Introduction
We present to the reader a text comprehensively addressing the problem of illness of Polish attitudes and Polish consciousness. Diseases that we discuss on an example January Uprising, however, binding wherever the indicated threads of the January Uprising with akin threads of another uprisings. The Polish mentality and the Polish imagination of service to the nation are liable not only for historical circumstances, but besides for centuries the work of the enemies of the Polish nation, consisting in vacating attitudes that, under favorable circumstances, will lead to national tragedies and massacres of Poles – and the demolition of all actions aimed at repairing national awareness and attitudes of Poles. As a consequence of our work, a comprehensive text was created, which an undeveloped reader can discourage. So we appeal at this point to everyone, alternatively of getting angry early – read and considered the following article and attached a fragment of A. Wrotnowski's book, if not 1 effort – in respective smaller ones. We highly urge text November Uprising – cult of political errors, false heroes and its effects.
We want you a reflection reading.
Editorial of Polish National Thought
celebrated in 2013 150th Anniversary January Uprising (22.I.1863) could be an excuse to discuss misconceptions about the political attitudes of Poles, in which their service to the Polish people should be manifested – and why certain attitudes considered patriotic by Poles are in their nature highly anti-national. These misconceptions and the resulting attitudes have not only led (with the effective assistance of the Prussian, Austrian and Austrian agents and Intrigues of abroad Elements cultural Poles) in the year 1863 to national tragedy, but besides played a decisive function in another national disasters (1830, 1944). What attitudes of Poles we have already written widely in the text about November Uprising. Let us remind – we mark the confusion of national responsibilities with rivalry on the "Molojka" bravado and "hero" not counting the consequences that this rivalry will have for another Poles – individuals as well as the nation as a full (this incalculation is simply a contempt for the wellness and life of another Poles and their property – as well as the common national property), ignoring geopolitical, geoeconomic and military conditions and wishing thinking. Polish people who think nationalally in their activities are obliged to put the destiny of another Poles first, not – the desire to show themselves before others "patriotism" or to introduce their ideas of consecration to the "home" without looking at the effects of these actions to another Poles. The Pole has obligations towards the Polish nation – Poles surviving present – and those who are coming. These are Polish duties, which Dmowski wrote about. Responsibilities towards a peculiar human group, not a vague “home” or “independence”. specified an knowing of the duties of the individual results in concern for another Poles and constant reflection on whether the benefits of circumstantial actions outweigh possible losses or not. The nationalist has no right to take risks in a situation where disaster is almost certain, and the only reason for endangering the lives of others is the notion of "honor" imposed on him. There is no right in national matters to be guided by emotions – due to the fact that emotions make him easy a tool in the hands of others who, by driving him into anger, themselves keep distance – and do not necessarily service the Polish cause. The aim of the Polish nation is to proceed and build the prosperity of Poles, not to fill the Polish cemeteries with corpses to make a surviving space for another (helping to fill these cemeteries with Poles) nations. War is an extension of politics (as Clausevitz noted) alternatively than a method of demonstrating attitudes and emotions or commanding "moral rations". The policy serves circumstantial national objectives – economically, demographically and politically measurable. Policies aimed at achieving another objectives – to the detriment of the abovementioned areas of national existence – must be regarded as an enemy to the nation and yet to destruct the nation. 1 of the most prominent Polish national ideologists (if not the most prominent – and present – for unusual reasons silenced and forgotten), Zygmunt Balicki, perceived the harmfulness of the dictatorship of emotion in Polish political reasoning very similarly:
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Source: Zygmunt Balicki, past Dilemma, National Review, October 1908, year I, no. 10.
Of course, in Poland there are groups and centres which (for reasons explained in the above mentioned). November Uprising text) the above reflections and guidelines of conduct are very unflavoured. These groups request Poles with not national attitudes, but pseudo-patriotic attitudes – unreflective, irrational, ultra-emotional. They request Poles who are easy to manipulate – and those who, thanks to instilled pseudovalues, reject rational politicians and political realism. For Poles who are deceived by pseudo-patriotic national attitudes and care for national interest are something abroad – suicide spurs are the essence of Polishness, condemning them and their leaders and attitudes which led to those doomed to defeat – is simply a "stack honor":
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Source: Stanisław Michalkiewicz, "Epigons celebrate anniversary", www.michalkiewicz.pl, August 1, 2012
The comparison of the above quote with Balicki's message shows clearly how pseudopatriotism is to national thought. The essence of the “realist” dispute with “independants” around Warsaw Uprising It is not, as S. Michalkiewicz claims, the love of “realists” for “involvement” but – apparent even to AK commanders and their subordinates the deficiency of any chance of achieving political or military targets with resources and in the geopolitical-military realities of the time. So the spit-out “realists” are enemies of irrational actions and the waste of the most precious, what our nation has – Polish blood. While spitting out “realists”, S. Michalkiewicz moves the speech into the area of emotion – he writes about the contempt and disregard of “realists” towards “independants”. This serves only to incite S. Michalkiewicz's readers against the realism – the agitation effectively closes the way for rational arguments – and to trigger specified a state in all discussion of readers (in the presumption – "independants") with “realists" a clever publicist. After the “implantation” of his readers on the common sense arguments, S. Michalkiewicz puts the thesis that “realists” are simply cowards, in a guess – unlike “independants” – which is actually a book value (emotional reward) in order to strengthen a peculiar attitude. It is clear that the level of public debate on the issue crucial to the Polish national identity is embarrassing.
Let us look at another alternatively crucial message – here the author does not manipulate the reader, but presents his point of view:
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Source: Michał Karnowski, With specified power we ourselves must organize celebrations in honor of the heroes of 1863, we must establish the Citizens Year of the January Uprising
So we are to worship a national disaster provoked by Prussian agents and Jews on its services (cf. besides A. Wrotnowski, “Post-Contribution Aspiracye ...”, → p. 246, “Did Prussia finance conspirators?” – underlined text, J. Giertych, “Thousand of Years ...”, Volume II, “The emergence of January Prussian Intrigue?”, → p. 360 ), which resulted in respective tens of thousands of people being sent to exile, the Polishization of the administration was cancelled thanks to the efforts of Wielopolski and The Polish education strategy was devastated in the erstwhile Kingdom of Poland (see J. Gierty, “Thousand of Years ...”, Volume II, → p. 352 Let us not forget the unimaginable material losses caused by the confiscation of the property of Poles and the embezzlement of Polish property of Jews (see ‘Judeopolonia ...’ L. Szcześniak, p. 11), which importantly weakened the Polish nation for decades – besides politically, due to the fact that political power is simply a derivative of economical and demographic power. How, being a Pole, can it be written that thanks to specified a terrible catastrophe “the derivative of Polishness did not die out”?!? She didn't go out. despite a terrible disaster, and no - Thanks to her. On the function of “the cult of heroes” and Józef Piłsudski, even though the national position is known – we mention the reader to the text by K. Kawalc National Democracy against the traditions of national uprisings.
The problem of the sphere of the outbreak of the January Uprising has already been addressed by publishing a fragment of S. Didier's work in the text “Jews and the January Uprising and its planned anti-Polish dimension”. In this text we would like to extract from our oblivion another work dealing with the circumstances of the January Uprising, namely “Post-Contributive political aspiacies of the Polish people” by Antoni Wrotnowski. The book Wrotnowski, which we quote in the text, and which we will put below, is very crucial for the contemporary Polish reader for respective reasons at the same time. First of all, Wrotnowski was a man surviving and operating in that era, knowing many people associated with the plot, engaging even as far as possible in averting the conspiracy. In addition, Wrotnowski, alongside his cognition of the interior affairs of Poland, which no contemporary historian has and will not have, has a broad cognition of the nuances of the European diplomacy of that time – and political competitions between the powers in which the Polish case was a cynically utilized tool. This cognition was transferred to the cards of his book. The clever head of Wrotnowski combined with the detailed cognition of the human age created a work of extraordinary, cited in many lectures of historians, but never published after 1898 – and today, very wrongly, completely forgotten.
The author included in his survey very interesting observations and facts – as well as the unique and widely cited message by Stefan Bobrowski, who personally told Wrotnowski the motives of the organizers:
When faced with people with a more sober view, to a conservative organization belonging to them, not being able to defy arguments demonstrating the incomparability of defeating Rossya, or even to win her army standing in Poland, they yet did not deny that the uprising would not lead the Polish nation to an independent state existence. And erstwhile they were asked why they wanted to initiate an uprising that It will cover the country with rubble and origin bloodshed to be completely useless and then Russian terrorism, – they replied: ‘that The bloodshed will be very useful that it has become even necessary, in the face of the compromise with Rossya, which margrave is trying to carry out‘. Conservative parties,-they continued,- are standing so far in front of the aspiacs of the nation against this compromise, whether he persists with them, is simply a very questionable thing for us, and we even anticipate that weary of political agitacy, sooner or later he will support margrave.
In our belief, therefore, it is simply a danger of faithfulness to the banner, by which, standing persistently, the Polish people have been carrying countless sacrifices for a clearly defined intent for years, and have lived with large ideals. The fact that the majority of the nation, erstwhile accepting a compromise with Rossya, is to depart from the flag must not be allowed at any price. A firm and effective prevention that this compromise cannot be carried out, so we consider our work to the Polish thought and to our homeland. Calling for an uprising to which we are preparing, we fulfil this work in the belief that to suppress our movement, Rossya will not only destruct the country, but will even be forced to pour out a river of Polish blood; – this river will become an obstacle to any compromise with the invaders of our country for many years.; for we do not say that even in half a century the Polish nation will put this blood into oblivion, and to scope out to the enemy who filled this river with Polish blood.
*) The words of Stefan Bobrowski, the then chief of the city of Warsaw in the conspiracy organization, (...) spoken in conversation with me in the late autumn of 1862, in Karol Ruprecht's apartment. Ruprecht... was a friend of mine, even since he returned from the Siberian mines. I have, therefore, frequently talked to him about a defeat threatening the country in the event of an uprising, prepared openly. Confused with my views, he explained to me that all his attempts to turn young people to organic work and to make her abandon the thought of an uprising were without any influence.
"Are there madmen among you, or are there strong arguments showing the perniciousness of the armed movement, not to be heard by those who are phanatized, but, nevertheless, the homeland in their own way loving and willing to sacrifice themselves ready?" Are there not honest men among you who should scare and halt the thought that they will send thousands of patriots to slaughter and at the same time carry out crimes against their own country and even lose the Polish cause?“ I said to Ruprecht once. .Try to talk to them – he answered, possibly you will be happier than me, very doubtful, but effort it – I will make it easier for you to see them.” I accepted this proposal, and on the day marked I found Bobrowski and 2 another members of the central committee, occupying the most influential positions in the conspiracy body. (...) I was talking to them a fewer hours at the time, – yet Bobrowski closed this conversation with words marked with quotes, – almost virtually quoted, due to the fact that I remember the full conversation to this day.
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Source: Antoni Wrotnowski, Post-Solution Political Aspiracy of the Polish Nation, Wyd. Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, Lviv 1882, → pp. 242-244; abbreviations: PMN editor
The spilling of Polish blood rivers in the name of no – national benefits, only bizarre ideas of creating a gap between Poland and Russia returned much later:
Tomasz Lubieński.: Is Pełczyński* He later made any effort to revise his war decisions and views, did he inactive stick to his own?
Jan Ciechanowski: He defended that decision. He said that the uprising had dug specified a deep blood ditch between Poland and Russia that Poland would never be so Sovietized. He erstwhile punched his fist on the table and thundered: As the nuke flutters, people will forget Warsaw!
...
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* Gen. Tadeusz Pełczyński (one of the perpetrators of PW’44, the fatal result of the gathering preceding the decision to rise, Chief of Staff of the KG ZWZ-AK [VII 1941 – X 1944], at the same time, as of VII 1943 Deputy Chief of General AK)
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Source: Conversation with Prof. Jan M. Ciechanowski, ed. Tomasz Lubieński and Dr. Janusz Marszalec, “In a fight without weapons”, DEBATA Number 8 (35) 2010, p. 4, also: “They talk centuries”, peculiar number 1/2004 (text besides available as http://www.postań.pl/index.php?tors=17&class=text).
So, as we can see, we are dealing not with an episode, but with a permanent distortion of attitudes and attitudes considered to service the Polish cause. This distortion, under adverse additional circumstances, leads to national tragedies. What responsibilities does a nation gotta face a hopeless situation? Is he expected to commit mass suicide? Before presenting the opinion of Z. Balicki and respective assessments of the January Uprising by R. Dmowski, we will let to quote another authority of the Polish nation:
Who can be amazed that the cage in Poland was broken by the breasts of “Polish birds” until feathers flew, leaving wounds?! Explain to the bird, so he doesn't request to beat the wires, or he can't beat them...! Even to a bird that has no knowing or discernment and the connection of its pursuits with the pursuits of another birds, you do not “explain” this. Would you like to explain that to a rational and free being? Oh, there's no explanation at all! alternatively of doing that, it is better to open the cage and give the wings the ability to make in flights and breasts – to be powerful, as it requires its own task, the destiny of man or nation...
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Source: Polemics of Primate S. Wyszyński with editor of Weekly General Stanislaw Stomma on the meaning of independency uprisings announced in the January Uprising century, Church of the Holy Cross, Warsaw, January 27, 1963, source: “History in Memories ...”, cf. besides wikicytates.
A fewer questions may come to mind. First of all – is the metaphor truly correct? Whether the nation is an organized community, governed by intelligent leaders, guided by national interests (economic, political, demographic) in elections, or—is an unreasonable mass of animal nature, pitched instincts? If the collective actions of the Polish nation bring to head animal protruding in a cage alternatively than rational actions aimed at achieving concrete effects (i.e. policy) – whether it is heavy accusation against the leaders and those who have allowed these leaders to lead, or – natural property of the Polish nation? Z. Balicki, observing the behaviour of various nations under conditions of failure of sovereignty, made the following reflection in 1908:
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Source: Zygmunt Balicki, past Dilemma, National Review, October 1908, year I, no. 10.
What is the conclusion? Well, nations without sovereignty take the action that comes from the reason of their leaders—and the ability of them to scope their countrymen with their ideas. Nations are not instinctive animals. Nations are collectives of intelligent beings, guided by more or little intelligent beings. S. Wyszyński makes a very unusual mistake in reasoning – claims that since an unreasonable animal cannot be explained to halt acting instinctively, it is all the more impossible to talk to a reasonable creatureOh, my God! An example of Prussia shows that either something is incorrect with the logic of the Primate priest, or – the Prusai people were not intelligent beings or animals in the period of submission to Napoleon. So what were they – plants? Stones? S. Wyszyński concludes the conviction with a kind of wishful reasoning – here is the occupier and oppressor who is to quit the benefit of the slave nation – and return his freedom. The reason why the possessor would do this – we do not learn this from the Primate. This celebrated sermon caused confusion in many susceptible to submission to the authority of Polish heads – and again forgave failure or planned crime of insurgent leaders. In addition, it sanctioned anti-national-pseudopatriotic attitudes, and naive ones – or planned anti-Polish speakers gave the chance to support the authority of S. Wyszyński and cynical use, Catholic religion of many Poles against the Polish people (although there are many another areas in which the religiousness of Poles is turned against the Polish people, we will return to the substance in another publications).
