The penetration of Russian drones into Polish airspace is simply a deliberate act by the Russian Federation, not an accident. The only way to deter repeated provocations is through a united and decisive NATO response, 1 that avoids any appearance of weakness and denies the Russian military further incentive to act. erstwhile again, Russia is sending a clear signal: the Kremlin is disregarding the Trump Administration’s efforts to establish peace and is demonstrating readiness not only to proceed terrorizing civilian targets in Ukraine, but besides to widen the scope of hostilities.
Why the air attack is intentional, not an accident?
In the past summer, the Ukrainian side discovered Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards among the components of downed Russian drones. This most likely indicates that Russian operators were preparing to penetrate the airspace of NATO countries, since the SIM cards of local mobile operators would let them to connect to mobile networks and execute certain tasks.
First, to conduct reconnaissance work. The Russians are equipping drones with 4G modems and another equipment, which allows them to transmit information about the location of air defence systems, the operation of defence and electronic warfare systems, capture visual data, etc.
Second, to test the organization of airspace safety of the countries on NATO’s east Flank, identify its weaknesses and capabilities, the principles of interaction during patrols by the units of various Alliance countries, find the possible reactions of governments, etc.
Third, to provoke political destabilization. The Russians are demonstrating their readiness for a fresh form of escalation in order to undermine political stableness within the European Union and NATO. The key goal is to supply another reason to supporters of the thought of Russian concessions to discuss the request to end the war on the Kremlin’s terms, the expediency of stopping aid to Ukraine in order to prevent a direct NATO-Russia conflict, etc.
If erstwhile isolated drone incursions were meant to appear as coincidence, then the appearance of more than 20 drones in Polish airspace is hard to justify as a “deviation from the course”. Especially, against the background of many motivations and goals of the Russian side.
What’s more, it is worth knowing that the drones sent to Poland were most likely not intended to strike infrastructure facilities or another targets. Most likely, they did not even have a full-fledged explosive component; thus, formally NATO representatives can interpret the provocation not as an attack or a threat to territorial integrity.
The intent of specified a provocation is to alternatively conduct reconnaissance activities, to test NATO’s air defence systems, and prepare for the minute erstwhile the Russian military-political command decides to take more dangerous steps, including an operation to establish control over the Suwałki Corridor or intervention in another possible areas of the Baltic region.
Did Poland manage to cope with the provocation?
The Polish Armed Forces, in partnership with the Netherlands, Italy and Germany, took the essential measures at the time of the provocation. any of the drones were destroyed, which was an unprecedented step for NATO. Poland reasonably initiated consultations under NATO Article 4 in order not to leave the night attack without further attention.
However, the real effectiveness of the consequence depends on the adoption of further method and political measures. It should be noted that the joint NATO aviation did not manage to hit all air targets. It is inactive hard to calculate the exact percentage, but there were definitely drones which managed to cross a crucial distance deep into Polish territory or fell on their own after moving out of fuel. At the same time, a crucial resource of aviation equipment was active –four F-35 and F-16 fighter jets, 3 Mi-24, Mi-17 and Black Hawk helicopters were utilized to down drones. Considering that the equipment was in active usage all night (even the aircraft were refuelled), the full operation looks rather expensive.
Of course, it is worth paying tribute to the professionalism of the pilots, but there are 2 nuances that should be taken into account to guarantee even greater efficiency of further defensive operations. First, Russian drones are inexpensive to produce. The costs of shooting them down utilizing air resources will importantly exceed the cost of sending them into the airspace of NATO countries. The Russians can simply proceed to direct the drones in different directions, provoking a corresponding reaction from Poland and another allies in the Alliance. Moreover, Russia anly needs to deploy 50, or possibly even 100, units of inexpensive equipment in subsequent provocations, and the task of eliminating them in this manner would be severely complicated.
This is why Ukraine is actively seeking alternative, cost-effective ways to strengthen its air defence systems, enabling it to strike multiple targets at lower cost. A key part of this strategy involves improving electronic warfare capabilities, expanding the production of interceptor drones, and more. In this context, Poland and another NATO countries bordering Russia have strong possible for cooperation with Ukraine: the combat experience of Ukrainian soldiers and their cognition of advanced technologies, combined with European backing and support, could make an effective air defence shield.
