Russia and Poland Conservative Enlightened

Conversation with Dr. Boris Miedev, Russian polytologist and philosopher

We are all impressed by what happened in the Canadian Parliament. I mean the speech and solemn welcome of the veteran of the Waffen SS Galizien, a “hero” of modern Ukraine. I have read 1 of your statements, in which you express the view that present neobanderism, utmost Ukrainian nationalism can be regarded as, I quote, “the emergence of agrarian chtonic elements”. What did you mean and how do you interpret the essence of this nationalism?

– It's hard for me to put it scientifically, due to the fact that I didn't precisely do it. This can so be considered as any diletant hypothesis. However, it seems to me that there is simply a danger associated with the historical awakening of any nations, which for a long time were under the control of another nations. They fight everyone around them. They were never entities of history. In fact, in this case, there is nothing to appeal to, but for the flag episode. specified nations were usually subject to the historical impact of various empires, in this case Poland, Austria, the russian Union. Their elite has always been Polish, Russian, even more German, partly, in the financial sphere – Jewish. They have never dealt with anything but farming. And then they ended up in their national state. Now we have any kind of revenge for being in specified a humiliating situation for so long. The Russians or Poles have something to mention, they have historical narratives related to kingdoms, empires. We have heroic periods in our history, so we don't gotta appeal to any excesses. If the Russians could only appeal to Jermak or individual like that, they wouldn't have any another communicative but to remind them of any bloody episodes. And here we have the effects of a long function as agricultural periphery of the empire. It's a origin of large danger. Of course, it would be better if, at the time of the birth of the Ukrainian national state, the urban population had more influence there. The deviation towards Europe inevitably strengthened the function and importance of the western regions of the country that were not part of the Russian Empire. It was these regions that external players, like the United States, were set up by participants in various protests, and as a consequence we have what we have. Unfortunately. It was known from the beginning that specified a threat existed. It was essential to take any serious action, in peculiar to prevent cutting off from the Russian past, to emphasise the importance of the Russian origin in the national-creation process, but it was very difficult. In fact, the same thing happened in Latvia, for example, and there was a akin pattern of the birth of Nazism. besides in Estonia and to a lesser degree Lithuania. Peoples who have not played a function in past are entering the historical, political scene and have acquired specified bloodthirsty qualities from the very beginning. That is their destiny and, of course, it is very dangerous.

In Poland we now have, according to various authoritative data, about 2 million Ukrainian citizens. You can guess what language you can hear on the streets of Polish cities. This is, of course, the Russian language utilized by the vast majority of them. I have a question about that. Even if we put Huntington aside and those geopolitics and researchers of civilization who tried to draw the boundaries of civilisational communities, where you believe this boundary of the Russian planet and of Russian civilization crosses. I mean the territory of Ukraine. due to the fact that some, even if Huntington, believe that its western regions have nothing to do with the concept of the Russian world. Others, however, believe that this border coincides with the Polish border. What do you think?

– The limitrof area, according to Vadim Cymburski, of areas separating us from the West, is distinguished by the liquidity of borders. Their association with this or that civilization is not dictated by nonsubjective factors, but by a circumstantial political decision. This is situational. And this fluidity besides applies to those nations who supposedly have already made a civilizational choice, entered NATO and the European Union, but inactive do not constitute an organic component of the Romane-German historical-cultural type, as Nikolay Danilewski called it. They do not precisely fit into the EU, nor does Poland. Ukraine is clearly incapable to enter into a union, and as shortly as this issue occurs, we will witness a large number of different conflicts. Their first trailer is her cereal dispute with Poland. It's just the beginning. There will be more and Ukraine will be pushed distant from the European Union, although not immediately: it will be a long process. However, all question about borders has a political dimension. What territories is Russia entitled to? Therefore, if we look at this issue from the point of view of political pragmatism, from the point of view of the clear outline of the Russian world, I would, rather frankly, confine myself to those areas which, in 2014, after the coup in Kiev clearly declared their pro-Russian identity, took decisive action to show disobedience to Kiev, against the alleged Euro-election of Majdan. This is, of course, Crimea, where the events of 2014 took place; they are Donetsk and Luhansk circuits. With Odessa, it's complicated. The pro-Russian sentiments were evident there, but were physically eliminated. As a consequence of the events of May 2, 2014, most of its residents were intimidated. All another regions have accepted Ukrainian sovereignty and European choice, have recognised – to 1 degree or another – Majdan. There was no active action to show their belonging to Russian civilization. I do not regulation out that 1 day they will review their choice. But for today, I would establish a border according to the rule that it would cover the area where a pro-Russian rebellion occurred, specified a counter-revolution against Majdan. These are clearly the 3 regions and Odessa with a question mark. There we have the Russian world, it actually exists. It besides belongs to Transnistria, which, as they say, is more Russian than Russia itself. It chose the russian Union and remained faithful to it even erstwhile Russia cut off from the USSR. Of course, it's besides Abkhazia and South Ossetia. So where we are dealing with a clear choice of a nation, without any doubt, for Russia, frequently under conditions of orientation of the remainder of the state to the collective West, there we have the Russian world. Where there is no specified thing, I believe that Russia should not lose its strength to keep or join these territories. Another thing is that I find it hard to deny it now, due to the fact that they are constitutionally part of Russia. The current front line may be the limit on which conflict can be frozen. On the another hand, I hope, in fact, that sooner or later, in Kiev and in another regions of Ukraine, possibly outside Galicia, they will revise their European choice. There is no place for Ukraine. Her clashes with Europe – I do not consider the United States here – will be very serious. Ukraine will stress that it has defended Europe's breast-feeding against Russian aggression and so has peculiar privileges; that it should be adopted on peculiar terms into the European Union. Europe will, of course, take the other position and all this will lead to a revision of this European choice of Ukraine. And then – I think in about 10-15 years – there will be a pregnancy in our direction. And we gotta wonder in Russia how we will behave then, due to the fact that I do not think that we request the full territory of this Ukraine. Russia has already made a large mistake by joining Galicia, which has created a threat to the flagplantation of Ukraine. However, these are all questions for the future, and present I believe that Russia should in no way search territories that show no loyalty to it.

