More pervasive Western commentators have long guessed the essence of Donald Trump's attitude to Europe: "He does not respect Germany, due to the fact that they are forever hiding not only behind the back of the United States but besides Poland and the Baltic countries."
Never before have the Germans met Russia as well as during planet War II. Millions of Germans then went to Leningrad and Moscow and millions shared their impressions with the russian Union in letters to their families. Hitler’s conquerors wrote in them about unimaginable misery, messes, impenetrable roads, abandoned collective fields and ubiquitous, beyond the human notion of filth. After a fewer years of war, however, Germany came to respect Russia. Their memories of 1945 and later are full of fear of Asian ruthlessness, cruelty, contempt for both their own lives and their victims. And they besides traumatize millions of women and girls raped by full battalions and then giving birth to an inestimable number of children who are descendants of the impossible-to-find russian army. As a consequence of this last phase of war and russian occupation, the German nation gained large and lasting respect for Russia. How Poles are different from the Germans if, after akin experiences, we have established in ourselves disgust and contempt for Russia as something indisputable from us worse, lower, simply inferior. And Germany, on the another hand, was fascinated by the size of Russia, its dull savage cruelty, unbridled force and power. This difference in German and Polish assessments is the apparent consequence of highly different value systems. Poles always valued freedom, real subjectivity and were not curious in dominance over others. In the ancient tradition of Germans, vice versa – dominance is the highest of virtues, the law is not meant to service either freedom or subjectivity, but order, so 1 should agree with what the power establishes. And strength is simply a large value, so you gotta respect the strong.
So the Germans look at Russia with godly fear. Embed, fascinated, humble. They remember who defeated them and what they can do with the defeated. They know Russia is dangerous, but they have a "buffer". They have Poland in which the authorities who obey them do everything under the dictate of German interests. respective years ago, they decided (though alternatively they had made a decision in Berlin) to retreat all Polish military units west of the Vistula River. So they don't go to waste in the event of an emergency attack from Russia. According to Berlin (with whom the pro-German authorities installed in Warsaw always agree) the intent of the Polish army is to defend the frontfield of Germany on the Vistula line. It was besides decided respective years ago that the most valuable component of the Polish armed forces at the minute of possible Russian aggression would be immediately searched in the vicinity of Berlin. This most valuable component is 48 Polish F-16 fighters, which should not be wasted to defend Poland. specified a “Polish buffer”, defending Germany on the Vistula line and possibly even supplying it from Germany – was declared completely adequate in Germany. A possible aggressor would burn this Polish buffer to the ground itself, but at the same time it would wear out adequate that Germans would not be able to endanger it. And it would give Germany so much time that, despite the long-term underinvestment of the Bundeswehr, it would have been able to arm itself if necessary. And German diplomacy might besides be able to scope a mutually beneficial agreement with Russian diplomacy.
This concept of its painful fact struck the eyes when, following the Russian-Ukrainian war, the European Union committed funds for investments in EU-European ammunition factories. 98% of them went to Germany and France. Why Poland? Although Poland borders Russia and Belarus (where the Russian army has been invariably stationed for respective decades), Poland would have had Russia on the remainder of its east border in case it defeated Ukraine. So why Poland’s ammunition factories? After all, everything we know about German defence plans proves that Poland is only meat thrown into it? It's a waste of investment in a place for destruction, isn't it? It is no coincidence that all German investments in Poland are located on its western premises. In German geopolitics Poland is besides defined as a "crush zone" or an "motorway for tanks". In German geostrategic Poland is only an area to hold the march of a possible east aggressor. How many can (and it is known that they can not besides much) defy on it Poles have. Resist, weaken the momentum of a possible Russian attack. Which besides means bleed out, get destroyed.
What is called “The Tartar East” is just a new, nicer name and a further old German concept. It goes further, that according to her, the full Polish defence is to be subjected to the European (read: German) command. due to the fact that Poland now has not only 48 F-16 fighters, but much more complete equipment. After all, we must not let this complete equipment to be wasted to defend a country as insignificant as Poland. It must be under European (read: German) command to defend what is most worth defending. So not Poland. And east Poland – that's for sure.
Is there anyone who believes that the “Hard East” is about anything else? Anyone imagine any Germans defending Poland as part of the “Tarchy East”? but for the sympathetic and how fewer isolated cases of warriors like Germany fighting in Ukraine today? So, aside from specified exceptions, due to the fact that we want not individual people – volunteers with rifles, but full, modern troops of the real German army? Anyone knows at least 1 specified case from the German-Polish relations of almost eleven centuries? Does anyone have the imagination to imagine something like this? And if not (because no example of the defence of the Polish borders by the German state always existed) – what is the basis of the thought, according to which it would now be in any way different from how it was absolutely always? “Going” into something like the “Hard East” on any proposal, specified a decision would should be based. For now, we know that we are already making up weapons and ammunition factories, which will only be built in Germany and France. Not in Poland. So what is this “Tarcza East” offer for Poland if Poland is not to have an arms manufacture and its military is to be subject to orders from outside? So, service others. service without own weapons and ammunition. Nothing more – to be just a buffer to a temporary, devastating defense. specified an offer lies under the beautiful words “Tarcza East”: Poland is to be one-off, incapable to reproduce its forces, commanded from the outside by a bumper. Means – the same function for us, but in the "maximal version", due to the fact that in this version Poland is to have nothing (it is simply a pity, why will it be wasted?), but it is to be commanded from outside, which is clearly no longer – not to defend Poland and Poles themselves.
Somebody give me 1 proof that there is something different about the Tartar East. Let him point to anything more than empty declarations. And since he won't find any proof of that, let him immediately tell me who he needs to be to agree to that.
Artur Adamski
