Before the Moldovan parliamentary elections: a European future in shadow of uncertain results

On 28 September, Moldova will hold parliamentary elections in which the pro-Western Action and Solidarity organization (PAS) will fight to keep power. However, the polls show that although she inactive enjoys the top sympathy of the voters, it will be very hard for her to repeat her success 4 years ago and get support to regulation alone.

To stay in power, PAS may be forced to form a coalition with 1 or more groups that will safe their place in the future parliament. The available studies show that only pro-Russian open parties or only nominally pro-European parties will be included in it, in fact linked to pro-Russian or oligarchical environments. Cooperation with them will lead to paralysis of the improvement process and, as a result, to slow down or even frost accession negotiations with the EU. Nor can it be excluded that the highly negative script in which the PAS will stay outside the governing coalition, created by Eurosceptic and pro-Russian forces.

The interior sources of PAS trouble...

PAS inactive has the top public confidence. Established on the basis of civilian movements at the initiative of president Mai Sandu in 2016, the group is unique on the national political scene. Unlike most parties, including those nominally pro-Europeans, it has no connection with the country's oligarchy strategy from the late 1990s to 2019^[1]. It is so not focused on defending the interests of the political and business circles (at the head of another forces frequently – formally or informally – were the leaders of these circles) but were actually curious in carrying out a deep reconstruction of the state and in implementing changes to yet enable it to join the EU.

PAS is liable for the large advancement towards the European integration of the country, including the start of accession talks in 2024. Over the past year, the government has almost finished as part of the negotiation process screening (i.e. review of national government for its compliance with the Union) and met the conditions set by Brussels to open the first negotiating cluster (so-called fundamentals)^[2].

In the July 2021 parliamentary election, the organization received unprecedented – for a pro-European group – support (also abroad, where more than 14% of all eligible people voted) – as much as 52.8%. In fresh years, however, her popularity has declined. Currently, he can number on only about 35% of the vote decided to participate in the electorate election^[3]. Negative for the ruling camp is the consequence of the mediocre economical situation in the country, much slower than expected, the pace of implementation of key reforms and deoligarchization, communication errors and scandals involving members of the PAS, as well as the targeted actions (mainly propaganda) by Russia and representing its interests in Moldova political forces.

In particular, the image of the government was shaken by the marked increase in the cost of living, mainly due to external factors (Russian invasion of Ukraine, the resulting increase in energy prices, deterrence of investors, etc.). The improvement of the financial situation of citizens was, alongside the fight against corruption, 1 of the delicate election slogans of PAS. From the control of the State, gas prices to individual customers nearly quadrupled from 4.5 to 16.74 leu (about 0.85 euro) per 1 m³and tariffs on electricity – twice. This led to inflation of 67%. As a result, the absolute poorness rate in 2024 was as much as 33.6% – by 6.6 pp. more than in 2021. The overall economical indicators of the country did not look better. In 2022 the economy shrinked by 5.9% and in the next 2 years it stagnated (GDP increased by 0.7% and 0.1%, respectively). Data for the first 4th of 2025 indicate that we are facing another recession (-1.2%)^[4].

In the view of the large part of the electorate, the authorities besides do not deal with the implementation of the improvement of the judiciary, which is part of the PAS' crown announcements in the 2021 campaign. As many as 44% of the population are badly judged by the moves in this area^[5]. This is due to both the low pace of change – in peculiar the mirrors of judges and prosecutors – and the scandals accompanying this process. As an example, it is worth pointing out the loud and ongoing conflict between the president and the head of the anti-corruption prosecutor (from 2023 to 2025) and 1 of the icons of the reconstruction process of the Veronica Dragalin judiciary. The erstwhile accuses the second of inefficiency, and the (former) prosecutor publically accuses the president of attempting to manually control the mirroring process^[6].

The slow dismantling of the oligarchy strategy besides negatively affects the image of the government. The first major success in this respect was only on 5 August 2025, erstwhile Evghenia Guțul, the (chief of executive authority) of the Gagaus Autonomy and a close associate of the fugitive from the country in 2019 and hiding in Moscow Ilana Șora (a businessman pursuing the interests of the Kremlin, as described below), was sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment. It has been proven, among others, to be active in illegal financing controlled by the magnate of the organization ȘOR (delegalised in June 2023).^[7]. Partial triumph should besides be considered to be the detention on 22 July 2025 in Greece of Vlad Plahotniuc oligarch who, at the request of the authorities, was on the list wanted by Interpol.^[8].

