In Afghanistan, it was impossible to “stand behind”, “out of the front line”, as president Donald Trump said about the engagement of allies. There the “front” was actually everywhere. And no of the coalition's military contingents were touristy there, even if the national RoE (arms-use guidelines) assumed limited participation in the fighting. The Taliban did not care about specified details – they besides attacked humanitarian troops.
One specified operation was codenamed "Winter Wind", and its aim was to aid Afghan people. The winter of 2008 was highly cool and snowy, civilians in distant villages needed fuel, food and warm clothing. The Polish CIMIC, a civil-military squad of advisors working with the Afghan army and police, went to help. The convoys were shielded by soldiers from the 6th Infantry and Assault Brigade (today airborne), among them kpr. Szymon Nightingale.
It was February 26, 2008, evening. Simon was driving on Humvee's "ganerka". A squad of 8 vehicles had already returned to base. Poles passed the village of Yahya Khel, to the “house” in Sharana they had only 4 km. – Our car was seventh – Jacek Domański, the driver, told me a fewer years later. The convoy drove off-road for fear of the mines that the Taliban had put on the roads. Until at any point you had to cut the riverbed, alleged flaws. It couldn't be done anywhere. The Taliban knew that sooner or later we'd be going that way. And they put on a burden – he mentioned.
It was 18.15, six trucks had already overcome the obstacle erstwhile the seventh, rear wheel invaded the mine. The blast was powerful. St.-Worship Hubert Kowalski, who sat on an unfortunate wheel, died instantly. The driver was thrown outside. The nightingale, fastened with belts, remained in its place. Meanwhile, the car rolled forward and landed on the roof...
– By the time I passed out, I crawled to Szymek, but he was already dead... – said Domanski. Then he told us what happened just before the explosion. “You can see the lights from the base!” Simon shouted. “Come on, come on!” he drove the driver. "My wife's birthday is today, I gotta call!". Those were his last words.
In 2016, I spoke to the widow.
– This is the gift I received... – said Barbara Nightingale.
A dense method advantage
The war in Afghanistan was not total. There were no frontal attacks at the ft of Hindukush utilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers, a immense number of aircraft, guns or tanks. Single skirmishes had quite a few firepower, but mostly Afghanistan cannot be compared to planet War II or the current conflict in Ukraine. This was a modern variant of the (anti)partisan war, of an asymmetrical character, where the method and technological advantage of 1 side was crushing. Hence comparatively tiny losses of Poles and the full coalition in general. They did not consequence from the fact that individual was taking off, not engaging, avoiding fighting. This was surely not done by Poles, as evidenced by the number of wounded and fallen military soldiers (43 soldiers and 1 military individual died). Why this statistic? due to their method advantage, Poles – like all coalition soldiers – were highly hard targets for the Taliban.
Take the example of a summertime change in the 2010 Polish military contingent. Six soldiers were killed, more than a 100 wounded and wounded. Thus PKW during VII the change lost 5% of people. In linear formations – and these have suffered the most for apparent reasons – were sub-chapters in which losses reached 30% of individual states. This is not in any way a statistic typical of a “backward” mission.
Besides, what would being behind that mean? Staying in databases, performing logistics tasks? In Afghanistan, it was vain to look for a classically understood front line. As Tomasz Kamiński, a traveller and an afganologist put it correctly during 1 of his panels, the war was where abroad troops were at that moment. Kamiński compared NATO forces to nests that attract wasps, by default Taliban fighters. "Where there are no nests, there are no wasps", he concluded. specified nests were not only moving troops, but besides regularly fired from rockets and mortars of the base, where soldiers of the coalition, including Poles, were besides killed and wounded.
Polish-American fraternity
Let's stay at the bases for a moment, understood as the back room. quite a few soldiers, including Poles, carried out logistical tasks and did not engage in combat activities. Does that mean bail? Not at all! Imagine any army without logistics – it's like fists without legs and head. So we sent them to Afghanistan and to those military men who kept behind. In fact, they tried, but the Taliban made it hard for them. But it is worth remembering what the structure of the Polish contingent was – it did not have full developed logistics, due to the fact that it did not have to. An crucial part of this task was carried out by the Americans – that was the agreement between the coalitions. 1 of its effects was that the combat component of the Polish quotas was not 1 5th or 1 sixth – as usually happens during expedition missions – but 1 3rd of the full forces. Our soldiers mostly entered the fight.
Sometimes this was due to the requests of Americans who were trapped. This was the case on September 10, 2009, erstwhile Afghan-American patrol ambushed close 1 of the villages in Andar District. At that time, a platoon of red berets was sent to action. St. General Piotr Marciniak. “Foka”As his colleagues said, he died trying to clear the building. Despite the awareness that the Taliban might be inside – as indicated by the bloody way – Peter was the first to enter the Kalata (Afghan building). He took on a series of 2 rifles, he fell, his friends failed to carry him out. For respective twelve minutes there was a fierce fight at stake – Poles had no hope for another script – it was the recovery of the body of “Foka”. Eventually, it worked out and cost 4 more soldiers.
The Americans in this incidental have not suffered any irretrievable losses. That's not what I'm talking about, not to exterminate anyone, but for simple integrity. Afghanistan was not a failure competition or a commitment ranking. He was a test whether NATO could act as a real military alliance. And the Alliance passed that test. Poland passed it. The unworthy words of Donald Trump will not change this, as they will not remove from memory examples of the Polish-American arms fraternity. 1 of his symbols is death Michaela H. Ollis, who died on August 28, 2013, covering the body of a Polish soldier. This act will not be forgotten by Polish veterans, no substance what they hear from the US President.
The speeches contained in the text were collected on the occasion of the publication entitled “In Our Memory. Iraq, Afghanistan 2003–2014” (Warsaw 2016, issue of the Veteran Centre for Activities Outside State Borders, collective work) in which they appeared. In the article I besides reached for fragments of my another book, “from Afghanistan.pl. alphabet of the Polish mission” (Ustronie 2011, published by Warbook).
