Below we present a conversation with an experienced Swiss officer, for years working in the military intelligence of the Swiss Armed Forces General Staff, a associate in many UN peacekeeping missions and an expert on military affairs, Colonel Jacques Baud.
Militaryisation
Colonel, my first question concerns the spending of NATO associate States from the European Union. I mean military spending. NATO talks about a minimum 5% of GDP. What do you think would be an effective minimum to counter Russian possible as such, given the current potential? Is that 5% of GDP, more or less?
- Zero. No, no, let's be serious. First of all, this full defence spending thing isn't truly new. erstwhile I was studying, about 40 years ago, we talked about the alleged burden sharing. The United States continued to complain that Europe did not pay the part of its European defence costs. So, actually, this full issue did not appear with Donald Trump, but in fact it is simply a very long-term problem, even during the Cold War. The question you're asking present could have been asked 40 or 50 years ago, which is why I'm joking. I'm kidding by saying "zero," due to the fact that we had precisely the same discussion during the Cold War. And during the Cold War, well, with current experience, with papers published by the American CIA and the like, we know that the USSR, the russian Union, seemingly had no intention of attacking Europe. But thisWe know today. During the Cold War we were someway convinced that the russian Union, i.e. the Warsaw Pact, in fact, including Poland, by the way – we were convinced that the Warsaw Pact was expecting or waiting for a good chance to attack Europe. And we expected it. And even then, we never achieved the level of spending that the Americans expected. Therefore, erstwhile we start asking a question about the Cold War, we can see that present it is in a sense... we gotta see it in a very comparative way. I always say that the level of defense... I am a erstwhile military officer erstwhile you address me, you say "Colonel", and I was Colonel of the Swiss General Staff, which means that I powerfully advocate strong defence. And I think you always have an army on your territory, as they say. It's either yours or individual else's. So it's good to have a strong defense. I surely wouldn't blame a country that wants a strong defense. This applies to everyone. The problem is: the defence must be adequate to the threat. That's the point. present in Western Europe, many people complain due to the fact that we abandoned or abandoned our military-industrial complex. I mean, this American remained due to the fact that the United States is in a permanent war. There are wars everywhere. Now, if they don't fight in the mediate East, they fight in the Far East and so on. Europe had no war. And that's why, after the Cold War, we decided we didn't request the same level of defence as during the Cold War. And that's why the expenses we spent in defence have been reduced everywhere. I mean, during the Cold War, like Switzerland, the Swiss Army wasn't a professional army. It's crucial to emphasise that. Anyway, the Swiss army had 800,000 men. There's 100,000 today. Why have we reduced it? Not due to the fact that we abruptly realized we didn't request an army, but due to the fact that we realized that safety could most likely be achieved by another means. Traditionally, erstwhile we read Clausewitz and akin authors, safety is based on 2 pillars: abroad policy and defence policy. These are the 2 pillars. They gotta work together. And that's why Clausewitz's celebrated thought that war is simply a continuation of politics by another means is precisely due to the fact that there are 2 pillars, which means that if you have a good abroad policy, a strong abroad policy, strong allies, a good relation with your neighbors – you don't gotta have a strong defence. If you're in an environment where everyone is your enemies, you request a strong defense. Take Switzerland’s example so that there is no controversy. Switzerland had a safety policy based on cooperation. safety through cooperation means that developing cooperation with neighbours, developing good relations with neighbours reduces the likelihood of engaging in war. That's why you don't request an extended military apparatus. You gotta have an army. I think that is part of the institutions that are essential in the country, regardless of the situation. But if you feel safe with your abroad policy, you don't request anything. That is why it is average that we have this reduced level of military-industrial complex and even military readiness in Europe today. However, now that Europe considers the war in Ukraine to be a European war, we abruptly discover a discrepancy between what we had in Europe, that is, a peaceful coexistence and the situation in which we set ourselves an enemy. The problem is that, given the Ukrainian conflict in Europe, and especially in the European Union, attempts have been made to present this Ukrainian conflict as a conflict against Europe. It's not. It's a regional conflict that could be resolved. If Ukraine had respected the Minsk agreements, this conflict would not have happened. This means that it is simply a conflict with very limited objectives, with a narrow geographical scope. It surely wasn't about controlling all of Ukraine. The mark was linked to the Russian population in Ukraine and so there is absolutely no reason for the remainder of Europe to feel threatened by Russia. The problem is that in order to supply the essential support to Ukraine, we ourselves are creating a fresh threat. Just a fewer weeks ago, the French Chief of General Staff said that within 5 years Russia could attack France that France would be Russia's target. How did he figure that out? What is the reason for this threat? Regardless of what we think of the Russians, what would be the intent of the attack on France specifically? Do they have the means to occupy Europe? The business of the country by the Germans, for example, was a immense operation. The business itself, not to mention military operations. Just occupying the country is simply a problem. Would Russia be able to take over Europe today? Would it have financial resources, economical opportunities and possible for this? most likely not. In my opinion, no substance what we think of Vladimir Putin or anyone else, the Russians are rather rational.
