Termination

Termination of limitation period – essence and intent of the institution

After the deadline limitation the individual against whom the claim is entitled may evade its satisfaction.

However, the limitation period shall be interrupted by any act before a court or another authority designated to recognise or enforce claims of a given type, or before an amicable court, taken straight to analyse or establish or satisfy a claim or safety (Article 123(1) of the Code) and by designation of a claim by a individual against whom the claim is entitled.

The reasons for the interruption of the limitation period can so be both events (actions) in the material sense (recognition of the claim) and of a procedural nature (action to bring an action for the intent of pursuing the claim) (so: judgement of the territory Court of Writing of 29 November 2018, Ref. I C 751/18).

Recurrent limitation after interruption

In the light of Article 124 k.c., after any interruption of the limitation period, it shall run again and, in the event of interruption of the limitation period, the limitation period shall not run again until the proceedings have been completed.

Direct objective

In accordance with Article 123(1)(c) of the Code, an action by a creditor interrupts the limitation period, but only if it is taken straight to investigate, establish or safe the claim before the competent authority designated for the designation or enforcement of claims of a given type, including the arbitration court.

Nature of the provisions on interruption of the limitation period

The limitation is an institution of mandatory law (ius cogens) and the provisions governing it, including those concerning the duration of the limitation period, cannot be repealed or amended by the parties.

Entities participating in the interruption of the limitation period

As indicated by the ultimate Court in its judgement of 19 November 2014, II CSK 196/14 (not publ.), the interruption of the limitation period pursuant to Article 123(1)(c) occurs, in principle, only between the parties to the proceedings, if it is clear from the nature of the legal relation between them that they are materially obliged or entitled, and so the effect of the interruption occurs only within the substantive and applicable limits of the action taken by the creditor.

The interruption of the limitation period can so only consequence from the conduct of the creditor or debtor.

Effective filing of a suit as a limitation action

The application shall, in principle, constitute an act before a court straight for the intent of pursuing a claim and, as such, shall interrupt, in accordance with Article 123(1)(c), the limitation period.

However, it should be noted that this effect is only effective in doing so. The case law of the ultimate Court is uniformly presumed that the suit was filed effectively erstwhile it was done by a individual who has an active legal right and judicial and procedural capacity.

It is so a situation in which a individual entitled to a claim is brought against an obliged person. The interruption shall so take place within the subject-matter and applicable limits of the action taken by the creditor: that claim which is secured, sought, established or enforced shall be effective against the individual to whom the action is directed and for the benefit of the individual carrying out the action.

These conditions which are applicable to the effect of the interruption of the limitation period should be referred to the time erstwhile the action is brought, since the effective bringing of the action by the individual entitled to that action results in the effect referred to in Article 123(1)(c) (see the resolution of the ultimate Court of 27 May 1992, III CZP 60/92, the order of the ultimate Court of September 2009, I CSK 99/09, OSNC-ZD 2010, No B, item 66 and 7 October 2016, I CSK 628/15, the judgement of the ultimate Court of 6 December 2013, I CSK 78/13, of 11 January 2008, II CSK 288/06).

Termination of the limitation period by the joint debtor

The doctrine and judicature presume that the provision of Article 377 kc, which stipulates that the interruption or suspension of the limitation period for 1 of the joint creditors has effect besides on fellow creditors, is an expression of the rule of common representation of the joint creditors. According to this principle, legal acts carried out by 1 of the creditors with the debtor besides have consequences for the another creditors, but only if the consequence of those activities is simply a benefit.

In view of the above, a single joint and respective creditor's bringing a suit results in the interruption of the limitation period besides vis-à-vis another joint and respective creditors.

Application by a civilian partnership partner and interruption of the limitation period

Shareholders of a civilian partnership cannot be considered as joint creditors. The solidarity of creditors, like the solidarity of debtors, may arise from a bill or from a legal act (Article 369 k.c.). The provisions governing a civilian partnership (Articles 860 et seq.) are not a origin of solidarity between creditors and there is no mention to the rules on co-ownership in fractions.

The solidarity of creditors is only at the will of the parties and, if the expression of specified a will has not been demonstrated, civilian partnership partners are not joint and respective creditors. The application by 1 of them and on his behalf does not interrupt the limitation period for the another (yes: ultimate Court judgement of 28 March 2018, Ref. Act V CSK 368/17).

