Who are the main Iranian quarterbacks and what options are available for them in the conflict with Israel? Are negotiations possible? What is the basis of the regime's power, and what is the possible for change within Iranian society? Can east Europe inspire Iranian reformers? Leszek Jażdżewski talks with Dr. Walter Posch, an Orientalist working as an expert on mediate East Affairs at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Management at the National Defence Academy in Vienna.
Leszek Jażdżewski (LJ): Why is Iran so hard to return to negotiations with Israel, especially with the United States?
Walter Posch (WP): In addition to the historical developments between the 2 countries, there is besides 1 method aspect and 1 political aspect which makes it very hard for both parties to return to negotiations. Firstly, the positions and starting points of both parties are very remote. Iran has made it clear from the outset that zero uranium enrichment is not an option, while Americans in their fresh statements insisted on this.
Then there is the way Americans negociate – for example in the case of a peculiar negotiator, Steve Witkoff (a United States peculiar Envoy to the mediate East), who is surely a very competent person. However, Iran has a long past of global atomic negotiations and appears with a squad that includes very experienced technocrats and atomic scientists. Therefore, even if you are a large businessman and negotiator, I uncertainty if it will be easy if you do not have individual like Abbas Araghchi (the Minister of abroad Affairs of Iran) on your side who understands the subtlest details of the negotiation of this very delicate atomic agreement, containing all method gaps and details.
With this in mind, there is simply a second aspect of Iran's way of seeing current events. erstwhile these negotiations were prepared, Israel attacked and continued to attack and kill atomic negotiators, among others. Iran lost its vigilance, reasoning that during negotiations with the Americans there would be no attack due to the fact that president Donald Trump would never let a 3rd organization to disrupt talks or bilateral negotiations. Consequently, the Iranians wonder if the Americans have already cheated them from the very beginning. Whether this is the case, from Tehran's perspective, this is surely 1 of the possibilities, especially given the fact that so many atomic negotiators are already dead.
The reopening of the negotiations will so require large political will and even greater courage from the Iranian negotiating teams. If they uncover themselves and then they are attacked in their country, and tens of uninvolved neighbours die with you, it is truly immense to have the burden of reopening negotiations. On the another hand, all another options (such as deficiency of negotiation, taking a tougher position, or even going to attack US troops) are even more risky and will surely lead to a confrontation that Iran has always avoided.
Interestingly, both Donald Trump and JD Vance stated that this was all about Iran's atomic program, not anything else. So now the question is, how can we resume these conversations? Given that there is no longer an EU mechanics that would let the EU to enter into and let all parties active to engage straight or indirectly.
LJ: It now appears that Israel has control of Iran's airspace and is attacking various targets. To what degree does this mean that Iran is trying to mobilize society, prepare to face and undermine the legitimacy of the regime? What are your options for the Iranian government for society?
WP: There are many possibilities. But first, let us clarify a fewer points. Israel actually controls airspace with its air force, that's true. However, on the another hand, what does "airspace control" mean erstwhile the opposing organization has advanced rockets that could hit Israeli territory and destruct infrastructure in a way that has not yet been recorded? We have never seen specified destruction, even during the six-day war or during the Syrian attack on Israel in the early 1970s. The harm and failure which Iran is presently inflicting on Israel, as well as its self-esteem, is rather large due to the fact that they are truly serious.
The second issue concerns the political language that departs from the revolutionary slogans “Great Satan”, “Little Satan” and anti-imperialism for national defence. That is why the legal aspect is so important. That's why the army is withdrawing. That is why the language is used: “This is our homeland. We have been attacked!’ In addition, over the past fewer weeks, the Iranians have been able to detect many sabotage groups that have cooperated with Israelis or Israeli safety equipment. It may seem nothing big, but for them it is crucial adequate to show that they are in charge and rule.
After the first wave of shocks (such as the attack on the Tehran waterworks and the detonation of car bombs) Tehran seems to be able to keep order, at least for now. This may explain why the Israelis' fresh attacks were more difficult, more painful and mentally damaging to the Iranians. Moreover, it was very interesting what was not so destructive, namely the American attacks on atomic objects, due to the fact that it is hard to believe that there were no casualties.
In this context, the harm is surely extensive, but beyond that, fresh discussions concern how much enriched uranium the Iranians have moved to another safe place. Under another circumstances, this could be a tiny success, but given the harm done to Iran by the Israelis, Tehran cannot simply declare victory.