Therefore, I see no reason why they would abruptly attack Western Europe and occupy it. I mean, during the Cold War in Europe, it was feared that, rightly or wrongly, the Soviets wanted to spread communism throughout Europe. This was the historical dynamics and Europe as a full should at any point become socialist, and that was the reason for war. This was not justified, by the way, but we believed it at the time. What would be the justification for the Russians today? This is what should give us the chance to find the appropriate level of defence spending. First, rationally and factually, we request to measure the real threat, not the 1 we make up. If we look at this honestly, objectively and factually: I do not justice the Russians, but I do not think they want to attack Western Europe. Therefore, the level of our spending seems appropriate to me. It is in this context that we should see defence policy: in the context of abroad policy. If we proceed our provocations and aggressive rhetoric, we will surely not improve the situation. There will most likely come a minute erstwhile we will request a very strong defence due to these provocations. We'll fall into the trap of our own rhetoric. This is the case with Ukraine. I always said if I were Ukrainian, I'd fight like a Ukrainian. If I were Russian, I'd fight like a Russian. It's perfectly justified. The problem is that if we're not active in conflict, if we're from outside, why should we be involved? This is precisely where I see the problem with the European Union as a whole, including with my country, which, incidentally, is not part of the European Union. Why should Switzerland engage in this conflict, imposing sanctions and so on? I mean, we're out there and we should usage this position to facilitate the resolution of the conflict, not to support 1 side of it. This applies especially to Switzerland. In my opinion, this besides applies to Europe as a whole, due to the fact that most likely Poland may be more afraid about the conflict in Ukraine than, say, Portugal. But why should the Portuguese be equally affected by this conflict as the Poles? It doesn't make sense. This is where I see the failure of European policy, of abroad policy. I repeat: it has nothing to do with whether the Russians or Ukrainians are right. It's no substance what. Absolutely not. The point is that as an outsider, we should take advantage of this and aid these countries solve their problems by maintaining dialogue, active diplomacy and avoiding further polarisation of the situation. And erstwhile you look at our abroad policy in this context, the question of defence spending seems to be a very superficial discussion. Of course, you must have everything you request to defend your country. But you don't should be ready to fight from day one. At least not now, in my opinion. So I would answer this question like this: I don't know how much GDP we gotta spend. I mean, during the Cold War, we had a base, most countries had about 3% of GDP. Today, at least 5% of GDP is demanded of us. Yeah. And most countries in Europe, by the way, do not even scope this level. Why do we request that amount? Honestly, I don't understand. During his first term, Donald Trump demanded only 3% of GDP. Is the war in Ukraine justified by these additional 2%? He does not believe that this conflict can scope Europe. He doesn't believe it. So why does he want 5%? most likely due to the fact that they foretell that many countries will buy American weapons. most likely why. So there is simply a kind of selfish knowing of the problem. But in fact, I am certain that the Ukrainians pay much more than 5% of GDP for their defence. So why are we taking 5% Why aren't we talking about 10% if we're threatened by Russia? Or 15, 20 or 30%? 1 thing I know for certain is that if we had an effective, intelligent and peaceful abroad policy, we would surely not have asked that question.
