The president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenski determines the full number of soldiers and uniformed officers taking part in the defence of Ukraine for about 880 thousand, of which it is estimated that there are about 600 1000 soldiers on the ground forces alone.[1]. To rotate people who in many cases have been fighting for more than 2 years, the Kiev administration has announced a mobilization that can cover up to half a million people. On the Russian side, there is simply a process of expanding the army's numbers, which had more than 900 1000 soldiers before the conflict. Russian defence minister Sergei Szojgu announced the formation of 2 fresh armies by the end of 2024, which will require a minimum of 150 000 soldiers.
In Ukraine, on both sides, more than 1 million soldiers are presently fighting, supported by full state apparatus, and not only by countries straight active in the conflict. Nothing like a imagination of a limited war waged by tiny professional armies. Instead, we are dealing with a large-scale symmetrical armed conflict. It lasted not 2 weeks, but more than 2 years (the war has been in fact since 2014, but until 2022 it was a very limited territorial clash, as well as the way the fighting and the means utilized for it).
Why does the scale of military action and the commitment of states match those of both planet wars alternatively than limited military operations? due to the fact that reasonably equal opponents entered the fight, and the stakes are to beat a large state, not just occupy a part of territory or force a circumstantial political compromise.
The Ukrainian army at the time of the Russian strike of February 24, 2022 had about a 4th million soldiers. The Russians attacked with twice as many forces. So already at the beginning of the invasion of the field nearly 400,000 people were exhibited on both sides.
Currently, about 3 times as many are fighting. And it is clear that the forces active by the Russians in Ukraine are not able to handle all directions, which is why the front was restricted to the southeast part of Ukraine. Could it be predicted that a possible war between 2 large countries would be fought on specified a scale?
Of course I do. Let us remind you that, even though frequently considered "limited" operations by the United States against weaker ones: Iraq or the Taliban in Afghanistan besides required hundreds of thousands of soldiers and dense equipment. To defeat Saddam Hussein the Americans utilized force of 150,000 people who were supported by a powerful state apparatus and another tens of thousands of people active in the US or stationed elsewhere on Earth. During the 2009 occupation, 144,000 soldiers were stationed in Iraq[2].
When the Taliban – after respective years of invasion – conducted a counteroffensive in Afghanistan in 2009, only the Americans themselves had to increase their combat component in this country to nearly 100,000 soldiers. Let us remind that we compose here about asymmetric conflicts in which the US had a overwhelming technological, hardware, as well as war culture.
With specified a clear disparity of possible in their favor, the United States needed tremendous forces and resources to take control of the enemy's territory (which in Afghanistan never truly worked).
It was clear, therefore, that in the case of a possible symmetrical armed conflict aimed at beating the full state, the scale of engagement and effort of the aggressor's army must be much greater. If so, the defender should besides prepare for an opponent attacking with full possible and capable of conducting a conflict for a long time. This thesis was confirmed in the war in Ukraine. The Russians, who did not anticipate Ukrainian resistance, utilized forces numerically comparable to those utilized by the Americans in Iraq. As a result, they received a painful lesson, after which they multiplied their engagement in theatre activities, while shortening the front lines.
The war enters a phase in which the front is maintained on both sides thanks to people incorporated into the army or mobilized after the invasion. Truism that wars begin professional armies, but it is the reservists who finish them besides finds confirmation here.
Despite all these facts, in Poland we are inactive dealing with the debate on whether we should reconstruct the intake. In another words, should we train individual reserves for conflict time? specified discussions are not only many years late – although it is fair to point out that experts have long pointed out a systemic gap in the absence of an alternate to the collection – but in fact they should be considered without object.
The Polish State and society should take care of decently trained, reserve human resources for the needs of the Polish Army during the war. Without this, it may not be possible to conduct a conflict for more than a fewer weeks. And if that's the case, then the conscious opponent will be more likely to attack. Especially erstwhile he has in turn prepared reserves, industry, army and the full state to lead a long-term conflict. Without reserves and adequate army size, the Polish Armed Forces will not accomplish the appropriate level of deterrence. Meanwhile, the main task of the army is to prevent the outbreak of a defensive war.
