The war in Ukraine, which has lasted for 3 years, despite all its tragicism, is so beneficial for us that it allows us to observe what future conflict may look like, and to adapt our armed forces to the challenges they face. 1 lesson we should learn is that even the postulated 300-thousandth army is not adequate to wage a long-term war with a stronger opponent, and the state-of-the-art tanks, armored transporters, or artillery systems will not do much good if there is no 1 to fill their crews. So there are many and well-trained reserves. However, the strategy of training reservists leaves much to be desired and requires urgent reform.
According to the latest investigation conducted by IBRiS for “Rzeczpospolita” little than 11% of respondents declare that in the event of war they will volunteer to join the army. Apart from the fact that this is simply a decrease of respective percent points compared to akin studies carried out a year earlier, and taking an amendment to the fact that the veracity of specified declarations will be seen only erstwhile the war actually breaks out, it means much more possible volunteers than we request in the event of a full-scale conflict akin to the war in Ukraine. At the same time, far besides many of our armed forces can rapidly train them in the event of mass mobilization or after the war. Therefore, as a state, we should usage the time of peace, so that people ready to defend their homeland gradually and comprehensively prepare to participate in the conflict.
Training reserve soldiers in the 10th Opole Logistics Brigade.
This nonsubjective is to be served by the late announced programme of general voluntary military training. We do not know the details yet, so it is hard to blindly criticize or praise this initiative, but the question arises as to how it will disagree from the already available forms of volunteer military training. Since the suspension of compulsory collection in 2009, there have been various possibilities of voluntary military service – from National Reserve Forces to Academic Legia to territorial defence troops and voluntary essential military service. Anyone willing to take training – and although of course there were many volunteers, their number does not adhere to the 4 million people declaring their willingness to defend their homeland with arms in hand and definitely does not meet our individual reserves. So will the introduction of further proposals, specified as voluntary training "for all adult man", change anything?
As a erstwhile professional soldier and a multiple associate in exercises and reserve courses, I believe that the problem is not in the absence of a suitable programme, but in adapting the training to modern realities, planned needs of armed forces and volunteers' expectations. The current widely understood strategy of reserve training is the most after the stepmother component of state defence. He besides has the disadvantage that, through his, to put it mildly, anachronistic and inefficient assumptions, he effectively discourages the military service not only of those who would like to avoid it, but besides of citizens genuinely willing to stand up for the country in the event of war.
Someone mischievous might say that this is due to the fact that photographs of politics against the background of shiny fresh tanks and haubic look nicer and more appealing to a possible voter than a photograph with even the most motivated and well-trained reserveist. However, whatever the real causes of this situation are, our strategy of acquiring and training reserves needs urgent reform. Reforms that will be beneficial not only to individual reservists, but besides to the training military unit, and yet to the full state. The good news is that you don't gotta break down the open door here, but you gotta scope for the experience of countries where the strategy works better than we do.
One of the problems with the current strategy is the absolute deficiency of predictability. The provision of voluntary training in any form causes you to be placed on the list of reserve soldiers, of which people are then called upon for mandatory exercises in a vague way. Under the law, the reserve holder should be notified of the training no later than 14 days before its commencement. Even if this word would be extended twice or 3 times, for many people conducting their own business or working on the basis of more flexible forms of employment than a contract of employment an unexpected call to the unit for respective weeks could, without exaggeration, ruin their career. Not to mention the complications of private life.
It is clear that there are situations where reservists are urgently called upon, specified as the exacerbated global situation or natural disasters. In principle, however, nothing stands in the way of each reserve soldier being trained according to a strict plan and knowing in advance how many trainings, exercises and courses he will take and during which periods.
This solution would not only let the reservation holder to adapt professional and private life to the training calendar, but would besides warrant regular training. Even the best organized exercises will not be much usage if the skills gained from them are not regularly trained. any basic competences – specified as the operation of tiny arms – can be adopted erstwhile and even after years to a lesser or greater degree by a reservist remembered, but in the case of more specialized skills a fewer years' break makes it essential to train a soldier from the beginning. A large part of our reserves are specified cases: people who are formally trained and prepared to take up a position in a military unit, but in fact they wore a uniform a few, a twelve or even decades ago.