The Revidive or Perception of War
Yeah, that's right. Let's focus on Russia for a while. What do you think Russia and the Russian authorities can see as an existential threat to their security? I mean, what kind of weapons should be placed in neighbouring countries, specified as Poland or the Baltic countries, so that Moscow feels threatened by neighbouring NATO countries? For example, would it be a atomic weapons sharing programme and the accession of Poland or the Baltic countries?
The answer is clear. The problem defines what we utilized to call informing times. I mean the time between the detection of the threat and the minute of reaction. That's the thing. And by the way, that was what drove all the discussions on atomic weapons in Europe during the Cold War, in peculiar the alleged INF Treaty, which was all about how long it could be defended against atomic attack. In my opinion, atomic weapons should only be utilized as a deterrent, not as a weapon for combat. That's my individual view. I think that's what we meant during the Cold War. atomic weapons were not designed for use, at least at the beginning of the Cold War. This changed a small in the 1960s and 1970s, due to the fact that we managed to reduce its size and created a alleged tactical atomic weapon. But in the first fewer years, the thought was that atomic weapons are a weapon that is treated as a kind of insurance policy, not a tool for war. I think that was rational. The problem arose as we tried to reduce the size of atomic weapons and deploy them on the battlefield. We had rockets like Honest John in the USA, FROG-7 in the russian Union, the Warsaw Pact, SS-21 and so on. This was the reason for the discussion about INF, due to the fact that erstwhile the United States began considering the deployment of Pershing II missiles, and the Soviets began deploying SS-22 or SS-12 (for no 1 knows to the end whether SS-22 existed at all). Anyway, the problem with this weapon was that it wasn't just threatening to destruct everything on the battlefield. The Germans were the most threatened by it. This is why all these pacifist movements developed in Germany, due to the fact that this tactical weapon could only be utilized against the Germans. But besides, Pershing II and SS-22 evidently had a larger scope and could scope Moscow on the 1 hand, and to another capitals, most likely even Washington on the other. That's why we had to find a solution. The problem was in atomic strategy. During the Cold War many books were written on the subject, but the thing is, you can't destruct everything. Zelenski, incidentally, late said he wanted to bomb the Kremlin and so on. The problem is that if you destruct the decision center, you lose complete control of the conflict. And this could lead to complete destruction. That is why the ABM Treaty, for example the Treaty on the Prohibition of rocket Weapons, provided security, protection or defence of capitals – Moscow and Washington, alternatively than the full country. Its intent was to preserve command centers to let negotiations. Otherwise, if you destruct command, there will be no anticipation of negotiating and ending the conflict. So the point is, erstwhile you say you want to keep the command center, it besides means that you request to be able to halt the conflict, even if it starts accidentally. It happened respective times during the Cold War, erstwhile it almost happened. Incidentally, that was the reason for the alleged red line, the hot line between Moscow and Washington after the Cuban crisis. The point was that we should have the means to prevent disaster. We should be able to control the crisis throughout the process and even halt it, even if there is an accidental launch of a rocket, for example. In 2002, the United States declared the ABM Treaty. This opened the way to have ballistic missiles not only around Washington, but besides in another parts of the world, including Europe. There were discussions about the deployment of anti-balistic missiles in Poland, Romania, etc. This yet led to discussions about the effective deployment of these missiles. The problem is that launchers, which are presently located in Poland and most likely besides in Romania, are dual-functional. This means that these launchers can carry both ballistic missiles and ballistic missiles. If they can be utilized for ballistic missiles, this means that Moscow's reaction time is only about a minute, and this in turn means that there is no way to halt the crisis, even if it explodes accidentally. That is why the Russians were afraid erstwhile the US began negotiations with their European partners on the deployment of these missiles in 2004, 2005 and 2006.
