Protests of farmers, border blockades, sprinkled grain – these paintings have long been in memory of Poles and Ukrainians. Although Warsaw was 1 of the most crucial allies in the war with Russia, it was agriculture that became a field of conflict. However, the latest “Divided yields” study shows that the integration of Ukraine into the Union does not necessarily mean a price war. It can besides be an chance – provided both sides do a lesson.
Agriculture – more than the economy
Agriculture in Poland and Ukraine is more than just numbers in statistics. It is part of culture, memory and food security. No wonder it creates emotions far greater than another sectors of the economy.
When Polish farmers blocked border crossings in 2023 and trucks with Ukrainian grain stood in multiple kilometers of traffic jams, images of grain were circulating on social media. In Poland they were to be a symbol of the protest, in Ukraine – they aroused outrage and anger. For a society that inactive lives in the shadow of the large Hunger, the act of destroying food is more than a political manifestation. It's a violation of holiness.
In this conflict, emotions became the fuel of politics. Polish farmers accused the government and Brussels of betraying agrarian interests. The Ukrainian public perceived the blockades as an attack on the state at war for survival. On the 1 hand, there was concern about the buying-in price and the profitability of the farms, on the another hand, a sense of threat to the stableness of the state.
But there's a deeper problem underneath these images and passwords. This is not a dispute over individual shipments of corn. It's a collision of 2 different agricultural models. Poland – shredded, inactive based on household farms, but reinforced by a strong processing sector and advanced added value food exports. And Ukrainian – concentrated in the hands of agroholdings, which have hundreds of thousands of hectares and are geared towards mass production of agricultural natural materials.
How can we reconcile these 2 worlds within a single European Union market? This is simply a question to which there are no simple answers, but it depends on whether Ukraine's integration into the EU will become a origin of cooperation or endless conflicts.
Two Ways of Transformation
In the early 1990s, much indicated that Ukraine had better prospects for improvement than Poland. Her GDP was higher, and she besides had a immense agricultural possible based on black earth, which for centuries had been considered Europe's most fertile soils. At the time it seemed that it was Kiev that would rapidly enter the way of modernization and exploit its potential.
It's the opposite. Poland – thanks to economical reforms and beginning to the West – has made a profound transformation. In 2004, she joined the European Union, and this launched an avalanche of investments and technology transfers. Effect? After 3 decades Polish GDP per capita is almost 8 times higher than Ukrainian. Poland has become 1 of the largest food exporters in the Union and a crucial player in the global market.
Meanwhile, Ukraine was stuck in half-measures. Insufficient reforms, corruption, political instability and war have made possible untapped. Agriculture has remained 1 of the pillars of the economy, but mainly in the natural material dimension. Ukrainian producers went to the world's leading exporters of wheat, maize or sunflower oil, but the country did not build a strong processing industry.
This difference can be seen on the palm of your hand erstwhile you look at the structure of your production. Poland invested in meat plants, dairy plants, processing of fruit and vegetables, which export finished products. Ukraine inactive mostly sends grain and seed abroad. It's like 2 branches of the same tree: 1 grows across, releasing fresh branches, the another goes up, but without an extended crown.
And it is these 2 ways of transformation – Polish and Ukrainian – that must now meet within a single common market. Poland fears that mass natural material production from Ukraine will lower prices and hit tiny farms. Ukraine is afraid that without support and investment in modernising its agriculture, it will be brought into the EU as a supplier of inexpensive cereals.
Trade: Who gains present and who loses today
On paper the trade balance of Poland and Ukraine looks impressive. In 2023 Poland sold to Ukraine goods worth over PLN 51 billion, while imports from Ukraine amounted to around 20 billion. The difference – in favour of Warsaw – is huge.
But erstwhile we narrow down the analysis only to agriculture and food, the image ceases to be so pink. In this section Poland already has a negative balance. Only in 2023 the deficit reached PLN 3 billion. The main reason is the influx of cheaper natural materials: grain, rape, maize, sunflower oil. They are the ones that origin force on buying prices in Poland and make farmers feel threatened.
On the another hand, Polish companies have been building an advantage in the Ukrainian marketplace for years in another category: finished food products. In shops in Kiev, Lviv or Odessa we will find Polish cheeses, yogurts, sweets and cold cuts. It's not a coincidence. In 2023 58 percent of Polish food exports to Ukraine were processed products and feeds.
Simply put: Poland sells food to Ukraine with added value, Ukraine sells Polish natural materials. It's a natural division of roles today. The problem is, with accession, it can blur. If Ukrainian companies gain access to EU funds and start investing in processing, they will become competitors for Polish brands. And then the power strategy on the marketplace can change.
