia are characterized by a much more unchangeable profile. In the 1990s, their military power oscillated in the scope of 20-23 mM, without violent fluctuations. After 2014, and especially after 2016, there is simply a gradual increase in Pm, which accelerates between 2020 and 2024, approaching 30 mM. This indicates a process of planned modernisation and adaptation to a deteriorating safety environment, without destabilising economical bases.
Ukraine has remained a country with very limited military power for a long time. From 1992 to 2010, p.m. remained within the scope of 3-8 mM, which shows that the restoration of military possible was not considered a strategical priority. Even after 2014, growth was moderate. Only after 2022 is simply a sharp, almost three-fold increase in military power, which confirms that Ukraine entered a war with limited structural facilities and insufficient reserves for the long-term conduct of the conventional conflict.
Military power in a broader allied context
Figure 3. Military power of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and east Flanka + Scandinavia from 1992 to 2024
Source: own development
In order to decently place regional analysis, it is essential to look at NATO's military possible as a whole. As illustration 3 shows, the Alliance's military power persists between 360-430 mM, repeatedly surpassing both Russia and Ukraine's potential. This underlines NATO's lasting structural advantage, despite the interior diversity of associate States.
At the same time, the structure of this power is highly concentrated – more than half of NATO p.m. are resources of the United States (226,478 mM in 2024). This means that the safety of east Flanka and Scandinavia states is mostly based on the American strategical umbrella. In practice, their own military possible plays the function of the first line of defence to keep resilience until the full activation of the transatlantic potential.
This message confirms that even during periods of comparatively advanced military power Russia remains an actor with importantly smaller resources than NATO as a whole. From a strategical perspective, this means maintaining advanced regional resilience, capable of absorbing force in the first phase of possible escalation.
Militaryisation as an expression of state strategy
The levels of economical and military power alone do not yet show how states usage their resources. The analysis is so complemented by indicators of militarisation, which let to measure how intensively the economy, society and public finances are active in building military potential. In this sense, militarisation does not describe the scale of power, but strategical priorities and costs to the state and society.
Figure 4. economical militarisation of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and east Flanders + Scandinavia between 1992 and 2024 (World=1)
Source: own development
The indicator of economical militarisation shows to what degree economical possible is transformed into military capacity, and whether this process is long-term and planned or alternatively reactive. Unlike military power itself, it reveals the way resources are allocated alternatively than their absolute size.
According to graph 4, Russia maintained for a crucial part of the period considered the level of economical militarisation above the planet average. This has been peculiarly visible since the late 1990s and again after 2014, erstwhile the indicator points to the comparatively advanced strength of transforming economical possible into military capacity. This means that the Russian model of building military power was more based on the precedence of the defence sector at the expense of alternate uses of economical resources. At the same time, the performance of the indicator is characterised by a clear volatility, which suggests that Russia's economical militarisation was mostly cyclical and reactive, dependent on the natural material economy and current strategical conditions alternatively than a consistent long-term strategy.
Eastern Flanka States and Scandinavia present a more unchangeable model of economical militarisation. The indicator is moderate, with a visible gradual increase after 2014 and a clear acceleration after 2022. This suggests an adaptation strategy to strengthen defence capabilities while reducing excessive economical burdens.
NATO as a full maintains the level of economical militarisation below the global average. This confirms that the Alliance's military possible is based primarily on the scale and capacity of associate States' economies and their ability to finance defence in the long word alternatively than on mobilising the full economy for the purposes of armed conflict.
Ukraine presents a different trajectory. By 2022, the level of economical militarisation remained comparatively low, indicating a deficiency of systemic economical preparation for a advanced strength conflict. The fast increase in the rate after the launch of a full-scale invasion reflects the transition to a war mode in which militarisation is forced, reactive and highly costly, both in economical and social terms.
Figure 5. Demographic militarisation of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and east Flanders + Scandinavia between 1992 and 2024 (World=1)
Source: own development
Demographic militarisation shows to what degree state safety is based on public participation in the armed forces and allows to measure the social costs of the defence strategy.
According to Figure 5, by 2022 all the subjects analysed maintained a akin and comparatively low level of demographic militarisation, indicating a deficiency of mass mobilisation of societies during the period of peace. A tiny exception is the short-term increase in the ratio in Ukraine between 2012 and 2013, which was transient and did not turn into a permanent change in the defence model.