This is what Vladimir Putin said at the Munich safety Conference in 2007. This celebrated speech started a divided between Russia and the West. The Russians realized that if specified missiles were deployed right at their border, there would be no time to respond and could be dragged into a atomic war without any warning. And this is highly dangerous. Therefore, frankly, I do not realize why the United States has taken this initiative. It was, in my opinion, completely stupid due to the fact that it did not improve safety in Poland or in Europe. At the time, we had a good relation with Russia. So why would we abruptly provoke her? And for the Russians it is seen as existential, due to the fact that someway – and we gotta realize it, to realize it – the leadership of the US over the past 25 years has not been peculiarly peaceful. I mean, they started wars all over the world, so looking at it from Moscow, you can say, well, possibly present is okay, but what happens in 10 years and so on? So I realize Russian concerns. During the Cold War, we had a atomic weapon deal that actually worked well. Why did the Americans retreat from these treaties? There was no reason for that, due to the fact that everything worked fine. Communism's gone or gone. We had fresh relations with east Europe, including Russia. Why didn't we usage this to correct precisely what I explained earlier? Better relations, active diplomacy and safety based on cooperation, not confrontation. Incidentally, erstwhile we talk about safety through cooperation, not safety through confrontation, in this wording 1 can recognise the Organisation for safety and Cooperation in Europe, which was a concept developed by the Soviets already in the 1970s, due to the fact that they realized that the arms race, especially nuclear, led nowhere. At any point we should find a way to better work between East and West. They so proposed the Conference on safety and Cooperation in Europe, which later became the Organisation for safety and Cooperation in Europe. I remember in the early 1990s. I went to Russia with the Swiss delegation due to the fact that we were investigating the reaction of various actors in case Switzerland joined the NATO Peace Partnership. We feared that participation in the Partnership for Peace would change the perception of Swiss neutrality. That's why we went to Washington, Brussels and, of course, Moscow. On this occasion, we had the chance to talk to the highest military command in Russia. We were a very tiny delegation. That means we had a very good interaction with all the participants. The Russians explained precisely what I'm explaining now. They understood, and it was in the early 1990s that Russia was, as they explained, almost defeated. They felt defeated. Everything was falling apart. Inflation grew rapidly. The russian Army was retreating from everywhere. People lived in helicopters somewhere at the airport. It was a real image of the defeated army. The Russians have made this very clear to us. And they said, you know, now we have a fresh situation. They welcomed the thought of Switzerland joining the Peace Partnership. By the way, they besides made it clear that they themselves were curious in joining the Partnership for Peace. And indeed, Russia has joined the Partnership for Peace, like Belarus and another countries. This meant that for them, the Partnership for Peace was an chance to gather all erstwhile opponents in 1 organization. This meant that we wanted cooperation and dialogue, not confrontation. And this is something that I think has been happening since the 1970s. is simply a very strong example of what the Russians are aiming for. They don't want to antagonize us. most likely in times of communism, any wanted to grow it. But besides, I don't think the Russians want a war on us. It is simply a immense country with immense challenges, with adequate problems to solve in this immense territory to look for problems in Europe. The perception of Russia that we have in the West seems to me someway completely obsolete. We do not consider the realities and problems facing the Russians. They most likely have different priorities present than promoting what, in Western Europe and attacking France for no reason.
Not only armory
What do you think of their resources and potential? In your books you analysed their military-industrial complex, their possible as such. any say that if we had the current level of escalation, more or little akin to the present one, the Russians could inactive manage for 2 or 3 years, utilizing their current potential. Do you think they can fight for another 5 or 10 years, or will their possible run out?