What can be concluded at this phase of consideration? It's like The nationalist is to be guided in assessments and actions solely by the reason and good of his own nation – not by misdiagnosis of persons or institutions considered to be authorities. Critical reasoning for the nation is the work of all Pole towards all another Poles. Autorites may be incorrect as shortly as they are formulated, and their diagnosis may become obsolete. yet – as you can see from the quote from S. Michalkiewicz – the intentions of people considered to be authorities must not necessarily be pure. The essence of the activities of the national movement is to follow the national interest at any time – to constantly redefine and correct our policies according to the political, economical and demographic situation.
So what did Z. Balicki propose as an alternate to murdering the Polish nation with the aid of the doomed national uprisings? At first glance, an attitude akin to that promoted by conservatives – working at the base, working on the creation of real forces, systematically strengthening a nation that had to lead either to evolutionary attainment of certain national freedoms, due to the accumulation of forces – or to warrant that the nation would be provided with appropriate forces erstwhile reaching for freedom would not be equivalent to national suicide:
...
There was a fresh concept of measures in national politics: a conflict that was both work and work, which was besides a struggle. ...
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Source: Z. Balicki, The Nature of National Democracy as a Partition, “Review of All Poland”, 1903, p. 334, cited for: B. Grott, “Zygmunt Balicki ideologist of National Democracy”, du. Arcana, Kraków 1995, p. 32
The way outlined above by Balicki was the only sensible solution not only after the January Uprising. It was already in the run-up The November Uprising, of which generals were aware murdered by at least unreasonable – and now worshipped as patriots – by P. Wysocki's subjects. Roman Dmowski, in his most crucial work – “The Thoughts of a Modern Pole” does not deal with either the leaders of the uprising or the misconceptions about serving the Polish cause, which, as a consequence of its spread, have put a terrible burden on the course of events:
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Source: Roman Dmowski, Thoughts of Modern Pole, Publishing Society, Lviv 1907, pp. 196-197, pp. VI. Political Revival
Dmowski's attitude is so curiosistic. First of all, he acknowledges that the January Uprising brought something another than misery to the “country”. If another step on the way to the eradication of feudalism, essential for the emergence of a modern society capable of absorbing the thought of a national – we could agree with Dmowski. Only that Dmowski does not mention a single affirmative effect of the January Uprising on the Polish case, and as shortly as it turns out, a 4th century later will describe only the negative effects (The wider effects of the Uprising are discussed by J. Gierty: “A 1000 years ...”, Volume II, → p. 350 and beyond In addition, he removes the perpetrators of the national disaster from criticism only due to the fact that no of the political centers opposed national stupidity enough. That's a beautiful weak premise for dismissing charges from circumstantial people liable for a national disaster.
Dmowski is much better at identifying the effects of the negative January Uprising. It points to the erasure of the Polish case from the political map of Europe, the large harm caused by the deficiency of Polish political and public institutions during the period of peculiarly dynamic socio-economic transformations connected with the industrial revolution, the elimination of the serfdom and partial misappropriation of peasants – and the awakening, as a consequence of these changes, of national awareness. So Dmowski wrote in 1933:
... After the partitions, it was richer than another districts, a fuller life, and after the Vienna legislature it was a separate, to any degree modern state, lived on a higher intellectual footing and maintained closer relations with Western life.
In the second half of the century, the central district, as a consequence of belonging to Russia, in its political institutions much more was left behind Europe than the Prussian and Austrian partitions. ...
It was a terrible condition that this coup (red note: industrial revolution, the elimination of the state, the improvement of the national consciousness of the masses) began at the time of the bankruptcy of the political origin of Poland. Finally, this economical and social advancement took place in the absence of public institutions, with the inclusion of a complete control of life in the hands of the government, which originally understood the needs of this life, which had to be the origin of many perversions.
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Source: R. Dmowski, Thoughts of Modern Pole, Gen. Turnovers (chapter added in 1933), I. Downfall, seventh edition of the Young National organization Circle, London 1953, p. 113-115
Note: Part of the ‘Think ...’ editions [e.g. 5th of 1934] does not contain this chapter
Below we will mention extended passages of the "Post-Soviet Aspiracy ...", which discuss errors and negligence of various Polish parties active in the increasing conflict, which (As a consequence of the actions of the Prussian and judaic agents, cf. S. Didier's monograph) ended in a national disaster. "After-party aspirin ..." are all the more notable and recommended that their author, in his political analyses published in 1882, uses a sober judgement of the situation, appropriate to national environments (see, for example, R. Dmowski, Thoughts of a Modern Pole, Rzd. The coup (added in 1933), I. The coup).
A. Wrotnowski has been carefully diagnosing the political negligence of margrabie Wielopolski (other texts on Wielopolski: Ungrateful countrymen, erstwhile will you build a monument to Wielopolski?, S. Didier o margrabi Wielopolski):
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Source: Antoni Wrotnowski, Post-District Political Aspiracy of the Polish Nation, Wyd. Gubrinowicz and Schmidt, Lviv 1882, Str. 189
The fight to push forward a political program adapted to the Polish political and Polish negotiating capabilities, not the maximalist aspirations and attitudes formed by the wares-romantics, required propaganda work, regardless of how beneficial the implementation of the Margrave programme was to the nation. Meanwhile, Wielopolski gave the field to propaganda-ideological opponents. At present, there is besides a conflict for the form of Polish national attitudes, the fight of which is described in the text. November Uprising – cult of political errors, false heroes and its effects. This fight, if an authentic Polish national movement is always to be revived in Poland, not its mockery, replicating pseudo-patriotic propaganda of 1 of the main political parties – we must not lose. Without restoring in Polish national consciousness the appropriate proportions of assessment of events, rationalisation in formulating programs and diagnosing the situation, without restoring the primacy of reason over emotions in Polish political discourse and Polish national consciousness there is no mention of effective national policy, nor – gaining wider public support by a rational and pragmatic national movement. This was proved by the decisive defeat of Margrabie Wielopolski, even though past acknowledged him right – without national awareness there can be no national policy. This ideological conflict must not be lost, despite the appalling difference in financial possibilities, the cut-off from the media – and the creation by the enemy, alongside popular politicians and publicists, alongside the disinformation agency – including the masses of Poles – of deceptive and unconsciously damaging. These environments – in bad religion (and the deceived Poles – in the best!) force anywhere where only anti-national, irrational pseudopatriotism can. It is time for nationalists to activate in those online media in which they are inactive allowed to be present – and they began to arrive with their message, besides to pseudo-national groups. It's time to start spreading valuable papers and links to them among friends – and to pseudopatriots-dominated websites. The nation deserves an antidote for anti-Polish propaganda, and it is the work of the nationalists to deliver it to him.
Poland National Thought
(Think national.wordpress.com)
2013
(a) Conspiracy Organizers
There is no uncertainty that the main work for all subsequent national disasters falls above all on the organizers of the plot. By exploiting the righteous outrage of the full Polish society, caused by the bloodshed of innocent blood in February 1861 and the patriotic feelings it had for the first time since the 1930s an chance to express itself openly and seriously; – utilizing the breakdown of conservative bias, among the ferments, caused by the establishment of a compromise program with Rossya, considered against the political aspiacs of the nation, they undertook a sad and frantic task of starting a war, to regain the sovereign power of Poland. Influenced The immeasurable presumptuousness and criminality were not able to comprehend that the measurement of the rightfulness of specified a task is always and everywhere not the rule itself, but the abundance of war measures and uniformity with the forces of the enemy, though most relative, but giving at least the likelihood of victory. If the right to regain the lost existence, no nation can be denied, and thus it always has a title, to win with weapons what it has taken distant from it, - nevertheless, for the sake of the greatness and importance of the goal, he powerfully forbids fighting in the face of a manifest deficiency of strength and a apparent incomparability to fight this law in open combat. And all gust unfulfilled with results, casts the substance of a tamed nation into a deeper abyss, alternatively of taking it a step higher, and even more the country weakens, alternatively of respecting its strength for a better future.
This unquestionable principle, only to direct guilty patriotism and all attempts by all nation, without national independence, did not realize first of all part of Polish emigration (Note ed.: As you can see history likes to repeat itself erstwhile no of it draws conclusions for the people's conduct.), creating a “democratic centre-; Polish society doing nothing to heal itself
from the fatal plague liberi conspiro, it did not disturb the refugees to turn the minds of the youth in the direction for the vital interests of his most harmful. “He who has hands can have a stick,—he who has a stick, he who has a stick can take distant the bayonet, who has a bayonet in his hand, he can take distant his cannons and ammunition”, said Ludwik Mierosławski(Note ed.: If the reader seems to think that Mierosławski did not have followers in the Polish anti-Hittlerian underground: "Before deciding on the premature battles, the government delegate to the country was warned by the military and politicians afraid about the march east by fresh German units and the return of the territory authorities to Warsaw. Among another things, he was observed by Labour organization president Józef Chaciński, to whom the delegate did not react, and to Jerzy Braun's remark of a associate of the National Unity Council that the Home Army soldiers had no weapons said: ‘They'll get it.‘’. Source: Jacek Smolarek, "On the 65th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising"), 1 of the most prominent agitators of emigration democracy, and it comes with sadness to confess that not a tiny number of youth, seeing a fresh paterotic catechism in this apparent folly of an incorrect rabble, was inclined to take part in plots aimed at The start of a war with the first-class military power, without the Polish army, and throwing sticks, and most of all with a hunting firearm and a scythe, on armed and organized Russian corps. This morbid attitude of Polish youth, decided to emigration agitators for their fantastic exploitation of ideas. Listening to their voice, he organized a conspiracy in the country.
The sworn in, giving evidence of unorthodox energy and organizational capacity, consumed each without exception a political error, completed within 2 years by the government and by strong conservative biases at once, well understood that the war with Rossya would be evident madness. Having drawn respective tens of thousands of men into conspiracy, They did not hesitate to make assurances of unquestionable victory, they yet gave the slogan to start a fight, having, as it was easy to predict, to fill the country with ruins.
This is all that the Polish people have suffered since 1864, and what will inactive endure is so their exclusive work. Without a bloody brawl for their voice begun, Rossya would not even have come this far in the 1950s in the way of Russia's Russianization of Poland, nor would she dared to have a hundredth of these measures, which her erstwhile terrorism marked.
Thus, the game organizers have committed the most severe crime a certain number of individuals can commit against their own country; – specified a court will be forced to renounce their history, especially since the pieces of unwarranted fears caused by the Margrave program will not be able to invent any another mitigating circumstances, even against the tens of thousands of consorts they ordered to stand on the conflict line.
As the decision organizers did not consider it essential or useful, to examine first of all the attitude of forces which they led to combat, in relation to the number of troops that Rossya could throw on Poland, and yet, even in supposing –
Not only that for each insurgent unit they would shortly adopt weapons, that with the aid of a real miracle, at 1 minute before Rossya was dressing himself up, so in a very short time, they would organize regiments and corps, intention, warehouses, wellness care and hospitals, in the words of all the instruments essential for conducting the war, they agreed without a uncertainty on specified an crucial substance to calculate what the number of improvised Polish troops would be, and nevertheless what strength the enemy would fight. They were so obliged to complete this calculation with all possible accuracy; but they did not make it obligatory to satisfy it, and did not even realize it. In part, under the influence of fanaticism, which takes distant the sobriety of all political view, part again due to unparalleled presumptuousness and recklessness, the game organizers thought that any of their own homelands love that they can love them. Therefore, accusing the full Polish society, the deficiency or at least insufficient degree of love and self-sacrifice for the home cause, any attention to the necessity of this account calls contemptible deficiency of courage(Note ed.: See previously commented quote from S. Michalkiewicz's text.).
The more of the conservative organization their warnings about the terrible consequences of throwing a gauntlet to a mighty power, without the ability to support this call with an awesome armed force, were so more careful to cover up its absence from the general (Note ed.: Cf. ‘PW’44 without weapons – reports of counterintelligence AK ...’.).
And as if in contrast to the fact that bias, out of disregard for Rossya's power, they made their political dogma, saying that Not paying attention to the number of her troops, is synonymous with Polish patrioism. They did not even agree to open the books of their native history, as if they did not, in fear, emphasize that for years more than 200, the forces of war of Rossyi grew and grew in contrast to the diminishing forces of the Polish nation.
From the head they did not search in the past neither discipline nor guidance, preventing them from having a sobering effect not only on those who were confounded, but even on the very creators of the mad theory, which kidnapping as weapons though he was a mute, counted as dogma, blind obedience worthy. So the organizers of the game did not remember, and possibly forgot, that the year 1634 was the culmination of the Polish weapon over the Russian; – that in the 20 years later, the Moscow tsar, having entered Lithuania and Ukraine with a force of 140.000 troops, had already reached Lublin and Zamość, while Poland, which was at the time won by Karol Gustav, was not able to resist, had to agree to the failure of crucial areas of the country mentioned in the treaty of truce, 3 lists of 1656 in Niemieża close Vilnius.
Written down. They besides did not remember, or did not want to remember, that the boldly successful weapon in 1654 Rossya, subsequently developed her possessive policy against the Polish people and pursued it persistently with an inexorable consequence. As the settlement of 16 September 1658 in Hadziacz, between the Republic of Poland and the Cossacks was later concluded, there were reasonable grounds for a union with them, which already existed between Poland and Lithuania, the Moscow Tsar immediately broke up this truce, and threw all his forces on Poland. In this war respective years led, the success of the Polish weapon was already balanced with failures; "The Republic was no longer able to recover the state in 1650 in possession of the Tsar left behind, and even enslaved to occupy peace, the decisive withdrawal of the Tsar Smolensk, Chernichov and Siewierz and the leaving of Kiev for 2 years in enemy hands. On 30 January 1667, in Andruszów, the truce of 131⁄2 years, only for the price of the above concessions, the Republic of Poland saved the Polish, Polish and Vitebsk Infanty. From the minute of this truce, the Polish nation, but inactive having a state existence, which could so put up serious armed forces, adequate to fight the Turks, could no longer be able to exert themselves to the expanding power of the Tsars. Even Jan Sobieski, but after the triumph by Chocimski (r.1672) surrounded by the halo of glory, did not dare to go against Rossya in order to regain the countries lost by the Treaty of Andruszowski, but by renewing in 1680 the truce for further years of 13, left the Tsar to proceed possession of Kiev. Even the triumph at Vienna (12 September 1683) did not dare John III to war with Rossya; – in the hope of bringing her into common action against the Turks, the Republic of Poland yet dismissed her Kiev, the heart of Polish Rusi and all erstwhile occupations, (Grzymułtowski Pact on 3 May 1686), The common relation between the war power of 2 nations has so changed beyond Sobieski; – the armed forces of the Republic, which even in the first half of the 17th century Rossya could not yet face, in the end of that century already for its defeat inadequate, decreasing and weakening in the 18th century with specified an unparalleled velocity that the Russian monarchs, while conducting their policies, do not request to throw many armies at Poland, and spread their influence with the usage of the army, comparatively not great.
