Shopping according to needs

So what is the recipe for speeding up changes? The conflict in Ukraine has shown us that the position of years and even months is besides big.

Krzysztof Zielski: The General Staff is very powerfully active in the construction of a fresh model of planning and programming of the improvement of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, including the strategy of implementation of purchases of military equipment. We anticipate that the fresh solutions will let us to model in a more open and flexible way the various stages of the process of acquiring equipment included in the programme of improvement of the Polish Armed Forces [currently scheduled for the years 2025-2039].

Is there any sense in a rapidly changing safety environment that we now gotta get attached to specified long-term papers as this programme?

Krzysztof Zielski: Of course, due to the fact that building the military's future capabilities requires looking at plans in the long term, frequently going even beyond the horizon of 15 years. Yes, specified planning may seem besides long in situations relating to individual orders, but in the case of key, advanced weapons – most frequently obtained as a complete system, including complementary, interlocking capabilities, including a logistics package related to support for operation for the next 30 years – we request to talk about contracts with a time of 10 years or even longer.

ORP Rescuer, photo. PGZ War Shipyard

Marcin Kubica: It is so essential to question the production possible of the home industry, even from a planning level. If we have plans in specified a long time horizon, it is worth considering at first whether the manufacture is able to respond positively to the challenges posed by the HR General Staff or the armed forces widely understood.

Arthur Kuptel: Remember that our military equipment acquisition strategy is multi-stage, multi-institutional, multi-level, multi-ministerial and sometimes international.

In a word – megacomplicated?

Arthur Kuptel: Exactly. The area in which our soldiers, workers, experts come to work is highly complicated. For all political, economic, financial issues related to the ordering of equipment are concentrated in the Armed Forces Agency, but not all of us are affected! We must remember the function of politicians and politicians in this very complicated purchasing world. It can be paraphrased here that Carl von Clausewitz's words [military, theorist of war coming from Prussia] that the acquisition of military equipment is simply a continuation of politics, but another means.

Marcin Kubica: An crucial element, among others in the purchasing processes, is the highly advanced specialisation. We don't have time for experiments and solutions. The national manufacture seems to have already identified references and potential, which is mostly represented by our strategical partner, the Polish Armed Forces Group. We in the WB Group besides specialize in the production of circumstantial equipment. This creates a field for very effective cooperation with PGZ-et, which has already been confirmed in both subcontracting and syndicated forms. It seems that specified a expression of cooperation should continue.

BWP Borsuk at the “Autumn Fire 23” show in Bemów P, photo. spit. Piotr Szafarski/16 DZ

Does the Armed Forces Agency have the right potential, for example individual – due to the fact that it employs only a fewer 100 people – to carry out its tasks effectively?

Arthur Kuptel: Undoubtedly, the number of our personnel is disproportionately tiny if we look at the tasks carried out. In a short time, since 2022, the number of projects and the level of backing for tasks carried out in the Armed Forces Agency multiplied, and the number of personnel remains at a very akin level – about 500 people. And if we included the key regional military representations – whose resources we wanted to integrate more into the AU structure to accomplish synergies – this number would double. Today, however, specified a solution has become questionable. By contrast, in France, which has armed forces akin to Poland, the equivalent of our Agency Direction Générale de l’Armement [DGA] employs respective 1000 people. The Swedish equivalent of Försvarets Materielverk [FMV] has about 3.5 1000 employees. duplicate institutions like defence Acquisition Program Administration [DAPA] in South Korea or Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı [SSB] in Turkey number respective 1000 specialists.

How does specified a tiny number of employees translate into your projects?

Arthur Kuptel: erstwhile I started managing the Agency in 2022, we implemented, despite the hierarchical structure, in the implementation of selected tasks the alleged plan mode. At the time, we assumed that 3 to 5 experts were working on well-managed programmes, with which others could join erstwhile needed. At the moment, the Agency manages over 400 projects with a full value of about PLN 560 billion.

And during these negotiations, Western companies are supported by the largest law firms in the world. Is there a hazard that staff shortages will put us at risk?

Arthur Kuptel: As far as expert cognition is concerned, there is surely no disparity, due to the fact that we have specialists with superior experience and large knowledge. In the armory it is simply a bit like in athletics – if the negotiations are exhausting and long, it is good to have a squad in which, alongside the basic players, they are valuable reserve, who press at the last phase of the procedure. The deficiency of personnel worries me more for another reason...