- Honestly, I'm not certain I can answer that question. But they will surely find resources in the current situation to make the Russian military-industrial complex. Trying to isolate Russia from the remainder of the world, we have led to a situation where its military-industrial complex becomes the driving force of the full economy or a crucial part of it. I am not certain that this is what the Russians want, due to the fact that they have actually developed this arms complex over the last fewer years. We can see that production capacity has increased enormously over the past year, 2 years, which means that this was not their mark before. They're forced to. Today, due to the fact that another aspects of the economy have been marginalised by Europeans, they evidently usage this chance to make their economy, building on a strong pillar of the military-industrial complex. What we are presently seeing in Russia is due to her relation with China and the fact that China has taken the place left by Europeans, especially in the production of cars and the like, means that, in my opinion, Russia has begun to consider the improvement of its real economy. Russia, or indeed the russian Union, was a immense supplier of weapons worldwide. Ukraine was also, by the way, a weapon supplier in the 1990s and early 21st century. Russia was 1 of the largest arms exporters in Europe, which means that the arms manufacture complex, in addition to driving the conflict today, can become a actual pillar of the economy in the future. However, we see that they do not want to focus solely on the military-industrial complex, which means that the Russians are not striving for a model of war economy. This is an economy in which the military-industrial complex is crucial due to the fact that it must drive the current conflict. However, I do not have the impression that the Russians see this as a major economical activity for the future, which means that they are trying to make another sectors.
There are many areas where they make production capacity, specified as semiconductors, which not only service military purposes but besides civilian purposes. There is large possible in Russia to make their tremendous intellectual possible to make another aspects of the economy as well. They will surely gotta make their military-industrial complex to respond to the current crisis. The conflict in Ukraine is highly demanding in terms of equipment. We besides see this on the Ukrainian side. It absorbs a large part of western ammunition and so on. It's a conflict that consumes quite a few military and industrial resources. The same applies to Ukrainians. And it surely concerns the Russians. It is so no wonder that the Russians feel the request to further make their arms manufacture complex. But seeing another areas develop, especially in the field of investigation and the like, I don't think they're trying to focus solely on weapon production. They besides effort to address another aspects. For example, they produce fresh types of vehicles. I mean, Lada, I mean civilian cars, you know. They upgraded production facilities to offer another types of vehicles, more attractive, more modern, intended for civilian use. We besides see that the economy is developing. During the Cold War most of the industrial production in the russian Union was intended for military needs. This was most likely 1 of the reasons why the full strategy collapsed at any point due to the fact that it was a strategy focused on military and defence issues. I think the Russians realize that this can't work. So they definitely request a strong military-industrial complex, but they do not focus solely on defence. They besides search to apply a more balanced approach to another aspects of the economy. The problem they have present is that precisely due to the fact that they are trying to make fresh areas of their economy, they do not have adequate workers. Their production capacity is increasing faster than the number of people in the labour market. As a result, there is any kind of inflation in the labour market. There's no unemployment, it's the opposite. They don't have adequate men. So they effort to hire workers from North Korea, China and another countries. This means that they have broader ambitions than just the improvement of a military-industrial complex. They want to make another aspects. I think it's a healthy reaction not to focus on the defense. You don't gotta make cars if you can buy them cheaper in Western Europe. But erstwhile Western Europe closed the borders, they had to do it themselves. This is where they are. This means that in fact, in trying to isolate Russia, we have created an incentive for it to make not only our army, but besides another sectors of the economy. The best example is grain. Before 2014, Russia was a net importer of grain. But since 2014, erstwhile we imposed the embargo, sanctions, the West no longer exported grain to Russia. present Russia is simply a net exporter of grain and has become Ukraine's strongest competitor. There are many another examples, specified as wine, cheese and the like. Since the European Union for example stopped exporting French cheese to Russia, the Russians said: “All right, all right. You do not want to sale your cheese, we will produce it ourselves.” They hired people from France to produce French cheese in Russia. I do not know if it tastes the same, but European media have reported it respective times. They went to Russia and were very well paid to start producing French cheese, camembert and all another French cheeses in Russia. So, in my opinion, Russia has expanded its activities in this area not to limit itself to military production, but to extend its product range. I mean, products they can't get from the West make themselves. And now they're exporters. Same with apples. Russia was a net importer of apples, buying French and Belgian apples.