Let us decision on to your fresh geopolitical reflections. I mean your article for “Russia in Global Politique” and 5 principles of paleoconservativeism formulated by you. I'd like to ask you a fewer more circumstantial questions. You compose about geopolitical blocks of the future. I realize that you think that there may be only 3 specified blocks?

– No, I didn't say it that strongly. I believe that as shortly as the Western task begins to be clearly institutionally manifested on the basis of the G7 skeleton and its cultural, axiological and economical unification occurs, there will be separation from it from the Global South and a number of another countries. I think another countries are going to start building blocks. China does not truly want to act on this logic now, it does not suit them - it wants to be a global economical power without wanting to limit itself to Pakistan, North Korea and respective another countries. However, as shortly as China’s deterrence script begins, for example, it will benefit from any preferences Vietnam, too, will begin to follow block logic. It is hard to say whether there will be a Russian-Chinese bloc on a more serious level, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization turned into the equivalent of NATO, but something like this can begin. Russia will besides face the request to build a real block around itself, concluding that the existing structures, specified as the Organization of the Collective safety Agreement, no longer function and request close, vertical integration around it. This is already happening, but for now it concerns vassal states specified as Abkhazia or South Ossetia. However, it will already be a expression consisting of 100% certainty that its members will support Russia and Russia will support them. This block logic will not be besides comfortable for Russia; as we can see, it is trying to argue it. However, it seems inevitable due to the fact that otherwise the Collective West will deal with everyone. Armenia will become a origin in stopping Russia, as will Vietnam – stopping China. Regional blocks will so begin, in which I believe Russia and China will besides take part. I think India will decide for that, too. We will so have at least 4 blocks in Eurasia. We inactive have the muslim planet and Turkey, which clearly distances itself from the collective West, clearly organically does not belong to it. To the Turkish block, of course, belongs to Azerbaijan. The countries of Central Asia can besides become part of it. So I think that a full of 4 or 5 blocks will be created in Eurasia. That's the logic.

So this is simply a kind of multipolar world?

A multiblock load. Actually, Huntington predicted it, but he was incorrect about a fewer things. First, they were besides closely linked to religions, causing any tensions and question marks. Besides, he gave it all specified a somewhat conservative character. He did not see that the Collective West would not unite on the basis of attachment to civilization's roots, but on the basis of any liberal global projects. So he underestimated this liberalism, what he termed with contempt the Davos culture. He did not foresee that they would become a origin for the unification of civilization, which he argued exceptionally. He didn't think of that. Although he should have thought about it, due to the fact that he wrote reports to the Tripartite Commission, which was the first of the collective western bloc. Instead, he wanted this civilization to be more religious, oriented to historical roots. Meanwhile, it became completely the opposite.

As for the collective west... Imagine the next year's election is won by Donald Trump. say he doesn't have any brakes in the form of a deep state, although it's hard to imagine. But let's effort to presume that he's starting to prosecute a truly isolatorial policy in the United States. Do you believe that in this case, what we call the collective West can break down and that continental Europe can become 1 of the players again?