This uncertainty makes agriculture 1 of the most delicate political topics in Warsaw-Kijów relations. Polish farmers say: "We do not want our farms to die under the force of Ukrainian grain". Ukrainian politicians answer: “Our agriculture must live due to the fact that it is the basis of our budget and safety during the war.”
In the background is the 3rd actor – the European Union. Brussels looks at the overall balance sheet and sees in Ukrainian natural materials an chance to increase food safety throughout the community. But for Polish farmers, this is not a "opportunity", but a real threat to their income.
Poland: force on fields, chance for factories
In Polish villages, fear is increasingly heard: "We cannot withstand competition with Ukrainian grain". And it's hard to be surprised. Agroholdings from across the east border grow hundreds of thousands of hectares. Labour costs are lower there, and access to land is much easier. erstwhile specified a giant markets millions of tons of wheat or maize, the price in Poland immediately drops.
Small and medium-sized farms that have neither scale nor capital to compete are the most vulnerable. Farmers surviving from respective twelve hectares, producing mainly grain, can be placed against the wall. For them, the integration of Ukraine into the EU could mean a real hazard of bankruptcy. But the same situation looks different from the position of Polish processing plants. For feed, meat, dairy or sweets producers cheaper natural material is an opportunity. If the cost of the input falls, it is easier to compete with the price and increase exports to demanding Western markets. Poland is already 1 of the leaders of processed food export in Europe. The integration of Ukraine can only accelerate this trend – if the State and the Union make the right conditions.
The future of the Polish village depends on whether the weight can be transferred from natural production to products with higher added value. due to the fact that in this game it's not the wheat on the wagons that determines the victory, but what comes of it: bread, pasta, finished products.
Therefore, together with Wawrzyńc Czubak and Vitalij Krupin, we emphasize: Poland must invest in modern processing, support production groups and make short supply chains. Without this, a large proportion of farms will be swept distant by price competition and the chance for economical promotion of the full sector will be wasted.
Ukraine: an chance to modernise or consolidate oligopoly?
For Ukraine, membership of the European Union is not only a geopolitical issue, but besides an chance for the top modernisation impulse in history. EU funds, access to technology, investment in infrastructure – all of this can completely change the face of Ukrainian countryside. This is promising on paper: farmers could benefit from subsidies, make household farms, enter shorter supply chains and process more natural materials on site. The grain, which present goes consecutive to the port of Odessa, could be processed in plants in Ukraine, creating jobs and more added value.
But there's another side to the medal. Already today, agroholdings control immense areas of land – sometimes respective 100 1000 hectares. They have modern equipment, capital and access to markets. If EU funds and fresh opportunities are mainly addressed, the structure of the village will polarise even more. alternatively of modernising on a broad scale, the oligopoly will be strengthened.
There are millions of people associated with tiny farms in the Ukrainian countryside. They guarantee that families are maintained, frequently in the grey area and without unchangeable income. If they do not receive support, the marketplace will marginalise them. This threatens not only with social tensions, but besides with political consequences – due to the fact that the village in Ukraine is simply a immense part of society and a possible electorate.
The improvement of the land marketplace remains unknown. The liberalisation of trade was to open up fresh investment opportunities, but without transparent rules it was easy to concentrate ownership. If the land falls into the hands of a fewer oligarchs or abroad corporations, dreams of a fair transformation of the village may dispel.
Therefore, the question is: will Ukraine usage the Union to modernise “deep” by supporting household farms and local processing, or will it deepen the natural material model, in which only the export tonnage counts? This decision depends on whether accession will become a developmental impulse, whether it will increase the distance between winners and transformation losers.
Union: inexpensive natural material versus farmers' income
For Brussels, Ukraine's accession is primarily numbers. More than 40 million hectares of agricultural land represent the largest expansion of the single agricultural marketplace in history. In Eurocrats, it means "enhanced food safety of the Union" and a chance to reduce the cost of natural materials for the food industry. At first glance, it's a benefit. Consumers can benefit from lower prices of bread, pasta or meat. The food industry, which is inactive 1 of the strengths of the European economy, gets access to cheaper inputs. Europe as a full is becoming more competitive towards global markets – from the US to Brazil.
But this balance sheet does not look so good from the position of farmers from Poland, Romania or Lithuania. They will be the first to feel the effects of falling buying prices. For large farms in Western Europe – specialised, well-mechanical – this force will be easier to deal with. For smaller producers from Central and east Europe may mean drama. That's where the political hazard comes from. The Union, alternatively of becoming the beneficiary of the ‘low-cost natural material’, may become the arena of fresh subsidies conflicts and safeguard mechanisms. Just remind farmers' protests of 2023 – hundreds of thousands of people on the streets and tractors blocking roads across Europe. If there are no soft landing mechanisms, the integration of Ukraine can origin akin waves of discontent, only on a larger scale.
