Polish Armed Forces – inactive unspoken history

Jerzy Kirszak: It could be that Poland, not only would lose land in the east, would not receive lands in the west, granted as alleged compensation, due to the fact that since we are faithful allies, we do not deserve anything. Here is simply a akin communicative with the Warsaw Uprising – what if it had won? What if there was a plan for the office to defy the entering Red Army? Then there's water on the russian propaganda mill that the National Army is fascists.

The debate was attended, from the right: Anna Putkiewicz, editor of the quarterly “Army Poland. History"; Robert Sendek, editor of the quarterly "Army Poland. History"; Juliusz S. Tym, historian of ASW; Jacek Tebinka, historian and political scientist; Jerzy Kirszak, PhD, worker of IPN and WBH; Piotr Korczyński, editor of the quarterly "Army Poland. History", photograph by Michał Niwicz

Jacek TebinkaThat's right. Colonel Tem clearly said: the military does not discuss, the army follows orders. In February 1945 we already have in London the coalition government of Tomasz Arciszewski, who is the government of the protest against Yalta – from which little, unfortunately, results. At the political level, this government has not considered the anticipation that we will abruptly stay neutral and halt fighting. This was not at the command level either; even General Anders, who, from Sikorski's point of view, could be accused of any politicism, met Churchill and in the Polish version of this conversation is attributed to Churchill, he is not in English: "You can take your divisions, we do not request them." On this basis, however, I would not build besides far-reaching theories about Churchill's hostility to Anders, they actually liked each other. Anders' anti-Sovietism enjoyed Churchill very much, although Churchill had a completely different policy, consistent with what he perceived as a British business. Indeed, in February 1945 the Italian front without the 2nd Corps would make a major problem, due to the fact that the human resources of the Allied, although part of the Western coalition were the United States, were very limited. Removing 2nd Corps soldiers would be very embarrassing. However, it was not seriously considered by the Polish government, nor by the Polish commanders, regardless of the fact that the moods in the 2nd Corps were very bad – due to the fact that these people faced a ghost of losing their homeland. Another thing is that this first shock among soldiers who did not know the situation was caused not by Yalta itself, but by Churchill's speech in the home of Commons in 1944. And here, as Colonel Tym pointed out, these troops would be disarmed so that we wouldn't start fighting the Americans or the British, which would be a complete absurdity and water on the russian mill, that I would usage that word from the Peerel propaganda. Let us remind that specified an incidental with the Greek brigade occurred in the mediate East, where there were strong anti-monarchist and leftist tendencies. any of this unit refused to fight under the emigration authorities. The British disarmed her, there were armed incidents, there were dozens killed. Thus, from the point of view of the Polish case (although acquisitions in the west, and the British and Americans have lost their desire to support them especially in Potsdam) it would be suicide.

Airmen of Polish Division 303 watch the remains of the shot down German aircraft Ju 88. On the right visible Spitfire fighter Jan Zumbach, 1941, photograph by NAC

Julius S.: 1 crucial thing to mention here: we are talking about the circumstances of February 1945, but a year earlier, in the spring of 1944, we have a situation in the British Isles that more than 200 soldiers, most of them Jewish, but besides those professing Orthodoxy – Ukrainians, Belarusians – are deserting from the 1st Armoured Division, but besides from the 1st Parade Brigade. This is the consequence of a kind of provocation carried out by russian peculiar services in order to show allies, but besides public opinion around the world, that the Polish Armed Forces do not want to fight. A serious problem was that the Government of Poland could not respond properly, due to the fact that this issue besides became the subject of an interpelling in the British home of Commons. There is rich documentation available in publications, and I besides reached the protocols of the British War Council, which show that the highest British commanders knew that this was a provocation of russian peculiar services. However, our government was incapable to build an effective strategical communication tool throughout planet War II. We did not know how to break with the Polish state ration to the planet public. The problem was besides addressed by the Polish Armed Forces, due to the fact that we were incapable to “sell” the biggest victories of the Polish weapon – especially in the Italian campaign, that is, both Monte Cassino and the capture of Ancona, which was the only independent operation of the 2nd Corps. This besides applies to the battles of General Maczek's 1st Armoured Division.