Piotr W. gains this influence in 1704, bringing only 6000 soldiers into Lithuania and sending 12,000 to Kiev, to
helping August II against Charles XII. Thus the strength of 18,000 troops suffices to the Russian monarchy in 1716 to throw panic on the Ternograd Confederates. The threat of 50,000 Russian and Prussian soldiers entering Poland, is supported by a diplomatic act developed in 1724 due to the unfortunate Toruń case. The 40.000 Russian troops thwarted in 1733 the unanimous election of Stanisław Leszczyński; – 12,000 threatens Rossy in 1761; 8,000 put on Lithuania in 1763 throws panic at the opponents of the “Familia” organization whom he supposedly helps; respective 1000 in the following year, provides the Polish crown to Stanisław Poniatowski, despite the more many forces of the Hetman Party, having no courage to face Rossya and leaving Warsaw *). Finally, respective troops of the Russian army, not the army with an awesome number, thwarted all attempts by the Bark Confederacy.
Putting forces comparatively not great, does not prove that Rossya in each of these clashes is in no way capable of throwing more corps on Poland; – he argues, however, that to fight with the Polish army, she did not already last century recognise the request to lead a large army, although it existed and could increase her staff, and to eat arsenals, including all war instruments, but flawed or inadequate. As Rossya was able to lead the armed forces on the conflict line on a tripod calculated whenever she came to face the enemy, she was indeed a dangerous, powerful means of combat. The year 1807, and even more 1812, proves it. In turn, erstwhile the Polish people in 1831 began fighting for their state existence, for the first time since the 130s he ordered more serious and well organized forces, Rossya set up 160.000 troops, although after the two-year Turkish war, the recently completed was actually weakened.
It was so unquestionable, and for everyone seen that in 1861-1863 no war was threatened, Rossyn, in order to keep his power in Polsee, could cast on her forces very serious — at least 300,000 men. And indeed, the Russian army's account of the rank of soldiers issued in 1863 shows that the number of troops to suppress the insurgency on this side of the Niemne and Bug, and at the same time to impress Fraucy, was nearly 200,000; with this
*) Kisielewski loco citato p. 225.
so, which worked in Lithuania and Volyn, passed the overall figure of 300,000, accepted in the predictions of sober minds.
The game organizers replied that in 1861 the Russian garrisons in the Kingdom did not carry 80,000 Judah, that so by ordering 100,000 consorts, these garrisons could endure, and then they would endure all enemy unit, entering Polish borders. First of all, they consciously and out of head lied to themselves and others with a figure of 100,000 consorts, since it was clear that even in early 1863, the full number of consorts did not scope half of that number; – which, in fact, came to light in the first months of that year, erstwhile the consorts appeared in the field. More importantly, this figure of 100,000, in the belief of the organizers of the conspiracy, was not awesome at all; for they did not want to believe that the regular army, even the 1 in 1861 stood in the Kingdom, would sooner or later break up and abolish the fucker, even though 200,000 people counting, all over the country with necessity and in 1 place for the deficiency of organization, warehouses and food could not gather; – they did not want to realize that this army could be abolished before it, Rossya would bring fresh forces into the country and will not quit until she herself considers that she had exhausted the resources and means of prolonging the war; and these measures would not exhaust either the mover or the guerrilla, even though the most fortunate and successful operation. They did not want to draw attention to the fact that they would start a war with forces and means that could not be compared and seemingly weaker than those utilized by the Confederacy of Barska, the emergence of Kościuszko and the emergence of November; – on the contrary, since 183l, seemingly powerful, it is possible to bring to the conflict large and well organized armies, respective times more many than those which the Poles had previously defeated.
All these considerations raised in the confidential, though with the organizers of the game of talks, (for no 1 could talk publically and act openly),—they were the voice of the 1 crying in the wilderness, before their conceit, passing all notion, Looking at the arrogance with which they had announced the victory, it was clear that they were fighting the Republic of San Marino or the Brunswick army, not the power, the planet rightly regarded as a large military power..· Although the blood feud by the organizers of the game created and started, it was nothing another than Rossya's
a fresh historical fact, in a band of the same nature of facts, inevitable in relation to a nation tamed and subdued; – Therefore, no historian will find that the organisers will carry out the crime against Rossya, no 1 will deny that the act under these conditions, conceived and executed, was a crime against the country, since the fight at least the most solemn, could not force Rossya to renounce her power over Poland, but he had to carry out the ruin of the full country and a long series of severe persecutions.. This act bore an even clearer feature of the crimes against his homeland, since it was at the same time a visible rocoche of respective dozen, or even a fewer 100 individuals against the manifest will of the full country (Note ed.: Analogie z conspiracy of 1831. they come up alone.). After all, the full Polish society since the 1930s emphasized its reluctance to resume an armed fight with Rossya, in the presence of a belief of incomparability to defeat it. The organizers of the game did not respect this will, but, putting theirs above the will of the general public, challenged Rossya on his behalf, although they did not have a mandate from the country to this challenge, and even well understood that the overwhelming majority of the nation was the opposite.
It did not halt them for a minute to think that in the event of a more vigorous attitude of the conservative organization they could origin a split, or possibly a civilian war on Polish land against the Russian army, – a defeat even more terrible to the nation than all that he later suffered, and averted by the passive attitude of the said organization with victims of the occupation. So they left behind a sad memory, especially erstwhile judging their actions from the position of political morality. In this respect, they submitted evidence that they had no thought of any work to the country. They besides had no thought of the "government" obligations, although on the eve of the explosion, the prominent word "national government" had taken precedence, nor of the work of any authority, to those who surrendered to it. Every government has a work to calculate the forces and means to the task which it indicates to the society of which it is expressed; – any government of a country, even with full state autonomy, would have fulfilled a state crime whenever it called upon a nation to fight clearly equal, undoubtedly leading to a disaster, or whenever it neglected to accumulate appropriate war measures, in the presence of equal enemy forces.
The organizers of the game did not announcement that the declaration of war to a power as powerful as Rossya, against
The forces they ordered would gotta bear in past the name of a crime, even in this case, if they were the government of an independent Polish state; and war was not recognized by the full nation as an apparent necessity.
And those sworn in, and thus those who recognized their authority, lied and deceived them in the most shameful manner; for they had drawn them into the collusion, having considerable forces to start the battles ready, which they had not had, and assured them that the weapons along with ammunition and all war supplies were prepared and would be delivered in time to the places designated for the formation of troops, and yet neither weapons nor ammunition brought them into the country. So they sent those who trusted them blindly to the forest with their bare hands to the inevitable slaughter by the Russian troops, against whom the troops were not even to defend themselves.. And having formed out of these unfortunate twelve unarmed groups, they were bold to declare that they had started a war of independency of the homeland! abroad aid could not be expected and could not be expected; as it will be told in the following paragraph, even France considered the insurgent movement premature and harmful for its then diplomatic combinators; – and it developed its diplomatic act in the Polish case only a fewer weeks later, and not due to the blood in Poland, but due to the Prussian-Russian convention, and thus the fact which at the time of the uprising no 1 could predict, which was not predicted by the game organizers. The subsequent diplomatic actions of Napoleon III, thus have no effect on the relief of the dense guilt of the organizers.
What is the saddest thing, and what comes to express with the most vivid pain, those of the leaders of the conspiracy who were at the head of it in the last months before the issue of the slogan for the uprising, went on to do the work in bad religion in the sense that they themselves did not delude themselves in any way as to the consequence of the blood feud in which the country interfered, – nevertheless, they continued to draw to their ranks the assurances of doubtless triumph over Rossya.
When faced with people with a more sober view, to a conservative organization belonging to them, not being able to defy arguments showing the incomparability of defeating Rossya, or even to win her army standing in Polsee, they did not yet deny that the uprising would not lead the Polish nation to an independent state existence. And erstwhile they were asked, for-
What they want to create, which will cover the country with rubble and origin the bloodshed to be completely useless, followed by Russian terrorism, they replied: “That The bloodshed will be very useful, that it has become even necessary, in the face of the compromise with Rossya, which margrave seeks to carry out‘. Conservative parties,- they continued,- are inactive standing with the aspiacs of the nation against this compromise, whether he persists with them, is simply a very dubious thing for us, and we even anticipate that weary of political agitacy, sooner or later he will support margrave.
In our belief, then, is the danger of faithfulness to the banner, by which the Polish people have been enduring, bearing countless sacrifices for a clear intent for years, and surviving their large ideals (Note ed.: That the program of Wielopolski did not gotta break national aspirations it is easy for the reader to conclude again reading the thoughts of Z. Balicki about Fighting through work and Prussian politicians' attitudes towards the failure of sovereignty. The harm of the foolish “life of ideals” is evidenced by the destiny of the Polish people, in which the crucial function was played by this author a devastating nation Polish primacy of feeling over reason in politics.). The fact that the majority of the nation, erstwhile accepting a compromise with Rossya, is to depart from the flag must not be allowed at any price. A firm and effective prevention that this compromise cannot be carried out, so we consider our work to the Polish thought and to the country. Calling for an uprising to which we are preparing, we fulfil this work in the belief that to suppress our movement, Rossya will not only destruct the country, but will even be forced to pour out a river of Polish blood; – this river, for many years, will become an obstacle to any compromise with the invaders of our country; for we do not say that even in half a century the Polish nation will throw this blood into oblivion, and to scope out a hand to the enemy who filled this river with Polish blood" *).
*) The words of Stefan Bobrowski, the then chief of the city of Warsaw in conspiracy organism, – the same 1 who died at the hand of number Adam Grabowski in 1863 in a duel, spoken to me in late autumn 1862, in Karol Ruprecht's apartment. To this conversation with Bobrowski, whom I had never before known, and later never met, came the following way: Ruprecht, undoubtedly the purest and most noble figure among the parties of the movement to which he joined. in order to make certain that in the actions of the confounded, the revolver, knife and poison did not play a major role, he was my friend, always since he returned from the Siberian mines. I've seen him rather frequently in the years 1861 and 1862, so I've frequently talked to him about a disaster threatening the country in the event of an explosion. An uprising prepared openly. Consistent with my views, he explained to me that all his attempts to turn the youth towards organic work and to make her abandon the thought of the uprising were without any influence (Note ed.: The attitude of organic work never gave the Polish people specified respect of the environment as heroism. But for the sake of respect among those who are empty in their head, was the full nation allowed to push toward a certain defeat?).
"Are there madmen among you, or are there firm arguments showing the perniciousness of the armed movement, that they may not be able to hear in the people of the phanatised, but nevertheless the homeland in their own way loving and willing to sacrifice themselves ready,--isn't there among you honest men whom they should fear and restrain the thought that They will send thousands of patriots to slaughter, while at the same time carrying out crimes against their own country, and even they can lose the Polish case“ I said to Ruprecht once. effort to talk to them—he answered, possibly you will be happier than me, very doubtful of that, but effort it—I will make it easier for you to see them.” I accepted this proposal, and on the day marked I found Bobrowski and 2 another integrals of the central committee, occupying the most influential positions in the conspiracy body. I don't give their names, not knowing if or where they live. I talked to them a fewer hours at the time, – yet Bobrowski closed this conversation with words marked in the text with quotes, – quoted almost literally, due to the fact that I remember the full conversation well.
Thus, the Margrave program was not put up early, yet became 1 of the most crucial reasons, leaders of the leaders' grievances, or at least it was damaging to The head is hot, never and nowhere without reality.
Under the influence of unwarranted fear that among the Polish society at the time this program could endanger the ideals and .standard of the nation, youth always and everywhere for a pohop to act, and conceited, – she considered it an work to stand up for the Polish idea. Under the motto of this thought both the majority of leaders and each of those who joined the collusion acted. First, after explaining to themselves that this thought will not otherwise be saved from destruction, as with bloodshed, They stepped back from a step that they thought was manifest madness.. The fear of apostasy of a major part of the nation from his 100-year-old political aspiacy, which they raised in the best religion and out of deep conviction, outweighed the stakes. They didn't even go back to reasoning that they were betraying the trust of those who were sworn to be sent to death, that they would bring a series of disasters to the full country.; – and fulfilled the top madness and at the same time a dense crime in their own homeland, in order to make Poland's compromise with Rossya for a long time can stop. Their responsibility is thus so visible and so profound that even this fear that the program of margrave over the aspiracists of the nation should not win, and the impact of this fear upon them cannot be accepted as mitigating circumstances.
However, by showing 1 of the main reasons for issuing a password for armed uprising, they besides emphasize that some
The work for the accidents of 1863, falls on the margrave, who, however, for the sake of hot patrotism, appearing prematurely with his program, provoked outrage in the hot minds, and unwittingly pushed them on the mad road.
(b) Leaders of the Uprising
The fact that the Russian Monarch was given obedience by respective tens of thousands of consorts, supported by the establishment of a secret “national government” and declared by him to respond, had to trigger repressive government measures; – that there could not be a speech about conducting a formal war between Poland and Rossya, in the absence of a Polish army capable of fighting an enemy army.
And in fact, in the last days of January 1863 the government itself assumed that moving army columns would environment and enslave each insurgent unit, most frequently hiding in the woods. However, the commanders of the Russian army did not fulfill the task with the right rush; – which can not be explained otherwise, as bad will, or alternatively the desire to prolong the operation against the said troops, in order to increase the individual materialistic benefits and number of awards which the Russian monarch utilized in akin times generously to dress.
In view of the passive attitude of the full nation, terrified of the dangerous consequences of the country, the movement of respective 1000 people did not let it to presume the features of a historical event, or even origin diplomatic acquiescence of Western powers.
Although Berlin journals, and especially semi-official and following the guidance of ministers, on the first news of the outbreak, overestimating the forces of the insurgents, attempted to give this movement the importance it did not have. Although the public opinion in England has made a clear message against the systemat utilized by the Russian government in Poland since the 1930s, even in consequence to the interpelacy in the parliament, the ministers of the Queen expressed themselves fiercely against Rossya and against politics conducted by her in Warsaw, while insisting on violating the conditions of the Vienna Treaty, the laws of the Polish people defining.
