A Tale of How a Dog Doesn't Like a Cat

There are more Russian experts in Poland than 500 years ago. The latter, thanks to Stańczyk's ingenuity, tefnisian and philutian, were revealed by him during his walk through the Kraków marketplace erstwhile he faked the toothache, painfully putting a handkerchief on his cheek.

By receiving advice on how to treat this pain, from respective twelve stallers and bribes, he won the bet in which he was betting that the most in Krakow is doctors from teeth. Today, russian and Russian scientists in Poland do not request to uncover themselves with a fortitude – they do not consider themselves to be "golden hands" from Russian or Ukrainian matters. Rather, they eagerly support their speech faces into a silver screen, chat on the radio and in the podcasts, gnaw on patient paper their elucubrations and send them into the world. They too, including many politicians active in the activities of the present government, have developed to the maximum of the Polish average stereotype of knowing who in the East is our friend and who is the enemy. Stereotype, of course, jagiellon.

Juliusz Mieroszewski, 1 of the most powerful heads in the field of knowing east issues, wrote 60 years ago: “Our conventional policy towards Russia requires careful consideration. In the centuries-old conflict for leadership in the East in a territorial sense, we were defeated. Consequently, if by the Jagiello thought to mean territorial expansion, it should be objectively stated that the Jagiello thought has become an anachronism.’ Atoli in the heads of politicians cursing at the “Doctrine of Giedroycie-Mieroszewski” and adopting the Jagiello mars mines nested a vulgarized version of this doctrine, which boils down to the fact that with the aid of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, and with the support of the US, defeat Russia erstwhile and for all and push it to “Eurasia proper”, that is, east of Volga. Therefore, all anti-Russian attitudes and moves of the russian states of east Europe advocates of the alleged "Doctrines of Giedroycie-Mieroszewski" have long observed with pastries on their faces, and of course they urge these countries to proceed playing on Russia. I will exemplify this visit. Lech Kaczyński in Tbilisi in 2008, during the Russian-Georgian War, erstwhile the president of the Republic of Poland, after landing in the capital of Georgia, declared that he "comes to fight".

Behind this, dressed in God-fathered flowers, political atavism is the request for a historical retaliation in Russia. For the failure of the brightest Republic in history, even though it controlled east Europe as far as Moscow (in 1610-1612), Kursk and Riga. In the end, as a consequence of the partitions, she was hanged from the Russian Empire. Which of Moscow's peripheral and backward cities transfigured after the reforms of Peter I into a colossal state-continent, not only imposing its hegemony in Central Asia and the Far East, but besides dictated the rules of play in Europe, especially after the Russian troops entered Paris in 1814 and after the Vienna Congress. And which for a 100 years held the Kingdom of Poland in the superior embrace (and later the politician of the “superwislan” province) – after incorporating previously extended border territories of the First Republic – and without a pardon suppressed all Polish impulses of independence. After the short 20-year existence of the Second Poland, Poland again experienced dependence on Russia, this time Soviet, for the next half century.

Today, the full legion of Buncho "Polish patriots" is as much excited as possible, in relation to Russia, by the tribal imperative of revenge, which has drilled in and for centuries lies in the minds of pre-modern peoples. The request for a dintojra, which is not very suited to the politicians of a country belonging to the European Union with its postmodern values, is so dressed in fine “supporting democratic forces” in the non-Russian countries of east Europe, protecting them from Russian hegemony and interference. Although these countries are not so much more democratic than Russia, and they are plagued by the same problems: “Oligarchical clans”, corruption, unprecedented dispersion in income among the population, etc., as in Russia. Mentally, the societies of these countries are besides infected by the strategy of sovietism and inactive appear more as homines sovietici than aware of its national and civilian position Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans, Armenians.

Under historical and cultural conditions, these nations belong to European civilization, but barely fit into its modern canon. This message besides applies to the Russians, due to the fact that the last fewer years have dramatically withdrawn Russia – a country that, at the end of the Petersburg era, at the level of elites: landowners, higher layers of bureaucracy, entrepreneurs, merchants and wealthy peasants, not to mention intelligence, showed indeed European references – from Western civilization standards. The point is that after 1991, the process of modernization in Russia, where the multum of contradictions and dilemmas of a political, economic, social and cultural nature came together, at which the Gordian node looked like children's lace knots, required a peculiar commitment from central power. Just like Peter I, who reformed the drowsy and inertial Russia with the works of Western thinkers in 1 hand and a dense stick in the other. At that time, the EU, including Poland, tried to consolidate Russia in its interior modernisation (EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization), but this initiative was stuck in a number of political inconveniences.

Unfortunately, Vladimir Putin, after taking office as president of the Russian Federation for the 3rd time in 2012, gradually turned the inlet of ideas and modernisation initiatives. But he did not refrain from dialog and cooperation with the West. The test of Russia's European credibility culminated in February 2014, erstwhile tensions against Ukrainian pro-EU protests (Majdan) against the president escalated in Kiev Victor Yanukovych, which, under force from Russia, distanced itself from the EU. Russia agreed to the compromise negotiated with the aid of the 3 “Weimar” ministers of the SZ: France, Germany and Poland between the opposition Majdan and Yanukovych camp. Atoli already 24 hours later, erstwhile Yanukovych fled Kiev to the east of Ukraine and then to Russia, the opposition poured out outside its majadan barricades and fences to take full power in Kiev (and shortly throughout Ukraine). The “Weimar” ministerial guarantors of the Kiev compromise (despite certain tense reactions on the German and French sides) have in full ignored this violent phrase, showing that in Ukraine it is not understood at all that pacta sunt servanda. And that the Bolshevik directive, that in political combat it is crucial who "first burys in the grave", wing of opposition Ukrainian democrats.

Only erstwhile the Majdan oppositionists formally deposed Yanukovych and masquerade in the seats of power, Putin, as 1 of the informal girders of the Kiev compromise, could not neglect to feel that the president of the Russian Federation was made a fool. The Russian self-inheriters, if they were shamefully imperished, reacted differently: they drank themselves to death, cut off the heads of the courtyards to whom they attributed treason, or wallowed on the level in hysteria attacks, or immediately acted in arms against the emperors. This second option was chosen by Putin – he began to militarily decompile Ukraine. First he broke off Crimea, then moved to Russian-speaking east Ukraine.

After all, 2 Weimar partners clearly became convinced that in the case of clashes between Russia and any russian state of east Europe Poland does not keep an nonsubjective distance from the parties to the dispute and tends to support the anti-Russian side. Therefore, in the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, under the auspices of Germany and France (the alleged Minsk process), Poland was short. For at least 3 sides of this process: Russia, France and Germany, decided that Poland's presence in it would only origin problems, not solutions.

And after 2015, the government of the Law and Justice Party, obsessively anti-Russian, invaded any contact with the Russians, so bilateral dialog with Russia actually died before 2022.. After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the POPiS parties, who are loathing each another and kicking each other, run a consistent trot against Russia.

It is unacceptable to deny that Poland, as shortly as it encounters a conflict between the east European state and Russia, without any thought, will throw itself like a raging dog on the Russian side. It's just that the dog doesn't like the cat first, and then it picks up arguments. But if the cat is the size of a Siberian tiger, then possibly it is worth to tame this dog's anti-Russian vigor?

Prof. Jarosław Bratkiewicz

Think Poland, No. 11-12 (15-22.03.2026)