What?

Arthur Kuptel: Our teams, although fewer in person, carry out many programs on a case-by-case basis, or case-by-case basis. This greatly prolongs the duration of proceedings, which in turn can be of tremendous importance in the financing of arms projects from EU sources. The question is how much we will be able to usage these funds. This will, of course, depend on how many projects will be prepared and how many will be. Nevertheless, I am afraid that our human resources will be adequate to scope 100% for EU money for the Armed Forces of Poland.

What else, too additional personnel, do you request the Armed Forces Agency to make purchases for the Polish Army more quickly?

Arthur Kuptel: I would point out that we are not the only ones with a problem with the efficiency of the military equipment acquisition system. In many countries, including the United States, the search for ideas on how to accelerate modernisation processes began. To do so, of course, we request to review all the legal documents. They were formed for a comparatively long period. But you can handle it. In Australia, for example, the bureaucratic documentation process was reduced by 45%. And this is another thought that, if you can introduce, will velocity up your purchases.

Before the equipment is produced, we request to make innovative solutions that will interest the military. How does it happen?

Jan Grabowski: It doesn't look like any people think the Armed Forces Agency is coming to us and saying, "You have this to deliver, and we motion and produce." This may have been the case once, but present the acquisition of equipment takes place through negotiations.

Which are sometimes very long...

Jan Grabowski: Yes, sometimes they are long. But there are besides short ones, as it was in 2024, in relation to the Ship “The Rescue”. Both sides, both industrial and military, knew their capabilities and expectations, due to the fact that talks about this specialized unit had been conducted for years.

Fregata Rakietowa Miecznik, photograph by Polish Armed Forces Group S.A.

And an example of long negotiations?

Jan Grabowski: “Narew”, or anti-aircraft defense. It lasted a fewer years. Another example is “The Sword”. Both projects have a very large share of Polish industry. We are an integrator and manufacturer, we work with abroad technology suppliers. specified complex processes require very precise arrangements, so long negotiations were entirely justified.

Marcin Kubica: I would like to draw attention to 2 elements. Firstly, the interoperability of the systems that we produce so that they can be integrated into a larger allied system. Secondly, standardization on an allied level. I am talking about the issues of normatives that specify the hardware requirements in terms of what we have present and what we deliver to our troops. In Poland, defensive standards are very frequently a determinant in this matter, and in allied countries - STANAG-i [standardization agreements] and completely different verification bases. It's manufacture that forces any dualism. We request to compare these 2 standards on almost all task so that we can both sale in the country and export our equipment. This affects the pace of execution of orders and increases costs.

Jan Grabowski: The disadvantage is that the manufacture has not been active in the planning work since the beginning. The French agency referred to in the debate powerfully engages the companies there – not the plans, due to the fact that it is indeed up to the general staff – but the method requirements of the equipment to be bought. A good example that this works is the French program of modernization of the armoured vehicles of the land troops "Scorpion", which includes the projects of the fresh wagons of the Games phono, Jaguar and Serval and the modernization of Leclerc tanks. fresh vehicles were to be deployed to the military in many years, and in Nexter [now KNDS France], it was already at the phase of determining the needs that the steering strategy should be constructed. And it was decided that the driving strategy should be adapted to the user, due to the fact that young people who will support them are accustomed to solutions known from game consoles. That was preemptive thinking. It's a small different in our country.

Why?

Jan Grabowski: The Polish manufacture sometimes lacks the ability to manufacture certain products due to the fact that they have been lost for years. So we buy any equipment overseas, due to the fact that we don't have time to do things from the beginning. Sometimes we gotta adjust the acquired equipment to the Polish user, so our partners are crucial here. The Polish arms manufacture – and I mean both private and state – sees it as a problem that there are no rules allowing home companies to be included in talks with abroad partners from the very beginning of negotiations. specified a solution would be much more effective not only for us, but besides for the user, due to the fact that we know the needs of the Polish Army best.

Production: Magdalena Kowalska-Sendek, Tadeusz Wróbel, Aleksander Kruk, Marcin Kopeć, Marcin Łobaczewski, Maximilian Łobaczewski

Also crucial is the issue which has appeared in the statements of Generals Zielski and Kuptel – and the way in which arms systems are acquired should keep pace not only with legal but besides technological changes.