After all, the full discussion in both chambers was not authorized to conclude that England wanted to support or rise the Polish case. From the attitude of Prussian journalism and public opinion bodies in England, the more sober minds in Poland could thus bring out this
only the conclusion that Both over the Thames and over the Spree, the Warsaw movement saw a means of obstruction, and possibly to soften the alliance between France and Rossya, which was then desired in both St. Petersburg and Paris , and put as expected, until the calming of Poland (Note ed.: In fact, the discovery of the alliance of 1859, J. Gierty, was postponed: ‘(...) Although by 1856 France was together with another countries in the war against Russia, as early as 1859, 3 years later, it happened not only between France and Russia to bring it closer but to a formal secret arrangement, concluded on 3 March 1859. another countries, as well as planet public opinion, did not know about this arrangement, but they suspected its existence. (The text of this arrangement was found in the Czarchy archives by russian historian Rewunenkow and announced the first message about it in 1924 and the full data in 1938.) It was clear to the planet that France now has Russian support in its planet policy – permanent or unstable, subject to or without hesitation. This was expressed, among another things, in the fact that France, under the regulation of Emperor Napoleon III, has undertaken with all courage an action to unify Italy, striking (with Piedmont-Sardinia) on Austrian governments in Italy (...)" [Source: J. Gierty, 1000 Years of past of the Polish Nation, du. Veritas Foundation Press, London 1986, p. 317]).
In the face of the diplomatic negotiations of the Petrsburg Cabinet with Napoleon III on the said alliance, and the more detailed attitude of the monarch in talks with the Poles since the beginning of the Warsaw manifestacy, the country has been convinced that, on the 1 hand, the key to the Russian concessions and the reason for the reform, is the importance of the close covenant with France, that the change of the strategy of governing the Kingdom of legislature takes place for higher reasons of abroad Russian policy; – on the another hand, that without changing in measures that might be a covenant, Prussia and England want to usage the Polish movement for this purpose, namely the bloodshed over the Vistula River, which may not be without influence on public opinion and the Emperor of France himself. The extraordinary amount of the Prussian gold coin, then circulating in Warsaw, led to the thought that between the organizers of the plot, the secret agents of the Berlin Cabinet could operate, since the insurekcya in Poland came just in time for the above-mentioned views, and since on the first news of the uprising, the Prussian press tried to give him the highest political significance. Therefore, no 1 in the country even expected to diplomaticly crush Prussia or England on the Polish substance *), so neither the organizers of the game nor the leaders of the armed movement could number on them in the first weeks after sending them to the forests.
*) There could be no assistance from Prussia; it was widely known that England dismissed the Polish case at the Vienna Congress, and prevented France and Austria from interfering with it in 1831., – and did not let this substance to be raised during the Crimean War, which even affected the hasty completion of this war, and even the warp of the Treaty of Paris itself. Finally, it was remembered that erstwhile among this war, allied powers decided to form regiments of Polish riding alongside the Turkish army, and erstwhile the Yemeni Zamoyski wanted to give character to the erstwhile Polish legions, he went to London demanding that they should receive the flag with the white eagle and chase, Lord Palmerston did not respond to this request, "voulez Vous donc monsieur le Comte nous brouiller avec la Russie."
With this increased intensity, however, Napoleon III was expected to announce how the insurgent movement in Poland would propose. His views on the Polish substance were widely known, and although during the 2 erstwhile years his attitude became seemingly more attentive, and for Rossya more friendly, it was known that the substance was besides the axis of all his politics, that his views did not change, but put them aside to a more convenient time. The bitter impatience with which the full nation at that time looked like news from Paris was justified. With equal fever, the organizers of the game had to look to France, after the assurances received from Jeneral Wysocki and another refugees, who had an introduction to Prince Napoleon, who was known to have sympathized with the parties of the movement in various countries, and in his conversations doubtless little attentive than the French emperor, did not exert a calming influence on the minds of the organizers in question. (Note ed.: It remains to be asked what important, with a desire for the result of the armed confrontation of the conspirators with Russia, the aid could be given by France, separated from the Kingdom lands by respective borders and hundreds of kilometres—not the first time in insurgents' accounts it was imagined that an ally with whom there was no common border, whatever it meant.).
At the time, she had a Polish substance of very many friends among French intelligence, as we know, to the governments of the second little favorable empire, thus eagerly raising all hesitation in his abroad politics. Napoleon III's careful attitude in the presence of bloodshed over the Vistula River, which did not harmonize with the attempts he had previously made to rise the Polish question, was regarded by the French opposition as a peculiar chance to show the instability of his policy (Note ed.: The Polish issue has always been a tool for European countries to conduct politics, not its aim – and Poles should yet realize it. In political competitions with banana republics and chaotic tribes there is no place for relationship – and Poles have always been for the “west” they hoped for, either 1 or the other.).
Sympatya .for Poland and antipatya to Napoleonic governments, were simultaneously introduced to the game. Therefore, in the press and in both Chambers, the voices were hot due to Polish voices accusing the emperor of leaving the matter. In consequence to these .interpelacies, The Minister of State, on behalf of the monarch, declared that maintaining good relations with all powers is the first interest of France, and so the first work of its government, saying that Poles should anticipate to improve their destiny from the good dispositions of Emperor Alexander II, alternatively of making obstacles to it, or to search this improvement by way of uncertainty and even incapable to bring them to the desired goal..
This statement, giving a decisive blow to the hopes of the leaders of the uprising, convinced the country that the movement would not receive any aid from the outside, so that it would be suppressed in a fewer weeks at the latest, and starting to think about regrouping conservatively, that from the passive attitude it retains, it would shortly be able to draw out of the passive attitude of the movement.
the title to the Government's message that it has a rule to benefit from the announced reforms.
However, there was an unforeseeable and highest political significance, which radically changed not only the form of things in Poland, but even the policy of the full of Europe. One of the higher Prussian military came to Warsaw in order to show to the Duke of Constant that the Polish uprising is so powerful that Rossya, on his own strength, will not be able to aid him – that Poland can lead to independence, and thus exposure Emperor Alexander to territorial losses, that the Prussian king so gives Rossya military aid against the insurgents, and to this end he wants to first agree on the conditions of the arrangement, to find the manner of joint action, in the event that Rossya's regulation over the Vistula River is simply a threat. The plan of this arrangement was the first vertical moved on the political chessboard by today's Chancellor of the German Empire, who, having freshly assumed the leadership of the Berlin Cabinet, had just begun his large game, culminated, as it is known, with amazing success.
Although the large Prince of Constanta did not admit the request to supply Rossya with assistance from a abroad army against the movement that the army gathered in the Kingdom was able to suppress within a fewer weeks, the Prussian jenel rushed to St. Petersburg, where the message of Berlin's cabinet was readily accepted, and with the inexplicable haste a celebrated Prussian-Russian convention was signed.
By the very nature of things, this convention thwarted all erstwhile negotiations of the Petersburg Cabinet with Napoleon III and broke the alliance that was the goal of these negotiations, while putting the fact made in the face of Europe as a whole: a strict covenant resistant to 2 northern powers; – it must have made a large impression everywhere. There is no uncertainty that the Polish case for Prussia as for Rossyi was only a means leading to another political goals, not the intent of this covenant; – it is not possible to say that in the Petersburg office as in Berlin, the name of inaccurate news about the number and kind of arms of Polish insurgents, or that there would be uncertainty about the abundance of armed forces, against them operating, – chambers were yet afraid of intervention or, at least, of diplomatic activity of Western powers, especially after the message of the French government, clearly denying the hope of any aid. Dot-
It is not known what benefits Rossy sought in this covenant, but it is evident that it subjected her to a certain dependence of Prussia, since she was forced from now on to support all the political combinators of the Berlin Cabinet, or at least to let them, and since the covenant in question deprived her of her freedom of action for 15 years, it yet led to the fact that she had to look indifferently at the changes she had made on the continent, which did not go as she thought, and even threatened any of her own interests.
So it can be assumed that in the 1950s at the latest Rossya herself will begin to be amazed at the arduousness with which the Petersburg cabinet entered this covenant, and her own historians will justice that by them the political game of Prussia made it very easy. Indeed, Prince Bismark restrained Rossyi's politics in the large European issues, insured his political combinators on her part – he prevented her from allied with France, and even among the 2 powers cast a bone of discord. So in all respect he received, a large political victory, and from that convention only to derive advantage; – in addition, he gave emergence to the character of a historical event, an global event, since he recognized it as a war between the Polish and Russian people to specified an degree that it required intervention of the 3rd Power (Prus), – since he explicitly announced this intervention, his conditions in the diplomatic strategy were defined, and so the first 1 fulfilled the act, this starting intervention.
Rossya herself, by signing this convention, caused a diplomatic storm on the part of all the European powers, a storm more severe to her state pride than threatening her borders, a storm whose averting came without difficulty, and which She diverted the attention of the Petersburg statesmen from the Holstein and Schleswig Question, immediately by Prince Bismark suffered, and not necessarily settled according to the interests of the Russian people.
From the Prussian position, the Convention was so an thought of indisputable genius; – from the Russian position a clear political mistake. The immediate change of attitude of Napoleon III is the first proof of this.
This change was, after all, easy to foretell in the face of the perilous importance of the covenant of the 2 northern powers, Napoleon's devastating plans on the Allies with Rossya resisted, and at the same time indicating that he would meet in all political combination of his.
obstacle simultaneously in St. Petersburg and Berlin, understanding
In this way, the Prussian-Russian Convention, and attaching to my general meaning – European, Napoleon III immediately after receiving a copy of it, convened a secret council, on which he decided to make a diplomatic akey in order to encourage Austria and England to the common origin of Polish action, which is to say more clearly to the war aimed at rebuilding the Polish state. To the conventioner that emphasized the Prussian-Russian covenant, he intended to respond with the covenant of Western powers, and armed by their intervention in Poland. The course of this exercise has not yet come out of anyone's memory, so here it may be omitted, especially since, as has already been mentioned, it has been accurately told by the celebrated Polish publicist.
However, there is simply a request to item the impact of these diplomatic negotiations of Napoleon on the minds in Poland. The beneficial work of Prince Adam Czartoryski in Paris was not interrupted by his death; for his boy Prince Władysław took it. The “Polish office” under his direction, paying close attention to the current French policy, could not anticipate the Emperor Napoleon to rise his voice in favour of the Polish insurgents. After all, the words of the Minister of State Billaut, spoken in both chambers, seemed to go further than required by the diplomatic approach to Rossya at the time, due to the fact that they could be explained in this way, that even in principle, Emperor Napoleon ceased to grant Poland the right to regain state existence. Thus they expressed a strong impression on all Poles who were then in Paris. Under the influence of this impression, Prince Władysław Czartoryski felt that he should not proceed to attend meetings at the imperial court, to which he had always received invitations; in raising these words of the Minister of State, he asked by letter Prince Bassano that he should be removed from the list of persons invited to the court. This letter, published by the Journals, and making certain to satisfy the easy-to-mean national dignity considerations, emphasized that, according to Prince Czartoryski, the return to Rossya's politics came so clear and decisive that even the social relations of the Duke with the court ceased to have a racy existence, so he cuts them, since they could not bring any benefit to the Polish cause.
Before Prince Czartoryski's letter had the time to leave the country, where he would undoubtedly be even stronger than the Poles in Paris made an impression, and he held back the same
many more than standing in insurgent ranks, and more importantly convinced conservative parties that his passive attitude was appropriate in all respect, – the above-mentioned facts were told: the Prussian-Russian Convention and Napoleon III's resolution on this secret Council. The day after her sitting, Prince Czartoryski was informed of a extremist change in political position. By order of the Emperor himself, his secretary explaining Prince Czartoryski about the beginning of diplomatic excise, accepting the armed movement over the Vistula River as the starting point for putting the Polish case on the agenda of Napoleonic politics, told him at the same time that erstwhile an agreement between the Western powers requires any time, Poles should so effort to guarantee that the uprising is not suppressed, but that it persists until the armed intervention is fulfilled. Vous comprenee quil est tres difficile d’aider un homemé mori, tachee donc de durer”, said Senator Mocquart respective times during this conversation. ‘D u r e z’ * Oh, my God * They told Prince Czartoryski the French ministers, with whom he immediately began to endure and from whom he received closer news of Napoleon's proponents, returned to Austria and England. "D u r e z" was echoed by the another Austrian ambassador, Prince Richard Metternich, on his way to Vienna to facilitate negotiations for a covenant of Western powers on the Polish matter. “D u r e z” was yet advised by the president of the French Chamber, and previously the president of the legislature of Paris, hr. Walewski, explaining the Polish visitors that the state existence of Poland at least 15 million became almost unquestionable.
All these messages, spreading across Poland through the flight of lightning, indicated an work for the full nation to which it could not go back and which it did not truly go back.
For erstwhile again, the destiny of our homeland was taken openly into the hands of Francy , who was then considered invincible, and her monarch, the same who liberated’ Italy, restored the existence of Romanians and large political matters 1 after another, began with a serious diplomatic act, in order to realise the 100-year political aspiacies of the Polish people.
Therefore, the return of Napoleonic politics, the joyful welcome across Poland, that at the time it was unexpected, and by its nature it was approaching and facilitating the large intent for which the blood of respective generations was poured out in vain, and it seems to exhaust their inexhaustible self-sacrifice, the minds ‘even the soberest were
Source: Ksawery Pruszyński, “Margrabia Wielopolski”, edited by Reader, Warsaw 1946, p. 127
electrified at 1 moment. all impartial historian will admit that it could not have happened differently, for no 1 in Polish society could and had no right, nor this assistance from Napoleon prepared to reject, nor his diplomatic act stood across; – nobody wanted to disturb it. Some, the power of conviction and reason, others with instinct and heart again, were drawn in direction from Paris. The compromise between the Polish people and Rossya, that is, the Margrave program could no longer be spoken, and even all Pole had a work to emphasize that this program is the opposite, since Napoleon III, on his own work before the court of past and in the presence of the full world, undertook the task of rebuilding Poland (Note: Napoleon's enthusiasts and conspirators should only consider whether Napoleon's declared aid can prevent Russia from doing anything – and whether the spilling of the river of Polish blood can undermine Russia's dominance within the realm or aid with anything in Polish affairs, regardless of what calls and assurances flow from Paris.). erstwhile he first demanded that the Polish uprising continue, so to satisfy this request had to become the main goal of the full Polish society.
Only margraves with their immediate surroundings had the work to endure in his position, regardless of this diplomatic act of the Emperor of France, and in fulfilling this duty, gave evidence of civilian courage, which brought him uncontested honor. Any another Pole would not have avoided the justified allegation of apostasy from the national flag if among the loud and serious taking of the Polish case by the Western powers, he was clearly against them, on the side of the compromise with Rossya.
Although no 1 could anticipate Poland to win and even effort to organize an awesome national army, winning the enemy in an open fight. Nor did Napoleon or any of the statesmen with the Prince of Czartoryski make a akin demand; for specified a demand, regardless of the fact that the Russian government ordered many armies and politics in Poland, would indeed seem ironic.
The French Diplomacy so demanded an extension of the bloodshed over Vistula, Nemna and Wila, i.e. the transfiguration of the bloody feud, caused against the will of the full nation by conspiracy organizers, to a bloody manifestation, carried out on request and with the will of the full nation and seemingly supported by the full nation.