– There's a chance. In history, anything is possible, including this scenario. It is believed that in 2018 Trump considered twice his speech with NATO. I'm certain these claims have any reason. Apparently, he was stopped by John Bolton. possibly the 3rd time, if he's not next to Bolton, it'll work. At the same time, the structures of the collective West and the deep state would most likely not sit with their hands on and watch Trump disassemble as Boris Yeltsyn erstwhile dismantled the russian Union. There would most likely be any countermeasures. Candidates are already visible to take over the function of the United States, in peculiar the United Kingdom. It makes it clear that the United States, as a consequence of interior divisions, can no longer claim the right to be a collective captain of the West, and that it can guide it further. I read quite a few American and British press, and I see that there are different voices in American media, while the British talk about the conflict in Ukraine with 1 voice, possibly with the exception of respective authors like Christopher Hitchens. A unanimous anti-Russian position is clear. It's not precisely in America. Firstly, we have the Republican Party, the majority of which holds a different position on the conflict in Ukraine. Even in the Democratic organization there are besides different opinions, experts. Consensus is so not so obvious, besides on another issues, specified as abortion. On the another hand, it seems to me that Trump will not return, that something will happen to him or to America, which will not let him to take over. If he wins, he will be categorically required to leave NATO. Thirdly, I think he's being suggested to channel energy into the anti-Chinese direction, actually accepted by the American establishment. Here he can prove himself; I think he'll get carte blanche. And in this context, he can besides argue with Russia, due to the fact that she will not run after it. So I don't think the collective west is going to fall apart due to Trump. I am certain that building the block strategy is simply a permanent phenomenon. He and Trump will survive, regardless of America being a challenge to him. It's actually the most crucial challenge to halt the formation of the transatlantic block.

Maybe that's good. If we consider, like you, that the dissolution of this Euro-Atlantic cooperation and American isolationism can lead to dominance of the position represented present by London and the tiny entent you are writing about – Poland and the Baltic countries...

Yeah, it's a large threat. I think we avoided the possible of a direct confrontation with NATO in 2022 solely due to the fact that America stopped Britain. You can argue about it, but you did. I don't truly want to talk positively about Washington's politics from an ethical point of view or the pragmatism of his own interests. However, war would be inevitable if Britain dominated. All of Boris Johnson's actions led to Russia's direct clash with all of NATO. We had attempts to escalate a kind of Kaliningrad blockade in June 2022. specified a horizontal escalation would lead to Russia's reaction. The optimal solution for Russia would be to last the collective West, but under the guidance of more pragmatic people. There's no point in trying to break it. Russia won't be part of it anyway. But this collective West should realize that there are limits to Russia. It seemed to me that in 2021, erstwhile Putin met Biden in Geneva, something like this began to hatch. Clearly, however, the language of common knowing was not adequate for both sides. It's like they talk different languages. We don't know if there are any hidden reasons that this happened, but from what I read – and I read rather a lot about it – I feel that they just spoke in different languages. possibly even the United States did not intend to provoke Russia, but their actions bore many different possible interpretations. Russia chose an explanation that was more appropriate to it, although it turned out to be wrong.

About the ideological framework of this block strategy you're talking about... The Collective West has its postmodern or neoliberal ideological set, although there is no unanimity, as you know, even though Poland or Hungary are different in this matter. What about Russia? You're offering her conservative ideas...

- Conservative Enlightenment.

Yeah. How would you characterize this ideology? How much could it increase Russia's soft strength in another countries? Would she be attractive?

– I think that if this thought is decently formulated, it will be very attractive. In total, she began to be attractive until the events of 2022 occurred. Russia was in Eurasia a moderate, conservative, European force at origin level, but not European in terms of current standards. A force with geopolitical subjectivity and certain prospects for technological development; capable of building satellites and moon rovers and mostly having a technologically advanced future. I believe that it is full possible to return to this image. There are, however, any factors that make it impossible to do this anymore. Firstly, the Russian intellectual class should be guaranteed a serious participation in this project. Therefore, the attitude towards intellectuals must be revalued in Russia, given the function of an crucial component of this process. And that's what I call conservative enlightenment. The intellectual class should be convinced that it is up to its efforts to find the civilisational future of the country, and not only the representatives of the force departments. In Russia, we call it a imagination of the future, and that is what this is truly about. The second crucial component is that the logic of block division itself – especially in the context of the collective West – inevitably leads to the necessity of a conservative Enlightenment project, which was formulated in the 17th century for national states. The transatlanticisation process leads to a counter-enlightenment project. The erstwhile is about the thought that certain countries lead another countries by hand through history. This is simply a kind of belief in the Netherlands or Brussels that they have made progress, and you Poles are inactive backward. You don't really know what your future looks like. This is absolutely not an Enlightenment Project, due to the fact that it is that we ourselves are going where we deem appropriate, and no 1 will lead us by the hand. This is what Kant wrote about, claiming that preachers, holy books, and institutions are not needed here. Today, liberal formation aspires to the function of secular and spiritual authority, which leads to a bright future of backward nations, incapable to even imagine that future. It is not by accident that we have here the question of technological synchronisation, the denial of human control over our own fate, artificial intelligence. This is all no accident; these are issues related to the collective task of the West. The formation of this collective West as an empire marks the end of the Enlightenment Project. Russia has a good chance in this situation to announce the resuscitation of an enlightenment task based on its conservative worldview. In this way we can separate ourselves from the totalitarian, controlling units of China, and, on the another hand, the collective West proclaiming that it is leading us any way that we ourselves are not yet to understand. In the meantime, Russia predominates tradition and the human person, any human rights and nations, who are denied progressive names.

