The celebration of independency is like a proposal to dance barefoot, to which the answer of the bride from the Wyspiański drama is not heard: "she is to be in shoes at the wedding".
To answer the question of whether it is worth celebrating independency Day, 1 cannot avoid a polemic with an excellent historian Prof. Lech Mażewski, which at work „Poland as a junior partner? Sketches about Polish politics from the election of Stanisław August until the fall of the Polish People's Republic" formulated the following thesis: Talking about the essential importance of the legion act in order to regain independency by Poland shows features of the same mythism as the claim that this “Solidarity” overturned communism and regained independency for Poland. The emergence of a geopolitical vacuum in our part of Europe – which was the consequence of the First planet War – in the late 1980s. It first resulted in the resignation of the USSR from the European conquests of the Second planet War and then the dissolution of the east Empire without which there would be no independency of Poland.
Unless “Solidarity” has truly refuted anything, there is no way to agree that in Poland A.D. 1989 any geopolitical vacuum was created. The situations compared by Mażewski with 1918 and 1989 are not at all analogous. After the First planet War there was indeed a political vacuum in Poland, due to the fact that both Russia and Germany fell into decline, let alone Austro-Hungary, which fell apart. Both Germany and Russia were not active in shaping the Universal Order. Russia did not sign the Treaty of Versailles at all, but Germany was forced to do so by the victorious Allies. These circumstances allowed the reconstruction of an independent Polish state and without the usage of armed forces. It is essential to agree with the thesis of a prominent historian that it is hard to consider legion story as such. Of course, the order was created without the participation of the 2 possibly strongest European countries from the beginning, and questioned its sustainability. This uncertainty existed until the outbreak of planet War II.
Nothing like this happened at the end of the Polish People's Republic. Is it possible to make a geopolitical vacuum in the bipolar strategy that lasted until 1989 without the simultaneous collapse of both political blocks? As long as the russian Union and the full east bloc were dissolved, the Western bloc not only did not fall apart but strengthened. GDR leaving the russian sphere of influence was attached to the West Germany, expanding the overall possible of Germany and thus the United States as a consequence of the existence of a bipolar system. The American impact region thanks to the unification of Germany was greatly enlarged by both the area and the force of the influence, not to mention the leap in comparative power of the United States as a consequence of the collapse of the geopolitical rival block.
"From the end of the Second planet War to the end of the Cold War, the United States has consistently pursued a policy of hard balancing towards the USSR, bearing spectacular success" (John J. Mearsheimer, "Tragism of Powers Politics", 2019, p. 394). In this situation, it is hard to recognise a geopolitical vacuum. Poland changed only hegemon, which was sealed in the following years by Poland's entry into NATO and the European Union. In 1918, however, we faced a distorted multipolarity which produced a geopolitical vacuum diagnosed by Mażewski in central Europe (ibid., p. 422).
The situation described is no exception, but on the contrary, the past of Poland fits perfectly, as long as we look at it through the prism of appropriate political theory. By a “appropriate theory” I mean the most akin to the actual global policy of offensive realism, represented by Mearsheimer, quoted above. Unlike its competitors, i.e. the various ointments of "civilizationisms", e.g. liberalism or institutionalism, and classical realism and defensive realism, it is internally consistent and is well consistent with facts. According to offensive realists, the anarchical structure of the global strategy pushes the states to maximize power as it gives the best chance of endurance (security). Classical realism, the constant pursuit of power, sees in human nature, which does not explain many of the policies actually implemented, e.g. shifting work or maintaining the position quo. Defensive realism assuming that the structure of the global strategy (force system) is not conducive to gaining power, incapable to explain the reasons for wars, explaining them deficiency of political orientation.
Theories placing emphasis on the civilisational nature of conflicts, specified as liberalism, are not worth any consideration due to their incompatibility with facts. For any reason, the strategy of the state, or the civilization that organizes it, does not explain global politics, whether it attributes itself to militant or peaceful character. For both peaceful civilizations lead wars (often within themselves) and militants contain peace (even between civilizations). The origin of wars is seemingly in an global game of business alternatively than ideology.
Although this fact is historically highly obvious, it is notoriously contested. A typical example may be the thesis of supposedly spiritual nature of wars. This should be considered a average symptom of the power of social standards: if they did not have it, they would not be able to function. Mearsheimer notes: “The basic message – that in the well-understood interest of all country is the selfish pursuit of power – does not kidnap crowds. It is hard to imagine a leader who would openly appeal to his citizens to fight and die for changing the balance of power in his favour. No European or American leader has made specified an appeal either during planet wars or throughout the Cold War. Most people like to see conflicts between their own homeland and another countries as conflicts between good and evil, in which they stand on their own side of angels, while their enemies are allies of the devil" (ibid., p. 30).
