How do we interpret the results of the elections in the Netherlands? What does it truly mean to return past to European affairs? Is the EU a phase or an actor in a large drama of history? What Europe emerges from Donald Trump's efforts to dismantle the American empire and planet order after 1945? Leszek Jażdżewski talks to Luke van Middelaar, manager and founder Brussels Institute of Geopolitics. Political theorist, historian and author of the book "The Passage to Europe" (2013), has besides late published "LeRéveil géopolitanique de l’Europe" (2022), "Pandemonium" (2021) and "Alarums and Excursions" (2019), groundbreaking studies on Union crisis policy.
Leszek Jazdzewski (LJ): How do you measure the results of fresh elections in the Netherlands? Does the fact that there has been a shift towards the centre mean that populist policy has been rejected? Or were another issues affected?
Luuk van Middelaar (LvM): The election results in the Netherlands were indeed surprising, and the winner turned out to be D66 (central, liberal and pro-European party), which won the majority – about 1 sixth of the vote – and was placed first. We observed a turn towards the center – votes were cast for the winning D66 organization (the leader is Rob Jatin, who is likely to be the next Prime Minister of the Netherlands), but besides for Christian democrats who besides like to occupy the centre position.
However, the first crucial issue to pay attention to is that the extremist right did not lose due to the fact that there is no single organization here, which is the organization PVV (The Freedom Party) by Geert Wilders, which was the biggest organization in erstwhile elections. Wilders lost 10 seats in the parliament due to the fact that he was incapable to keep the promises made to his voters during a very chaotic 2 years behind the erstwhile ruling coalition he was a associate of.
Wilders' voters were disappointed, but they did not massively decision to the center – alternatively they switched to smaller sister parties. Therefore, the extremist right-wing block of 3 parties inactive has (as in erstwhile elections 2 years ago) about 40–42 of 150 seats in the Dutch lower chamber, which means nearly 30% of the vote. This part is actually rather stable.
However, it has changed that the another voters have actually moved somewhat towards the centre, but I would say that they have expressed their desire to improve governments, any stability, any peace and a return to decency – which has always been a Christian-democratic value. Many voters have had adequate of the erstwhile chaotic coalition. In a sense, they put 2 horses in the center to guarantee stability.
Moreover, the last notable fact is that the left fell comparatively poorly. The Historical Dutch Labour organization and Greens are presently in the process of merging. They hoped that a combination of red and green forces would let them to take the first or second place – as they had done before, but not this time. They took 4th place, which was alternatively disappointing. In total, the left received only about 20% of the vote. Historically speaking, it's besides a weak score.
These are the most crucial facts and results. Of course, we could besides discuss what this looks like compared to another countries and associate States in Europe and the European Union. Nevertheless, this is part of the general trend, namely the strong bloc of the extremist right and, at the same time, the desire for effective governance. Furthermore, we can besides see that the erstwhile left-right axis has been partially replaced by populism versus efficient governance or anti-democratic forces versus democratic forces - that is what we can say.
LJ: During the election campaign, the VVD organization promised not to form a coalition with the alliance of the Greens and the Left. Are they going to break that promise?
LvM: That's the key question right now. The initiative will be 1 of the 2 largest centre parties, D66 and Christian Democrats. And indeed, the question is what another liberals will do (more right-wing liberals with VVD).
The D66 organization will be very hard to agree to include 1 of the extremist right-wing parties in the coalition with VVD and Christian Democrats – not PVV, but 1 of the smaller and allegedly more acceptable options. However, I do not think that this is the way that voters D66, as a winning party, will be able to accept. There's not quite a few options here.
Basically, the only option, if you want to avoid a coalition of six or 7 parties, is simply a coalition of the 4 largest center parties, and VVD will gotta accept it at any point. It is simply a kind of red-green coalition version. This will lead to any kind of psychodrama – as is frequently the case in coalition countries specified as the Netherlands, Belgium and now France.
LJ: How do you view 1989 from today’s position and what has this year taught us?
LvM: This is simply a wide-ranging question on a very comprehensive subject. possibly a small semantics first, definitions first. What does it mean to return history? Of course, I don't mean that past has actually stopped in the meantime, but of course it is besides an allusion to the explanation of "end of history" Fukuyama, who, whatever it is said about her, embodies and expresses a certain belief (in retrospect of illusory time) in the planet after 1989 and its evolution. This besides leads us to analyse the dynamics of European policy and how the return of past has been experienced by different people at different times.
I remember the present (and former) Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, on the day he took the position of president of the European Council said: “History returns”. I was present at the power transfer ceremony between the 2 Presidents of the European Council due to the fact that I worked for his predecessor. In 2014, this was a very strong mention to Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, which meant the return of the policies of the large powers. This is definitely a central aspect of this situation.