There is no request to show that even this demand, but within more modest closed boundaries, was not easy. Regardless of the difficulty, the full Polish society felt that it had a work to make this request enough, and could not at the time accept otherwise; and submitted fresh evidence known from the past of its self-sacrifice and at the same time extraordinary energy (Note ed.: Forgetting that even the biggest sacrifice will not give anything, and Polish blood is not utilized to show anything to anyone that he does not promise and does not demand.). People who realize well that the Polish people
There is no strength to defeat Rossyi, who has remained passive in relation to the movement so far, did not hesitate to take the direction of the said manifestation as shortly as possible. any were part of the reformed under then secret national government, others took seats in its provincial, county, and city organs, others brought weapons again, others ran for insurgent troops to set an example of perseverance and dedication to the country (Note ed.: Or alternatively – a nonsense waste of strength in a lost cause?). To emphasize that the movement in Poland has turned into the movement of the full nation, or at least it has become a movement supported by the full nation, Prince Władysław Czartoryski, recognizing the secret national government, accepted from him the denomination as a public diplomatic Polish agent in France and England. Galicia and the Duchy of Poznań did not neglect to help. Having collected a national taxation from all the people of the country, from which, by the way, even the Rossyans in the Kingdom avoided, and having collected a fund from a national loan, set aside for the acquisition of weapons and for the maintenance of the movement, the fresh executives, energetically supported by the general public, were able to satisfy their task. The uprising, as a bloody manifestation of the full nation, lasted longer than the French diplomat had requested., while highlighting the organizational capacity of its managers and their subordinates, unity in the nation, the content and strength of political aspiacies, drawing the full society to astonishing self-sacrifice.
The vast majority of those who tried to sustain the movement in this age followed the voice of duty, without deluded by the hope of winning Rossya without the aid of Western powers. Since the movement continued, the powerful authorities of France have been making this aid dependent on it; – they recognized so the necessity to do for their part everything that he demanded from the Polish people (Note ed.: It remains to be asked whether what the Emperor of France required the Polish people to do was truly serving. The further course of past showed that Napoleon III had nothing to offer to the Polish nation, and his policy, whether conducted in good or bad faith, had put a Polish national blow, whose nature was taken by Dmowski – The Polish nation in social transformations and national processes initiated by the industrial revolution and partial dismantling of feudalism (the dismantling made by the Tsar as part of the repression caused by the uprising!) entered the detachments from its own offices and institutions. The same ones about which the recovery of Poles was fought for by Margrave Wielopolski.). In this deficiency of illusion, and in the sense of this duty, lies the undeniable merit of them, which is exacerbated by the thought that all action of them was combined with danger, all step with the hazard of life, freedom and property. So, hello to their memory! (Note ed.: Worshiping the memory of victims of political frauds and mindless criminals, victims of misconceptions about what the service of the nation and the national origin is – let us never forget our work – the work to fight for the national awareness of Poles, which will let for a appropriate assessment of not serial participants – but the policies and decisions taken by leaders. National consciousness, which will not let to mix respect for victims with affirmation of political surrealism, which is besides present a origin of diseases that are ongoing Polish political life.)
Kulesy of the outbreak of the January Uprising according to the book “Margrave of Wielopolski” by Ksaver Pruszyński
The genesis of the January uprising would be incomplete if the genesis and the circumstances of the order to initiate the uprising by the ‘Central Committee’ were omitted. Below, the reader will find details of very interesting – and uncommon in discussions about the Uprising. Below is simply a fragment of K. Pruszyński's book.
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"The very bottoms of the "red" were concerned. Here, for at least a twelve months each of them had been drawn into a highly mysterious collusion, took oaths, attended nightly meetings, knew only his direct manager of the three, 5 or tens – but the announced national uprising someway delayed from period to month. These people wouldn't wait. Now they couldn't wait long. If they waited longer, the Margrave branch of their shelling from Warsaw, Radom, Lublin and threw in Russian uniform somewhere to Petersburg, Moscow or the Caucasus. It began to grow in discouragement. Where will it rise? What does the Central Committee do around the nymb of conspiracy? Now these reds, who were disbanded from the Committee in June and who were subjected to the increasingly distant influences of Mierosławski, began to act. On their initiative, there was a flyer-recall that self-proclaimed the Central Committee. This 1 did not say no to her, once, so as not to uncover to strangers the fact that frictions and divisions be in the Central Committee, again, so as not to increase the impression that the present Central Committee is going back or back.
So the masses accepted as a good coin the leaflet's announcement that "the Central Committee will defend those who are in danger" and "the day of the announcement of the brand will be the day of the outbreak". The first announcement was purely demagogue. The Central Committee, or anyone else, could not promise that "dopings" or "will not allow" to enter the brand because, unfortunately, this was completely beyond its capacity. In a more balanced society specified words would be taken for demagoguery, but in the Polish era it was explained that "seemingly" The Committee has any data to say. The second conviction was possibly even more dangerous. Was it intended to scare Wielopolskie? Is the announcement that “the day of the brand’s announcement will be the day of the uprising” expected to mean: don’t make a brand, due to the fact that if you do it, then it will explode? It's hard to propose tonight.
It is certain that even then, and then from different wheels there were insistence to postpone or cancel the brand. It is besides certain that thousands of young people have understood that the date of the new, irrevocable detonation will set the date of the brand..
In the meantime, 2 conspiracies in Warsaw were held in the beginning of December. 1 was “red”. For the first time, this convention took on military character. It was attended by people, specified as Colonel Zygmunt Miłkowski, later known as Teodor Tomasz Jeż, a nearly 100-year-old conspirator who fought in 1848 in Hungary, and Różycki, the boy of the insurgent general of 1831, and Langiewicz, a Prussian officer, and Serakowski, Russian, and Padlewski – all the chiefs whose names had been loudly armed in little than a year. It was a convention of the insurgent elders. Thus, the insurgent elders considered the uprising necessary, but demanded that the detonation be postponed until spring. At the same time, the “white” convention was full of national optimism: the uprisings – they knew that it might only become a disaster – would not be. And only 2 participants of the reunions – Padlewski in "red", Stefan Bobrowski in "white" – argued differently. How shall the uprising emergence in spring, Padlewski reasoned, if the land is stripped of the hottest elements in the spring? Padlewski was at that time the town's military chief of staff of conspiracy. Bobrowski – “white” – was young. Both perfectly They felt that the masses, so long warmed up, warmed up to a liquid lava of the revolution, which would no longer be able to stop, which would happen.
The insurgent chiefs were absolutely right to halt the uprising. They already knew well what the masses did not know, that not everything is as beautiful as what they promised from the past. It was in France that police discovered a weapon acquisition agent, founded freshly by the “red”. Not only did she arrest people, but not only did the uprising find itself without an arsenal, but there was a worse thing: the French authorities issued the found papers to the Russian embassy. The French authorities are erstwhile Napoleon III authorities. Memento was dangerous. So, in practice, is this so much foretold, so much gossip fueled by the belief in France? What else would Louis Philip's police do? Aren't those who say that you can't number on words of sympathy and tears of compassion, that France will not go to war for Poland, although it could go to war for Italy independent? At the same time, the Warsaw Police had a lead on the underground printery of the “red”, “Ruchu”, arrested and destroyed the letter. It was a serious loss. “Move” led the utmost opinion, worked it, trusted it. If he had existed longer, he might have been able to usage fresh ideas, which had begun to affect not only the Central Committee.
For the end of 1862, and the first days of the following, brought trials of an unexpected return. It was not only Alexander Herzen who warned Russian conspirators not to associate themselves with the Polish uprising, which under these conditions would be only an act of madness. It was not just “Time”, so far thundering at the brand, he abruptly started writing differently. He advised the conscript to hide abroad, and even for the first time the licence began to be able to go to the solstice, "where, like everywhere, it is possible for the Homeland to work and the fame of the Polish name spread". Not only “Time” came up with specified an unexpected discovery. The Reds wrote the same cup in a cup. "If Moscow – they have now – can take a fewer 100 or a fewer 1000 brave young men, it leads into the ranks of the army as many apostles of freedom." Thus, erstwhile they first poured quite a few oil upon the fire, erstwhile the flames began to swell, they were seized by buckets of water. The atmosphere was overheated for individual to be the apostle of liberty in the Soldace rail.
Meanwhile, another unexpected bitch against the brand arrived, and he left the wheels, which in Russia supported Poland. In addition to any court factors, alongside people like Błudow, who had a higher interest in the Russian state, they were, as we have already mentioned, many Russian diplomats. The Russian Ministry of abroad Affairs, at least in part, supported the agreement with Poland. Ambassadors and Russian MPs in the capitals of the West suffered so much harm from Russia by the governments of the Vistula. Especially Russian diplomats, working to bring Russian-French closer, feared it like a fire. 1 of them was an MP in Brussels, number of Eagles. Catherine's lover's grandson remembered the child, how Tadeusz Kościuszko stayed in the palace for a while. As an old aristocrat, he had alternatively compassion for the rabbled after all uprising of the Polish nobility, as a cultural Russian he was disgusted with the cacapian methods of the general wilderness, and as a Russian he did not carry much in the heart of all these Gerstenzweigs, Bergs, Lüders, Immermans. Now number Orłów was 1 of the most active creators of Russian-French rapprochement. He carefully smoothed out the old grievances of the Crimean War, leveled out common prejudices, tried to get Russia and France to hand themselves over the heads of 2 German capitals. The Earl of Eagles feared that the brand would lead to an explosion, inciting an effort at a French-Russian agreement. In this thought he arrived at erstwhile from Brussels to Warsaw.
The December gathering with Wielopolski and Orlov at the Grand Duke was undoubtedly the minute erstwhile the destiny of the brand weighed. Anyway, if when, then they were the most threatened. Wielopolski knew that Eagles, unlike so many others, are a serious partner. Eagles knew the same thing about Wielopolski. And he had no foolish suspicions that Wielopolski was a “Polish Wallenrod” who drove Russia into defeat with a trick. Wielopolski knew that Orłów was right in that, at least, if the brand led to the explosion, the detonation would break like a firecracker at the ft of Paris' agreement with Petersburg. Nevertheless, as the Eagles wanted this agreement. Did he foresee that it would lead to a war with central states? Did he foresee that Austria would come out of these wars broken down and Prussia truncated about their Polish districts? This is simply a very logical hypothesis. Another – happier – Russian-French alliance led to this a fewer decades later; could it not now have led to this earlier?
But Wielopolski besides knew that the “reds” had worked besides long on the outbreak of the uprising so that they could postpone it forever. possibly he knew there was an detonation planned in the spring. He besides knew that the red movement in the country was paralysing further reforms. He assumed that the brand would be the best weapon to "cut a revolutionary ulcer."
The word of the brand was expected from the first days of January, so around the tenth area of Warsaw filled with young people who left the city to avoid being recruited. The Kampinoska Forest swarmed them for a number of days pThat night, from 12 to 13 January, erstwhile police and troops performed, as usual, a draft. The next day, crowds gathered around the citadel, who were lively commenting on the incidents, shouting loudly and challengingly, but this time, not margrave, not Russians, but Central Committee.. Is that surprising? You'd be amazed if you didn't. For more than a year now, the Central Committee, the mysterious authority, has been calling for them to emergence up and tell them that day. For over a year, he organized them, made them wait, utilized them for demonstrations, prepared them for assassinations. For over a year, he has promised the support of the world, plots that within Russia will blow up the czarat, interventions that from outside Russia will bring aid to the West. He painted the draft into the army with specified gloomy colours; so he assured that he would not let the union to succumb. And now the brand was carried out. And many people knew that For respective weeks, all prominent leaders disappeared from the Committee, from Warsaw, from Poland. They were overseas. Margaria was not mistaken in his calculations and in the announcements of his press. Those who could hide behind the cordon; those who could not be left at the mercy of fate.
The Branka was carried out without difficulty, and shortly an article in the body of Wielopolski, in which margrave's pen was known, wrote about it that it was held in full peace, and among conscripts it was possible to announcement "even a cheerful disposition". Since nothing in Poland is as annoying as a written word, the phrase served for years to condemn margrave. That was a lie! That was not true! A priest was referred to as a priest who entered the premises where the conscripts were gathered and found many of them... playing cards. Playing cards, most likely only in the eyes of a very large layman, is simply a symptom of peculiar desperation. Shortly thereafter, the Kingdom recruits were to greet the Tsar with a immense “ura” like the recruits of the Kama or Oki. So how was it really?
It was most likely little dramatic than who imagined. After all, the fiercest ones fled into the woods and were not embraced. For 2 1000 conscripts in Warsaw, it is said that only something more than 500 had contact with “red”. The intention of Wielopolski was to present matters in a insignificant light, as those who pushed to the uprising presented them in an exaggerated one. If the intention of Wielopolski missed, it was for another reasons. We mentioned that Almost all the insurgent elders were not in Warsaw at the time, they were not even in Poland, they went abroad. Didn't she want to be in Warsaw in those hard times erstwhile the brand would come and they wouldn't dare throw the password? Did they think the detonation would never happen without them? Didn't they have the courage to set their imaginations on fire, turn their minds on, but not prepare – due to the fact that they couldn't – the conditions, halt a individual appearance? To take for this halt of the ODium of unpopularity? It is adequate that there were no chiefs, and the Warsaw crowd cursed absent chiefs, how he sometimes in Poland cursed those chiefs who left their troops. But on the site of the prime figures in the Central Committee were secondary, or alternatively third- and fourth- and plan. He was, as sometimes in Poland, a complete deficiency of people. Sergeants alternatively of generals. And those who had already gone into the forest, that the crowd of evil “red” that the brand had succeeded, that the staff they were counting on would be destroyed, went to the uprising. It was decided overnight from 22 to 23 January. The young poet, Maria Ilnicka, in the absence of better ones, wrote a call to the nations “Poland, Lithuania and Russia”. In the province, it was ordered to attack Russian crews in the country. The Central Committee has changed its name for the 3rd time in its history. It was no longer "Municipality", it was not "Central", but it took a name that was expected to go into history. He appeared as “Temporary National Government”. In – this temporaryity lay the mark of casuality and of the haste with which the historical, dense burden took place.
Source: Ksawery Pruszyński, “Margrabia Wielopolski”, PAX Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1957, pp. 139 – 146; Fatigue: Editorial PMN
Fragments of the January Uprising chapter
Poland National Thought
(Think national.wordpress.com)
2013
Demonstrations “patriotic”
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They were (Note ed.: demonstrations) surely induced, guided and fueled by those forces who sought to make an uprising in Poland, especially by coal organizations, connected with emigration centres specified as the school in Cuneo, and together with them by abroad influences about the face and global goals. But the machinations of these forces would be ineffective if there were no nation ready to surrender to them. Polish society in the Kingdom, remembering the times of independency from the years to 1830, as well as the real ten-month independency in 1831 and the war in which the Polish army had quite a few triumph – all of this happened 32 years ago, so at the time erstwhile the people of the 50 and 60-year-olds were active participants of those events, and at the time 40-year-olds remembered something of what they had seen and survived at the time – the society was tired, outraged and crushed by the 30-year period of abroad oppression. People had had adequate Russian rule, adequate police oppression, and they wanted to drop these governments and this oppression and were ready to follow the first cast slogan of disobedience and protest. Manifestations occurred first due to the fact that the nation wanted them and joined them willingly. And the second is that there were forces that gave and organized the slogan for these manifestations.