In another words – and this is an argument for those who are afraid to take an oath due to the fact that they would possibly gotta fight first – If the society does not exposure the appropriate army and reserves and does not deter the aggressor with military possible and besides a willingness to resist, then the hazard that civilians (i.e. even those who did not swear) They will gotta fight the aggressor's troops is much higher. Higher than if the same civilians were trained, swore an oath and became part of the armed forces' potential.
This completely apparent to military and defence specialists must have sounded here. The request to train reserves is absolutely essential for Poland and there is nothing to debate here. Poland has been in permanent danger of armed conflict for hundreds of years, which has ceased to be comparatively short. Therefore, it is not appropriate to ask ‘if’ but ‘JAK’ to rebuild the strategy of reserve training.
One should besides be aware that with about 300 1000 armies created for peace, during the war the military must have reserves of another 300-400 1000 people. Just to rotate and replenish the losses on the front. Although the truly optimal and mark model should be 1 in which part of the reserves complement the units already existing in the skeleton. So that armed forces can increase their possible during conflict by respective additional, developed tactical or even operational unions (e.g. divisions or corps). In specified a variant the reserves would should be even respective times larger than the army's numbers during peacetime. This is what we have today. The problem is that these hundreds of thousands of people from the old reserve strategy trained are just getting older. fresh recruits are not trained to replace them. There's a 16-year gap on this plane that keeps expanding.
If we request trained reserves, do we request a draft?
In Poland, the training of reserves was carried out through the general military conscription conducted as part of the essential military service. The work to do specified a service was imposed on men aged 19 or older who had not previously performed the ISC and qualified for the service in accordance with the medical category. The last draft was held in 2008, and since 2009 this mechanics has been suspended. After this date, men gathering age and wellness conditions (the drug category.) were moved to the reserve without training after medical examination.
In another words, since 2009, Poland has no longer trained reservists. As a result, the youngest trained reservists are present aged around 34-35. However, these – in reserves – are the least. Theoretically – due to the fact that these data are classified – we have the largest reserve resource among 50-year-olds who in a fewer years (max. decade) will “come out” of the strategy in general (theoretically they will be 60-year-olds, but... No jokes).
It should besides be remembered that, although the reserve exercises have late been increased, there are in large part people who have not had refreshed military cognition and practice. In addition, many reserveists are outside Poland (emigration) and bringing them to Poland on time “W” would be problematic, if not impossible.
The last and possibly most crucial problem is that after the suspension of the universal collection, the training facilities for the reserves were liquidated. A large part of military property (cosherons, infrastructure, land) was sold out and the professionalization of staff and structures was besides carried out.
So, Even if, from tomorrow, the Polish Armed Forces would not be able to: accept, equip, accommodate, or train all of 1 fresh year under the work to hold the ZSW. And that, despite the fact that we are presently dealing with demographic decline. It is worth remembering that, for the time being, we ignore issues related to socio-economic conditions, which would besides – and possibly above all – pose a challenge.
Almost 390 1000 children were born in Poland in 2007. Even if only men of the same year were recruited, the army would should be able to train about 150 000 people per year (if not all would qualify). Let us remind that this number corresponds to the Russian spring draft of 2023. About as many people of the Kremlin are going to be included in the draft besides this year. We are writing here about a country that has been at war for 2 years and is rapidly expanding administrative and training infrastructure into successive draft and mobilized waves...
It is so apparent that even if the general military conscription was acceptable in Poland in economical and social terms, it is simply impossible to reconstruct it for this moment. This requires billions of investment and years of infrastructure, as well as the improvement and training of staff to train reservists.
So the question is, if not the draft, then what?
OBLIGATIVE TRAINING OF THE WAR RESERVE
Even if the restoration of the collection was technically feasible, the formerly utilized expression of universal collection would be completely inadequate to modern socio-economic realities. It would be burdensome and socially unacceptable to pull a citizen out of the socio-economic strategy for a year, for example.
Therefore, solutions should be sought to guarantee training of military reserves, but which would not affect introducing a totalitarian model. 1 that would not be based on violent coercion, alternatively based on a motivational system. It is simply a model that would increase public awareness and a sense of civic duty, not increase opposition against state apparatus.
