Polish strategy and problem of the mediate country

In this text I prove that the improvement of an action strategy for the mediate state is simply a task without precedent in Poland's history. For no 1 has always done this before. The text discusses the state of cognition about medium-sized countries, the function of these countries in the planet and points to challenges for Polish decision-makers.

What is simply a average country?

History divides states into large and small, that is, power and everything. For hundreds of years, the existence of medium-sized countries has not been seen and written about it. Writing in the 16th century Giovanni Botero was the first to separate mediate countries as a separate group. The difference between tiny and average countries is as follows. According to Botero, a tiny country needs external support. In turn, the mediate state can take care of itself without outside support. On the another hand, a large country is 1 that has a crucial advantage of size and power over the others. The main component of Botero's discrimination was the size, endurance and safety of the population.

In the mid-18th century, Gabriel de Mably described the hierarchy of countries in the world, leading to a discrimination between the powers of the first, second and 3rd order. As the powers frequently get into conflict, Mably wrote that it gives emergence to opportunities for mediate countries to become a stabilizer and to gain regional leadership on a peculiar subject. The main function of medium-sized countries is so to strengthen and safe relations in the region. Medium-sized countries should take care of principles, limit conflicts and increase functionality in a given country community.

In the 19th century, first attempts were made to find indicators to measure the position of countries. In addition to the already known criterion of magnitude, the demographic criterion (Politz concept) and then the strength criterion (Lorimer concept) were proposed.

Just before his death in Wrocław, General Carl von Clausewitz wrote an article commenting on Belgium's independency and the disappearance of countries specified as Burgundy and Poland. The mediate state in Clausewitz had its functional geographical, political and military features. Geographically, the mediate country separates large powers, so it is something like a buffer (Zwsichenmacht). specified a country should besides be politically "advocating stronger neighbours" and be able to defend itself.

In the first half of the 20th century, resources become more crucial in assessing the power of states than action and political role. This will happen in both German Geopolitikas well as the Anglo-Saxon explanation of global relations. In assessing the position of the States, attention was drawn to (1) size, (2) material resources, and subsequently to (3) ability to act, (4) impact and (5) stability. The countries were relegated by industrial resources and capacity (coal and steel production). improvement of global statistic under the auspices of the UN has made economical possible the main measurement of the power of states.

In 1954, Kingsley Davis suggested utilizing GDP as a general measurement of comparing states' power in global politics. During the Cold War, there were besides respective methods of calculating the power of states, based on a combination of demographic, military and economical potential. Later there will besides be a popular economical division of countries and regions into centres, semi-periphery and periphery.

The noticeable problem of postwar literature is to focus on the powers and their influence on planet politics. In the second half of the 20th century, only a fewer works were published, where the subject of mediate or alleged emerging powers was addressed. That is why present we inactive deficiency adequate generalisations and language to describe the policies of mediate countries. We request to make it ourselves.

What does that mean?

We have witnessed a long-term anomaly in global relations. The anomaly was that there has been no major war in Europe for decades. We took advantage of that. Peace is an ally of mediate and tiny countries due to the fact that they do not become victims of large states and can accumulate wealth for a long time. The average countries do not have much comparative force, so they effort to gain opportunities in a way another than violence.

The fast increase in comparative strength is possible peacefully through cooperation and through skillful specialisation. This is why medium-sized countries are trying to join decision-making processes and formats as partners of both powers and tiny countries, allowing them to get fresh functions (markets, production growth, transport hubs, tourism) and roles in the system. Importantly, if these activities are carried out in agreement with powers or be in a region where there are no powers, then the mediate country itself can become a regional leader by converting the possible developed into further areas.

We know from fresh past that mediate countries service (1) peace, (2) the improvement of services and (3) global institutions. The powers strive for power due to the fact that they are safe, and the mediate states strive for safety due to the fact that they are not yet powers. On the another hand, tiny countries simply want to last and guarantee that people have a good quality of life. The smaller the country, the more it uses global institutions to increase its importance in cooperation networks. It's working. The last half-century is primarily the success of tiny countries. On the 1 hand, it was thanks to the US and long-term peace and, on the another hand, to the effective usage of the detonation of services in the global economy. It is thanks to the services of countries specified as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Italy or Poland that have come out of permanent peripherality and have become crucial players in their regions.