Manifestations – they were not just street marches, to which the Russian army was shooting. It was the full attitude of society. It was common.
Carrying grief. It was wearing badges, passwords, subtitles. They were collective prayers and singing. It was a crowd gathering in churches not only for average services, but for collective speeches that were more political than spiritual in nature and for proceeding sermons given by any priests whose political temperament was so that they spoke more about the nation's harm than about serving God.
The spiritual speech of these manifestations was notable. It was evident that the Catholic nation manifested its attitude. He manifests it in songs, in collective prayers and in readiness to die martyrdom (Note ed.: 1 can only ask about the intent of this martyrdom in that geopolitical situation – what was this martyrdom expected to gain for the nation?). Manifestations of 1861-63, as well as the formation of 1863-64, are frequently compared to the Bar confederation of 1768 and subsequent. And here and there, the nation manifested its fervent Catholic zeal, and revealed it not only by displaying the cross and the Catholic banners, by praying and ready for martyrdom, but besides by tiny things specified as demonstrating its Catholicity by ostentatiously wearing crosses, medals and another badges (Note ed.: It's amazing that whenever Polish enemies effort to manipulate the nation, they bring together what spiritual hysteria seeks. Examples even from the latest and not completely out of the past history, the reader will easy find themselves. Even NRAs in situations of higher necessity “He converted miraculously”, and the nation was introduced into a state of spiritual exultation. This spiritual exultation has its very circumstantial function – it disables all rationality and makes participants ‘misteries’ completely resistant to the voices of a justice coming from outside their circle.). This note was neither in the war of 1831 nor in the Napoleonic Wars, nor in the uprising of Kościuszko. Manifestants of the times of Wielopolskie and insurgents of the January Uprising referring – in spite of their will – to the bar confederation, thus referred to the fight against ‘flood’ Swedish and another manifestations of patriotism, combined with the Catholic religion of pre-selection Poland.
Perhaps the 1861-64 generation was religiously more fervent than the 1831, 1812, and 1794 generations. The attitude of this generation was expressed in a spontaneous, collective instinct (Note ed.: Which did not benefit the nation. But his enemies – huge.).
Who manipulated Poles – the function of Jews
But besides the organizers holding hidden strands of manifestation and insurgent action were eager to usage Catholic slogans and gave their actions a Catholic feature. Apparently, they realized that the Catholic slogan was an effective slogan and that skillfully utilized it allows them to kidnap the crowd behind them. any Catholic manifestations, any spiritual services, and any prayers at the time feel a note insincere. The crowd was not dishonest: the crowd was fervently devout. But those who were able to direct and impose on him the slogans and slogans of the crowd only utilized the Catholic banner and the Catholic word, but they themselves were not believers and righteous Catholics. After all, they were – in the most crucial part
– coalworkers, i.e. non-believers and enemies of the Church. It was their friends and colleagues who accepted the Mahometian religion 7 years ago in Constantinople
– of course, in a manner as dishonest and pretended as conspirators in Warsaw, acting as Catholics.(Note ed.: The association with Solidarity and the NRA imposes itself again.) ...
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It is notable that Jews took a large part in the Warsaw demonstrations of 1861-62.
“Many Jews attended churches at heart-hearted Masses with songs and patriotic speeches” (Hirszhorn). Jews Sometimes “They carried out the duties of quaestors in the churches, namely in the church of Bernards during the service, the Jews gathered respective 1000 zlotys for the uprising” (Hirszhorn). “On Easter Monday, at the sermon (...) Fr Mikulski, there were plenty of Lutherans and Jews in the church on Powązki” ( Przyborowski).
"The loud rabbi Beer Meissels played a mysterious function at the time. He arrived in Warsaw from Krakow. There was no shortage of him in any major manifestation. Even for the least acquainted with the past of the native Pole with accidents of 1861-1862 the name of the alleged hot Polish patriot, Meissels, is inextricably related”. I have already quoted Kukiel's information that Rabbi Meissels was yet imprisoned and expelled by the Russian authorities.
The participation of Jews in Polish – and frequently Catholic – manifestations shows that at least any part of the judaic community in the Kingdom spoke on the side of the demonstration action (Note ed.: Interesting natures of this ‘telling the side’ mention to text Jews and the January Uprising and its planned anti-Polish dimension). It should be assumed that it was not the devout crowd that invited Jews to attend the services and to collect contributions at these services, but that agitators were doing so, trying to transform
These services in political manifestations and the presence of Jews tried to prove ‘pluralism’ and the diversity of these demonstrations.
Genera of the brand
It is highly crucial to respond to all these manifestations and acts of protest. He considered them rather rightly
– not only for showing the feelings and instincts of society, but besides for the organized work of the conspiracy apparatus. He put a mark on the camera to destruct it. He imagined that he would lead this apparatus—and the full social layer created by it—to initiate the uprising and thus to extract himself from the top—and thus let him to catch this apparatus and this layer and destruct them, either by death in skirmishes, or by death sentences, or by being placed in prisons or in exile. He thought not so much about Poland and the Polish people, but about winning his own and his social layer, and about removing from the life of the country the elements – the full social current – which are a threat to him and to the advanced social layer, possibly in kind ‘Galician slaughter’ 17 years old. He demonstrated many features of his worldview and character: his narrow, state view of Polish affairs, his inability to realize the request for national matters to be reconciled, his fear and hatred and his cold ruthlessness and cruelty. (Note ed.: It remains to be determined what could be reconciled from the component which pushed and provoked by alien machinations continued to strengthen in the push to face – with mass ‘patriots’ The demonstrations gave him a sense of strength, and persuasions – either excitable or convincing about their own power and convincing weaknesses. Interestingly, between 1980 and 1981 a very akin mechanics was observed. The concessions of the authorities were considered as a symptom of weakness – and alternatively of calming the situation – allowed the NRA to manipulate naive Solidarity members into another escalation of claims. The assessment of the Polish individual seems besides far advanced and unfair. The reader is powerfully advised to read the book by Ksawery Pruszyński "Margraż Wielopolski" so that he can get an opinion about the individual and politics of Wielopolski.).
“He got an ulcer,” he spoke to his friends early in January
– and you gotta cut it, I will crush it will emergence in 1 week, and then I will be able to rule” (Revunenkow).
For this tool ‘intersection of ulcer’ Wielopolski decided to usage the recruit ordered by the Russian government on 6 October 1862. This conscription besides included the Kingdom of Congress.
After the Crimean war, the Russian army was reduced in numbers. For this reason, the Tsar ordered that for 4 years there would be no military draft in the Russian state. The Kingdom conscription was decided in 1862, six years after the Crimean War.
The Russian military strategy in those times was very unfair to those who were called into the army. Military service lasted 25 years. (Note ed.: We remind the reader that the order of the brand was a consequence of no ‘patriots’ and ‘religious’ The demonstration, only – which was not hidden by the plotters preparing the uprising – was a loud matter, for example, of thwarting the acquisition of weapons by the French authorities.)
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"It was reported that the brand would take place on January 26, 1863. To inform her, and to get her out of town in time, the deadline was 22 January. Surprise came. The Branka in the capital was carried out on the night of 14th to 15th January, erstwhile only a part of the youth threatened left for Kampinoska Forest and Serock Forest. On 16 January, the Central Committee... ordered the start of the uprising on 22 January" (Kukiel).
The uprising was not a small-scale venture, specified as Zaliwski's expedition, Simon Konarski's attempt, or even the action of 1846 and 1848. This was, both in the intention of the organizers and in the execution, a large uprising. I mean, real war. Next to the War of 1831, the Second large War of the Congressional Kingdom with Russia.
The size of the war was not only due to the plans of the organizers – ultimately, the plans of the emigration coal producers in the projects mentioned just now, and especially in 1846 they were not smaller – but besides to the fact that society immediately supported these plans. This society was mentally prepared to make a large appearance against Russia by manifestations from 1861-1862. I wrote years ago that these manifestations were useful due to the fact that they put force on Russia. I want to modify that view now. These manifestations went besides far. They were playing with fire. They created dangerous moods in the Polish people, due to the fact that they were conducive to the uprising. The conspirators, the country and the emigration, are to blame not only for the insurgency, but besides for the preparation of it by the Revolutionary Moods, these politicized services, prayers not so much of the pious, but besides of mourning, badges, and passwords, and street passages. It's hard to know where the line is. any demonstrations were most likely needed. But the line was definitely crossed. The nation was so agitated that he wanted an uprising. I mean, he wanted war. So erstwhile the war's slogan was thrown – he followed it. Of course, Wielopolski helped to throw this slogan. I mean, he put a match on the firearm. But the firearms were prepared by the conspirators.
Military situation
Meanwhile, war was impossible. The attitude of forces was that this war could not be won.
The Polish nation achieved awesome achievements in this war. We must admit that Polish heroism, shown in this war, was wonderful. I will repeat here what I wrote on the occasion of the war in 1831: that erstwhile there is simply a war, there is simply a fight. We must worship the heroics of the soldiers of this war as we worship the heroics of the soldiers of 1831. But politically, this war was simply a crime. We condemn those who wage this war. due to the fact that you don't start a war without the conditions for it to be a winner.
At the minute of the detonation “As a weapon, a full of respective 100 rifles and a bit of a scythe were counted, on the turnarounds” (Kukiel). "An army with a 100 1000 mountain faced at the beginning of 5-6 1000 fighting" (Kukiel). “In the first weeks, the forces of the uprising increased to any 20,000, and organized combat units were created from the clusters” (Kukiel). “The effort of the underground organization is that the Russian partition itself sets out new, large forces fighting, discouraging
from the shreds of the erstwhile troops and the recently created, reaching 35,000 in May, and the scope of the fight expands to the far reaches of the erstwhile Republic, to Dniepr and Dźwina" (Kukiel). But in August "Governor General Berg preferred fresh forces, although for any 30,000 insurgents who were then under arms, Russia had in the areas under construction in April 275.000, in July 340,000; of course it was a concentration in predicting the existence of 3 powers with armed intervention" (Kukiel). Russia was at that time afraid with the anticipation that France, England, and possibly Austria would support the uprising – which was a fear for it, and on the Polish side an illusion completely unfounded. These powers gave any pro-Polish clichés, but actively they were not going to aid Poles.
Russian author (Rewunenkov) claims that in late 1863 he was in the Warsaw territory of 170.000 Russian soldier, in Vilnius 145.000 and Kiev 90, so together in these 3 districts 405,000. At the end of the year it was in the Kingdom and Lithuania without the Kiev district, 360,000 soldiers, including 259 battalions, 129 squadrons, 226 Cossack sots, 442 cannons.
It should be added that the Russian military was massively superior to the armed insurgents. It is actual that during the uprising, its organizers managed to acquisition in Belgium, England and Austria and smuggle into the Kingdom through the Prussian and Austrian territories a large amount of good modern weapons. In the later phase of the uprising, any insurgent troops were rather well armed with handguns. (Of course, not in artillery.) These weapons were better than those utilized by the Russian military, so that any Russian troops were yet re-armed with weapons, captured on insurgents. "At the end of the uprising... all nearly Cossack regiments were armed with our enfields or Belgian and Viennese artillery" (Zaluski).
Leaders of the January Uprising
"How did it happen that the uprising broke out in January 1863? Of course, the direct consequence (...) is simple: the detonation was the work of “red” organizations, that the Central Committee of the organization decided to initiate the uprising at its gathering on 16 January 1863, where they were present. Stefan Bobrowski, Józef Jaworski, Jan Majowski, Karol Mikoszewski and Zygmunt Padlewski, that the soul of this Committee and the crucial supporters of the uprising were Padlewski and Bobrowski, that the opposition against the draft of the uprising was marked in erstwhile meetings of the Committee (...) and that the date of the beginning of the uprising was determined by the Multi-Polish brand. The insurgents were Padlewski and Bobrowski."*
‘Roman Dmowski said that the uprising of 1863 imposed on Poland children(Note ed.: And who imposed Poland in 1830? Young and inexperienced people, thirsting for glory and “great deeds” The easiest way is to convert to unconscious tools.). At the time of his death, Bobrowski was 22, and Padlewski was 28. Their age and motion increase the tragic pathos of these terrible days" (Stomma). "Is he liable for war and military matters at the time: Chief of Staff Stefan Bobrowski, 22 years old – profession student, Władysław Daniłowski, 22 years old – profession student, Bronisław Marczewski, 21 years old – profession railway engineer owned
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
qualified adequate to do so (...) erstwhile they had nothing to do with the army, and about war and its forms most likely only a weak idea” (Ciałowicz). The carelessness of the 2 crucial perpetrators of the outbreak is highlighted in a peculiar way by the fact that shortly after that detonation both of them were recklessly exposed to death. Bobrowski got into a meaningless dispute with a known adventurer, went to Poznań and died in a duel, in March, 2 months after the explosion." The second perpetrator of the uprising, Padlewski, chose as ‘Pocket voivode’ in May 1863, 4 months after the outbreak, on the parade of the recently formed ward and drove in a carriage, wearing a uniform and a saber under his seat. The Cossacks stopped him. He tried to bribe them by giving them 100 rubles. "If Berg had given ruble, he might have left him alone, but 100 rubles awakened his amazement and of course suspected. car control reveals everything” (Stomma). A fewer days later, he was shot.
It was these reckless and irresponsible people who caused the uprising and originally commanded it. And yet the nation followed them. For he was prepared for 2 years of agitation, revolutionary boiling and manifestation to stand up to fight at all costs and Without reasoning about what this fight will bring.
Bobrowski, before the outbreak, said: “Invoking the uprising (...) we fulfil this work in the belief that Russia will not only destruct the country to suppress our movement, but will even gotta pour out a river of Polish blood, and this river will become an obstacle for years to compromise with the invaders of our country” (Wrotnowski). Jasienica does not believe in the truthfulness of this communicative about Bobrowski. But these doubts must be rejected.
Stomma so writes: "Bobrowski's words summarize... the well - meaning of the red program in critical years prior to its rise... The subject of the Reds was an unconditional order to fight the Moscals. There was any belief, possibly partially subconscious, that this conflict was essential to save the nation, allegedly to save the soul of the nation.