So 3 factors are important. The fresh reserve training strategy should be based on incentive solutions,At the same time, it cannot be besides burdensome in the context of private and professional life for citizens. All this on the presumption that training work must be universal. Is specified a model even possible? Yes. Moreover, systems with these values (university/motivity/low nuisance) work in our realities. All you gotta do is see them and put them in place for the military.
Basic military training [I ETAP]
There are many training systems covering almost all Polish citizens, from which solutions could be transferred to the military plane. 1 specified strategy is related to the creation of the Law of Driving. The exam is state-owned and carried out at the Road Traffic Centres. On the another hand, all training in this strategy was transferred to the private sector. This means that the state does not gotta keep a immense administrative and training apparatus. This solution works due to the fact that hundreds of thousands of fresh drivers come out of this strategy all year. For example, in 2020, nearly 300 000 fresh drivers were issued (and a full of 750 000).
The proposed solution to training military reserves would imply State military examinations for the full year. The examination could consist of 2 parts: theoretical (universal law tests and regulations) and practical.
The theoretical part of the conscription should be trained by itself, having cognition of the scope of the material. In turn to the applicable part, a individual would gotta take courses from e.g. a drill, the handling and maintenance of individual weapons, the acquisition of shooting skills, etc. specified courses could be organised by private entities in the form of nurseries, shooting wheels, etc., but besides selected military units (including WOT) utilizing their current infrastructure (shooters, instructors).
This would stimulate the private sector, as well as the retired military. Especially those who are not utilized in any way by the army, and who could share experience and knowledge, and by the way make extra money. Allowing courses in the private sector would relieve the resources of Si Armoured Republic of Poland, which are presently utilized for fast improvement of the professional army, WOT and voluntary essential military service (as part of expanding the number and building fresh tactical unions).
The course would should be refinanced by the State (one-off, so that after failing the exam, the recruit will bear its own later costs). With which it should apply age limit for refundand, i.e. it could be possible for people up to, for example, 20 years old.
Thus, the course and the state examination from basic military training would include a reasonably narrow and very basic scope of cognition and skills. Consequently, courses could be short, and an exam would not require months of preparation. However, after specified a basic exam, a citizen would be acquainted with the law, would know military structures and regulations, and would at the same time get basic skills in the usage of basic equipment and individual weapons of a soldier.
Law or duty?
Graduation from basic military training should be compulsory for all men. Women could usage this option, but if they did not want to, then they would gotta undergo basic civilian protection training (+ first aid). Civil protection and first aid exams would besides should be passed by those who, for various reasons (e.g. health) were exempted from the military examination.
Thanks to specified a system, Polish society would get basic cognition and skills which would later be easier to develop. At the same time, the introduction of examinations would aim to build public awareness of rights, but besides the obligations of the citizen. form the right attitude. A military or civilian defence examination could be a circumstantial examination of civic maturity.
At the same time, cognition of weapons and military rules could be an additional incentive to enter military service. Basic military training exams could be 1 of the stages of recruitment.
Force or motivation?
If we consider that military training, as basic as described above, should be compulsory, what sanctions should be imposed on a citizen who would not pass the above-mentioned exam at the prescribed age?
In this respect, the incentive strategy should be considered alternatively than the prison system. It is not about putting young people in prison, it is about wanting them to pass these trainings and exams. In this respect, consideration could be given making the anticipation of obtaining peculiar privileges dependent on the issue of basic military training or civilian protection. Thus, without the following examinations, a citizen could not, for example:
- Take higher education at the expense of the state,
- Collect selected social benefits,
- Take advantage of selected taxation credits,
- Become employed in public institutions.
Such a list could be wider, and it would not necessarily gotta take into account the above-mentioned proposals. This is about identifying the incentive mechanism.
It is worth recalling that if individual had not chosen to take compulsory courses and take the exams and turned 20, he would not only have lost the above-mentioned privileges for the period up to the regulation of the obligation, but would have definitely been entitled to refinance the basic course costs.
Target solution or temporary solution?