Termination of limitation after designation of the claim

In the light of the jurisprudence of the ultimate Court, the designation which has taken place after the limitation of the claim must not break the limitation period. It is clear that the interruption of the limitation period by the designation of a claim may only concern an unlimited claim.

On the another hand, it is possible that the designation of a limitation claim may besides include a waiver of the limitation charge if the content of the message or the circumstances in which it was lodged results in the debtor’s will (yes: judgement of the ultimate Court of 05 June 2002, act No. IV CKN 1013/00).

It is only by relinquishing the limitation charge that the natural work becomes a complete work again. The resulting claim regains the quality of the action. In this case, the fresh limitation period starts to run from the minute the limitation is waived (yes: ultimate Court judgement of 12 October 2006, Act I CSK 119/06).

Recognition of a claim terminating the limitation period

It is assumed that the designation of a claim within the meaning of point (2) of Article 123(1) of the Code applies in any event to a clear declaration of intent or to another unequivocal conduct of the debtor vis-à-vis the creditor from which the debtor considers the claim to be existing.

However, whatever the nature of the debtor’s declaration of recognition, specified declaration must be addressed to the creditor. The 3rd organization submitted is irrelevant from the point of view of the limitation period (yes: ultimate Court judgement of 7 March 2003, I CKN 11/01).

Recognising the claim and waiving the limitation charge

The designation of a claim which interrupts the limitation period (Article 123(1)(2)(Kc)) must be distinguished from the waiver of the limitation plea.

On the waiver of the limitation — read here

Application for a feasibility clause and interruption of limitation periods

The judicature takes as an example of proceedings which interrupt the statute of limitations, the submission of an application for a declaration of enforceability or an extrajudicial enforcement title (yes: judgement of the ultimate Court of 17 December 2004, act No. II CK 276/04).

If the creditor has made specified a request to the court, the limitation period shall be interrupted from the date on which the application for a declaration of enforceability is lodged and from the date on which the judgement is given it shall begin to run again. This is the provision of Article 124 k.c. which states that after each interruption of the limitation period it shall run again.

Entity for which a feasibility clause has been issueda limitation period interruption

An application for enforcement shall consequence in a interruption of the limitation period erstwhile it comes from the creditor indicated in the enforcement title for which the enforceability clause has been issued. The identity of the claim is not adequate but it is besides essential to identify the persons for whom the action has been carried out.

Request for a settlement test and interruption of the limitation period

The view of both the judicature and the doctrine that the call for a settlement effort interrupts the limitation period (yes: resolution of the ultimate Court of 28 June 2007, III CZP 42/06, OSNC 2007, No. 4, item 54, Biul. SN 2006, No. 6, item 6, judgments of the ultimate Court of 3 June 1964, II CR 675/63, OSNC 1965, No. 2, item 34, of 11 April 2007, II CSK 612/07, not publ., of 14 November 2012, V CSK 515/11, Biul. SN 2013, No. 12).

The relevance of subsequent requests for a settlement example tointerruptions of limitation periods

In the case law of the ultimate Court, however, there is simply a dispute over whether the second and subsequent requests for a settlement effort constitute an act that directs the claim and, therefore, results in the interruption of the limitation period.

The indirect position accepts, in principle, the subsequent call for a settlement trial as an act which interrupts the limitation period, subject to the condition that it must comply with the condition of the undertaking straight for the intent set out in Article 123(1)(c) and must not constitute an abuse of a subjective right within the meaning of Article 5(c) (yes: judgement of the ultimate Court of 28 January 2016, III CSK 50/15, not published, judgement of the Court of Appeal of Gdansk of 27 February 2015, I ACa 649/14, not published, judgement of the Court of Appeal of Warsaw of 16 January 2014, I ACa 1194/13, not published).

There must be no dispute as to whether it is not an act aimed straight at pursuing a claim to call for a settlement attempt, the intent of which is only to extend the period of appeal of the claim by bringing another limitation period. specified an nonsubjective is both in conflict with the assumptions of the limitation institution, which is, first and foremost, the temporary limitation of the entitlement of the creditor and the granting of the right to retreat from the satisfaction of the claim and with the fundamental premise of conciliation, which is to bring about a settlement alternatively than a limitation period.