Besides, how many later on did this case light up like this? The uprising was meant to save the spirit of the nation. There was a fear of any interior breakdown, of interior surrender. This view of the uprising repents to our day. In this line of reasoning, the fight was needed for the fight and the end. Why this natural, mystical current to fight Russia? Why saving the national soul did not require fighting
* Oh, my God * "The duel was almost suicide, due to the fact that Bobrowski was short-sighted, without any skill in shooting, while his opponent was an excellent shooter, shattered with duels. (...)Bobrowski’s own individual decision extended the uprising. (And before that, he and Padlewski caused his explosion. And for 2 months, he held command of the uprising – J. G.) 1 alone, putting the signature and seal of the National Government, became a fresh authority (...), took the helm into his hands. And in this situation, he takes a duel with a brawler, a drink. (...) After all, even within the framework of these stupid honor codes, it was possible to postpone the duel until the end of the uprising.” (Stomma).
against Prussia or Austria? Why... for the purity of the soul in the (only) Russian partition it was essential to pay with blood? There is no rational answer to this” (Stomma).*
"The fresh uprising actually begins without a leader, as does the November one. (...) The uprising besides begins without a plan, due to the fact that from Padlewski's first concept remains only a chaotic, widespread attack on Russian crews without any guiding thought and without asking “what next?” (Cialovich).
"Because of the brand that was to take place on 26 January, Russian crews were at 160 points in the country, after 200-300 soldiers". In addition, “There were 22 1000 cities in Warsaw alone, and the larger centres were the towns of Modlin, Zamość, Dęblin, Płock, Kalisz, Radom, Lublin” (Cialovich). “Out of more than 160 localities where the Russian troops were standing, only 18 were attacked by 33 skirmishes” (Kukiel).
"In a strictly military sense, the uprising was a complete and apparent failure from day one. It was not a regular war for a single moment. Not 1 of the insurgent battles was anything more than a secondary skirmish and not 1 brought even a local and temporary victory. The only effort to gain a somewhat larger city – Płock – ended in failure. According to the plans of those who arose... the uprising was to become a regular war from the very beginning. However, it was from the first to the last day “a war of the smaller and larger independent troops, or parties—the cursed... partisan”. (Kukiel)*
In his 1863 writings, Józef Piłsudski recognized the night of January 22 as "tactically lost but at the same time a major strategical triumph of the uprising" (quoted by Kukiel) and this is due to the fact that after the outbreak of "Russians had to order the concentration of their troops in the most crucial administrative centres and communication hubs – a full of more than 40 localities, which necessarily gave emergence to large areas, many villages and towns" (Kukiel).
* Oh, my God * It is striking that akin words, though not ‘the river’but o ‘brooks’ blood besides contributed to the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising 1944. Matłachowski, who believes that General Leopold Okulicki was the real culprit of the decision to initiate the Warsaw Uprising, states, according to Colonel Pluta-Czachowski, that Okulicki stated: “In Tehran... the Western Allies betrayed Poland. Western leaders turned out to be petty. We've got to do a large armed act. At the heart of Poland, we will fight with the power to shake the world's opinion. The blood will pour down the creeks, and the walls will fall apart. And specified a fight will force the opinion of the planet to force governments to push the Teheran decision away, and the Republic will survive.”
This is, of course, a naive view. Neither the streams nor the river of Polish blood could influence the decisions of Western countries. Matłachowski besides quotes Ciechanowski's words: “There was quite a few mysticism, romance and pose in the activities of national commanders, but there was no calculation”.
* Oh, my God * A quote from another of my jobs.
...
Car Announces Amnesty – 12.IV.1863
The most outstanding change in insurgent policy was joining ‘white’, I mean the Masonic camp, until the uprising. The uprising was a work of art. ‘red’, I mean, coal producers. ‘White’ they were initially opposed to him, but then abruptly changed their position and joined – on 12 April 1863 – the uprising, which greatly reinforced the uprising, expanding it by many social forces.
"The Russian Chancellor (Gorchakov) warned the step of 3 powers (a surprise to support the uprising – J. G.) by announcing 12 April (1863) amnesty and solemn confirmation of the Tsarist manifesto of the rights given to the Kingdoms" (Kukiel). Western powers by their intervention “When they had done just adequate to anger those who had power, they did not do adequate to benefit the victims.” (Pierre de la Gorce). "An extraordinary (cracovian) «Time» addition appeared, then – on Monday evening – a basic article. (...) “Time” did not accept amnesty. ... The Tsar left 4 weeks to ponder, which by itself proves that he did not anticipate a swift decision, an effect overnight. Meanwhile, the Krakow activists at the White Camp rejected his offer without even waiting for an explanation of what they contain the notes of the powers‘ (Jasienica). "Murawev's nomination as Vilnius politician general signed (car) Alexander on the day of amnesty's expiry – May 13" (Jasienica), which is 1 period after the message both ‘white’as in the hand ‘red’ The Insurgent Government says they reject amnesty.
‘Without this intervention (powers) the uprising would have expired without more harm to (...the Polish people); the Russian amnesty and the imperial manifesto provided a convenient basis for the liquidation of an unfortunate undertaking and for the return to the situation created by the improvement of Poland. But that's right. in 5 days after the manifesto and amnesty, the first intervention of the powers took place. This intervention not only did the uprising not expire, but it expanded significantly. Namely, the “white” party, the opposing uprising so far, and from the “red” organization much stronger and more influential, decided to join the uprising and the full of its forces on the scales of armed conflict cast"."
"The first phase was a self-sustaining brawl of a group of unfavorable young men. The second was the accession to the action of these youths on the part of the factors that were considered to be the leading political centre in the nation and represented the expected authority, experience and dryliness. At the minute erstwhile the emergence of the “red” actually broke down, the “white” started a completely fresh uprising, starting the action to any degree from the beginning. Yet they did not impose the emergence of their power. Simply: they went in practice under the command of “red”. Only gradually, the way
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
The interior evolution of the rebel government apparatus later passed into the hands of more conservative elements, which grew in the action of “white”, although they did not belong to them, and most of all in the hands of Traugutt”."
Changes and rivalries in the insurgent government have since been primarily an expression of differences and aspirations between ‘red’ and ‘white’.
‘White’ in their decision to join the uprising, they hoped that France and England (maybe Austria) would defend themselves in support of the uprising. They were kept in hopes by unwise and dishonest promises and persuasions of Western powers, e.g. the celebrated word ‘durez’ (continue) Napoleon III. Of course, it was delusions.
"In June 1863, after the situation became much worse and the uprising intensified, (the Chancellor) Gorchakov wrote to number Berg, the chief commander of the Russian army in the Kingdom since 29 March, that the emperor did not want to delete the autonomy of the Kingdom, but “is willing to make it erstwhile order is restored in the country”. (Revunenkov)*
The last chief of the insurgent government was Romuald Traugutt. He held this office—with large skill and dedication—for six months (17 October 1863 – 11 April 1864). It was a erstwhile Russian colonel, a associate in the Hungarian and Crimean campaigns, no longer active. He organized in April 1863 in the territory of Kobrin in Polesiu ‘lot’, with which he has, in general, successfully fought. It marked an outstanding Catholic attitude, almost close to holiness. On the initiative ‘white’ was brought to Warsaw for the lead role.
"Traugutt took power on October 17. He didn't appoint a fresh government. The collective power was replaced by his personal, nameless; outside he utilized the name and stamp «National Government». From October to April, he ruled from his conspiratorial flat on Smolna by the Secretary of State and department heads. It brings planning, organizational sense, hierarchical order and discipline. A common move, in winter unreal, was postponed until spring. From Paris he brought... armed aid in the spring. So he wanted not only to endure under arms until now, but to make strong staff to rapidly make into an army. The insurgents were given a regular military organization: 5 corps, their commanders are subject to absolutely everything in their territory, the “party” lose their independence, become part of regiments or divisions” (Kukiel).
Traugutt was arrested along with his associates and recognized by the Russian authorities along with them as the National Government. On August 5, 1864, together with the government-recognized aides (Krajewski Reef, Józef Toczyski, Roman Żuliński, Jan Jezioranski) he was sentenced to death by the Russian military court and hanged on the slopes of the Warsaw citadel, in front of a deadly depressed Warsaw crowd.
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
Effects of the January Uprising – repression
..."With what carelessness and freedom it is said: the Tsar decided to rediscover the country. And he treated it as a worthy and reasonable task, since he entrusted it to a venerable reformer. In the eyes of the French (Ollivier) our case was no longer a substance of support. Nothing can be done with us; so there is no advice, we must impose a solution unpleasant for us, but against our unwiseness (apparently) inevitable”."
The Multi-Polish Age is over. Not only the Russian government, but besides the Russian people with a violent perversion of feelings and aspirations moved towards a fierce anti-Polish attitude. For years with the top 50 (1863-1914, possibly with any softening after 1905, i.e. the 42s) reigned in the Kingdom - and all the more so at the ends - a russification strategy much more stringent than in 1831-1860.
Wielopolski left first for Berlin, then Dresden, then Germany. In the Kingdom "The governor's office was maintained until Berg's death in 1874. After him there were only politician generals, on the basis of martial law ruling the country without a break of forty years.” (Kukiel). The kingdom became a simple Russian province. In 1865, Russian became an authoritative language in the Kingdom (which was not an authoritative language from 1831 to 1860). In schools, starting in 1864 and yet since 1869, the Russian language was introduced only (beyond religion). It was forbidden to establish besides private Polish schools, and private teaching in Polish, which became a criminal act. (Despite how Polish lands of Russian partition long and wide developed secret Polish teaching, led mainly by women, wives and daughters of landowners and intelligence.) In 1869 the Main School was closed, and the Russian university took its place.
The uprising was suppressed by cruel, bloody repression. At the same time, as a consequence of taking distant all the political and national distinctities of the Kingdom, it was made a province, subjected – with a unusual tendency to Russian, optimistic illusions -rusification. 1 Russian dignitaries expressed the belief at the beginning of this period that there would come a time erstwhile mothers in the Kingdom would sing lullabies in Russian to their children.
The Russian government did not grant the insurgents Kombatan rights, that is, by taking them prisoner, they did not consider them prisoners of war. He recognized them as rebels, judged them ad hoc before field courts, and sentenced them to death, usually by hanging. The insurgents – or people who were conducive to the uprising – were frequently hanged, too, without judgment.
"Four 100 executed from court sentences were counted – but they had to be hundreds shot or hanged by simple orders of military commanders, not to mention a fewer tens of thousands of dead or murdered. 4 600 were sentenced to detention and 700 to detention, many thousands to
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
The exile. Tens of thousands of tiny nobles and peasants from Lithuania, full villages, were displaced again. 1,660 (earthly) possessions were confiscated in the Kingdom, 1800 in the lands taken. National and dutiful and confiscated private goods go back to donations and majorities for “usmiritieli miatieja” (threaters of rebellion). The places of gradually removed officials, judges, teachers of Poles occupy the incoming Russians" (Kukiel) "According to calculations of the insurgent government member, Agaton Giller, fell in the uprising of 30 1000 insurgents, 1500 were shot or hanged, about 150 000 Poles and Poles went to prison or exile; about 500 million zlotys were incurred in cash, and in confiscations of property, destroyed buildings, etc. – over 1 and a half billion."*
The Archbishop of Warsaw, Szczęsny Feliński and 2 bishops, Popiel and Lubieński, were sentenced to exile and any dioceses (Latin) remained without shepherds for many decades. The Unica Church, which after the 1839 cassation on east lands remained inactive in the Kingdom, namely, in Chełmszczyz and Podlasie (Chelmic diocese), underwent a full cassation, hundreds of thousands of its followers were forced into the Orthodox Church and were secretly faithful to the Catholic Church for 40 years and in 1905 200 or 300 000 returned to the Catholic Church in the Latin rite. In the takeover of the Unitsky Church (Catholic Greek rite) for the Orthodox Church, the Russian authorities utilized force to overcome the opposition defending their peasant temples, e.g. in the village of Pratulin the Russian army killed 9 peasants-units on site, and 180 badly wounded.
Repressions were peculiarly ruthless in Lithuania, where the power was exercised by General-Governor Murawev, mostly called by Poles ‘The hanger’.
How cruel were Russian methods of suppression between 1863 and 1864 of the Polish uprising, is evidenced by the relation of a man who was surely not friendly to Poland and Poles, namely the German chancellor (premier) from 1900 to 1909, Prince Bernard Bülow in his memoirs, taken from the stories made straight by the Russian dignitary Bülow. The chief of Vilnius police provided Murawiev with a list of about 100 people suspected of supporting the uprising at a dinner in Vilnius. Murawiew hit the cross with 20 names on this list and had them hanged. The chief of police noted that these people were the least guilty. Muraviev replied: “That’s the point. If the punishment falls like lightning from the heavens, so that you know neither where it came from nor why it strikes, it causes the top terror.”. These people were hanged. The Poles adorned them with their graves with flowers. erstwhile Murawev found out about it, he had their corpse dug up, put them in the exercise square, and sprinkled only a thin layer of ground, and then ordered the 2 Cossack regiments to practice on horseback in that square until all the corpses turned into crushed pulp. “The answer to specified horrors was half a century later revolution and Bolshevikism”, writes Prussian and German, Poland's hostile statesman (Bülow).
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
"The destiny of the towns where the fighting was fought was tragic, like the Hungarians, Siemiatics, Miechów and others. Everywhere, the Russians took revenge by killing residents” (Kukiel).
Also in the Austrian and Prussian partitions, severe penalties were imposed on those who participated in the uprising, or who cooperated with it. The solidarity of the partitioning states was strained. "In Galicia, the state of siege liquidated the organization and insurgent troops; investigations against 8600 people were conducted, over 3200 were arrested" (Kukiel) "In the Prussian partition, repressions for participation in the uprising were very serious – 11 death sentences (actually absent), 27 prison sentences. This put an end to amnesty after the victorious war against Austria 1866.” (Kukiel).
I wrote half a century ago: ‘The immediate consequence of his (January birth) was the demolition of the Russian-French agreement (...), and thus the demolition of the hope of a fast reconstruction of Poland; it was the demolition of the Polish reforms which gave the Kingdom a certain degree of independency and freedom; it was the demolition and the elements of the distinctness which existed in the Kingdom and before the Wielo-Polish era, and the release of the Kingdom – for the first time, since after 1831 the Russian Kingdom was not thought of as the spoil of respective twelve years of Russian policy; it was an unparalleled reversal of the Russian cultural and social partition, so that the district, which was 1 of the most flourishing countries in Europe before 1830, at the end of the 19th century, became 1 of the most backward countries in Russia.‘."
It is worth adding that “In 1905 there were less schools in legislature than in 1832, and 2 thirds of the population could not read and write” (Conenic). "In 1814, she held Congressional advanced Schools 48, in 1838 only 33, and in 1889 even 31" (Wakar), “Although the population was constantly growing, and much so, and prosperity was growing, and the request for higher education was spreading greatly. ... The government achieved its goal: intellectual desolation among the people grew year by year. Finally, the government was fooled by Poland to the Russian level. The state fined up to 300 rubles and 3 months in prison for teaching mediocre children free in Polish. respective 1000 children were thrown out of Warsaw's protection due to the fact that they were taught to read in Polish; they were thrown on the pavement of the street, on hunger and on a large city street‘ (Conenic). ‘In 1908, 1 school (in the Kingdom) had a population of 2,552, whereas the average of the full Russian state was 1967. The public treasury spending was in 1906 on 1 school-aged kid (8-11) on the head of 1 ruble 70 kopecks on average in the full Russian state, but in legislature (...) only 69 kopecks‘ (Conenic).
