After the turn of 1989–1991, with the dissolution of the east bloc and the consolidation of the USSR, the post-communist planet – including Poland – found itself in a completely fresh reality. On the global stage, there was a “one-pole moment” – a period of virtually full dominance of the United States. It was at that time that the omnipotent superpower imposed on the world, including Poland, 2 key packages: the neoliberal "consensus from Washington" and the borderless marketplace and liberal democracy – as the only (alternative, as Margaret Thatcher emphasized at the time) ideological and political vision. Francis Fukuyama announced “the end of history.” The only possible direction was to be liberalism and capitalism – preferably in a transnational edition.
Only a fewer politicians – specified as Jacek Kuroń – or experts – like Tadeusz Kowalik or Witold Kieżun pointed to the social costs of transformation: the injustice associated with excessive privatisation and the side effects of the free market. However, as sociological studies show, most of the population did not argue the fresh order. Like no 1 questioned the main directions of the abroad policy of the state, practically identified with the state's rations, defined by the first head of diplomacy after the change of the system, Krzysztof Skubiszewski.
Liberalism and capitalism were to be an alternate way to development. Poland went this way without much resistance, believing that anchoring in the Western planet is simply a warrant of safety and prosperity.
We practically all advocated the fastest anchoring in the Western organization strategy (NATO, EU, Council of Europe, OECD, etc.), regional cooperation and a good arrangement of relations with fresh neighbours in the east, not only with Russia. Although there were disputes about how to accomplish these goals, until the beginning of the 21st century – and the appearance of the 4th Polish task (2005–2007) – Poland's abroad policy enjoyed a broad parliamentary consensus. First we wanted to "enter Europe" and then we wanted to accomplish the objectives set, which brought membership to these organisations and organisms, specified as the EU.
New fragmentation
However, erstwhile these objectives were achieved, the consensus broke. On the interior phase appeared – inactive ongoing – the duo PO and PiS, dangerous for the state, due to the fact that he subjected the state to organization interests and conflicting ideologies behind them and visions of the future of Poland: on the 1 hand, transnational, as the Liberals and their facilities wanted, on the another hand, national and "swingerenist", represented by the Law and the forces of the right side of the political scene.
Although Poland, as part of the thought of "IV Poland", was a pioneer in moving distant from the imposed "liberal package" (ideo, political and economical liberalism)1, this process followed gradually but consistently. The gap between liberal and sovereign values in Poland was akin across Europe and in many EU associate States. As early as the second decade of the 21st century, it was evident that seemingly a united Europe is actually cut and divided: liberals clash with conservatives, marketplace supporters with permanentists, federalists with nationalists, etc. In place of unity, fragmentation appeared, the best evidence being brexit (2016–2020). alternatively of a more compact and united Europe and the EU, there has been fragmentation and polarisation.
Poland and Hungary were pioneers in moving distant from the "liberal package" imposed, but in time akin trends emerged across Europe and in many EU associate States.
Where did this polarization come from? This is simply a question that will be the subject of ideological, political but besides academic disputes for a long time. Proponents of individual “truths” will preach their rations independently of the opinions of the opponents – this phenomenon is observed present in excess. However, looking with a cool eye, it is worth pointing out at least a fewer reasons for fresh fragmentation in both the western planet and Poland.
The first signal was the major economical and financial crisis of 2008-2010, which in Europe will be remembered primarily as a period of deep crisis in Greece and major budgetary and economical challenges in another Mediterranean countries. They have triggered a wave of social discontent, followed by criticism of the foundations of the European Union. It is worth remembering that the EU was created at the time of the top triumph of the West and not only accepted packages of values and economical ideas promoted by Americans, but adopted them as its own in June 1993 – in the form of the alleged Copenhagen criteria (liberal democracy, free market, the regulation of law and number rights etc.).
From this set, the “market foundationalism” was first challenged, which is to say, overtrusting marketplace forces, which in our region is yet to be achieved by the alleged dependent development, namely the excessive dependence of economies on stronger organisms, whether German or American. In the mediate of the past decade, there have been 2 phenomena: an unprecedented wave since planet War II and the challenges of the EU's external borders, as not only the alleged muslim state and the ghost of terrorism have emerged, but Russia has annexed the Crimea and fought in Donbasa.
Europeans have gradually lost their sense of security: social first, then interior (as a consequence of migration and terrorism) and yet external, due to the fact that borders have ignited. European unity has begun to crumble, and the Union itself has become the object of a protest, treated as an alternate one. This was first revealed in referendums in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005, erstwhile citizens rejected the imagination of a transnational organism (the draft European Constitution).
Since then, Europe has been facing a legal and organization crisis. The Lisbon Treaty in force present (December 2009) is purely "revisional" and so does not solve the problem of deficiency of imagination and leadership in the European Union, for which the remedium was to be "Constitution for Europe". We have lost our common azimuth and polarization has increased, as evidenced by the brexit and the social divisions revealed on its occasion, which nationalist and populist forces have utilized for their own purposes, offering simple and medial attractive solutions – frequently illusory and frequently without affirmative changes.
