The End of Geopolitical Imagination
The improvement of a global geopolitical situation, which has been shaped in a completely fresh way by the Trump administration since the beginning of its second term, poses peculiar challenges for countries specified as Poland. This is due to the fact that since 1989 Polish policy has remained in the right otherwise belief that our future is permanently connected with the Western bloc, the leader of which is the United States, and whose organization framework is designated by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The first 2 forts – the US and the western block – are presently radically contested by Washington.
After 1989, Polish politics besides developed smaller formats, which are an expression of our country's search for its place in Europe. They were either intended to strengthen our European and Atlantic aspirations or our global position. Double Zeitenwende (i.e. the turning point), associated first with Putin and then Trump, cancels them too. Some have already exhausted their first potential, and others have been false from the beginning.
The era of geopolitical certainty has come to an end – present Poland will not be decided by the erstwhile declarations of belonging, but by the ability to find itself in a planet where even alliances cease to be obvious.
Regional formats to the fresh reality
The format that exhausted its founding possible is the Visegrad Group. As we know, it was intended to strengthen the strength of Central Europe (many post-communist countries) towards the russian Union – through joint efforts to solve the Warsaw Pact and the RPPG – and to support their pro-European aspirations. The countries of the region were to aid each another and share experiences on their way to the European Community.
For a good fewer years the Visegrad Group has been paralyzed by a deep division against both of its founding issues. In the face of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the 2 countries sided with Russia, which is peculiarly unacceptable for Poland. There have besides been, sometimes in Warsaw, more frequently in Budapest, attempts to usage the Group as a origin of European disintegration, to deviate from EU standards and to undermine EU decisions, which contradicts its founding intentions.
The expression from the beginning false and doomed to failure was the Trimorum, referring to earlier intermarine concepts that appeared in this part of Europe. Sticky names and narratives of respective countries – from Estonia to Croatia – have neither adequate economical possible nor a geopolitical community of destiny and interests to make more lasting added value. In addition, erstwhile Poland began to betray its intention to usage the Trimorz to choice a separate integration centre in opposition to the processes generated by the institutions in Brussels, individual countries lost their sympathy for this format. The trim became – or was actually from the beginning – an empty idea.
Regional projects make sense only if they are based on a real community of interests and ability to act – without it they are only effective names for political emptiness.
Union restrictions on ‘tyralier’
At the same time, the European Union, which is now 27 and most likely 30 countries in the future, where integration processes make horizontally (thirlary) does not supply the capacity to concentrate safety and economical and technological improvement capacity to the degree essential to meet order power politicsWho are trying to impose Washington, Beijing or Moscow.
It would so seem appropriate to view sources of this focus in a smaller group of ‘wanting and able’ countries. In this context, the EU can play a affirmative function as a single regulatory area and open interior borders. However, this would mean the emergence of something that Poland was very afraid of in the past – a hard core of European integration, in which there might be no place for us.
In fact, mentally and politically, we have excluded ourselves from specified formulas through distance or opposition to attempts to strengthen integration in a smaller group of countries. It was feared that this could harm our relations with the US or NATO. In the current situation, specified concerns seem unfounded. The Americans themselves, turning distant from Europe, make us take greater work for the safety of the continent.
The “tyrallier” Union provides a wide area of force but does not have the force of impact. In the planet of power politics, a hard core capable of real focusing will and possible is needed.
Europe's hard core: Central-Western and Northern Blocks
So which countries would be in this hard core? Not everybody's on fire for that, and not everyone's good for it for all sorts of reasons. This block of concentration of possible and will on our continent can be a group of countries of Central-Western and Northern Europe: from Poland through Germany, France and the United Kingdom, to the Benelux countries, Scandinavia and the Baltic States.
It is simply a region of about 300 million people, comprising high-economic developed countries, with 3 economies of size to the top 10 of the planet and the highest income countries. per capita (at least 5 of them are in the world's top ten). It is simply a block of high-tech countries with tremendous capital resources and a advanced general culture – material and spiritual.
It is essential to add a common cultural foundation as a platform on which nations, of course, can cooperate well with each other. The common base gives them a sense of unity and proximity, conducive to assurance building and cooperation. Poland, as a country with a sustained advanced rate of growth and the 20th planet economy, is well included, besides in cultural terms.
It was no accident that Pope Sylwester II, from Burgundy (French), sent Emperor Otto III (German) to Bolesław (Slovenia) to build a common Europe. A gathering in Gniezno in the year 1000 can be considered – somewhat joking – as the beginning of the Weimar Triangle. The Wazov added the Polish politics to the northern, Baltic dimension. In the following centuries, Western and Northern European nations have strengthened their ties. Poland "lifted" towards the east, which was not a happy choice – neither geopolitically nor in terms of economical and social development. Geopolitics of the second half of the 20th century brought us back to Western and Northern Europe. It is worth drawing the best possible conclusions for Poland from these judgments of history.