As for political measures, Poland reacted within the limits of what is possible and made a pass to NATO. The Alliance can no longer show weakness, since provocations will surely continue. Among the possible actions of the Alliance that would make sense are the expansion of the military presence on the borders with the Russian Federation and Belarus, an increase in the number of aircraft patrolling the airspace over Poland, the Baltic countries, and Scandinavia.
At the same time, 1 key thing that can strengthen NATO’s position is to begin real consultations on the anticipation of creating a specialized region in the regions of western Ukraine (at least 150-200 kilometres long), where all air targets that appear to be on their way to NATO airspace could be shot down over Ukraine, before they penetrate Poland or Romania. Of course, specified a decision requires consensus and political will, but it would clearly fix the rules of the game and set real “red lines”. The Russian side is no longer afraid to cross the erstwhile lines set.
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Will Russia hotel to further provocations?
NATO has the chance to show its own strength without a direct military clash with Russia if it takes decisive steps after this provocation. Otherwise, fresh attempts by the Russian side to penetrate the Alliance’s airspace will be even more large-scale and provocative. At the very least, Russia now stands to benefit by systematically wearing down Europe’s air defence systems.
The Russian-Ukrainian war is developing along a trajectory to the point where thousands of drones will be in the air at 1 time. Another attack of Lviv or Volhynia regions will be an “excellent opportunity” to launch respective twelve more air targets into Poland or the Baltics. In this way Russia can begin to exhaust NATO even without a war.
The more that European countries usage costly resources to counter fresh provocations, the little they will be able to aid Ukraine, and will lose financially themselves. It is likely that this, too, is 1 of the Russian command’s simple calculations. Therefore, to reliably defend its own borders, Europe needs to make a comprehensive air defence system, which includes both costly fighters and installations, as well as cheaper means designed to continuously counter the next time a swarm of drones tries to abruptly penetrate their space.
The applicable technologies are already being tested by the Russians and this must be taken into account erstwhile planning military spending for the defence of European countries and erstwhile planning at the NATO level. Of course, countering the Russian threat should be comprehensive: it should include not only shooting down their drones or missiles, but besides expanding sanctions pressure, where Poland is leading the calls for specified action.
Traditionally, the atomic deterrence safety strategy is built on ensuring that atomic countries do not enter into direct conflict and that atomic weapons are not used. That is why the US and another NATO countries rightly explain their reluctance to provoke a direct military conflict with Russia. However, it seems that the Kremlin has found a different explanation of “nuclear deterrence”: Russia is investigating NATO’s strength with conventional methods, neutralizing the crucial advantage of the Alliance countries in conventional means with threats to usage atomic weapons in case of their conventional consequence to Russian provocations.
Such a Russian approach could lead to hostilities extending far beyond the borders of Ukraine, given the Kremlin’s plans to redistribute spheres of influence in Europe. It needs an effective consequence that will not provoke a real military confrontation between NATO and Russia, but will form clear “red lines” that will prevent the Kremlin’s further desire to test the Alliance. The Polish side has confirmed for itself: the Russian war is not only against Ukraine, it threatens everybody.
The key thing that can be done in these conditions is to full guarantee own defence capabilities and strengthen Ukraine’s military possible both within the framework of coordination of air defence systems and through investments in joint military-industrial activities supporting the Ukrainian army.
Interestingly, now erstwhile Viktor Orbán is blocking military aid packages from the EU budget and sabotaging joint decisions, he is putting not only Ukraine, but besides his own NATO allies under attack, as Polish abroad Minister Radosław Sikorski reminded him rather clearly via social networks.
NATO and the EU request further unity and support Ukraine as a defence outpost on the east flank, and not be afraid to show subjectivity, forcing Russia to make peace. Only then will fresh provocations be avoided.
Anton Naychuk is the manager of the East European Council, a think tank and public diplomacy club established to investigation and discuss current political, economical and social processes in east Europe and Central Asia.
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