The expedition of the Lower Silesians to the East Kresa under the direction of Dr Tadeusz Samborski, associate of the current word of the Polish Sejm, is an extraordinary tourist and political adventure, a lesson in cultural and historical education, and, above all, an chance to intellectually reflect on Poland's relations with direct neighbours in the East.
A fewer days' journey to Lithuania in late October 2024 met all the above expectations. He favoured a reminder of the centuries-old heritage of the extraordinary Baltic-Slavic Empire, connecting the lands of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (WKL). They formed the basis of a immense cultural crucible, unique in European scale, diverse and harmonious, open to others and strangers, and at the same time connected with a sense of community.
Lithuanian peregrination stimulates nostalgia for the lost size of common statehood, although in the local population it causes various associations and mixed feelings. First of all, to this day, rather frivolous from the point of view of Lithuanian sensibilities is the thesis that Yogajła (Jagiełły) married Jadwiga Andegawenska was a unique transaction, beneficial to Lithuanians (soldiers, boyars, nobles). any of them converted from Orthodox to Catholicism, and Lithuania was incorporated into Western civilization. She besides gained effective protection in clashes with the Teutonic Knights and Moscow. In the end, the Duchy was located in the region of "split" between the Polish and Russian elements. The rivalry of the 2 empires determined his fate.
The multicolored past has been mythologicalized and each organization consisting of the empire of the Republic of Both Nations has become a hostage to its own historical policies, highlighting more shadows of common experiences in Lithuanians, and glares in Poles. He tried to give them in his painting, painted on the 300th anniversary of the Lublin Union Jan Matejko. In his explanation the Lithuanian power was not pleased with the absorption of Lithuania by the Crown. These negative emotions and reactions are peculiarly reflected in the image of the leader of the Lithuanian magnatery, the hetman of Nicholas “Rudy” Radziwiłł, kneeling with a good saber.
In the case of Poland, the cultural preponderance of nobles played a crucial function in building common pretensions, in contrast to the peasant tradition in Lithuania. Their marginalization and peripherality in opposition to the imperial tradition – Polish and Russian – created its own historical recommendations, based on distrust and deep complexes towards 2 large neighbours.
This all requires restraint in the assessments of modern Lithuania, which tries to bargain for itself the communicative of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, although it did not have much to do with cultural Lithuania. The Lithuanians epatate visitors with a strong reminder of legends of the only king of Mendog and his successor Giedimina and the lituanization of everything Polish or Russian. It is hard for tourists not only to learn topographic names from Poland, as if in the context of westernization (Lithuania is part of the Western community), to usage another languages was detrimental to the popularization of Lithuanian.
The Polish ear most offends Adomas Mickievicius, who did not talk and wrote in Lithuanian and surely another Lithuania meant, writing an invocation to “Mr Tadeusz”. According to his cognition of literature, Mickiewicz expressed his love for a country where they were spoken mainly in Belarusian (around Novogródka). And surely he was an archeological poet due to the fact that he created canonical national masterpieces in this language!
In order to realize this paradox, 1 must remember that the Lithuanian patriotism (Starolitwins) at that time was a variety of Polish patriotism. another large creators confessed to him: Juliusz Słowacki, Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, Władysław Syromla, Stanisław Moniuszko, as well as our contemporary – Czesław Miłosz and Tadeusz Konwicki. It is worth mentioning Józef Piłsudski or Lucien Żeligowski. It was only at the end of the 19th century that the Young People who spoke Lithuanian appeared, and it was they who created the Lithuanian state at the beginning of the 20th century, with a favourable coincidence of historical circumstances.
National processes were not in vacuum. The entering of Lithuanians in various alliances with Germany, and even with Bolsheviks, must have caused a sense of ingratitude and betrayal on the Polish side. There is no place for a broader analysis of these dramatic conditions, or even a reminder of the common hostility of the interwar period and times of planet War II. 1 thing to remember is that the lituanization of Vilnius, which began then, means in practice its dramatic depolonization.
With this greater estimation, the determination of the Polish number in Lithuania should be taken to defend its national, spiritual and linguistic identity. Most Lithuanian nationalism is mostly directed against the Polish element. But the situation is different from that of the business times. Lithuanian Poles may request Lithuania and Poland to effort to enforce their treaty obligations as well as to comply with global regulations, the Council of Europe Conventions and EU law, as well as with global regulations. It seems that in these cases we are faced with a clear deficiency of good will on the part of Lithuanian and immense negligence on the part of Polish. It is besides possible to complain to the European organisations that they do not care adequate to comply with their regulations.
In this context, the activity of the last Polish Ambassador to Lithuania deserves recognition, Constantine Radziwił, which, during a comparatively short word of office, became known as being delicate to the identity and interior sterilization of compatriots, a reliable interlocutor of Lithuanian partners and advocate of standardisation on many of the above. It is simply a pity that the Minister of abroad Affairs, on behalf of the coalition government, machinically recalled respective twelve ambassadors to the country, without weighing on their actual achievements, loyalty in the service of Poland and Poles, as well as the importance of institutions. The winner was the logic of blunt retaliation and “the division of spoils”. erstwhile again, concern for the Lithuanian countrymen came to the next stage.