A strict agenda of regular exercises besides avoids situations – now the norm – in which any of the reservists are called upon to train many times, others very rarely, and there are those who have not been summoned once, while in military units meet in the same exercises people with highly different skills and experience. This translates into the request to adapt the training programme to the least trained, which makes all scholars inactive and inactive absolutely basic.
A concrete position, in a peculiar unit, of training in line with the time of war, according to a pre-defined plan, with more or little the same people – would not only let for reserving development, but would translate into his assurance and a sense of being competent in his field, which in turn increases morale and readiness to participate in the conflict. At the same time, specified a strategy would let supervisors and instructors to get to know the trainees better, identify those who stand out and direct them towards additional, more specialised courses or vice versa – those who stand out and require more attention or transfer elsewhere.
Another change that would improve the attractiveness of military service in the reserve would be the appointment of posts according to predispositions, experience, and, if possible, even – due to the fact that why not? – the aspirations and preferences of the volunteer. It would be Truism to say that all man has different skills, talents and ambitions, but this banal fact is frequently overlooked erstwhile broadcasting military specialities and mobilization allowances. This leads to a situation where a professional medical rescuer becomes a bomb squad, a 50-year-old logistics with a spine defect is assigned to the crew of the whaubic, where he must carry dense missiles and a young, athletic volunteer dreaming of serving in special troops or the air-desert is given the post of accountant or excavator operator. And again: taking into account individual talents and ambitions is not only beneficial for a peculiar reservist who can make in his desired direction during military service and gain qualifications besides in civilian careers, but besides for armed forces who benefit from the professional cognition provided by a volunteer or just his involvement.
Next: adapting training to the realities of the modern battlefield. The war in Ukraine has been going on for over 3 years now, and everyone, even if he does not want to, has seen the pictures of this conflict. The contrast between what a real war looks like, what skills are needed on it, and what challenges are faced by fighting soldiers in it, and what training in a military unit looks like, is simply a very powerfully affecting the morale of a reserveist. The fast absorption of experiences from Ukraine and the conversion of these experiences into training aspects should be a priority.
One of the most frequently raised by participants in the training of the reserve issues is quality of uniforming and equipment issued for exercise. The uniforms or shoes utilized are standard, as are the equipment from the erstwhile era: celebrated cheetahs, pushbags or steel helmets. Of course, the military has its limitations and it is hard to anticipate any soldier coming to the unit for a fewer days or weeks to get the most modern equipment consecutive from the production line. But on the another hand, if anyone thinks that specified things don't matter, he's wrong. Convince of being needed, respected, taken seriously is an crucial component of building a service ethos, which translates into morale and readiness to participate in subsequent trainings, and in the longer term, an armed conflict.
Another component of the improvement of the reserve training strategy would be to make the military service not seen as a waste of time, but as an component of building its career, social position or even as an elite public service. We are not able to train the full society in a short time – we are limited not only by the costs of specified a project, but besides by the number of instructors or even specified trivial things as the anticipation of accommodation and catering trained in military units. However, there is no request for all citizen to form a soldier or to force the full yearbooks into the army. You can trust on a volunteer. However, in order to attract a adequate number of volunteers, they should be offered more than the possible of fighting in the front row. In another words, doing the service — or even the declared willingness to do the service — should affect certain privileges.
What these privileges would consist of – a substance for discussion, but there is simply a very wide spectrum of possibilities: from subsidies to education by the anticipation of gaining various qualifications to the most controversial proposal, which is to make certain civilian and political rights dependent – to taking positions in the state administration or electoral rights, for example, from the passage of military training.
And for those who do not want to undergo specified training: equally professional and well-organised civilian protection training. due to the fact that another lesson we should learn from the Ukrainian conflict is that the war does not only affect those in active service and not only the result depends on them. In addition to the soldiers in the trenches, the state besides needs a backroom, a functioning economy, people who simply stay in the country, will proceed to work and pay taxes to finance war activities. And to these people, even if for various reasons they do not want or cannot stand in the arms of their homeland, the state besides owes it to supply the chance to best prepare for the armed conflict.
However cynical it would sound, all day of war in Ukraine, all destroyed Russian tank and fallen Russian soldier buy us any time to prepare for a possible future conflict. It is crucial that we do not waste this time, and in addition to buying weapons and military equipment, we besides pay any attention to people who will service them during the war.