20 years ago, I wrote: “The resurrection was an unnecessary and harmful undertaking, and... those who caused it deserve to be condemned as the culprits of the large disaster.
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
The essence of the failure of the uprising was to forget by its perpetrators that Poland has not 1 enemy but two: Russia and the German people. They acted as if the Congressional Kingdom was surrounded from the west by the sea, or bordered with friendly countries, so as if the operation of the declaration of war – regular or guerrilla – of the Russian imperialist was a politically completely simple operation, while in fact the situation of Poland, Polish affairs and uprising was politically highly and tragically complicated. Even the strategical situation of the Kingdom was desperate: without its own arms industry, it was doomed to supply arms from abroad, and it was cut off from the sea and was not bordered by any kind country. Under existing conditions, the uprising could not succeed, so calling it was an act of criminal recklessness.
The consequence of the uprising was immense losses in blood, property and cultural achievements, and was a political defeat in the form of a final Incorporation of the Congressional Kingdom, which has thus far maintained a large scope of distinctness, to Russia. There was besides a immense cut of Polishness on the east Earth."*
Effects of the January Uprising – depolonisation
"The biggest disaster that brought about the uprising on us was the weakening of Polishness in the east lands. If in the Kingdom the Russian policy, despite all the ruthlessness and veracity of the Moscow brutality with which it was introduced, did not produce tangible results, and in view of the uniform Polish face of the country and its higher than Russian culture it could not bring – so much at the east Borders it caused us unrepentant damage.
On the south-eastern lands, Poland was already cut by the November uprising. But in the area of the erstwhile Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it reigned omnipotently until the January Uprising. (...) In Lithuania, Belarus, Polesiu and Inflanta until 1864, there was no another origin another than Polishness (and, of course, Jews), which would mean anything in the local life in any area, simply not. On the January Uprising, the sad peasants who spoke Lithuanian spoke Polish and nothing was related to Russianism. The Polish language had a strong position in the church. Thin local government, and even any branches of administration, were in Polish hands.
After the January uprising, all of this disappeared. After all, the lands were taken from a country where only the advanced layer was clearly Polish; the social pits were under prominent Polish influence, but from origin and language to the most part Polish were not. A fewer decades of restraint of Polishness, introduced by Murawev's system, respective decades of oppression, expressed even in specified unprecedented and at the same time simply grotesque orders, like the ban on speaking Polish in public places, caused social pits in the lands taken from the Polish influence. any of them, in the area of the Orthodox population, assimilated, at least superficially, with Russia,
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book. 23 -Hist. Nar. Pol., Vol. II
part created fresh nationalities: Lithuanian, Latvian (Catholic-Latvian) and partially Belarusian – and only part, mainly in the vicinity of Vilnius, Grodno, Białystok, Kowna, Dyneburg and Słucka yet adhered to Polishness. Had it not been for January, the Lithuanian peasant under Saul and Poniewie, the latgal peasant under Rzeżyca, the Belarusian peasant under Polocek, Minsk, Lepl, Vitebsk and Mohilev, the Polesick peasant under Piński and Mozył would have been the same Polish peasant as the 1 who besides spoke a separate, own voice of Kashub, Kurp or the mountaine, and the Orthodox pop in Belarus or Polesius would have been the same Pole as the Evangelic pastor in Cieszyn Silesia. (...).
There is another factor... that has gained much from the January uprising. They're Jews. (...) If, for example, in Pinszczyń they are apart from a fistful of lands in their debt, apart from bureaucracy and apart from the dark, illiterate and utmost destitution of the peasant mass, the only component that means something in the life of the country and which in the full country, and not only its cities (Pińsk has 75 percent of Jews) gives a judaic stigma, this is the consequence of the January uprising. Poles were the leading component in this country. But the beginning of the January position cut them; a vacuum arose to replace them. due to the fact that the life of the vacuum hates, and due to the fact that Russia, completely this country's alien, could not fill this vacuum, so it was fulfilled by the only, possessing the local element: Jews. From a country facing mainly Polish Pińszczyń became a country facing mostly Jewish.”*
The Alvensleben Convention and its Effects*
The January uprising caused Russia's firm and violent reversal not only from Poles, but besides from France. The consequence of this was to bring Russia closer to Prussia.
At the same time, Prussia was in a position when, with the Russian facilities behind it, they could afford to carry out – with the hands of the co-chair of their politician, Chancellor (premier) Bismarck – a large imperialist action that transformed them from a medium-sized country to a large European power, namely the German Empire ruled by Prussia. Within 7 years of the January Uprising (1864-1871) Prussia under the leadership of Bismarck carried out 3 major war-hauling and extended diplomatic action and were full successful, becoming what in the era of the Vienna Congress, despite the support of English, could not yet become. They could do it now due to the fact that Russia was kind to them. And if she were inactive in the strategy of pro-French politics, she'd be in their way.
* Note ed.: first midtitle
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
When a January uprising broke out in the Russian partition, Bismarck immediately sent from Berlin to Petersburg as a typical of the Prussian king, General Gustav von Alvensleben, to declare to the Russian Tsar that Prussia was entirely on the side of Russia in the dispute between the Russian state and the Polish insurgents. The consequence of this visit of the Prussian typical was that it was concluded on 8 February 1863 – precisely 2 weeks after the outbreak – 22 January – of the January Uprising – of the Prussian-Russian alleged Alvensleben Convention, the power of which of Prussia undertook to come with the assistance of troops and another Russian authorities in suppressing the uprising.
The actual Prussian aid declared in this convention was trivial: it was limited to cases specified as providing care to Russian customs chambers in the towns, cut off by the uprising from the Russian backdrop. Simply: Russia did not request any more help. The convention brought any insignificant diplomatic and another inconveniences to Russia.* But the historical essence of this convention was that Prussia declared themselves friend of Russia and enemy of Poles and that Russia was ready to aid against the uprising. At a time erstwhile France and England declared themselves - in words only, not an act - as a kind uprising, erstwhile even Austria seemed to favour a certain degree of uprising - there was a state, namely Prussia, which declared itself on the side of Russia and against the uprising. Russia was grateful for that. And from this minute on, for years, she referred to Prussia with fervent kindness.
Bismarck wrote a separate chapter in his diaries. "Alvensleben Convention" (Die Alvenslebensche Convention). In this chapter he wrote: "This convention was a successful decision on the chess board, which settled the party, moving within the Russian cabinet between the influence of the anti-Polish, monarchic and Polonizing, panslavistic direction".
So, according to Bismarck, Alvensleben's convention was “A successful decision on the board” ‘war ein gelungener Schachzug’, which decided the organization within the Russian government. Means that there was an interior conflict in Russia: the pro-French direction (and at the same time the pro-Polish direction) struggled with pro-Russian. The triumph of the proprusian direction was the consequence of the Alvensleben Convention. But this convention was not born of nothing: it was the consequence of the uprising. If there were no uprising, there would be no convention. Bismarck actually says between the poems that this January uprising was a decisive chess move, which gave the Russian government a triumph over the pro-Russian direction and the pre-Polish direction and ensured Russian neutrality against the later seven-year Prussian business policy led by Bismarck against Denmark, Austria and France. The Prussian triumph over Denmark, Austria, Hannover and France was the consequence of the January uprising.
* Oh, yeah * In my book "January Uprising Curies" I analysed the effects of this convention and its assessment by the world's historical science.
The Spring of January Prussian Intrigue?
Is Bismarck only He took a happy opportunity, what was the unfortunate and mindless Polish uprising for him, which did not give Poland and Poles anything – alternatively it gave, but only disasters and disasters – and it divided Russia and France? His expression about a successful decision on the chessboard gives emergence to a suspicion far more terrible: that Bismarck not only took advantage of a happy opportunity, but tried to make this chance happen.
Is it possible for Bismarck to origin a January uprising?
I wrote – 15 years ago – in 1 of my works: “As for the evidence of the organizers’ relation with Bismarck, the request is indeed strange. Is it possible (...someone) would like me to submit to him a protocol of Bismarck's conversation with the insurgents in which Bismarck would say: «I want you to make an uprising»and Poles responded «order, Chancellor, we will do as you say»? Of course, I cannot present specified evidence, due to the fact that I neither keep in the archive the protocols of specified conversations, nor the conduct of specified conversations seems to be so. The influences of this kind are made in ways far more subtle and elusive and are frequently not direct. specified influences and impacts can only be mentioned in the form of hypotheses and the collection of clues. But that does not mean that specified influences do not exist, and that it should not be essential in historical studies to effort to detect them.”*
I announced – in 1936 and 1965 – 2 large books, in which I gathered many clues, indicating contacts between the Prussian authorities and Polish underground organizations, as well as with the Italian underground movement, which had a connection with the Polish insurgent camp, even through the officers' school in Cuneo, or the expedition of Colonel Francesco Nullo.
The perpetrators of the uprising, especially those like Padlewski or Bobrowski, surely not Prussian agents. But they were people. unripe and inexperienced, with no cognition of abroad policy matters. They didn't know what they were doing. They didn't know who they were benefiting, they didn't know who they were harming. They made the decision to rise. But what led them to this decision, whose counsel, whose arguments? We don't know that. However, a way indicating that there were direct or indirect secret contacts between Polish enemies – and most of all Prusai - with the Polish insurgent movement there are many.
I will not repeat here what I have announced in these 2 books. But I'm going to give you 2 information that shows who Bismarck was and what his M.O. was.
Thanks to the diary of the German Chancellor from 1900 to 1909, Prince von Bülow, we know that erstwhile the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, Bismarck felt it wise to secretly communicate with revolutionary Italian organizations in order to influence the Italian government's attitude in this war. To this end, his trusted representative, diplomat
* Oh, my God * A quote from another of my jobs.
von Holstein met late in the evening in Florence, under the arch of the bridge on the Arno River, in a fewer hours of conversation with the incognito arrived in Florence and the disguised Italian conspirator Mazzini. This information shows that Bismarck was able to have secret, conspiracy contacts, maintained by completely unofficial methods, with revolutionary Italian circles, the same ones that had previously powerfully supported the Polish January uprising.
During the general exhibition in Paris in 1867, Tsar Alexander II and Prussian King Wilhelm I arrived in Paris. We know from the 3 French authors (Paul Lenoir, Madame Joliette Adam, Victor Tissot) who announced their books between 1884 and 1905, and most likely drew their data from the French police that allegedly Prussian police intelligence has detected the decision of the Polish conspiracy committee in Paris to assassinate Tsar Alexander there. This attack was to be carried out by a young Pole, Zygmunt Berezowski. The Prussian intelligence chief, named Stieber, immediately reported it to Bismarck. According to Bismarck's instructions, nothing was said about this to the French police. But 2 Prussian agents continued to accompany Berezowski. He managed to get close to the carriage the Tsar was driving and fired the gun, but a Prussian police agent standing beside him conquered his hand, so the bullet missed. So it happened as Bismarck wished, allegedly saying to Stieber: ‘In this way the crime will be annihilated, but the assassination will become a fact‘. This assassination greatly damaged the French-Russian relations that the Tsar's arrival in Paris could have improved. While this fantastic relation is true, it shows that Bismarck was able by agents of his police to scope Polish conspiracy circles and to engage in risky, dangerous intrigues. (Berezowski was sentenced to prison, after 20 years he was allowed to settle on the island of fresh Caledonia, where he died about 1916.)*
* Oh, yeah * I wrote about it: “This unfortunate young man..., who spent nearly half a century in prison, on dense robots and on exile on a remote, sad island in the confederate hemisphere, devoted his life to a origin that he believed served Poland’s welfare. Unfortunately, he was wrong. He served not Poland, but Bismarck's politics, and it was for her that he sacrificed his life. The real and not deceptive and apparent intent of his consecration was to contribute to the discrimination between France and Russia, to the isolation of France, to the anticipation of a Prussian triumph (..), to the truncation of it (France) over Alsace and Lorraine and yet to the construction of the German Empire. Berezowski was a tool for Prussian provocation”.
And: "One question arises: was the thought of the assassination of the Tsar in Paris born in Polish heads, or was it given to Poles by Prussian agents? We know Berezowski was not the initiator of the idea, the thought was imposed on him by a draw. Where did that come from? Let us consider that the Prussian agents not only followed Polish conspirators, but “incited” them.”.
And: "Berezowski's case is like a January uprising in a miniature. (...) The French-Russian rapprochement created a fresh European situation, very dangerous for Prussia. To bring it closer, Prussia utilized Polish matters. (...) In 1867, the close-up had been crossed off for a number of years, only started to germinate a small bit again; in order to frost and trample its frail plant, only a tiny thing specified as Berez’s assassination” (quotes from another my book).
The circumstances which cast a suspicion on Prussia that in any way Polish insurgent movements may have been influenced by the fact of German support, shown to any insurgent leaders. Marian Langiewicz was the dictator at 1 time during the uprising. After the uprising, in 1867, he settled in Turkey and received a position on Turkish railways, which were known to have been owned and built by German capital. I wrote about it: "If we had assumed that the Prussian government had any responsibilities towards Langiewicz and wanted to guarantee that after the uprising, he would stay quiet and not be overly dissatisfied, we would gotta presume that the solution would gotta look like this: a position in a alternatively distant country, a non-German company, but a German government dependent"." 10 years later, the situation became even clearer: in 1877 Langiewicz became a typical of Krupp's celebrated German armament mill (in Essen) for Turkey and from now on, most likely until his death (in 1887) supplied the Sultanian army with guns and another war materials of that factory.
Also another dictator of the January uprising, Ludwik Mierosławski, looks supported by Prussia. He crossed the border between Poznań and the Kingdom, along with the army. And even in 1848, in the era of the Poznań Uprising, captured and imprisoned, he abruptly got a passport to go to France and rapidly left. “The Prussian King and Nicholas I agreed that they failed to hang him” (Kukiel). possibly it would have been successful if he had not been given a passport.
In conclusion, I'll give you a fewer more quotes from the work of an excellent French historian, Pierre de la Gorce, nineteenth century old.
‘In 1863 2 large complications broke out in Northern Europe: the Polish uprising and the Danish principalities. It is impossible to say adequate about the impact of these events – besides the first of them – on the destiny of Prussia. It was for Bismarck. two extraordinary graces his luck has given him And without whom his genius would stay bound. The Polish uprising was a wonderful opportunity, which provided Prussia with the moral support of Russia towards the West. The case of Danish principalities was a general trial in a field limited to what would then be tried at an extended theatre. (...) In the eyes of future times (...) these 2 episodes (also, I repeat, the former) will merge into 1 full of the coup which, transforming the northeast of Europe, established the Prussian advantage”.
"It would be a large dexterity on the part of the Berlin Cabinet if he offered his most ferocious assistance to the Tsar at precisely the same time that another powers happen with smitten or unpleasant advice. In particular, the procedure would be to show the value by contrast and would be among those that are not forgotten.".
...
* Oh, my God * A quote from another book.