Also Polish. Poland was 1 of the main exporters.
- Yes, exactly. But now that we've stopped selling them, the Russians make them themselves. We have so lost the market. Our farmers are not in a good position, and Russia has this chance now due to the fact that it has immense resources. They are now able to simply flood the marketplace with their products. I mean, they could do it, but present they can't export to the West. The current war in Ukraine has surely enabled Russia to make its military-industrial economy. Not only quantitative, but besides qualitative. It is besides crucial that they have combat experience. This means that experience gained on the battlefield can be straight translated into their industrial production. They have a vast structure that analyses everything that happens on the battlefield; both their own experiences and abroad equipment, for example M1 Abrams, Leopard 2 and the like. This means that present the Russians can usage conflict not only to increase production but besides to improve the quality of the products offered. For decades they have been known, for example, for Kalashnikov, which is simply a very simple weapon, very durable, very reliable and so on. Today, they produce sophisticated technologically sophisticated weapons, including firearms, highly precise, more advanced than AK-47s and the like. This means that they can learn from fighting experience to offer better products on the market. There's no uncertainty about that. But I repeat, my assessment is that they do not want to trust solely on the military marketplace and that they are besides developing. And that's where the Chinese come in, due to the fact that they replaced all the car factories and another factories that were in Russia. I mean Western factories that were in Russia. Now Russia produces its own electrical cars. They didn't do it before, but they realized it was besides something they could make to support the commercial and civilian market. Insulating Russia, we have created an incentive for Russia to become a real superpower, not only in terms of nuclear, but besides economically. It's an interesting development. I am convinced that the Russians do not want to trust solely on their military-industrial complex.
Finland
Did you announcement that the president of Finland, Alexander Stubb, was present in Washington during 1 of the meetings in September? My question is rather simple. Can Finland and a process called finlandization after planet War II be, In your opinion, a kind of model for Ukraine and a solution to the current conflict?
- Well, yes and no. If we look at the proposal made by the Ukrainians in March 2022, we will remember what the negotiations in Istanbul looked like, the first circular of negotiations in Istanbul, initiated, by the way, by the Ukrainians in mid-March 2022. They made a proposal. In fact, what they proposed is safety guarantees for Ukraine. And erstwhile the finlandization took place, the point was that Russia or the russian Union itself guaranteed the safety of Finland. This means a unilateral system. Take Switzerland or Austria, for example, due to the fact that the Austrian model was based on the Swiss model of 1815. The thought was that the safety of Switzerland, or actually its neutrality, was guaranteed by the superpowers of the time. I mean Prussia, Russia, Austria and large Britain. They were the guarantors. This is precisely what happened more than a century later in Austria, where the safety guarantors were in fact the 4 planet War II winners: the russian Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. erstwhile the Ukrainians presented their proposal in March 2022, they applied the same scheme, but with the participation of 5 permanent members of the safety Council and respective others. As far as I remember, 11 countries were among the guarantors, but mostly members of the UNSC. This means that it was a small more extended than finlandisation. Finland, as I said, is simply a unilateral guarantee. This is about multilateral guarantees. An interesting aspect of the Ukrainian proposal from that period, that is from March 2022, is that it involves countries from both sides. On the 1 hand, there were China and Russia, but on the other, all Europeans, that is, Western members of the safety Council. In my opinion, this is the solution that we should strive for. What the Western countries have late proposed, I mean Emmanuel Macron and all the rest, is actually a kind of peacekeeping force. I don't think we should look at it that way. We should realize and realize the concerns of the Russians. They don't want any abroad troops. Incidentally, this was besides in the Constitution of Ukraine from 1991 and 1992. It states that no abroad troops will be stationed on its territory. I think it should stay that way. I think the Ukrainian proposal would be good. I mean, 5 countries and a fewer others, possibly Germany, I don't know, possibly Poland or another countries. I think even Brazil was considered as a possible guarantor in the March 2022 project. This means that we should have a group of countries that will warrant the safety of Ukraine, not only by sending troops, but besides by creating a forum for dialogue. erstwhile you send troops, as Macro suggested, it's fundamentally a peace operation. It's a tactical issue. Honestly, it's childish. I do not exclude that this may happen in a fewer months so that the peace treaty can enter into force and be accepted. But that's not a solution in the long run. In the long run, we request something more specific. This besides includes the negotiating mechanics due to the fact that erstwhile tensions arise, the crisis – the first thing should be to talk about it. This should be the first step. Let's sit together and effort to solve the problem by talking to each other. If this doesn't work, we can go 1 step further. But we should have that mechanism.