The request for the court to examine the creditor’s motives for subsequent requests for a settlement sample

However, in any event, the explanation of the meaning of subsequent requests for a settlement example should be examined on the basis of the facts presented by the creditor after the first unsuccessful settlement attempt.

It is essential to measure whether these circumstances justified his belief in an objective, realistic anticipation to change the debtor's position and possible settlement.

This may lead to uncertainty of the debtor as to his legal situation, but the intent of Article 123(1)(c) is to defend the creditor, who takes action to defend against an unfair debtor who does not fulfil the benefit and that nonsubjective should be decisive in the event of a limitation period. The debtor may be entitled to the protection provided for in Article 5 k.c. in the event of abuse of the law by the creditor (yes: ultimate Court judgement of 10 January 2017, Ref. Act V CSK 204/16).

Bank enforcement title and limitation interruption

The beginning of enforcement proceedings by the bank has a material effect on the interruption of the limitation period only in relation to the creditor covered by the banking implementing title.

On the another hand, the acquirer of a non-bank debt, even if the acquisition occurred after the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the limitation period for the bank started to run again, cannot trust on the limitation period interrupted by the beginning of the enforcement procedure by the first creditor being the bank.

The exceptionality of the privilege of issuing a banking enforcement title leads to the conclusion that, since it cannot be the basis for execution to another persons than those indicated in it, but for the legal consequences on the part of the creditor of another bank, the material consequences of the commencement of enforcement proceedings as a creditor’s activity, a bank leading to a limitation period, concern only that creditor and do not apply to a non-bank buyer.

The buyer of a non-banking claim acquires a claim in its content and subject identical to that of the divested bank, but does not enter into the legal situation of the seller caused by the interruption of the limitation period and the start of the run again (yes: the ultimate Court resolution of 29 June 2016), Act III CZP 29/16).

Termination of limitation of the claim from the insurance contract

Pursuant to Article 819 §4 k.c., the three-year limitation period for a claim for the benefit of an insurer shall besides be interrupted by filing that claim to the insurer or by filing an event covered by the insurance. The limitation period shall begin again from the date on which the applicant receives a written declaration from the insurer that the benefit has been granted or refused.

The ultimate Court in its judgement of 6 October 2017, Act No V CSK 685/16, has settled an crucial case concerning time limits for damages. In interpreting the provision of Article 819 §4 kc, the ultimate Court considered that the limitation of a claim for compensation is besides interrupted where specified a claim has been filed by an injured individual who is not a organization to an OC insurance contract and not only if the organization to the insurance contract makes the application.

Claims and limitation interruption

The action aimed straight at establishing a claim, causing the limitation to be interrupted, is besides an action for the determination of a claim under Article 189 (yes: judgement of the ultimate Court of 5 July 2018), Act II PK 109/17).

Termination of limitation to the suspect and the claimant

If in the case they do not appear as plaintiffs or defendants all persons whose combined participation in the case is necessary, the court must act in the manner laid down in Article 195(1) of the Code, and so call upon the plaintiff to designate, within the prescribed time limit, persons who do not participate in the case in specified a way that their call or notification is possible.

The question may arise as to whether the claimant's request for participation in the case causes the limitation to be interrupted in relation to the defendant. The ultimate Court has explained that, in accordance with Article 123 k.c., the limitation period is interrupted by any action taken before the court for direct redress. This is besides the case in the course of the process of requesting the claimant to participate in the case. Where, therefore, a request to participate in the case is made at the request of the claimant, the limitation period shall be interrupted at the minute of submission of the application.

This besides applies to the effect in the form of interruption of the limitation period for the claimant. The first act referred to in Article 123(1)(c) is to declare that the notified entity will act as plaintiff. The consequences of the service of the suit shall be borne erstwhile the suspect has been notified of his or her intention to join the 3rd party’s trial as plaintiff, since the application has already been served. With the essential co-participation on the plaintiff’s side (mergency pass), the effects of the application are only with the minute erstwhile the declaration of accession is made by all the participants (yes: ultimate Court judgement of 28 March 2018), Ref. Act V CSK 368/17).