PAS has besides faced the problem of ineffective communication with society since the beginning of its rule. According to a survey of April 2025, as much as 69% of Moldovan believes that the cabinet "communicates in a non-clad way". The same claim that its representatives are either “liding” or “truth”^[9]. In this context, it is worth noting that the organization consistently restricted the political space for another pro-European groups, as it viewed them as competition. She sought to monopolize the pro-Western electorate segment, presenting herself as the only force capable of effectively implementing the integration agenda with the EU, and assumed that even with the decline of satisfaction with the electoral authorities in favour of rapprochement with Europe, they would stay without real choice. However, as a result, it reduced the chances of building a possible coalition, while at the same time creating conditions for expanding the importance of centr parties specified as the National alternate Movement (MAN).

...and external sources

Moscow besides contributes to the decline in support of PAS. With the aid of popular media, especially social media, the Kremlin tries to convince Moldovans that Sandu and her organization consciously and at the command of the West (primarily the US) destruct relations with Russia, and by supporting Ukraine and modernizing the armed forces, they violate the constitutional neutrality of the country. In Moscow's view, these steps endanger the destabilisation of the situation, and even the re-explosion of the 1992 frozen conflict with Transnistria, which in practice will drag the Chisinians into the war with the Federation (in the separatist region there are 1,5 1000 of its soldiers).

The coming of the election deadline makes Russia intensifying the decision towards Moldova. The social media (TikTok or Telegram) regularly includes material to ridicule and discredit the authorities. For this purpose, sophisticated manipulation techniques are increasingly used, specified as artificial deepfak intelligence generated and fabricated articles prepared allegedly by Western publicists and posted on websites pretending to be existing portals or newspapers. An example? The material, which at the turn of July and August 2025 came onto a website imitating a popular American gossip service (saying by a actually working writer there), convincing that president Sandu was to illegally get semen of celebrated Western gay celebrities for her alleged partner^[10].

Moscow besides uses the mentioned Transnistria under its political patronage. Its self-appointed parastate authorities have been calling on the PAS government for months to launch at least 42 electoral points for Moldovan passport holders, with an estimated number of around 300 000 (while there are about 2.4 million people surviving in the Chisinau-controlled territory)^[11]. This aims to increase the number of votes cast on pro-Russian parties, with which the majority sympathizes with autochthons. Finally, the Moldovan government decided to open only 12 specified committees^[12].

The most crucial competitors...

The second most popular force in the country is the 1 who can number about 25-30% of the vote with Moscow Patriotic Election Block (BEP), tied at the turn of July and August. It consists of 4 elements and is headed by the organization of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) – the largest prokremlian group in the country. The Communist and Socialist faction, to which this party, led by erstwhile president Igor Dodon, has 29 parliamentary seats in the 101-member parliament. In addition to Vladimir Voronin's communists, president from 2001 to 2009, BEP is co-founded by the Republican organization “The Heart of Moldova” (PRIM), led by Irina Vlah, was a sashka of the traditionally located in the south of the country of the ultrapro-Russian Gagaus Authority, and the organization “The Future of Moldova”, set up by erstwhile Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev.

Politically supported by the Kremlin, BEP advocates closer cooperation with Moscow and against European integration. It criticises the values promoted by the EU as allegedly contrary to the Moldovan and even straight hostile Orthodox tradition, which is in the perception of representatives of the core block of the state culture. It besides calls for the Chisinau to keep neutrality and not engage in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, although it does not formally support aggression.

The 3rd force – with the support of about 10% – is the existing since January 2025 and the programme-based pro-European Political Block ‘Alternative’, composed of 3 groups: the aforementioned MAN Mayor of Chisinau Ion Ceban, the improvement and Consolidation organization of Moldova (PDCM) of the erstwhile Prime Minister Ion Chicu and the left-wing Civic legislature (CC). Among the crucial members and faces of this conglomerate must be Alexander Stoianoglo, a erstwhile lawyer General (nominated by Dodon in 2019) removed from his position at the PAS initiative in connection with the initiation of anti-corruption proceedings against him.

The 'Alternative' nominally advocates the European integration of Moldova, but has links with Moscow and is politically assisted by it. The first block politicians in the past openly presented pro-Russian views and maintained (sometimes even intense) relations with the Kremlin. Ceban for years belonged to the Communist organization and then to the PSRM, where he served as its chief ideologist and then to the advisor of president Dodon. In 2019 – exhibited by socialists – he became mayor of Chisinau (in the course of the run he most likely benefited from the support of Russian “polittechnologists”)^[13].Mark Tkaciuk, co-founder of CC, for years was 1 of president Voronin's closest collaborators and the main ideology of his communists. In turn, Stoianoglo, yet cleared of the charges against him, took part in the presidential election in 2024 with the support of the pro-Russian PSRM as the main counter-candidate for the re-election of Sandu (in the second circular he lost to her, receiving 44,65% of the vote).