By the way, it is worth to add that erstwhile the PRL-Polish politician Stanisław Ciosek He served as ambassador in Moscow from 1989 to 1996, it was his effective speech for 7 years that did not disturb anyone, even erstwhile successive government teams changed.
Modern Lithuanians do not believe that Poland has abandoned imperial traditions, referring to the alleged Jagielloan idea. Despite respect for the concept of ULB, promoted by Juliusz Mieroszewski in the Parisian "Culture", i.e. unequivocal support for the independency of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, the return to the NGO's end heritage was and is simply a origin for fear and annoyance for the Lithuanians.
Olives added restraint of the Polish population in Vilnius to the fire against Lithuanian independency processes in the late 20th century. The suspension of the majority of Polish deputies to the ultimate Council in March 1990 during the vote on the act of restoring independency became an excuse to talk Poles about pro-Russian sympathy. fewer people noticed that this was a natural reaction to the activation of Lithuanian nationalism. After a hard period since the dissolution of the USSR, Poland and Lithuania concluded a treaty on friendly relations and good neighbourly cooperation on 26 April 1994. Notwithstanding its shortcomings and omissions in the implementation of the provisions, it remains after 30 years the most crucial point of mention for common relations.
The Polish side shows large commitment to the alleged strategical partnership, supporting 1 another with Lithuania in integration processes with the West. Rzeczpospolita has done a lot in the last 3 decades in the field of care for the destiny of the Polish national number (information, educational and educational policy, material support, infrastructure improvement with an excellent Polish Culture home in Vilnius). However, small has been achieved in guaranteeing the position and political representation of the Polish minority. Nothing was done to convince the Lithuanian side to abolish the electoral threshold for number parties, as it was done for national minorities in Poland. After all, the Polish number in Lithuania is many times larger than the German number in Poland, which is the beneficiary of this principle. The fresh elections to the Lithuanian Sejm showed how easy it is to manipulate the borders of the constituency (so-called "gerrymancerism", electoral geometry), in the absence of a reaction of the Polish side.
The visitor from Poland surprises Lithuania with a heated ambition dispute concerning the access of the Polish number to spiritual practices in St Stanislaus Cathedral in Vilnius. In this temple, the fates of both parts of the erstwhile Republic are symbolically intertwined and it is unusual that there is no place in it for Holy Masses in Polish. There is no known activity on the part of the Polish Episcopate to reconstruct a certain minimum normality in this respect. After all, Lithuanian Poles during the period of russian atheism maintained Catholicity of Vilnius churches. I remember that during the first visit in 1978, the “gallery of paintings” (because the place of worship was abolished), with the participation of “the curator” (of the Polish minority) I learned the mysterious interiors of the cathedral, and the chapel of St. Casimir touched the imagination in conjunction with the chapel of Zygmuntowska in Wawel.
Polish and Lithuanian politicians can say that common relations have never been as good as they are today. This rhetoric is based on the unreflexive solidarity with Ukraine in the ongoing war against Russia and the manifestation of the russophobic doctrine of security, expressed in a faithful attitude towards Western patronage. Current politics and mythology of past hinder the establishment of permanent intergovernmental forums for building common trust (consultational, study, expert bodies). Historical narratives and resentiments are not conducive to building a common future.
In addition to war against Russia, neither organization is trying to make any modus vivendi in relations with a powerful neighbour, and today's experience of Western decomposition, usage for future normalization relations with Russia and Belarus. It is actual that both countries have a unique title to observe Europe and the remainder of the planet before the war. But the only way to halt Russia is to halt it. The readiness to defend effectively cannot mean incitement to war. Sooner or later, there comes a time to return to normality and so good neighbourly cooperation. Therefore, in dealing with powerful neighbors, war rhetoric must be toned, alternatively than getting utilized to the roles of eternal “goons”.
It is advanced time to realize that talking to an unfriendly country is not the same as accepting its policies and approving its authorities. The Americans kept their diplomats in Moscow even in times of deep Stalinism, even though they did not agree with the policies of the Kremel satrapa. Similarly, following the 1962 Caribbean crisis, a "hot line" was launched to avoid misunderstandings in reading the sinister intentions of the parties to the Cold War confrontation.
Diplomacy is always associated with peace, requires imagination, ingenuity, cognition and foresight. It is based not on "power of destruction", but on "power of persuasion and persuasion", "power of tender", where skills and affirmative attitudes are needed towards the another side. In diplomacy, frequently talks turn opponents into partners and allies. Its function is to facilitate changes in global relations without bloodshed.
