On the night of 7-8 September, the Russian attack on Ukraine was launched by Polish military aviation, ground air defence and radio-location reconnaissance. The inhabitants of Lublin and Podkarpackie voivodships received 2 RCB alerts, later cancelled. The Polish airspace was not affected, but the night showed the price of constant readiness on the east border.
Russian attack put the Polish army on its feet
Operations Command of Types of Armed Forces launched at night the essential forces and measures following the increase in Russian long-range aviation activity that led to attacks on Ukraine. Military aviation began operating in the Polish airspace. Ground air defence and radio-location systems were besides put on alert.
The actions were preventive. Their aim was to safe the Polish space, especially areas adjacent to the Russian impact area. There's been no breach. That's crucial information, but there's no reason to underestimate the situation. Russia one more time forced the Polish state to launch an costly shield of its own sky.
Two alerts in 1 night
The first alert of the Government safety Center went to part of the population of Lublin and Podkarpackie voivodships after 4 a.m. Recipients were called upon to stay vigilant, track messages and respond to alarm sirens. The informing was cancelled before 5 o'clock erstwhile the service received information about the cessation of the threat.
Around 6.30 a.m., residents of the same regions received another communication related to the re-operation of military aviation. This alert was besides cancelled later. A dynamic change of messages may have caused concern, but the informing strategy is expected to work rapidly as the threat changes from minute to minute. After each specified night, the State should check whether the messages have arrived in time and were unambiguous to people.
In August A akin Russian attack besides launched Polish aviation and RCB alert. The repetition of these actions shows that they are no longer an extraordinary episode. They became part of the safety of residents of east Poland.
Preparedness costs, passiveness would cost more
For Poland the stake is direct. Any massive attack on the western regions of Ukraine may imply the request to choice up aircraft, increase radar work and put civilian services on alert. This is simply a burden for the military and the budget, which is the origin of Moscow's aggressive policy.
The only reason why you can't build a false sense of safety is due to the fact that that night did not break the border. Ukrainian intelligence warned against Russian investigating of NATO's east flank. Poland must so keep its ability to respond rapidly and treat allied support as a complement to its own defence.
The efficient pick-up of aviation and the launch of ground systems was the right answer. Now an equally reliable evaluation of alerts is needed. Poles in Lublin and Podkarpacie have the right to know what to do erstwhile the telephone wakes them in the mediate of the night. State sovereignty starts with the ability to defend its own territory and clear information for citizens.
Source: == sync, corrected by elderman ==, Communications of the Operational Command of the Russian Government and the Government safety Centre