Therefore, Brussels will gotta ask itself any uncomfortable questions. Is the common agricultural policy ready to accept a player like Ukraine? Will the strategy of subsidies and interventions be able to defend different agricultural models – from household farms in Poland to large farms in France? Finally, will politicians be able to explain to citizens that integration is not only a cost, but besides an investment in long-term food safety for the full community?
One thing is certain: Ukraine's accession to the EU will not be neutral. The benefit of manufacture and consumers will be lost to those farmers who will be left to themselves. If the Union does not make shielding mechanisms, this imbalance can rapidly turn into a political storm.
Four possible scenarios: where will integration go?
The “Divided yields” study shows 4 possible developments. This is not academic fun – each has real consequences for Polish and Ukrainian farmers, for EU agricultural policy, as well as for political relations between Warsaw, Kiev and Brussels.
Scenario 1: Cooperation and specialisation (‘win–win’). In this variant Poland and Ukraine share roles. Poland strengthens itself as a regional processing and export centre for advanced value-added products – from dairy to meat products and sweets. Ukraine remains the main supplier of natural materials, but is gradually besides developing its own processing. Thanks to joint investments in logistics infrastructure, both countries gain a competitive advantage and farmers, although under pressure, can number on support mechanisms. This is simply a script where integration becomes a common opportunity.
Scenario 2: Price War and Protectionism. The logic of “everyone has a patella starch” dominates. Ukrainian grain floods the market, prices fall, Polish farmers lose income. Under the force of protests, Warsaw and another capitals introduce unilateral blockades, Brussels reacts late and common trust between partners disappears. Integration, alternatively of strengthening the community, becomes a origin of constant tensions and trade wars. This is an option where everyone is losers: farmers, consumers and politicians.
Scenario 3: Unilateral modernisation. Ukraine is mainly gaining in this scenario. Access to EU funds allows it to rapidly increase productivity and make agroholdings. Poland, if it does not accelerate investment in innovation and processing, may lose its advantage to date. Ukrainian companies become competition for Polish brands, and a fresh strong player appears on the regional market. This is simply a variant beneficial for Kiev, but risky for Warsaw.
Scenario 4: Drift and chaos. The least favorable option for all. Integration is slow, without clear rules and effective support mechanisms. Poland continues to protest the import of natural materials, Ukraine does not make full usage of the funds and the Union does not have the courage to plan fresh tools for the common agricultural policy. As a result, farmers live in uncertainty, investment slows down and the possible for cooperation is wasted in an atmosphere of common pretension.
What do you do to win?
The “Divided yields” study leaves no illusions: Ukraine's integration into the Union is an inevitable process. The question is not ‘is?’ but ‘how?’. And that's where circumstantial recommendations come in.
Poland must rapidly shift the burden from selling natural materials to advanced value-added production. This means investing in modern plants, supporting production groups, developing short supply chains and promoting export brands. At the same time, the State must defend the smallest – not with subsidies indefinitely, but with intelligent mechanisms to stabilise revenue, access to technology and advice.
Ukraine faces a historical chance, but besides a risk. If EU funds only scope agroholdings, accession has preserved the natural material model and deepened inequality. Therefore, programmes are needed to support household farms, local processing and a transparent land market. The Union can be the lever of modernisation for Kiev, provided it is not brought to the financial function of the ATM.
The European Union should plan the integration of Ukraine with a view to "soft landing". There is simply a request for continuous marketplace monitoring, fast intervention mechanisms, support for tiny producers and investment in technologies that reduce production costs. Brussels must remember that integration is not only about greater food security, but besides about social stableness in regions that may feel lost.
Conclusions: this is not a zero-sum game
The war in Ukraine showed that Europe's safety does not end with tanks and rockets. Equally crucial is food safety and stableness in the countryside – this Polish, Ukrainian and EU.
The accession of Ukraine is simply a test whether Europe can think strategically. If short-sighted protectionism prevails, we will get a repeat of the blockades, protests and common accusations. If the imagination of cooperation wins, Poland and Ukraine can together become a pillar of the food safety of the continent.
It is simply a choice that will not be made in the distant future. It is happening present – in decisions taken in Warsaw, Kiev and Brussels. And it depends on these decisions whether integration will be a common success or a origin of further conflicts.