For Europe, this means primarily the return of Russia and its direct territorial aggression, which the remainder of Europe has experienced with any delay. Just look at Germany and Olaf Scholz's celebrated speech on "Zeitenwende" given just a fewer days after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It was a German way of saying that “history is coming back”. We experience a reversal of the wave, or even a reversal of the course of time, as indicated by the word Zeitenwende. The historical eras are changing before our eyes.
Let's take a look at the remainder of the planet that doesn't focus so much on Russia. China and the dynamics of relations between the United States and China are the main topic. China, like Russia, is not satisfied with a more submissive function in the large planet past game, which was assigned to them after 1989, and which was to trust on joining all global organisations (e.g. WTO in 2001).
China has become like us. We've been experiencing this for over 10 years. China was not satisfied (and had no reason to be satisfied) with its possible and a more modest political, strategical and economical role. As a result, the remainder of the planet is experiencing the return of the politics of the large powers, but in peculiar this applies to the United States and China. It kind of coincided in time.
Somewhere between 2014 (or even 2008, if we go back to the August 2008 Russian-Georgian War) and 2022, all Europeans realized that the era after the Cold War was over. That the period that began in 1989 no longer exists. This is the period in which our generation studied, grew up and began to work. Our parents spent most of their working life in the Cold War era. We are people of the generation after the Cold War, but the next generation will also, in a sense, live after the Cold War – and although we do not have a name for this word yet, we know that something fresh has happened.
As far as Europe is concerned, this is simply a painful awakening for Europeans – harder than for many another nations in the world, due to the fact that many of them besides see opportunities. But for Europeans, for us, the end of history, the planet after 1989 served us very well. He has provided us with the prosperity of globalisation and a strategy for which the EU was very well prepared as a market-forming mechanism. He has given us regional and even global stability, with the US inactive acting as our protector.
There has been collective military disarmament – we have stopped investing in our armed forces, which is very visible in Western Europe, but to any degree besides in Central and east Europe. This is simply a well documented fact and people have realized it – which is evidently a affirmative phenomenon.
However, something else happened after 1989. We were besides disarmed intellectually, ideologically. We have lost the chance to speak, talk and debate about our place in the planet in terms of history, power, strategy and geography. due to the fact that we preferred the language of law, principles and standards – which is simply a friendly language – it besides meant that we neglected the old language of history, strategy, power, geography, diplomacy, etc. For people like us – historians, philosophers, publicists, journalists and intellectuals – this is besides an crucial issue.
Our function is to reconstruct this kind of language, knowing the planet and prospects for current events and matters – reasoning in terms of risks, threats, opportunities and, again, long-term perspectives.
Maybe I'll finish there. Looking at the amazing course of events this year, 2025, since Donald Trump's return to power in the White home and everything that has happened, 1 can get the general impression that Europeans have shown resilience and ability to act. It is actual that any things were improvised, but generally, they were truly in reactive mode. They weren't involved. They weren't in charge. Sometimes they were just observers.
This reactive mode of action reflects the deficiency of historical awareness – historical in the sense of past in the present. erstwhile you are incapable to truly look back and realize where you come from, it is besides very hard to look into the future – imagine yourself in the future and take a direction.
The broader time position gives direction without a catalyst in the form of a direct threat that Europeans request all time. If you look at China, Chinese leadership has a clearly defined long-term direction. They think of 1949, the revolution of Mao, and they think of 2049, the century of this revolution. That's their trajectory. At the same time, they besides look back at China as a civilization.
Xi Jinping, who is well aware of this common relation between the past, present and future, brought Confucius back to the mainstream of Chinese thinking. Even a generation or 2 ago, for example in Mao times, it was an absolute taboo due to the fact that it associated with “old China” and old religion. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping uses this thought – like Putin uses the Orthodox Church.
The same approach applies even to Donald Trump and the MEGA environment. Of course, they may sometimes improvise, but clearly they besides have a long-term vision. They simply want to destruct the order that arose after 1945. And possibly from our point of view (or from my point of view) it looks like they are simply destroying things – what they are actually doing. From their point of view, however, they besides build a fresh order.
They want to fundamentally change the course of history. They want to end the order established after 1945, in which, of course, the United States was the basis of the full global system. In those 80 years, it worked beautiful well for the Americans. However, American voters are no longer convinced of what is mostly driving this dynamics.
The United States wants to introduce a fresh order for the next 100 years. It's something I learned from talking to people in Washington. Their attitude truly is: "OK, we are besides changing the age and accelerating this change." In Europe, however, it is very hard to think in these categories. Also, as I mentioned, we are reactive. There is any apathy and fear, as well as amazement (often even naivety) towards the pace of Chinese and American action.