It is clear that the requirements for the conduct of modern war are much higher than those associated with the cognition of law and regulations, the drills or the ability to undress and the deposit of Kalashnikov. Nevertheless, this kind of basis should be known by all soldier and reservist. And to get this kind of skills, you do not request an extended administrative and training apparatus.
However, it should be remembered that – as in the case of the Law of Driving – the exam alone without continuous practice will not do anything. Reservoirs must keep contact with the military otherwise cognition and skills will be forgotten.
Therefore, the SZ of the Polish Republic should rebuild training facilities so that they can decision to training reserves in the right number as shortly as possible. In time, all persons who have passed the basic military training exam could receive appropriate specialist training – as part of the second phase of training. According to military assignments and according to his qualifications acquired in civilians.
Profiling reserve soldiers
It is worth noting that the advantage of this two-stage solution is the fact that, while in the case of 18-19-year-olds we are frequently dealing with a "pure card", the army could already get information about the possible of a given reservist. Thanks to this, IT would not gotta undergo training in a mechanized unit and drive a BWP. Instead, The Polish Armed Forces would delegate reservists to units and tasks compatible with their possible and skills. This would make it possible to manage human resources and their capabilities more optimally.
The Polish SZ could besides make a full database related to the profiling of reservists. In specified a system, even a reserve part of the army would be mostly made up of de facto professionals (in their fields of “civility”). Of qualifications sometimes comparable or even higher as in the case of professional soldiers.
People working as professional truck drivers would be directed to driving tasks, logistics managers, cyber-military IT specialists, radio operators, etc. This would further reduce the cost of training reservists.
Specialist military training [II ETAP]
Thus, the erstwhile essential military service could be converted to multi-stage system, in which the State would bear the minimum costs at first (example from basic training or civilian protection). In the first years of operation of the MON would have had time to make training infrastructure. At the same time, reservists would gain time to focus on the profession and the army would gain time to learn about the possible of the reservist. This would not be allocated until the second phase of specialist training.
This could take place for example during vacation periods in college or after graduating from higher education. For those who would not have chosen to proceed education and would have started working earlier, the allocation and the second phase of training could have taken place earlier. It would be worth giving citizens a choice erstwhile it comes to the minute and form of training. E.g. specify that a reservist after the basic examination should complete specialist military training until he reaches the age of 24. If he had not done so, he would have been subject to compulsory universal recruitment. So that at the time he turned 25 he would have completed both stages of training. At the same time, we should besides think about those who failed the basic exam and did not receive specialist training until they were 25. If they wanted to regain their rights to the lost privileges, they would gotta take their own course and exam from the first stage, and possibly in any part cover the costs of specialist training (another motivation to opt for training at a certain age).
Thanks to the introduction of the time frame (4-5 years to regulate the second phase of military training), the first wave of reservists intended for training would be somewhat diluted, thus enabling the administrative and training apparatus to have a chance of little painful absorption of reservists.
To make the training process as least burdensome for society and the economy, The second phase of specialized classes could be divided into respective courses lasting for example 1-3 months. It is clear that the modern battlefield requires more specialized and frequently complicated tools. Which can prolong the time essential to decently qualify a soldier. On the another hand, the recruitment for e.g. yearly training could be very burdensome for those working or learning. Hence, it would be worth to introduce a strategy applied at any universities. 1 in which the military would organize further specialist courses on circumstantial dates, and recruits themselves could choose the time of their credit. They would decide whether to spread the second phase of training for respective years (between 20 and 24 years of age) or to regulate their attitude towards military service at 1 time.
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Old men?
The above-mentioned solution would result, among another things, in the fact that in any cases a reservist would have completed training only at the age of 25. So the average of the private age (and the full army) would have increased importantly compared to the condition we had 20 years ago and fundamentally the full past before. However, the question should be asked: What a soldier the modern army needs? Young and strong, or experienced and specialized? In the modern field of the conflict for success, it is not the physical strength, condition, pace of march or ability to fight. Only the efficiency of utilizing the tools of the battlefield. Haubic, tank, airplane, radio, drone, etc.