On the another hand, Israel cannot declare triumph and say, “Now we are letting go.” Of course, to the large surprise of many military experts, neither organization has yet exhausted its rocket supplies, and this will surely not happen before the end of this conflict.
Today society, especially its secular part, wants nothing to do with the regime, and surely not with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who for many people in the mediate East is simply a kind of villain. On the another hand, real opposition groups (those that have ties to another countries or are willing to catch arms) are mainly Sunnic fundamentalists who are so sympathetic to the Palestinians that, according to their declarations, they would not stand up for the Iranian homeland. That's what it's called, more extremist opposition.
In a broader perspective, however, the government has lost a crucial part of its credibility in fresh years – especially the Iranian safety services – and so the Revolutionary defender is having rather serious problems with the public.
First, the number of volunteers dropped dramatically. Secondly, if you look at how the Revolutionary defender avoids having sole work for certain events (such as the shooting down of a civilian passenger aircraft 4 years ago due to the insistence on the usage of the inexperienced crew of the Revolutionary defender units liable for air defense, or in a unusual case of erstwhile Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, erstwhile the Revolutionary defender was liable for his method security, and erstwhile this happened, the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, who was a state guest, would have been a large burden for all country.
These events show more than just the request for improvement of the Revolutionary Guard, and item the request to take even more crucial steps, up to a very deep restructuring. In fact, 3 restructurings have already been carried out last year. Meanwhile, the “ordinary” armed forces retained their reputation and tradition. It is fundamentally an old Iranian army that is apolitical and inactive has any respect.
The strategy itself is presently in a phase in which it is experiencing the same crisis as in the fresh years of chess. Social issues are aversion to leadership, but any of the another issues are much more serious. How can multiethnic and multi-denominational societies be treated fairly? We all know Iran is mostly Shiite, and 50 or 55% of the population are Persian, but what about the rest?
Our number concept clearly does not work in Iran, but there are different cultural groups there. So what is the solution? The last individual who tried to give a better answer than the erstwhile government was president Hassan Rouhani, who tried to make the strategy more democratic and inclusive. However, the papers he produced remained in the academic sphere and had no political significance.
As far as the Sunni issue is concerned, it is very unusual that there is simply a correlation between women's rights and the rights of the spiritual minority, due to the fact that actual tolerance is that it is actually said, "We don't care." As a state, for example, it can be said that women must be covered up in state offices for certain reasons. This can be done, but in private and public life it should not be required. The Sunni insisted on this due to the fact that it is simply a manifestation of the religiousness of a certain mediate class and a symbol of the revolution.
On the another hand, it deprives half the population of the right to choose. As a result, we now have Muslim and muslim women who say, “Well, I would like to have a choice and I want my sisters to have it too”. Even as marginal as erstwhile president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he said, “Well, a female should decide.”
At the same time, out of 95 million people, at least 30 million are Sunni, which is simply a immense number. There are cultural minorities, specified as the Belujs, Turkmenistan, Kurds, Arabs and Persians, especially in east Iran. These tensions and problems come first. erstwhile the Iranian government is in crisis, current tensions aid it a little, due to the fact that it can change the communicative of national defence and patriotism. This may work for a month, but the real problems are only put aside for later.
At the same time, with the current leadership and under the regulation of the 80-year-old leader of the revolution, even if he wanted to, he would not be the individual who would change Iran, would power him with fresh energy and carry out the essential reforms. Given the longevity of the current regime, its weaknesses and strengths are now profoundly rooted in the state structure. Consequently, state improvement and government improvement are now going hand in hand, so any improvement in Iran will be painful – whether it is peaceful, at its own pace or imposed.
It seems that all political elites and Iranian society are avoiding any change due to the fact that they were blocked at all times. Whether it's intellectuals, technocrats or anyone else, even though they tried to make the muslim Republic a more rational and liberal place, they never had an influence proportional to their meaning.
This tension now reaches its climax and regularly leads to explosions. The lower the abroad pressure, the more frequently these explosions occur. If you leave this country alone, after a phase of comparative calm the situation gets worse. We saw this a fewer years ago after Mahsa Amini's death, erstwhile everything exploded, but not as a coordinated revolutionary or anti-regime movement. The striking thing was that in Iran people were very outraged and said, “Stop killing, halt acting like this!” Nevertheless, they did not even bother to say, "We are revolutionaries, we want to overthrow this system!" Rather, they said, “Just behave.” This is simply a much newer citizen approach than what we observed in the early years of the regime. At present, in view of the ongoing crisis, this attitude is somewhat suspended and somewhat weakening, but returns with each case of torture or death.