This is what has failed during the current crisis in Ukraine. The first step was the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Meanwhile, the French and the Germans admitted that they never intended to implement this agreement. If the West and Ukraine had accepted the thought of implementing this agreement and uncovering a political solution to implement it, we most likely wouldn't have a war today. This means that we should re-establish and formally make a forum, a platform where all the guarantians will gotta meet as shortly as the first signs of tension appear. The French, Germany and the British are in my opinion highly dangerous due to the fact that they behave childishly. This is unhealthy in global relations. We should most likely take an example from China. The Chinese do not straight engage emotionally in conflict, but they can keep any distance, they can sit with others, they can talk, they can effort to solve the problem.
World War III Tomahawks
By the way, the behaviour of Poland besides seems very childish. I don't know if you've heard of this, but our Prime Minister Donald Tusk told us this is our war. It is rather akin to French, British and so on, and even more radical. I have another question that could be called very circumstantial erstwhile it comes to military issues. We have late heard about the possibilities or discussions of deploying Tomahawk maneuvering missiles in Ukraine and handing them over to Kiev. What do you think? Would this change the military possible of Kiev in any way, or could it mean the beginning of planet War III?
- Yes, it could be the beginning of planet War III. It's possible. I think we can make 2 main observations here. First of all, we observe in Ukrainians a kind of obsession with the anticipation of hitting the very heart of Russia. In fact, I have the impression that Zelenski, since he is not successful on the battlefield, wants any symbolic success, political success, not military success, if you can say so. And the anticipation of hitting Moscow directly, even in the Kremlin, as he said, could be specified a symbolic triumph for him. That wouldn't change anything on the battlefield. In fact, everything we saw in the performance of the Ukrainians – attacks in the depths of Russia, headed by the celebrated Operation "The Web", which we had a fewer months ago, did not change anything on the front line. They had absolutely no effect on the war. It's just a symbolic victory, if you can say so. The same is actual of the attacks we had on the Kerchen Bridge, Crimea or Krasnodar. These are symbolic actions that had no effect on what was happening on the battlefield. That, I believe, is the expression that the Ukrainians admit that they are incapable to change the course of events on the battlefield. That's why they tried to win elsewhere. Even their attacks on the Black Sea played no part in this conflict, due to the fact that it was just a land war. This is not a naval war. I think it's all just symbolic victories for them. That's it. Zelenski comes from show business, which makes what he can show us, present to us, number more for him than accomplishment on the battlefield. The Germans say mehr sein als scheinen. For him it is the other – mehr schienen als sein. I think that's the problem, or at least the first aspect. The second thing is that this concept has not yet been confirmed by the Americans, but has only been mentioned by Keith Kellogg. Later, J. D. Vance repeated it. However, there is no concrete evidence that it was decided to deliver these missiles. Moreover, at the operational level, I am not convinced that the Ukrainians would be able to operate and usage these weapons due to the fact that they request the right software for that. They would request a number of its elements, which only Americans could deliver. The fact that this information has not been confirmed indicates that Americans are aware of the importance of the problem. Donald Trump doesn't want peace as such. He just wants the United States out of conflict. That's what he wants. He understands that this war is lost and must end in defeat of Ukraine. In this situation, the United States could begin to associate with this failure, as it did a fewer years ago in Afghanistan. I don't want that. They would so retreat from the conflict and pass it on to Europeans. Then he can come out of it eventually. I believe that he does not want to end this conflict on the grounds that he is no longer handing over weapons for free, but wants to sale them. So this is not about peace. It's all about giving up investing in something that won't make any more money. It's a purely commercial, selfish American approach. They don't see the point in investing in something that won't