End of geostrategic nap
Perhaps the key to knowing the fresh polarisation is, however, another phenomenon – a increasing income spread and social inequality. The marketplace proved not as fair as it was promised — it rewarded the richest, while the mediocre were stagnant or poorer. On this wave of social discontent was born " Donald Trump's Phenomenon", which rapidly gained a global dimension. As of January 2017, a protest of the current order took over his cradle — the United States.
While Trump's first triumph could be considered as a political incidental (and as specified was underestimated by the overwhelming majority of liberal elites), his return to power in 2025 should be regarded as a structural change. It symbolizes the antiliberal, conservative revolution in the heart of the West and the overthrow of the existing rules of the global order — a order based on values, built since 1945, and after 1991, dominant on a global scale.
Trump's assumptions are clear, although politics themselves are inherently unpredictable and chimeric. It has replaced the internationally promoted values with bare interests and bilateral transactions and the logic of force. The Age Comes hard power – a violent game of large powers. In this context, the European Union is in a hard position: as a transnational plan based on soft force (soft power) and the power of at most normative and commercial, due to the Single Market, loses its effectiveness and impact.
The Age Comes hard power – a violent game of large powers. In this context, the European Union is in a hard position: as a transnational design, based on soft influence, the normative and commercial powers at most, it loses its effectiveness and impact.
The challenges facing the EU present are indeed existential, as they undermine its existing foundations — from the side from which it has gained strength. For decades, Europe has utilized 3 very comfortable protective umbrellas: the US in the field of military security, Russian — providing inexpensive energy resources and Chinese — offering a gigantic marketplace and inexpensive goods2.
The Russian umbrella was lost after a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. umbrella, including the physical presence of US troops in Europe, is now besides in question. In this situation, not only the European Union, but besides NATO, are trembling. At the same time, tensions around China and their function in the fresh strategy of forces are expanding — although this “great game” is just ahead.
In Poland, the existing pillars of our strategy are virtually falling. The slogan “economy, fool” which has been the political axis for decades has been replaced by a fresh paradigm: “security, fool”. And this safety is widely understood — not only in a military sense, but besides in an energy, climate, environmental and digital sense. alternatively of globalisation, we have deglobalization, and alternatively of previously dominant concepts specified as: company, competition, profit, advertising, we have a full fresh vocabulary for public debate: shortening supply chains, home capitals, walls at borders, isolationism, nationalism or deportations.
It ended, alternatively irreparably "geostrategic nap". The old order isn't working anymore, the fresh order hasn't emerged yet. We're in the mediate of a geostrategic span, possibly even chaos. On the horizon comes the spectrum of a fresh performance of powers, and this should be an alarm for us due to the fact that we know what the year 1815 or 1945 ended for us.
Therefore, Poland, while inactive possible, should play with the Americans, search NATO cohesion and at the same time strengthen the function of the European Union, although no of these actions will be easy. All the more so, that no substance how the war in Ukraine ends, the US is aware that their biggest strategical challenge is China. They are followed by the alleged emerging markets and the global South, which are becoming increasingly important.
What's done is not coming back. In the face of the upcoming performance of powers, we must show vigilance, carefulness and, above all, the ability to anticipate. We request to rebuild national unity and rediscover our state's right.
The fresh global order begins to shape: G-7 gives way to G-20, the importance of structures specified as BRICS+ (today 12 countries, with more in line) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization — bordering Poland through Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast is growing. In this fresh planet Poland must find its right state — consciously, cautiously, predictively.
New challenges
New organization solutions appear on the geopolitical horizon, and with them a fresh planet order. It is hard present to clearly foretell its final shape, but on the basis of the available data and processes it seems almost certain that it will no longer be the Euro-centric or even Atlantic order to which we have been accustomed.
The most likely script is simply a multipolar arrangement – with Russia as a major player, regardless of the final of the war in Ukraine, and with China, and possibly besides with India among the main quarterbacks. The burden of global dynamics is shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific area, due to the fact that that is where US interests are focused today. This may mean that Europe will be partially left to itself. This is simply a major, almost seismic change, possibly the largest since the large geographical discoveries.
Therefore, Poland, like another tiny and medium-sized countries, should redefine its interests as shortly as possible. We must appeal for action possibly most necessary, although present sounding like a utopia: to build national unity and to re-try to specify what our state is right.
What's done is not coming back. In the face of the upcoming performance of powers, we must show vigilance, carefulness and, above all, the ability to anticipate. We have fresh challenges to face, but we gotta face them if we want to survive.
1Viktor Orbán with its "non-liberal democracy" (and as it turned out in time – simply autocracy) it did not enter the phase until 2010.
2As a consequence of this relation (not only characteristic of EU-China relations), it was the mediate State and not the United States that proved to be the largest beneficiary of globalisation.