Europe's strength can be born where economical potential, cultural community and political will meet – and Poland has all the assets to be at the heart of specified a core.
Europe as an actor in the planet power politics
This is besides a lesson for Europe as a whole. The double "turnpoint" mentioned earlier showed that the future of the continent should not be based on closer relations with Russia (as it was thought 20-25 years ago), nor should it be based solely on permanent – based on values, principles and experience of the past of the 20th century – transatlantic ties. Europe did not decide that.
The future of our continent lies in transforming European resources into the ability to defend our own safety and improvement interests. This is about both civilizational vitality and systemic efficiency, as well as firmness in relations with the outside world. Europe has the possible to become 1 building blocks a fresh global order. It doesn't should be a kind order. power politics, but if specified is to temporarily dominate global life, we request a muscular Europe that will not let ourselves to impose rules power politics à la Trump & Putin and will defend its island of democratic order.
This is possible due to the fact that defenders of democratic order and rules-basedorder there will besides be crucial countries outside Europe, specified as Canada, Australia, Japan or Brazil. Such a Europe is in Poland's interest – and in specified a Europe Poland should invest politically, strategically and economically.
EU strategical core: from tyralier to ‘fist’
Such a Europe cannot be built by going further with a tyrallier. In a tyralier, it is easy to lose 1 of the participants; individual else can fill an empty space. The march can be slowed down by marauders or those who are not in the right direction. This is the situation of the European Union - highly useful but susceptible to blocking. It should surely be appreciated that the EU has been able to mobilise itself to aid Ukraine and to increase its own efforts to strengthen the safety of its members, as the SAFE programme is the best example.
If Europe does not become an entity capable of defending its own interests, it will become the subject of individual else's game, which is why its strength is present a condition for endurance of democratic order.
At the same time, the EU as a full (27 and shortly 30 countries) will be hard to become a strategical actor, even if it is based on a foundation of close economical links. On the another hand, it is possible to gradually build the Community's strategical core – "fist" – in a smaller group of likewise reasoning and determined countries (like-minded, willing). This will not happen on the basis of 1 peculiar treaty, but by compacting the links between them.
This should be a conscious choice of Poland – and 1 can get the impression that the government of Donald Tusk understands it. This is indicated by contacts and agreements in the field of defence and the economy, which are the consequence of political determination to include Poland in a network of links creating fresh strategical quality in Europe. The Polish-French treaty with Nancy, signed on 8 May 2025, is simply a good example of this. Further agreements of this kind are being negotiated.
However, it is crucial that the political initiative is accompanied by the improvement of economical and technological interdependence. For the Polish economy, discipline and the technological sector, this will be a historical challenge – 1 that we are able to meet and that will “bring us up”. We must act with the awareness that in this way we contribute to the building of a solid stronghold for the defence of Europe's safety and economical improvement – and so besides our own interests.
Poland in the centre of fresh safety architecture
In this group of countries, we can number on hard but fair treatment, due to equality with the law and not to the oligarchical links or influence of peculiar political interests, as is frequently the case in the countries south and east of us. And it is good that we can no longer number on "special" – for historical reasons – considerations from Germany. Polish politics after 2015 made Germany immune to “arguments” or “historical considerations” raised to them by Poland.
Europe can go further “wider tyrallier”, au all the advantages and disadvantages of this model. However, it seems that in the age of hard geopolitics only Europe "strong as a fist" will give real cause.
Strongly unfriendly rhetoric and the way in which claims were formulated confirmed Berlin's conviction that fear of Germany, false accusations or request for reparations served the immediate interior political interests alternatively than rational relations with the western neighbour. As a result, relations with Poland ceased to be "special" for Germany and became normal.
Normality in relations with Germany is not a threat, but an chance – it depends on our maturity whether their strength will besides become a pillar of Poland's security.
However, the direct neighbourhood and the nonsubjective community of interests of both nations and countries – as we have seen after 1989 – proved to be beneficial for Poland and specified will stay in the position of building a hard core of Europe, this time with the participation of Poland, not with its exclusion. Disparity of potentials is not essential: Germany remains Europe's largest economy and akin asymmetry besides occurs in their relations with another neighbours. However, for all parties, besides for Poland, this is simply a kind of relation win-win.
All we gotta do is get free of the complexes that are revealed in any political environments. They have no justification, but they can only limit our chances of building a average relation with the main European economical power, which will besides become the main military power in Europe in the coming years. To a large degree it depends on us, how much of her strength will besides service the safety of Poland. This historical chance must not be wasted.
End of intermarine illusions
Polish politics must definitely part with inter-sea illusions and siren singing about subsequent versions of Central European “Rurity”. In doing so, we must avoid another wave of populism in power that would drive us to the outskirts of Europe.
Polish business is to blend into the safety and improvement region of Western and Northern Europe. At the same time, this economical and defence block can play the function of a locomotive for growth and strengthening the global position of the full European Union.
