When the ZSRS collapsed, the Russian population consisted of 90% Slavs. By 2022, the "white" citizens of the Federation constituted 72% of the population, and the country was already inhabited by almost 20 million Muslims. Does this mean that more than 2 thirds of Putin's soldiers died in Ukraine are Russians? Nope. The cultural composition of the Federation Army is not a mirror reflection of the social structure – in the military it serves to overrepresent national and spiritual minorities. And it is their representatives who pay the highest price for Kremlin policy.
Experts of the U.S. Institute for War Studies (ISW) already in April 2022 pointed out the multitude of non-Russian battalions among troops sent to Ukraine. It was about troops from Chechnya, Ossetia, Tuva, Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Czuwaszji and another Federation enclaves. “Putin [...] seemingly wants minorities to bear the burden of war at this stage”, says the ISW report. At the time there were no recruitments in the capital, but for the Far East and Siberian national territory the government established a standard of 200 “volunteers” per week. Partial mobilization, announced by the Kremlin on 21 September 2022, highlighted this idea. It was the warswomans in the regions with a large percent of the non-Slavish population that were to get the most conscripts.
This request inactive applies today.
Russia is inhabited by almost 200 different cultural communities, against which Moscow conducts imperial politics, inherited from tsarist and russian predecessors. Its aim has always been to progressively and systematically assimilate “foreign” and “worse” not to guarantee a harmonious life for them, but for violent exploitation. The Army played the function of 1 of the basic tools in these activities. As an example, let the opinions of Lieutenant General Alexander Rittich (1831–1914), who considered rusification to be the main task of the army towards the judaic population. The training was to make the “incapable of military affairs” of Russian exemplary Jews, with the essence of the conversion being the acquisition of subsequent generations of recruits. The Muslim population was likewise treated, frequently accompanied by attempts to convert to a "better" Orthodox faith.
The times of communism pushed further spiritual issues to the plan, but the army continued to feed on non-Russian recruits. Treated as “gun meat” and inexpensive labour, number representatives had hard access to higher and medium-sized command positions, and they were frequently referred to auxiliary units. In the 1960s, this organization racism established the practice of not accepting into service in strategical (nuclear) forces soldiers of "inappropriate" origin, primarily Muslims from the Caucasus.
In 2010, during his speech on the Day of Poverty, Putin stated that the triumph in planet War II "was achieved at the expense of Russia's human and industrial resources". "Forgotten" that among the 27 million russian victims were 5.7 million Russians, and the remainder were representatives of another ZSRS nations. Today, too, he talks about the fight between Russia and the Russians – with Ukraine and the “collective West” – although the killed and wounded soldiers of the Federation who would come from Petersburg, Moscow and another large cities of the European part of the country are comparatively few. But we have full villages and towns in the Caucasian and far east provinces where the population has been dramatically thinned down, even by 2 thirds of young men.
Russian prisoners of war in a POW camp in Ukraine, January 2025.
Why is this happening? From the position of the Kremlin, the failure of “less valuable” human material – traditionally deprived of listening to power and social respect – reduces the cost of war. It makes them acceptable to the large-town, "white" and Orthodox majority, choking its possible for rebellion. Opposition that could be a dangerous challenge for Putin and the company. Historically, for all Russian power the revolutionous Moscow and St. Petersburg carried the hazard not only of losing privileges, but besides of life. And so the crowds on the streets will not be, and with the fragmented, little organized, overwhelmed by the Russian element, the force apparatus will manage.
If we are considering the reasons why the Kremlin has not ordered universal mobilization so far, these are the fears mentioned. After all, mass conscription would gotta include previously protected population groups.
The hazard of "white" rebellion makes it inactive – despite three years of war – Completion of losses and expansion of the invasive army in Ukraine is based on a voluntary haul mechanism. So constructed that even without administrative orders attracts mainly minorities. Money is utilized as a “carrot”. The minimum wage in Russia is presently just over 900 PLN, at prices akin to Polish prices. In the “globin” – Russian province, to a large degree non-Russian ethnically, specified a wage is simply a standard, fewer gain more. The army, in exchange for agreeing to go to the front, offers respective times higher salaries, to families who have died (for local conditions) compensation. There are so many willing to service – on average about 30–40 1000 men are reported to the barracks and then go to Ukraine.
The problem is that the war continues, and the Russian army loses between a 1000 and a 1000 military (killed, wounded, taken prisoner) a day. In another words, almost everything that will throw out the “mobilization machine” is then “milled” on the front.
Russian propaganda ensures that the army's deficiency of volunteers does not complain, but much indicates that it's a good face for a bad game. Firstly, late again, for the sixth time since the start of the full-scale invasion, the wage of the participants in the specialization was raised. Apparently, the offer to date was no longer attractive enough. Second, reports of mass dispatch to the first line of untreated, previously wounded and injured soldiers multiply in the Russian infosphere. This may even take a grotesque form erstwhile men with bullets and hands on slings are rushed into the blast region (which is recorded not only by Ukrainian drones, but besides by the Russians themselves, outraged by specified behaviour). Thirdly, the Kremlin is increasingly seeking abroad aid. Appearance on the North Korean Front This is the most spectacular manifestation of this practice, but not the only one. Russia has long lured gastorbeiters from Africa and the Far East (for example from Sri Lanka), offering them better money for wearing a uniform than for working in civilian service.
Let's keep moving. The war in Ukraine importantly destroyed Russian prisons. present there are about 300,000 people in the gulags, more than 450,000 of them 3 years ago. The mass sending of prisoners to the front began in mid-2022. Criminals were treated instrumentally, throwing at the worst sections – only the conflict of Bachmut cost 40 1000 lives and health. The Kremlin was not peculiarly afraid about this, the hecatomb of convicts being treated as a good way to "recycle unnecessary human material". What I am mentioning is that Moscow is planning again a mass collection behind bars, which is expected to cover 120 000 prisoners in 2025. In addition to inhumane calculating, it besides proves desperation.
No little desperate is another practice. "Three-quarters of the fresh soldiers are older men," complained an airmen's officer last fall. His words were quoted by “Worstka”, an opposition Russian editorial board. According to her findings, the trend has intensified in fresh months, resulting in an ageing army. This problem had already affected the Russians (the Ukrainians too), but what is different is the average draft age oscillating around the 40s, and what is different erstwhile soldiers are 10 years older.
“So what? They're energetic, they're fathers. They are experienced," said 1 of the interviewors from the Ministry of Defence. Ignored the fact that older soldiers couldn't handle carrying dense backpacks, digging ditches and trenches. ‘They are sick. Everyone's sick. Their legs hurt, their head hurts, they are slow," reported 1 of the military.
In 2025 nothing changed in this substance – the younger volunteers inactive lacked the Russian army. So this 1 will either scope for the coercion—the protected recruits—or her command (and the political leadership of the country) will accept the progressive weakening. Both scenarios are subject to considerable hazard – interior revolt or defeat at the front. What should consciousness have, for example, Donald Trump. The American leader would most likely be more assertive to Putin if he knew (he wanted to know...), how much the Russians did not "stick"...