Against this background, it is incomprehensible to be uncompromising and fierce in the approach to Russia, as demonstrated most powerfully by tiny countries specified as Lithuania, which in the overall balance of forces do not play a major role. Only the restoration of basic diplomatic communication with Russia, as in the case of Poland as in Lithuania, can improve the climate in east Europe and lead to de-escalation of tensions.
In the light of political change in Washington, the possible of lasting alliance loyalty of these countries to Ukraine is dubious.. Therefore, treating the asset of its ‘frontality’ as the basis of the safety strategy is not only besides costly but besides highly risky. Especially erstwhile Western powers are considering re-esteeming their strategy towards Russia.
There is an impression that the destiny of our fellow countrymen in Vilnius was dedicated on the altar of good relations with the Republic of Lithuania. The outbreak of war in Ukraine only increased these feelings. The governments in Warsaw have not tried or tried to exert any force on their neighbor. In Lithuania there are inactive unresolved issues of guaranteeing the existence of Polish-language schools, media and theatres, the anticipation to save names and surnames in the first version, the right to usage parent tongue in public spaces (including bilingual topographical boards), the warrant of property ownership, the function of local government, including functional autonomy.
Negative implications of unconditional solidarity with Ukraine besides concern Polish minorities in the remaining 3 countries in the East. Nobody dares to even cry about Russian Poles today. Poles in Ukraine were trapped due to the fact that it was the Ukrainians who first needed help. In war conditions, they would be besides petty to claim their rights. On the another hand, Poles in Belarus bear the costs of unpardoned interference in the interior affairs of the Lukashenko government after the 2020 election. Currently, Poland is incapable to counter Minsk's oppressive policy, and politicians in Warsaw endure from amnesia, denying how foolishly they played Poles in Belarus, displacing its president.
Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski He was right to stress that “helping our brothers” is more crucial than “save others.” Why do the Polish elite not scope out to this national treasurer of political thought? Why are the “false prophets” in Poland and abroad mistakenly defining the priorities of Polish abroad policy, including towards fellow countrymen in the East?
The panacea for all historical disputes is to communicate about a common cultural code. In this area there is simply a deficiency of promotion of common multidimensional initiatives, congresses, conferences, festivals, exhibitions, etc., showing achievements and advantages of a syncretic culture in which there were no shortages of elements of the East and the West. Poland was (and is) an crucial transmission belt for Lithuania of western values, patterns and economical progress. The Grand Duchy was a bridge to ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. It gave the basics of the line of topophilia, which was celebrated in literature and art.
Why, then, could both countries not, for example, organise large panoramic exhibitions at the Western European capitals' salons, showing the exotic and different originality of the European East? Thanks to common ingenuity and goodwill, it is worth showing the interplay of political destiny as a unique work, a prototype of later integration unions in Europe, the vitality of the “eastern lung of Christianity”, the function of Byzantine, Judaist or Karaim influences. besides the military traditions of the erstwhile Republic cannot be understood without taking into account the achievements of the “Lithuanian Hercules”. Finally, civilizational radiation on the Tsar empire, even the polonization of Russian elites in the 17th century.
Both nations usage languages of separate pedigree, unlike 1 another, making communication difficult. Due to the presence of the Polish element, Lithuanians were easier to learn Polish than vice versa – Lithuanian Poles. The authoritative language of the Grand Duchy was Old Russian (the celebrated Lithuanian Statutes of the 16th century were written in that language). possibly today's Lithuanians so powerfully show their linguistic nationalism, hoping that in this way they will blur the difference between WKL and today's Lithuania. Common cognition of Russian proved to be a burden alternatively than a aid in communication. All the more so in the last fewer years, erstwhile hostility towards Russia grew. For young generations, the language of communication becomes naturally English.
Poland is the largest country in the area of the alleged Inter-Sea, i.e. between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea. For this reason, it traditionally reserves its leadership role, even erstwhile expressed with variable intensity. Unfortunately, leadership claims origin various reminiscences, extinguishing the enthusiasm of smaller neighbors towards specified a constellation of forces. Polynophobia is simply a phenomenon inactive present, although frequently ignored and not full recognized by the Polish side.
Little of that, Ukrainian elites aspire to be a strong competitor and even a rival in leadership. The Warsaw rulers are incapable to draw any decisive conclusions from this, naively believing that the largest beneficiary of the aid given during the war will never be brought to evil ingratitude. Meanwhile, the symptoms of Ukraine's ruthless rivalry with Poland are increasing. So it's time to look back.
Referring to the title in this article of the Lithuanian name Wilia – Neris, it is worth considering nevertheless the digestibility of even single Lithuanian words in Polish. By savoring kingjuk, quilts or quilts, as well as by bringing to the country tasty Lithuanian bread, honey tincture Suktinis or Stumbras vodka may be worth a surprise to Lithuanians sometimes and the most celebrated conviction of the invocation to the “Ponas Tadas” quote Lithuanian: “Lietuva, Tevyne mano...”.
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Think Poland, No. 47-48 (17-24.11.2024)