Despite the declarative pro-Europeanity, the bloc parties advance a number of ideas that fall within the Russian political communicative or conflict with the values proclaimed by the EU. They are powerfully in favour of Moldova's maintaining impartiality (both in the military sense and even in relation to Ukraine's ongoing armed conflict) and against expanding defence spending. Ceban powerfully and consistently disagrees, for example, with the organisation of equality parades in the capital, allegedly a manifestation of the propaganda of homosexuality, which "should be banned"^[14].

The chances of crossing the electoral threshold have yet another force – the populist Our organization (currently polls give it 9–11%), which is hard to clearly classify in ideological terms, while politically it is alternatively on the pro-Russian camp. The leader of the group – Renato Usatîi – is positioned as an antisystemist critical of both PAS and the most crucial opposition forces with which an open conflict is taking place. In abroad policy, he is considered to be an activist of the “promoldavian” and thus calls for independency and from the West (he is reluctant to approach Europe), and from Moscow. However, he has long-standing ties with Russia and its citizenship (which he himself has obtained from Putin under a peculiar decree issued “in thanks for his work and merit”^[15]), and local expert and journalistic communities repeatedly accused him of being associated with the local services. The slogans of extra-blocking and "equal distance" to major global actors de facto fit the Kremlin's expectations. At the same time, since 2020, criminal proceedings have been pending in Russia against Usatîi in connection with the alleged removal of 175 billion rubles from the country, and in 2024 the court issued a warrant for his arrest. However, this fact can be considered both as a evidence to the independency of politics from Moscow and the way its authorities legend it.

...and the large absentee

Finally, the beginning of the Pro-Russian “Winning” block, comprising 4 groups under the supervision of Șor, was not allowed until the election. On 19 July, the Central Electoral Commission refused to registry a conglomerate, stating, among others, that the forces forming it were de facto posthumous to the ȘOR party, whose activity was declared unconstitutional in June 2023.^[16]. As a result, the support that according to the polls gathered the block (about 10%), switched to BEP and Our organization or contributed to an increase in the number of undecided.

The ban on the participation of “Winning” in the election is the culmination of the actions carried out over fresh years by its actual leader, 1 of the main tools of the Russian influence on Moldova. The most spectacular manifestation of the activity of Șor should be considered mass buying votes during the presidential election and the referendum in 2024. utilizing a network of activists and bots, oligarch recruited citizens to vote against the president and European integration. Only in the 2 months preceding the event was to spend nearly $40 million (i.e. 20 times the run costs of all candidates). He besides organised flights to Moldova and consulates in Minsk, Baku and Istanbul surviving in Russia (where only 2 commissions were launched, with a full of 10,000 ballot cards) Moldovans to let them to participate in elections^[17].

Perspectives and threats

It is not impossible for PAS to regain the independent majority – although it seems difficult. possible success will require the mobilisation of diaspora, which can supply the missing fewer percent points. The final decision of the undecided, whose percent is as advanced as 20%, will besides be crucial.

The most realistic script assumes that the current ruling organization – despite having the best consequence – will be forced to look for a coalition player. There are no apparent allies, however, among groups capable of crossing the electoral threshold. By the end of 2024, a possible partner for her appeared to be MAN. Although Sandu does not trust Ceban and repeatedly called him “the Trojan Horse of Moscow”, she in practice allowed him to cooperate with him because, despite all doubt, his organization was the only program-like force to enter parliament.

Although MAN's entry into the "Alternativa" in January 2025, with which the coalition president absolutely excludes, has radically changed the situation, but the alliance – like Ceban's informal support of the number government of PAS – should not be completely rejected. Another option is to work with an unpredictable partner, our Party. Due to the programme differences and Usatîi's very reluctant attitude towards the ruling party, this group does not seem to have entered the authoritative coalition, but the informal support of the number cabinet in return for the hard to specify favour is not impossible.

Both the PAS coalition with MAN or Our organization and the establishment of a number government bring serious risks. There is no uncertainty that the majority thus created will be unstable, and co-habitation will be burdened with tensions and conflicts. It is besides almost certain that groups cooperating with Sand will effort – by blackmailing the break-up of cooperation – to push against EU government legislative changes (concerning moral issues, number rights, etc.). This will slow the accession negotiations and even lead to the collapse of the cabinet. In this case, there will be an early election or, which cannot be excluded, the creation of a majority by opposition parties without PAS.