Ukraine is an enemy country towards Poland. After the hostile, even provocative gestures of her authorities, this became apparent to almost everyone at the Vistula. I compose “almost” due to the fact that among the wise men of local farming there will always be those who must have an first opinion, even if it was manifestly absurd. We besides have many people working for abroad centres of influence, average fathers, folk philosophers and hierarchs of the Catholic Church. However, this is both quantitative and qualitative. possibly a few, possibly a twelve percent of those who declare themselves Poles.
Ukraine's hostility to Poland is not due to the wickedness of the authorities of this country, or even its citizens, or even to the cold political calculation of Zelenski and the company. It is simply a simple consequence of historical and geopolitical determinations.
The Ukrainian nation is simply a very young nation, only 150 years old. Even younger is simply a small over 30-year-old Ukrainian state. specified young nations, which form their identity in the absence of their own state, or even its equivalent, by definition enter into their genotype the thought of negation or even separatism. In the case of Ukrainians, the blade of this separatistism is directed first against Poland, second against Russia. Therefore, the full construction of Ukrainian national identity is by definition anti-Polish.
Since in the national mythology of our neighbors we have become oppressors of the oppressors, automatically those who fought us have become heroes. Even if they fought with an axe and fork with unarmed women, children and old people. Even if their actions were so palatable that the memory of them inactive gives you cold chills. The phenomenon of flagism, and so a peculiarly savage version of nationalist chauvinism, has been hanging over Ukraine since its first days.
However, it was not the only way. As the example of Croatia shows, 1 can consciously reject that part of its heritage, which is criminal. Which, apart from the standards adopted in civilised countries clearly, becomes a burden for subsequent generations. However, while modern Croats in the group cut off from the legacy of the mouth, the modern Ukrainians of the bander criminals made the historical policy of the holy martyrs. This will yet be a problem for Ukraine not only in relations with Poland, but besides with the Czech Republic, Hungary or Jews.
Kiev, deciding on the Westernisation way and rejecting, in contrast to Minsk, affirmative aspects of its east heritage, entered this way for the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. Both Americans and Germany rapidly discovered a useful tool for their east policy in the revival of Ukrainian nationalism. This gave him the essential fuel and provided an global umbrella. In fact, just to remind you, the Americans have already had any experience of working with banders, which they erstwhile considered useful, though disgusting, tool to fight the russian Union. In this situation, the natural candidate to assist in the confrontation with Russia became spiritual successors of Bandera and Shuchewycz – neo-banderists. Thus, anti-Polish flagism became a state ideology, instilled from the earliest years to the next generations of Ukrainians.
This was easier for decision-makers in Kiev, due to the fact that Poland was initially completely passive. Currently, erstwhile passive she stopped, Ukraine is no longer needed for anything. We have given the Ukrainians all surplus military resources, and even a large part of the resources essential to guarantee the minimum safety of our country. We have besides achieved a limit on the possibilities of economical support for Ukraine, resulting from the size and dynamics of our economy.
However brutal it may sound, the Ukrainians were grateful to us as long as we were essential or useful to them. They are presently looking for new, more powerful protectors who could guarantee the endurance of Ukraine in its current mafia-oligarchy form. Germany remains the only viable candidate for this function in view of the withdrawal of Trumpist America. However, what is an apparent political interest for Ukraine can be a deadly threat to Poland.
Thirdly, Ukraine is simply a powerful economical competitor for Poland. An example of Ukrainian assertiveness in these cases was the conflict over Ukrainian agricultural fetuses flooding the Polish marketplace and bringing to ruin Polish farmers. This conflict was a foretaste of Ukraine's possible membership of the European Union.
Kiev's membership in European structures, if it comes to it, will by all means be detrimental to Poland. Apart from the apparent economical aspects, political factors are decisive here. Deprived of the anticipation of membership of NATO Ukraine, being a associate of the European Union, will strive to make this creation as federalised as possible. The European superstate would, from the point of view of Ukraine, be equivalent to non-membership of the collective safety system. However, this is clearly contrary to the interest of Poland, which, together with Italy, Spain and the smaller countries of Central and confederate Europe, should aim to limit the expansion of Brussels' competences towards national governments.
The aspects of geopolitical antagonism between Ukraine and Poland can be multiplied. However, the conclusion is important. Poland and Ukraine are doomed: if not to open hostility, then to fierce, unparadoxed competition, in which there will be no area for mercy and sentiment. This is not the responsibility of any peculiar vileness or fierceness on the Ukrainian side. It is determined by geopolitics, richly seasoned history.
That's a terrible message. If it were only about any ideology or whim of ruling politicians, 1 could hope to make comparatively good neighbourly relations between Poland and Ukraine over time. However, erstwhile the attitude of antagonism is determined by nonsubjective factors, there is no chance.
So, contrary to the spells we have heard since the beginning of the present war, the existence of a strong Ukraine, or even Ukraine in general, is not in the interest of the state and the Polish people. It is time to realize this and accept the consequences of this apparent consensus. Unless we like to bask in absurd fumes of post-giedroycism, messianism and prometeism. Unless we truly hatred Russia more than we love Poland. We care more about the defeat of our imaginary enemy than the welfare and prosperity of our children and our grandchildren. If so, woe to us, for then our defeat is inevitable.
Przemysław Piasta