Clear differentiation occurs only after 2022. Ukraine is experiencing a rapid, leap growth in demographic militarisation, reflecting the broad mobilisation of society. However, reaching its highest in 2022, the country has a downward trend. Russia has seen an increase importantly greater than the east countries of Flanka and Scandinavia, but without moving to a full-mobilization model, while NATO as a full remains at the lowest level of the indicator, confirming the dominance of the professional armed forces.
Chart 6. Militization of GDP of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and east Flanka + Scandinavia between 1992 and 2024 (World=1)
Source: own development
The last key indicators – the militarisation of GDP, i.e. the financial burden of arms – are even more clear on the cost of strategical decisions.
As can be seen in Figure 6, in the case of NATO and the east countries of Flanka and Scandinavia, the level of militarisation of GDP over most of the period analysed remains unchangeable and close to the planet average. This means that the increase in defence spending was spread over time and adapted to economical opportunities, without expanding the fiscal burden rapidly.
Russia has maintained a average militarisation of GDP for many years, but after 2022 there is simply a marked increase in this indicator. This indicates an expanding cost of war, which is increasingly weighing down the Russian economy.
The most dynamic changes concern Ukraine. As the illustration shows, after the launch of a full-scale invasion, GDP militarisation grew rapidly, which means moving to a war economy and a strong dependence of defence backing on external support. However, the erstwhile marked increase in the ratio between 1999 and 2004 was of a different nature. It was not due to a permanent increase in military capacity, but mostly to the relation of comparatively rigid defence spending to rapidly shrinking GDP, typical of the transition period and macroeconomic instability.
Summary
A summary of all indicators analysed creates a coherent image of the structural differences between the entities concerned. east Flank States and Scandinavia built their resilience on a unchangeable economical basis, average militarisation and a gradual, predictable increase in military power. Russia, on the another hand, has over the years offset economical weaknesses with intensive militarisation, which has allowed it to accumulate crucial military potential, but at the same time has increased long-term structural risks. Ukraine, in turn, did not usage the period 2014-2022 to permanently strengthen its economical and military base, making full-scale war an existential burden for it.
Although it is frequently stressed that Russia does not presently have the capacity to conduct classical kinetic activities against the countries of east Flanka and Scandinavia, this does not mean a failure of danger. The change in its character – from an open military confrontation towards force below the war threshold. It includes sabotage of critical infrastructure, intelligence activities, cyber attacks, interference in transport and communication and long-term disinformation campaigns. In this context, the safety of the region depends not so much on the ability to defy a one-off attack, but on the resilience to systemic, hard to detect forms of destabilization.
The resilience of societies to specified actions is closely linked to the perceived readiness of the state. The more real investment in defence capabilities, infrastructure and modern technologies is seen, the little susceptible the information force and attempts to intimidate. The experience of the war in Ukraine shows that unmanned technologies, reconnaissance systems, autonomous sensors, and radio-electronic countermeasures importantly alter the nature of modern military action. The east Flank States and Scandinavia, developing their own production capacity and integrating into allied supply chains, besides strengthen the region's resilience under crisis conditions.
From a powerometric perspective, the analysis confirms that the real power of the state stems from measurable resources and their unchangeable reproduction, not from political declarations or strategical rhetoric. The countries of the east flank region and Scandinavia keep a balanced economical and military potential, Russia remains an aggressive actor, but internally susceptible to structural overload, while Ukraine – despite advanced public determination – has entered into conflict with a limited resource base.
At the same time, the analysis shows that the safety of the region depends not only on the aggregated power of NATO, but besides on the level of political coherence of the Alliance. Power measured in millimirs is simply a essential but insufficient condition for effective deterrence. The readiness to act together, the political consistency and the ability to make decisions rapidly stay crucial to the functioning of the collective safety system. In this sense, the strategy of the east countries of Flanka and Scandinavia, consisting of maximum strengthening of their own defence capabilities, increases the resilience of all NATO, limiting the hazard that possible political fluctuations of individual members will weaken the Alliance's consequence as a whole.
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[3] Lipczyński, T. (2025, 28 August). defence efforts. All NATO members achieved the 2% target. Only 3 countries achieved the fresh goal, including Poland. Forsal.pl. https://forsal.pl/world/security/articles/9873084,contributions-on-defence-all members-nato-osiagneli-cel-2-proc-no.html
[4] NATO. (2025). Defence grants and NATO’s 5% commitment. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment
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