Demographic and social circumstances have besides changed. In the past, large families dominated, and access to education was limited. From a brutal point of view of the state, it was better to hazard the lives of under-educated young people, who were unqualified than experienced, specialised or educated people. For they have always been missing. However, in the battlefield, where the strength of hands and legs was an component giving the advantage, youth and "survivor" was an asset.
Today is completely different. These skills and specializations have gained value. At the same time the household model 2+1 makes young people scarce. And yet the war is on de facto About their future. Losing a young generation in war is simply a waste of purpose. This was seen by authorities from Kiev, which not only established – as always – the advanced age limits in terms of mobilisation, but besides the lower ceiling. It was 27 years earlier. However, due to staff shortages, president Zelenski late lowered the ceiling to the age of 25. So, Ukrainians – vice versa as in the 20th century and before – they decided to go after the youngest citizens only in the last order. This is surely a sign of our time and possibly the beginning of any kind of trend.
From this perspective, the more mentally and professionally shaped 25-year-old Private Reserve surely represents a more valuable resource for the army than an 18-19-year-old (remember that it is simply a reserve alternatively than a professional soldier – the sooner the military career begins, the better).
It is besides worth remembering that the army is simply a system, and these solutions should not work in vacuum. If the reservists would have achieved “war capacity” at the age of twenty, then their peers in the professional service should have been sub-commissioners or officers. The point is that, in the professional part of the armed forces, promotion and improvement of a soldier is simply a natural, desirable and even required issue. So that, if necessary, the army would have a large staff of professional soldiers competent to command little experienced reservists who had powered the ranks after the conflict broke out. Unwanted, then, should be the condition in which a professional soldier retires to the rank of private... And these cases happen today.
Obligatory civilian PROTECTION TRAINING
In the case of persons who took a civilian defence examination at the first stage, these would be assigned to circumstantial civilian defence tasks at their place of residence. They would besides gotta pass the second phase of specialist training consisting in familiarising themselves with local civilian defence facilities, applicable regulations etc.
In addition to these individuals, they would be assigned to support the applicable emergency services (fireguards, medical services) or to state or local government administration. It is known that in the event of a disaster or armed conflict, medical care, fire department and even administration are overloaded. Meanwhile, in crisis situations, for example, doctors and nurses should focus on providing assistance and medical treatment. In view of staff problems in this sector, additional staff in hospitals and another medical facilities should be provided. Similarly, the Fire Department or local local administration cells dealing with civilian defence could be supported (or, hopefully, a fresh civilian defence body). So, in the second phase of training persons after a civilian protection examination would besides receive circumstantial allocations and specialisation taking into account the person's individual and professional potential. At the same time, they would request to familiarise themselves with the procedures and work of the institution (hospital, fire department or administrative cell).
Summary
Do Poland and Polish society request trained reserves as well as cognition of civilian protection? Yeah. Is it possible to suspend a general military draft from now on? Nope. Does the model of the Basic Military Service meet the requirements of modern society, as well as the requirements of modern training of soldiers for modern battlefields? Nope.
In view of specified constatations and limitations, the proposed two-stage reserve training strategy may prove to be an interesting option not only as a "post-concentration" solution but besides as a target. 1 which would give the Polish State the time essential to prepare the administrative and training facilities, which would avoid the sin of "failing" and could be implemented in a very short time (year?). This would have the value of deterrence, and would have started the process of raising awareness of young citizens' national safety and civic work in a state emergency.
What should be realised is the fact that reasoning about the geopolitical future of Poland we truly think about future generations of Poles. As liable citizens, parents and grandparents, we cannot neglect to give future generations a set of tools to deal with the challenges ahead. It is our work to prepare young generations of Poles for what may happen to them in the future. Military and civilian protection training is something of a kind of software that equips mentally for hard times. We cannot afford the sin of omission in this regard, as the parent should not deprive the kid of the chance to receive education. We cannot let our children and grandchildren down in the scope described. They must have the skills essential to defend themselves, their country and their families. Will these skills be useful to them? This is unknown, but will be any kind of insurance in case of worst-case scenario.
Krzysztof Wojchal
geopolitics, politics, law, economy, taxes – blog
[2]https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/facts-and-figures-drawdown-iraq
