
Propaganda differs importantly from average fake news, which we discuss on our website all day. Propaganda content is frequently not based solely on false information, but alternatively on facts that are subsequently exaggerated, distorted or overly promoted on the web to make the impression that the problem is far more serious than in reality. specified narratives prey on emotions, primarily fear, fueling it to excessive size and causing it to disrupt a sober assessment of the situation. That is why Kremlin propaganda is peculiarly harmful.
Our weekly analyses (available Here.) are intended to present to readers current trends and changes in pro-Russian disinformation in Poland and Europe monitored primarily in the Telegram communicator and fewer websites and groups/pages on Facebook. Each analysis presents the most popular narratives of pro-Russian propaganda in the monitored period and discusses the most interesting aspects of it. It presents a full number of views of disinformation content and utilized by propaganda of the Russian Federation (for each country for the 3 most popular narratives).
Reports appear with any hold due to the request to process and compile data. They are open and are simplified versions of more detailed publications within the Open Information Partnership network. They can be utilized freely by readers, media and analytical centres with a clear indication of the source.
Analysis
More about our evaluation system:
The most popular narratives of pro-Russian propaganda in 12 countries of Central and east Europe (the highlighted narratives besides occurred in the erstwhile monitoring period):
- Poland will be dragged into war;
- The West intends to open the second front of the war with Russia;
- Ukrainians commit war crimes;
- Importing Ukrainian products destroys the economy;
- Ukraine loses the war;
- Russia wants peace, but Ukraine/West fuel conflict;
- Western societies do not support Ukraine;
- Ukrainian leadership is corrupt/incompetent;
- Russian troops decision forward/achieve crucial successes.
Nazism A Popular Subject Before triumph Day
Popularity of discrediting narratives Ukraine continues to grow. In this period of monitoring, especially frequently pro-Russian propaganda sources have attempted to present it as a Nazi state. This communicative has increased its popularity throughout Central and east Europe, gaining peculiar importance in the information spaces of the Baltic, Belarus, Bulgaria and Armenia.

Ukraine – corrupt, mediocre and doomed
Ukrainian leadership is increasingly accused of corruption, war crimes and incompetence, especially in the information spaces of Ukrainian allies, with the aim of weakening the affirmative image of Ukrainian authorities and thereby threatening the supply of Western military aid, which forms the basis for effective Ukrainian defence.

The communicative about corrupt Ukrainian government, traditionally present in the Ukrainian ecosystem of disinformation, has intensified in another erstwhile russian republics specified as Belarus and Georgia. specified growth can be initially linked to a possibly upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, to which pro-Russian propaganda seems to prepare through consistent promotion of claims that Ukrainian leadership has no strength and resources to succeed. These messages are naturally combined with claims that Russian troops are moving forward, and Ukraine will inevitably lose the war, meaning that supporting it is futile and serves only a pointless extension of the war. The claims that Kiev is doomed to lose have been appearing in the monitored area for any time, but in this week their number has increased significantly. In addition, accusations against the Kiev government about alleged attempts to introduce censorship have intensified.

The above-mentioned narratives discrediting Ukrainian leadership are gaining popularity in the information space of Central and east Europe and begin to replace messages on which prokremlian sources focused earlier. Efforts to find fresh ways to affect audiences and scope more readers are besides evident.
The ‘Second Front’, however, has not been opened
Apparently, the popularity of the previously radically promoted conspiracy explanation about the planned beginning of the “second front” against Russia by Western states is falling. erstwhile no “second front” appeared for respective weeks, the communicative lost interest in the audience. This explanation continues to be spread with limited success in Armenia, but its popularity is decreasing. In Poland, the communicative about the “second front” is simply a conspiracy explanation that Poland is preparing an invasion of Russia.

Cereals cease to affect the recipients
A akin situation concerns claims of injurious imports of Ukrainian products, especially cereals. This explanation was erstwhile highly popular in Poland and respective another countries, especially in Bulgaria. Exaggerating the impact of Ukrainian imports on local markets (which was indeed a challenge for agriculture, but not as the Kremlin's propaganda presented) and combining these accusations with claims of their alleged harmfulness has been the hallmark of a transnational disinformation strategy for respective weeks. Although specified claims are inactive present in Poland in connection with the national debate on liable support for Ukraine's economics and were, with considerable delay, captured in Slovakia, the overall strength of communicative itself began to decrease.
Poland – 132 1000 views
Ukraine – 9.1 million views
Armenia – 26 1000 views
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – 40 000 views
Belarus – 222 1000 views
Bulgaria – 424 1000 views
Georgia – 10,000 views
Hungary – 48 000 views
Moldova – 85 1000 views
Slovakia – 107 1000 views
Source:
Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group, Monitoring study April 15-23, 2023
This study provides insights from the monitoring of narratives appearing on procremlovian websites and on social media in 12 countries of Central and east Europe, related to Russia's war in Ukraine. The data was collected and analysed by a number of NGOs, think tanks and researchers, and subsequently compiled by the Open Information Partnership (OIP) to advance the exchange of cognition across the OIP network and throughout the region.