bring back the investment. And they say, "All right, if you want to proceed the war. We'll sale you guns, but we'll give you nothing for free. That's 1 thing. Another point is that Donald Trump is most likely not a pacifist and does not want to end the American conflict in the way Joe Biden did in Afghanistan. He'd like to get out of this conflict with the hug. He wants to leave the phase with all the honors, and he wants to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Incidentally, erstwhile we look at the White home website, we'll see there a commercial for Trump's Nobel candidacy, so I think he's truly dreaming about it. The best way to get out of the conflict is to scope an agreement between both sides, Ukraine and Russia. He most likely realizes this, due to the fact that all the proposals to end the conflict so far were based on the plan of Keith Kellogg, the American point of view. That's typical of Donald Trump. He's trying to push through his own vision. He's making area by force. He wants to push his own solution. That's what he's trying to do. His people did not even effort to address Russia's concerns about a possible peaceful end to the conflict. The Americans have just realized that they have no instruments of force on Russia. The sanctions don't work. They so attempted to introduce alleged secondary sanctions against India and China buying Russian oil. Formally, these are duties, not sanctions. The aim is to increase customs duties on goods imported from countries utilizing Russian oil. But that didn't work either. What I mean is that both India and China have made it clear that this way they will not be allowed to play. As a result, the United States understands that Russia is no longer under pressure. They've already introduced all possible sanctions. Russia adapted to them, adapted to them very dynamically. Therefore, they no longer have the means to exert force on her. The only means of force available to Americans remains the threats of the transfer of the Tomahawks or another akin rockets to Ukraine. Personally, I think it's just an American threat, most likely a kind of bluff. That's my individual view, and I might be wrong. However, I believe that they are trying to say that if Russia does not start talking to Ukraine, they will hand over the last rocket. But let us return to the basic issue: could this affect the course of the conflict? most likely the Russians are now able to handle tactical maneuvering missiles. They most likely have systems that can shoot down rockets of this kind. Thus, even if the United States were to hand over the Tomahawk rockets of Ukraine, this would not affect the course of the war. The Russians are aware of this. That's why they won't give in to this blackmail.
However, I repeat that if the Ukrainians wanted to attack the Kremlin or Moscow with them, it would mean that they had received software for them that they do not own. They request TERCOM navigation for their use. It is essential due to the fact that Tomahawk missiles are flying just above the ground. They so request to burden very accurate maps of the site. They can't trust on a GPS signal. They must have geographical data entered and trust on very accurate cartography loaded into their processors. And only the United States can deliver this chart. So if the Ukrainians had attacked Moscow, it would have meant that the United States had donated the software. This would mean that the United States was aware of its use. The United States would then be a viable associate in the conflict. I mean, to any degree they already are. But this could be considered by the Russians to be the direct engagement of the United States in this conflict. That's why it's very dangerous. Personally, however, I think the Americans are aware of this. late an article was published in the Financial Times on the alleged Estonisation of European abroad Policy. This article found increasing irritation in the Trump European and Zelenski administration. Its origin is that they realize there that specified radicalization, that is, what they call Estonia, the direction of politics against Russia, gives absolutely no space to search a possible solution through negotiations. alternatively of knowing it and trying to find a political solution to the conflict, Europeans are turning the full process on, in fact, to escalate this conflict. I think the Americans are aware of that. Therefore, on the 1 hand, I believe that the usage of Tomahawk missiles in Ukraine could lead to planet War III. On the another hand, I think the Americans are aware of this threat. Personally, I think they were trying to make a threat to the usage of these missiles, but I'm not certain they'll make the decision.
Matthew Piskorski spoke