Jerzy Kirszak: I would like to draw attention to 1 more fact: the fact that we were incapable to show ourselves pegably, is besides due to the interior dispute existing in the highest Polish authorities on emigration and the rivalry of the military camp, represented by the Chief Command with General Sosnkowski, and the government of Stanisław Mikołajczyk. If 2 institutions and 2 leaders have completely different visions of how policies should be pursued towards the Soviets and towards the Allied, then aliens only win on it. Another thing is that erstwhile it comes to the press, and the press was the main origin of information at the time, the British newspapers are incredibly unfavorable. Among the journalists there is simply a russian agent, Stefan Litauer...

Jacek Tebinka: As for the press, I would not agree here – due to the fact that it depends: when, what newspapers, what matters. As for the judaic and Orthodox deserters, the British press was very sensitive. I don't think I would have agreed with you that we were so bad at public relations – I think we can look from a different angle. I have the impression that even the best of our efforts to solve the Polish case could not aid in the context of the assumptions of the British strategy and American inactivity between 1944 and 1945. However, let us note the crucial thing: in the consciousness of British society from generations of war – it was Polish soldiers, pilots and sailors who always remained allies. And besides British journalists of these generations, actually after the 1970s and 1980s, did not compose nonsense, did not make specified mistakes and did not forget about the Polish Armed Forces, writing about various aspects of planet War II, as it is today. Besides, I wouldn't attribute it to any special, hidden purposes, but simply complete ignorance. On the another hand, the war and post-war generation of average people and writing about planet War II alternatively remembered this. That does not mean that we will not find any popular discipline book, to which we will stick and say that individual wrote something incorrect about the Polish Armed Forces or even kept quiet.

Chief General Władysław Sikorski says goodbye to the Independent firearm Brigade of Podhale before her departure to Norway on 21 April 1940, photograph NAC

Robert Sendek: I am curious in a question that may sound a small provocative, so I would like to ask you to comment. prof. Tebinka mentioned that the Government of Poland on emigration was a government without territory. This means that it was a government without demographic background, but besides without method background in the form of military equipment for its troops. On the another hand, as more allies joined the war over time, especially the russian Union, then the United States, changed the position of Poland and Polish Armed Forces in Allied arrangements. So have they not at any point become a mediocre relative, a petent who asks his allies for method support? If you read reports about Polish efforts, for example, about bomb planes that could fly to Poland with drops, then this does not look peculiarly optimistic.

Jacek Tebinka: In no way would I usage the word “poor relative”. Let us remember that especially during the first period, but besides – as colleagues have already said – we were needed practically throughout planet War II as part of the alliance. all soldier was a goldweight. We mentioned pilots or crews of warships – their value as specialists was invaluable. In turn, our complaints about the velocity of recruiting troops were not due to any deliberate or hidden policy of Western allies, but simply to hardware issues. You mentioned the case of four-engine aircraft to fly to the country with discharges – prof. Anna Zapalec and I late published a book about Poland in a British strategy to support opposition movements, and it follows from our findings that the problems were simply a consequence of the fact that these machines in 1942 were besides lacking in tasks that were much more important, namely to bomb Germany and the conflict of the Atlantic. The drops to the country paradoxically moved on a larger scale at the minute erstwhile British politics were, from our point of view, the most yielding on the Polish issue, that is, after Churchill's speech in February 1944. The British Prime Minister continued to believe that his concept to force Poles to surrender the east Borders and decision Poland west at the expense of Germany and to reestablish diplomatic relations between Moscow and the Polish Government would give Poland independence. It turns out that this strategy has failed. Churchill saw it besides late, due to the fact that in May 1945. But one more time the answer: no, I think that if, in this context, we can talk alternatively of the French period: the French were very slow, everything was alternatively done by the prism of how planet War I was waged erstwhile preparations lasted for months.

Julius S.: As far as method issues are concerned, I would stress that we have passed on any interesting patents to the British. For example, Gundlach's periscope, which was a pre-war construction, but above all a mine detector, which the full British army utilized on all fronts of the war – this is simply a Polish detector, constructed by Polish engineers. The Polish Armed Forces had the Military method Institute, where fresh equipment was developed, sometimes large-scale inventions. Its primary task, on the another hand, was to familiarize the method staff, which was concentrated there, with how the modern state functions with advanced method culture.

The debate was organised in cooperation with the Warsaw garrison command.