But all this doesn't mean cutting off modern technology, like giving up artificial intelligence?

– No, it's not about denying them. The point is to admit that the usage of artificial intelligence should be subject to human control. It is simply a man who should control the processes he initiates. We can't summon spirits that we can't control. No Frankensteins. We only usage what we can turn off. Things that we can't turn off are not allowed to turn on at all. We can call that a motto. Conservative Enlightenment.

Finally, the question about the future and prospects of Polish-Russian relations. Choose any expression – forecasts, evaluations, what you want to convey.

– From a technological point of view, historical inertia remains an unexplained phenomenon for me. I did not think that Poland would keep the negative side of our relation in mind. Turns out it is. I'm certain it can be overcome, but this historical inertia is amazing. erstwhile I was increasing up, there was no anti-polonism in us at all, due to the fact that – although everyone read Pushkin – they did not dislike contemporary Poland. We didn't anticipate old bills, grudges to come first. We have a affirmative example of Hungary, which, after all, have many reasons to resent Russia. After all, she suppressed the Hungarian uprising in 1956. This was not the case with Polish “Solidarity”. russian Russia imposed a circumstantial government there. Hungarians so have quite a few reasons to have an injury to Russia, and besides, ethnically they are not as close to us as Poles. And yet, as you can see, we have a completely different relation with them – pragmatic, partnership. It can even be said that Hungary is closest to us from among the members of the European Union. In fact, a akin phrase in relations with Poland is not impossible. Yes, we had different moments in history. But from a geopolitic point of view, we are not peculiarly divided. It is apparent that Russia is not going to invade Poland – it is ridiculous. Poland does not want to attack Russia. I do not believe that Poland wants to dismantle Ukraine. This is simply impossible in the 21st century, due to the fact that everyone will immediately mention Munich agreements. And any country that would decide to participate in the partition of the sovereign territory of Ukraine would get a fascist state in Europe. I think our relation should change. However, this requires the resignation of a circumstantial memory policy, both by the Russian and Polish sides. This constant emphasis on the work of the another side for planet War II. Meanwhile, our countries have suffered the biggest losses if they number the percent of the population. Apart from Germany, no of the another countries specified as the russian Union and Poland suffered. I may be wrong, but I think so. This common anti-fascist past should be crucial to us. There was besides a common communist past, a hard period of the Russian Empire. It is very crucial that our countries do not fit into the European Union. Poland already has problems with this, due to the fact that as a conservative country it will not want to be a part of the liberal world, which will request more and more of it. This will take place as part of this globalist project, the formation of the collective West. This trial can't be stopped. He has any hard to realize for us and for you, purpose, but these goals are abroad to us and to you. Therefore, we are a small early and you are a small later – we will start looking for ways out of this situation. This does not mean that we will unite, do not give God! However, if Poland creates its planet as a friendly country towards Russia, it may be beneficial for us at any stage. Both of our countries have made mistakes. Russia's main mistake was to bet on Germany. This was an apparent effort to skip Poland; all those Northern gas pipelines, which yet did nothing. We missed Poland, but we did not accomplish anything with it. It was your mistake to bet on Britain, this British anti-Russian project. Relationships with this global Britain do nothing good. As a result, the British created a problem for Poland in the form of Ukraine. If we can base our relation on specified conclusions...

I am highly grateful that you have noticed the separation from the reality of claims that Poland intends or would be able to participate in the partition of Ukraine. You don't really know how stubbornly I fought with that kind of stuff, in Russian media... I besides find it improbable and unrealistic from a geopolitical point of view.

– It's an thought to fix any powerful people in Russia that they have remained. They're afraid to question.

We are perfectly aware of how this works. Thank you so much for talking to me.

Matthew Piskorski spoke

Dr. Boris Miedev (born 1970 in Moscow) – Russian political scientist, philosopher, journalist. Lecturer at the Faculty of doctrine of the Moscow State University Mikhail Lomonosov, whom he graduated from. He is the president of the editorial board of the „Russkaja Idej” portal and the editor-in-chief of the portal Publico.ru. Conservative publicist and analyst. Promoter of the achievements of Vadim Cymburg in geopolitics.