Even if the government claims that there is credible evidence of spies here and there (which may or may not be true), it is simply a fact that Iran is the main mark of global intelligence services. We have seen this many times in Europe, erstwhile an ideological regime, initiated by young, passionate people, is ageing and just becoming unpleasant. A akin situation is presently taking place in Iran due to the fact that it is an ideological strategy that loses its meaning as shortly as it relaxes and allows more votes and forces to take over. Chess had the same problem erstwhile he created the one-party state, the Rastakhiz party. The current government faces the same problem.
LJ: From the outside it seems that all legal alternatives to the muslim Republic are limited. Is it realistic to consider specified options in the future, after ending hostility in 1 way or another, or is it besides far-reaching?
WP: I don't think it's going besides far. That question will come up. I hope that it will appear in Iran, formulated by young Iranians or Iranian technologists, by Iranians from all levels of society, and that they will find their way. There's no request for a fantastic constitution. It is much more crucial to halt abuse in prison.
Iran has another problems. He's comparatively close to Afghanistan with his drug centers. Therefore, the Iranians frequently have an ambivalent approach. On the 1 hand, they request a strong safety strategy due to the fact that specified a large country evidently needs it. On the another hand, they're afraid of him. They besides have a strong authoritarian tradition. But let me explain 1 thing: given the past of a flawed but inactive dynamic Iranian parliamentary system, even though not democracy, the Iranians have always had issues of national sovereignty and democracy going hand in hand.
Even if any opposition representatives obey, they always describe the current government as an alien implant, possibly getting out of control, but elected by the West to submit to the Iranian left and so on. Others would say that Iran's highest leader Ali Chamenei stayed in Russia for any time. We see strong nationalism not in the sense of cultural superiority of 1 group, but independency in a very classical and non-European way.
We Europeans are accustomed to having national sovereignty, but we share a common destiny with another countries. Meanwhile, erstwhile I talk to Iranian democrats, people with democratic views, they always jump between 2 extremes. On the 1 hand, they claim that with the aid of the West they could get something and leave the current regime. On the another hand, they say there can be no abroad interference. This is simply a contradiction in itself. Therefore, in a sense they do not have a figure akin to Masaryk that could negotiate, realize the global political strategy and formulate what their national destiny is now. All this is missing due to the fact that there is no intellectual tradition of this type.
At the same time, at least half of the population was conditioned by 2 pillars. 1 of them is Iranian nationalism in the old Reza Chess tradition – a very watered nationalism from the 1930s. frequently the same people claim at the same time that president Ahmadinejad was a good example for them. If the debate on democracy involving the Iranians is not well conducted, it could be possibly dangerous, as it can easy lead to local separatist sentiments.
This brings me back to the concept of non-ethnicity, but of Iranian regionalism, which is how the central and periphery strategy is managed in Iran. Therefore, it is not about seeking to make a wonderful constitution on paper, but alternatively about practice within a given strategy and how the Iranians would like to do so at the minute – due to the fact that the current provincial strategy and relations between provincial authorities and central authorities are fundamentally the same as in the 1920s. The state is so very afraid that this is not related to the nature of the regime, but the nature of the government can be changed. And that's where I see the only function in the West.
This is about torture and political prisoners. It's about old, good, classical liberal values and the fact that people don't deserve that treatment. This does not gotta mean a complete improvement of the safety sector, but a improvement of the prison system. Iran is almost breaking a evidence in the number of executions, especially given that most executions are carried out on cultural minorities. That's the problem. The Iranians are painfully aware of this and want to change it.
When this changes, erstwhile force is eliminated from the system, another debate will gotta start. Then it will be possible to address more basic topics. This is not so much about combining religion and state. Rather, it is that the head of state is at the same time his highest judge, which is simply a fundamental problem. The apparent failure of the current constitutional law strategy is an ironic repetition of the imperial system.
Nevertheless, chess said that this is the constitution and that it cannot modernize the country, which is why it repealed the constitution. Now there is another powerful figure who is simply a constitutional justice and interprets what is incorrect as he pleases. Therefore, it may seem that this is simply a completely different system, but the problem is the same as before. This sounds very much like a strict muslim issue now, but of course it is just a question of authoritarian rule. This is highly convenient erstwhile you are strongmen Where you're a judge, a president, a defence minister, all in 1 person.
Learn more: https://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publicationen/book_the_iranian_security_apparatus_poch_web.pdf
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Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
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