Polish thought propaganda
Poles are a case of a nation highly susceptible to the perception of politics by glasses of perfect propaganda. I compose about propaganda on purpose, not ethics. There are various ethics, including Catholic one, and in it there is no Protestant opposition to the ethics of convictions and the ethics of responsibility, used, for example, by Mażewski quoted at the outset, to an appropriate analysis of the flaws of Polish politics ("Poland as a junior partner?", p. 5). The problem of Poles is the tradition of having irrational convictions, not just having convictions, which are affirmative and essential. Convincing offensive realism is not contrary to Catholic doctrine, but to Catholic heresy, called Pelagianism, or the thesis of the natural goodness of man, which destroys the request for grace. According to the Catholic dogma, the planet that rejects the grace of Jesus Christ passed on in the Church will look just as described by offensive realism. It will be ruled by a ruthless realpolitik. At the same time, Catholic religion considers itself to be (only) a origin of peace alternatively than a origin of war, which is besides consistent with the optics of offensive realism, in which no ideology (and so Catholic) explains the origin of wars. A reasonably common recognition of Catholicism with Pelagianism is 1 of the alien raids The enlightenment that we have faced.
After ethical “disarmament” of offensive realism, we can test his thesis on the political past of Poland, obtaining an highly clear picture. It is consistent with the realistic stream of Polish historiography that remains in the minority. In view of the fact that realism contradicts the anticipation of achieving planet hegemony, bipolar systems are considered: balanced and unstable (very rare) and multipolar systems are besides in a balanced and distorted version. "Multipolar systems aim for imbalance, and bipolar systems search balance, for 1 reason. The more powers the disparity in wealth and population, or the foundations of military powers, is more likely" (i.e., p. 408).
In general, in Europe, we are dealing with unsustainable multipolarism through a large number of wars and periodic geopolitical deserts. 1 specified hermit created after the Mongol invasion of Russia in the 13th century utilized Poland to conclude a union with Lithuania. By thus entering into conflict with Moscow, she unsuccessfully tried to bring her order to the East in the 16th and 17th centuries. Since the end of the Northern War (1700-1721), the full Republic of Both Nations has become an area of Russian hegemony. At the same time, with the European strategy striving for a multipolar balance, the failure of Polish political decision-makers, who inactive think in unrealistic categories of powers, incapable to find themselves in the politics of the dependent state. Consequently, Prussia manages to break Russian guarantees of territorial integrity of Poland, leading to 3 partitions.
The partitions seal a strategy of multipolar balance in Central Europe, which Poles unsuccessfully effort to break uprisings. The uprisings affect irrational Messianic-instructive ideology, which, as Realism teaches, is politically useless. The various periods are as follows: "1) Napoleonic Age I, 1792-1793 (one year), sustainable multipolarity; 2) Napoleonic Age II, 1793-1815 (22 years), distorted multipolarity; 3) 19th century, 1815-1902 (88 years), balanced multipolarity; 4) The Age of the German Empire, 1903-1918 (16 years), wobbly multipolarity; 5) Interwar period, 1919-1938 (20 years), balanced multipolarity, 6) Nazi Age Germany, 1939-1945 (6 years), wobbly multipolarity; 7) Cold War, 1945-1990 (46 years), bipolarity". (John J. Mearsheimer, "Policy Tragism ...", p. 416). It is clear that the various forms of Polish statehood (Warsaw Duchy, the Kingdom of Poland, II of Poland) are subject to periods of distortion of multipolarity.
PRL and Cold War
The fresh quality comes from the period after 1945, as it is not yet bipolar. "There is no uncertainty that the rivalry of the powers occasionally brings a unchangeable global order, as evidenced by the past of the Cold War. Nevertheless, all empire is constantly searching for ways to increase its comparative power and is ready to take advantage of opportunities, even if this is associated with undermining the existing order. In the 1980s, the United States tried in all way to weaken the USSR and to overthrow the unchangeable global order that developed in the late Cold War" (ibid., p.63).
The Cold War Order thus showed a tendency towards bipolar disorder, which the editor concluded Mateusz Piskorski likes to call it "unipolar moment". "The United States is the only regional hegemon in the past of the last 200 years" (ibid., p. 435). The concept of a regional hegemon can be explained as follows: "The reason why the United States can keep military forces around the planet and interfere with the policy of virtually all region is that they are safe in the Western hemisphere" (ibid., p. 434).