Marcin Kubica: It may be worth a closer look at the procedures for acquiring equipment abroad. In the WB Group, only 50% of our revenues come from home sales, the remainder comes from export. We have customers on practically all continents, so we practice working with the equivalents of the Armed Forces Agency and General Staff. We see how these systems work around the world, and we see differences depending on the circumstantial characteristics of the market. The example of Ukraine that we have been working with since 2014 is worth mentioning. Despite war conditions, fresh abroad systems are verified by the applicable institutions liable for these issues. Their investigation is conducted in a very short time and allows to identify problems with these systems. This shows us that speeding up certain procedures is possible in us, too.

Jan Grabowski: Until now, we have focused on the very process of ordering equipment, and the question of its life cycle should besides be taken into account in tendering procedures. Therefore, the Armed Forces Agency, which deals with the acquisition of equipment, and the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate, liable for its use, should work closely with each another as shortly as the contract terms are negotiated to prepare well for the subsequent usage of the acquired equipment.

Marcin Kubica: It is precisely this approach in Ukraine today, where not only the acquisition of equipment is important, but besides the production and maintenance skills that let to keep its life cycle. We, as a maker of equipment which we ordered from us, were besides obliged to supply training and service centres in Ukraine and it is an component of sine qua non concluded there for today's contracts.

Nevertheless, there are countries that have even more stringent requirements for abroad suppliers. India is the most utmost example we meet as a company. There, Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the “Make in India” program, which forces suppliers not only to warrant the ability to service the sold equipment, but besides the location of production in his country, transferring technology there. This is why in India we created a subsidiary manufacturing unmanned systems. However, even in specified a restrictive strategy there are certain exceptions in case of urgent operational needs.

There is an opinion in the public space that it is easier for abroad companies to supply military equipment to the Polish army than to national entities that request to undergo many studies, certification, to get quite a few papers required by law, while the abroad company does not have specified restrictions, due to the fact that it does not gotta prove that its product meets Polish requirements.

Krzysztof Zielski: If we combine 2 manufacturers, 1 of which has a proven product, sold abroad, certified, even if they were Natovian, then the selection procedure is different from erstwhile the offer comes down to the will of the maker that he will supply specified a product to us. Then of course we want to check whether the product meets our minimum expectations. Besides, we're committed to it.

As Polish companies, do you truly feel that in all aspect you are equal partner with abroad companies in the choice of equipment by the Polish army?

Marcin Kubica: I cannot agree that there is simply a disparity in this competition. Actually, the best wins. It is not that the Armed Forces Agency makes purchases without looking at where the products come from. It is very frequently based on the recognition of the essential interest of state security, and this 1 is actually linked to the performance of tasks by the home industry. And I believe that in these aspects, the position of our manufacture is actually protected on the 1 hand, but on the another hand it is besides assessed. I am able to realize the decision of the contracting authority, who, in the absence of a national option for a given solution, decides on a abroad product. The precedence is to build Poland's defence potential, as General Kuptel mentioned earlier.

The manufacture expects precise information on what the military needs. How can we avoid that we cannot produce equipment that was set 5 or 10 years earlier?

Krzysztof Zielski: Before the reform, which took place in the arms procurement strategy and which resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces Agency, we were very close to deciding to affect manufacture in this action at the phase of defining operational requirements. From the current perspective, we can see clearly that these initiatives have been an effort to find the right way to respond to the challenges arising from the realities of the era, in which the production of fresh technologies has been the consequence of many years of investigation and development, frequently lasting at least 10 years. It's not like that today. Now the consequence of the implementation work is simply a de facto product resulting from the fast compilation of available components into 1 device, i.e., not the construction of a ship, but its construction from the available elements. This is where technology has gone, and hence the increasing trend of investment in start-ups and niche capabilities of tiny producers is observed. They sometimes produce a tiny mechanism, seemingly insignificant in their isolated nature, and in fact, after integrating into another available systems and method solutions, it becomes the heart of many advanced systems, deciding on its military possible and superiority.

Another procedural concept, which has already been strengthened in the strategy of ordering military equipment, has become a transfer to the Armed Forces Agency of work for creating the method specifications of the product expected by the armed forces. Needs are so defined in the programming phase of their improvement as a description of capabilities. In turn, the Agency is developing a proposal for a circumstantial method solution, utilizing cognition of available technologies, which, after a skillful and, most importantly, can be rapidly combined to guarantee efficient transportation of the desired product. manufacture has been active in this process from the very beginning.