In summary, medium-sized countries are characterised by specialisation and regional scope of global impact. In their regions, they play a stabilising role, specified as separating large countries, balancing and ensuring functional initiatives in different areas of the economy. Due to the tiny force of comparative states, the average countries favour peace and avoid conflict, seeking to build influence through cooperation and peaceful competition.

Is there a Polish strategical thought?

In the beginning of 2025, I submitted a task to make the anthology of Polish strategical thought to the Polish Association of strategical Studies. After a fewer months of conceptual work, a list of more than 50 military and civilian publications was developed, which could become a starting point for the current challenges of the Polish strategy. The list included names specified as R. Dmowski, J. Piłsudski, W. Sikorski, S. Mossor, and J. Mieroszewski, and contemporary ones specified as K. Skubiszewski, Amb. P. Grudziński or Gen. B. Balcerowicz. Our problem is not the deficiency of strategical thought, but its limited knowing and application by decision-makers.

Of course, most of our political thought is overwhelmed by the subject of the multiple collapses of the state, which makes it dominated by a pessimistic reflection on the fight against the overwhelming rival and its own weaknesses. akin accents are present in the thoughts of the elites of another countries that were subject to dismantling in the 20th century, specified as Yugoslavia/Serbia, Hungary, Romania and Turkey. presently Poland is seen as a medium-sized country whose main nonsubjective is to guarantee national safety by deterring Russia and a deeper link with the West. The collapse of the USSR, the emergence of the EU and the expansion of NATO led to these goals and made Poland 1 of the largest beneficiaries of the modern global order. The problem is that the current order is subject to changes that request response.

The review of Polish national safety strategies after 1989 points to respective problems in our strategical culture. Most strategies were developed in tiny teams. These papers were frequently accepted late or at the end of the Sejm term. Moreover, the papers did not make a coherent strategy and were frequently not implemented. Many times the strategy had to be implemented by a different government than the 1 that developed it.

It is worth noting that papers from the turn of the century did not say much about abroad missions then, and strategies from 2007, 2014 and 2020 rapidly became obsolete due to the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation. There was frequently a deficiency of a comprehensive imagination and an indication of how to implement the strategy. All this makes our strategy papers general and reactive. The strategies presented priorities but did not offer a coherent action plan.

What do I do?

The current transformation of the planet towards a multicentric strategy (many powers, demographics in Asia and Africa) will mean little stability. However, I bet that in a time of weakening the main powers the comparative weight of the mediate countries will increase. Their autonomy and support are essential to the weakening powers that search coalitions to push various systemic solutions internationally.

In this sense, the issue of technological competition becomes an crucial problem for the Polish state's right. For decades, the technology issue has been considered a niche problem. In history, innovation was at a low level and even a tiny military or industrial modification could find the result of battles and wars. The creation and modification of technologies are now constantly affecting the form of global competition in all dimension.

Historically, medium-sized countries have been given the chance to make in peacetime through: (1) investment in innovation, (2) transport capacity and (3) provision of financing opportunities. Another crucial conclusion is (4) the request to gain early designation of economical and technological processes. Further Polish governments should pay attention to this.

The problem of medium-tech post-peripheral countries is that they usually do not have adequate financial and R & D infrastructure. However, they can inactive improve their position through (a) improvements, (b) fresh applications of known technologies or (c) technology acquisition. This corresponds fundamentally to the alleged Schumpeter Triad, which consists of invention (the fact that offers opportunities), innovation (the application of invention) and imitation (the dissemination of innovation through diffusion). Open access to cognition allows little developed countries to adapt comparatively rapidly to technological trends by identifying and utilizing good practices. But individual has to do it.

Therefore, Poland needs to make an institution of technological diplomacy within the Ministry liable for abroad affairs, or in cooperation with another government agencies for trade, promotion and abroad investment. akin activities require the operation of peculiar services, which should grow the activity to recognise the ecosystem (institutions, companies, people, networks, ownership) of technologies critical for the improvement of the Polish economy.

Poland should monitor and support the transformation of the EU's technological sovereignty policy, which can support the availability of resources for strategical industries of the future that Poland may not get on its own. In addition, investigation and improvement institutions and the transfer of technology from discipline to socio-economic practice should be supported more financially. The nonsubjective should be to increase the responsiveness and position of local actors in global and European value networks. It is crucial to start with its region and to closely observe good practices in this area among more advanced countries.