In the light of all of this, it is crucial that we do not halt again just to re-equipped in military terms (in terms of equipment), but that we besides do so mentally, ideologically and intellectually, so that we are better prepared to deal with the planet of immense changes and forces – a large part of which either wants to destruct us, or simply make us our playing field.
LJ: I very much like the way you are trying to reinvent the drama of our perception of politics in Europe. Of course, heroes are needed in drama. Meanwhile, it seems that 1 of Europe's problems is that it is not clear whether it is simply a phase or an actor. Who do you think responds to current events? Who should I get to hear Machiavelli? Are they European leaders, or are they the full European community? Can we even treat Europe as a hero?
LvM: It is easy for me to usage a theatrical metaphor to describe the interaction between actors in politics, but there is besides a scene, an audience, and in the case of the policy we are talking about now, it is not a national but a planet scene. And Europe's function there has decreased.
Europe is simply a smaller player than before and is looking for ways to deal with it. An interesting aspect here is the question of who speaks for Europe: will it be just 1 individual or several? And this 1 person, should it be an EU individual or a national leader?
French presidents like to talk and think "l’Europe, c’est moi". And to any degree they can embody part of Europe. Or is it France and Germany together? For example, during the euro area crisis, erstwhile France and Germany worked together, it could be said that it was a European decision. But today, in the era of Trump, Putin and Xi, it is clear that not 1 or even a duo of European leaders is enough. I am of course referring to the celebrated visit to the White home to Donald Trump, in which he took part, as far as I remember, as many as 8 European leaders, erstwhile the full of Europe was again very afraid after the gathering of president Trump and Putin in Alaska, that Ukraine would be left with nothing.
As I recall, Macron, Merz and Starmer appeared on behalf of the “great three”, but Meloni, representing Italy, was besides there. Finnish president Stubb represented the Russian neighbour's voice. There were besides 2 representatives of the institutions: president of the European Commission von der Leyen and Secretary-General of NATO Rutte. president Zelenski was besides present. In a sense, 8 or possibly 7 people were needed (if I could give Zelensk a peculiar status) to influence Trump together, influence his reasoning and surpass Putin in more individual conversations with Trump.
Europeans must execute in 4 or five. telephone calls were besides made. I find that interesting. It's besides easy to be ironic about it or simply say, "Well, let's just let the fresh president go, or just let Macron and Merz, France and Germany, or possibly Tusk go." No, Europe is needed today. Its unity is clearly felt as a territorial and political entity, partially embodied by the EU – but not only due to the fact that Prime Minister Starmer and NATO were besides present.
That is why we can clearly say that Europe exists and tries to find its voice – but it is simply a pluralist voice. Nevertheless, it was heard due to the fact that the gathering was effective. Still, it is hard work. Sometimes it looks a small odd. Both Europeans and European leaders are aware of this.
One of the interesting things that happened this year is Merza's return to the political stage. It became more explicit in abroad affairs than its predecessor, Olaf Scholz. At the same time, Britain has besides returned more as a part of Europe with Starmer, but besides due to the fact that the British, for their part, besides feel (regardless of their doubts, and they are unlimited) a sense of belonging to Europe as a continent, as territory, and know that they share any strategical and security-related interests with the remainder of us on the another side of the channel.
As a consequence of this war, as a consequence of the return of history, this kind of awareness of Europe is reshaping, not only in the EU sense, but truly in the territorial, historical sense, I dare say, civilizational.
LJ: 1 lesson from your books is that real European politics form events and reactions to them. What kind of Europe do you see as a consequence of the reaction both to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, possibly even more, to the failure to dismantle the American empire besides in Europe?
LvM: The Trump challenge is in a sense even bigger than the Putin challenge. Furthermore, from a historical point of view, Putin and Xi Jinping put an end to the planet that began in 1989. However, as we have mentioned, Trump's actions mark the end of the world, which began in 1945 – it is possibly more visible in Western Europe, but this can besides be applied to the full world.
Europeans refused to realize the challenge erstwhile Donald Trump won the election. For 4 years they waited for the election to be won by a democratic candidate. This time I think that we, as Europeans, are taking this more seriously, but inactive not serious enough.
It is clear that in this kind of reactivity, in the policy of events, there is simply a deficiency of more strategical prediction – not only in the sense of planning, due to the fact that it is impossible to plan everything, but simply to think ahead, to increase resilience, to see long-term trends in the areas of demography, energy, economy, to see China grow, and to think beyond the dynamics of relations between the United States and China and to effort to specify our function in this process. This is something that we, who are reasoning and talking about together, request to strive: more strategical foresight.
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Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
Read English at 4liberty.eu