Jan Grabowski: As far as hardware requirements and investigation are concerned, a very good example appears to be the combat Badger Infantry Car. Why have we waited so long for this vehicle? erstwhile papers were signed for investigation and improvement on this vehicle more than 10 years ago, it was indicated that tactical and method assumptions and what requirements are to be met. Badger is our "death star", which is why investigation and implementation to the armed forces took so long.

Dron Warmate, photograph by DWOT

In what sense is he “the star of death”? Is it a combination of 2 features: strong armor and simultaneous buoyancy?

Jan Grabowski: Among another things, yes. Badger has no competition present and is indeed 1 of the best cars in its category in the world. At the same time, it is the most Polish of Polish combat vehicles. For this reason, it is not easy to sale it abroad due to the fact that another armed forces do not request specified extended equipment as it contained.

Is it not essential to amend the existing procedures, legal provisions for ordering equipment? Should the contacts between the military and manufacture be deepened so that both parties can agree on what is possible to produce under Polish conditions?

Krzysztof Zielski: There are surely any that should be changed. Years ago, government was introduced to restrict the cooperation of the military with the manufacture in a restrictive way, motivating specified action by corrupt risk. This caused the military to fear maintaining regular contacts with industry. However, I would like to show this regulation. Today, these rules must only be interpreted as a formal procedure, which allows the ongoing dialog of the armed forces with manufacture to be maintained.

What should the reformed military equipment procurement strategy look like? Is it even possible to make perfect solutions that will satisfy all curious people?

Arthur Kuptel: Further consolidation of institutionally dispersed competences in 1 strong entity should be pursued – for a variety called the Polish Armed Forces Agency, which, on the basis of the laws, should gain state legal personality. Centralisation of analytical, purchasing, operational support related to the transfer of technology and knowledge, R & D geared towards the implementation of the tasks commissioned and impact on production processes is the main nonsubjective of the proposed changes. The reformed strategy should be based on the life cycle of the product. It's not a novum in the world. As I have already mentioned, there is DGA in France, FMV in Sweden, SSB in Turkey, and DAPA in South Korea.

Marcin Kubica: The ongoing improvement of the military equipment procurement strategy should, in a crucial part, focus on developing a strategy on the 1 hand, transparent, and on the another hand efficient and flexible. This is simply a mechanics that will guarantee the safety and innovation of the solutions provided to the armed forces. The purchasing strategy should be based on multi-annual modernisation plans and be reflected in multi-annual supply contracts with proven suppliers defined in national specialisations. There's no area for experimentation or exploration these days. The time has come for long-term work with key national suppliers selected on the basis of clear selection criteria, specified as their manufacturing potential, intellectual property of the solutions offered, technological independence, training and service capacity and reliability. The purchasing strategy should let an active dialog between contracting parties and the supplier to make effective plan management mechanisms for the procurement of equipment, but should besides support the improvement of national defence capacity. It should besides have mechanisms for the acquisition of equipment in emergency modes and support the effective implementation of innovative technological solutions, including those that have proven themselves in combat conditions. There are no perfect solutions, but the existing mechanisms request to be continuously improved so that the increasing defence budget is utilized in the most efficient way. Finally, it is besides worth noting the current European Union initiative on joint purchases. The procurement strategy should support these initiatives by promoting national solutions on the Union market.

Krzysztof Zielski: The nature of this planet and its processes is variable. Therefore, it is most likely impossible to make a strategy for the acquisition of military equipment, the effects of which, in productivity, the level of complexity, time-consumingness and dependence on planning and implementing processes will be able to satisfy all parties active in this action. The threats of the modern world, the complications of supply chains, limited production capacity, monopoly, demography, access to natural materials and technology, financial turmoil, rising manufacturing costs are only part of the factors determining the level of feasibility of our purchasing plans, on which we have a limited impact. It is so our task to build mechanisms for responding efficiently and adapting to the changes that are taking place, so as to "extract" as much operational capacity as possible from this process.

Jan Grabowski: It would besides be good if manufacture could cooperate in the acquisition of equipment with the purchaser from the beginning to the end. It is very crucial to programme arms financing, taking into account the full life cycle of the product, from the acquisition of
until he's retired. This is crucial both for the user and for the maker who wants to take care of his product, which is equipped with the armed forces.