If known words Halford John Mackinder"He who reigns in east Europe is in control of the heart of Eurasia. Those who control the heart of Eurasian regulation the island of the world. If you control the world's island, you will control the world." ("Democratic Ideas and Reality", 1919) we will combine with Mearsheimer's regional hegemony of the United States with the Brzeziński doctrine. Since Brzeziński's doctrine could not be implemented in east Europe by military means, it focused on the information war.
Zbigniew Brzeziński in a secret paper presented on 17 March 1978 to U.S. president J. Carter "suggested replacing the current defensive strategy towards the USSR and another east European countries with a fresh offensive strategy" (J. Kossecki, "The influence of the full information war on the past of the PRL", 1999, pp. 8.2). Since 1 of the variants recommended by Brzeziński coincided with later actual events, it can be assumed that the mass protests in the Polish People's Republic with the alleged "Solidarity" carnival at the head were nothing but "colour revolutions" led by American peculiar services. This is very likely erstwhile it is considered that earlier strategies called "defensive" by Brzeziński included operations specified as "Splinter Factor". This largest American intelligence action after planet War II caused dozens of spectacular political processes.
In Poland, the consequence was, among another things, arrest Władysław Gomulka made personally by Joseph Light, Vice president of the Xth Department of the Ministry of the Interior, celebrated for his escape to the West and performances on the radio "Free Europe". "Light was a double agent – he worked for secret russian services and for American intelligence – so his escape could have taken place for the cognition of both secret services. Given that the Light had already worked for the CIA much earlier and participated in Operation Splinter origin controlled by A. Dulles himself, which resulted in the massacre of Communist executives in east Europe, it can be concluded that the russian counterintelligence was not known to its second bottom, and so the full control of its full activities had American intelligence" (ibid., pp. 6.1).
Against the myths spread in Polish literature (e.g. by Józef Mackiewicz in: “Watakan in the shadow of a red star”) The Americans had a decisive advantage from the beginning in the information war over the russian bloc. Marxists rejected psychology, cybernetics, and another disciplines as “the bourgeois sciences”, in advance condemned their staff and methods of acting on disability. As a result, the adherence of communist propaganda was evident. In satellite countries specified as the Polish People's Republic, information services did not make information-evaluating cells (nota bene is the same in the 3rd Republic of Poland!). Political decision-makers did not have the right situational awareness, which made them easier to control. Unfortunately, this besides increased their vulnerability to manipulation by abroad information services, which, of course, took advantage of opportunities.
For example, it was typical for the CIA to place the main agentry in the party-state apparatus alternatively than in the underground and opposition, which did not substance much beyond the distraction and “muddle” of the information services of the PRL. The situation changed only with the financing of ‘Solidarity’, the NRA- u and another opposition organisations, which active the aforementioned offensive policy of Brzeziński, referred to Carter. If we add to this a clear economical dependence on the West (e.g. credits or licenses) we will get an outline of the ways utilized to overthrow the Cold War order, as quoted by Mearsheimer.
Simulating independency
In specified a situation it is in no way possible to talk about any independency gained by Poland as a consequence of the dissolution of the east bloc and the USSR itself. Rather, we are dealing with an advanced information operation that simulates independency by identifying it with the interests of the Atlantic West. Over the last 30 years, it has been hard to find an crucial issue (privatization, Washington Consensus, German unification, EU integration, east politics, Belarus, Iraq, Afghanistan, war in Ukraine, justice mechanism, green transformation, multipolarity, BRICS, etc.) in which Poland would have a different opinion than the West. Information services of the III Republic, as well as PRL services, and unlike services of the II Republic, do not have cells evaluating information. Therefore, the decision-makers' awareness of the situation leaves much to be desired, which public statements by Polish politicians are a sad proof.
The situation resembles the times of the First Republic after the Northern War. At that time Polish decision-makers besides did not display situational awareness and inactive thought in nonexistent, powerful categories. The fact that there is simply a parliament, government, constitution and military does not prove independence. The Polish Kingdom of 1815-1830 had specified attributes without being a sovereign state. The elites of the time, however, with this awareness, could have advocated repair programs. present Poland is simply a western colony. It could regain sovereignty by managing a possible vacuum created in the event of the EU's simultaneous disintegration, the withdrawal of the US from Europe and Russia's comparative weakness before the balance of the fresh multipolar strategy in Europe could develop.
Vladimir Kowalik
Think Poland, No. 49-50 (1-8.12.2024)