The full-scale war in Ukraine has continued continuously for over 1,300 days. Although any processes seem to be accelerating, according to any commentators, we can only deal with smoke screens. The past week passed under suspicion who was behind the 28-point peace plan in Ukraine that leaked to American media. He assumed, among others, a simplification to 600,000 Ukrainian army, a waiver of Ukraine's membership of NATO, or a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from their positions in the Donetsk Oblast.
The plan met with an almost unambiguously critical assessment in both Poland and Europe, as well as
and the United States. The central character of the discussion of this paper between the Russian and American administrations was to be on Donald Trump's side Steve Witkoff, for a gathering with a Ukrainian delegation overseas to Florida on Saturday 29 November.
In the meantime, there were besides key sentences of Ursula von der Leyen, peace talks in Geneva, where there was no Polish delegation. There is no uncertainty that there is any acceleration, even in terms of the number of diplomatic talks and meetings.
On the another hand, whether this will translate into a permanent agreement, on what principles and the consequences it will have for Poland, I will ask the expert on global affairs and politics of east Europe – Dr. Łukasz Muszyński. Honored by the Polish Geopolitic Society. The author of the book, published in 2024, "States not recognized in east Europe. Transnistrian Republic of Moldova and the Republic of Abkhazia’.
Doctor, let me begin rather mostly and openly. Do you believe
in permanent peace in Ukraine in the current situation on the front, why?
The thought of establishing lasting peace within this conflict has 2 contexts – declarative and practical. The first refers to the current, intensified efforts of US decision-makers to effectively impose a peace plan. The content of the 28-point plan presented in November this year was not agreed with the Ukrainian side or NATO associate States, as evidenced by the authoritative positions of individual political leaders. Thus, we can presume that the perception of American decision-makers has created circumstances that encourage us to take the initiative and dominate the peace process. In this context, the American administration may choose to force Ukrainian decision-makers to enter into an agreement, seeing them as a organization to a conflict with much little potential. This will be possible if the costs of the force put out will appear to US decision-makers little than the profits offered by Russian decision-makers. Moreover, it is worth taking into account the kind of the US political communicative so far relating to Donald Trump's alleged origin to prevent conflict in the event of the 2020 presidential election being won. Regardless of the course of further negotiations, including the concessions of the Ukrainian side and the criticism of the Euro-Atlantic partners, this concept can be presented by American diplomacy as best for the resolution of the conflict, even if it remains so only in the sphere of imagination.
In a applicable context, the current situation at the front and the state of Russian-Ukrainian relations do not anticipate the anticipation of lasting peace, including in the context of a formal truce or peace agreement. The main challenge would be to enforce the halting of clashes and common fire on an extensive, about 1000 km section of the front. The situation is further complicated by differences between Russian claims against Ukrainian circuits (Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporosk and Khersonsk), and the actual control of Russian troops, not covering all of these areas. Furthermore, in the Russian perception these administrative division units were entirely incorporated into the organization structures of the confederate Military territory of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In this context, the dilemma relating to the reliability of Russian decision-makers in complying with the contracts concluded remains important. It is hard to exclude the option in which the agreement will be breached utilizing unmarked armed formations or military equipment in order to ridicule American decision-makers by exposing their deficiency of performance in the conflict. specified dilemmas are due to the practice of not complying with commitments made, for example, in the 1992 Peace Agreement ending the conflict of territorial affiliation of Transnistria and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
Could the corruption of president Zelenski's close political association be an effort to undermine his position in Ukrainian society
And do you think this will affect his negotiating position?
The phenomenon of corruption and the functioning of oligarchical structures is 1 of chronic challenges for Ukrainian society and for decision-makers who would search to bridge this kind of practice. However, allegations against Andrij Jermak and dismissal from the office of the president of Ukraine may besides show increased interior competition between individual political groups. The point of mention remains the inevitability of holding presidential elections. This postulate is besides present in the expectations expressed by American decision-makers. Formally, Volodymyr Zelenski's word of office ended on 20 May 2024, however, the Ukrainian law on the legal government of martial law allows him to hold office until the date of swearing-in of the fresh president elected after the martial law. 1 of the options of the current action can so be the weakening of the political environment concentrated around W. Zelenski, in order to bridge its importance in the future election campaign.
At global level, however, we can anticipate that the corruption scandals that have been revealed among further Ukrainian political decision-makers will be utilized as an argument to halt financial, material and military support provided by the Euro-Atlantic partners.
Putting aside moral and ethical issues, whether peace in Ukraine is presently lying
In Polish business? Finally, the Russian army bleeds out all day, and Europe gets its time to build military infrastructure from a real event.
Due to social sensitivity, this is simply a hard context for consideration, but the task of Polish policy makers and advisory centres remains to value specified dilemmas. It is appropriate to consider that all Russian soldier and officer of the structures eliminated in the conflict will not be utilized for a possible hostile act against Poland and the Polish society. The same applies to destroyed military equipment and critical infrastructure components, specified as refineries and fuel storage. Moreover, social sentiment can be affected by the scale and effectiveness of the losses. The authoritative Russian political communicative is dominated by a message of advanced public support for actions taken by decision-makers, but is this valid in relation to the actual beliefs of a parent whose boy died on the front or a young man permanently physically mutilated as a consequence of armed action?
It is besides worth remembering that on the Russian side there are people who find themselves very well in conditions of destabilization. They come from areas of disputed entities, supported financially, materially and militarily by the Russian Federation, specified as the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia (territories). de jure Georgia). any of them are known for their criminal or paramilitary activity in the South Caucasus. They are not random people or recruited by trickery. They have experience of participating in armed actions conducted in Ukraine in 2014 and the current phase of the conflict fighting, among others, at Awdijiwka and Pokrowski. Motivations in this case stay opportunistic, which is besides confirmed by their recordings of looting and direct participation in military clashes. In the context of the Polish state, it is crucial that specified persons are not utilized to carry out a hostile act towards our country and society. However, we cannot be certain that in the future Russian decision-makers will not usage them, for example, to supervise illegal migration on the Polish-Belarusian border or to organize diversion actions in the Suwałki Przesm. From this favourable perspective, the hazard of their activities appears to be offset during further clashes in Ukraine.
In Poland there was a standard push, about who is guilty of not being invited to talk to Geneva. After little than 4 years of war behind our east border, the deficiency of specified an invitation for Poles is like a cheek. Gratitude in global politics is not a currency, but how can our policy be more effective to sit at these most crucial tables? Especially since these arrangements may be crucial to our safety.
It is essential to specify our own expectations towards the Ukrainian side, the Euro-Atlantic partners and the Russian decision-makers, and to identify the possible and capacity we can offer. This is simply a hard challenge, among others, due to the current level of political polarization, organization conditions of co-habitation and individual ambitions of individual leaders. The possibilities of developing this pool of issues so seem limited to a fewer of the most crucial issues, which will not be contested by the main political centres in Poland and will gain social acceptance. In the absence of a coherent expectation, an offer of opportunities, as well as a common political narrative, it is hard to require that partners can take into account or at least mention to the Polish perspective.
In terms of efforts to increase political effectiveness on the global stage, it is worth exposing the achievements so far, presenting the scale of military equipment and another material assistance provided to Ukraine. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to separate the support organised before private individuals and non-governmental organisations in order to make the partners aware that actions in favour of Ukraine were not carried out solely by the state authorities. The launch of an information run in the media and the net space of EU associate States, NATO and Ukraine would be an instrument for strengthening the image of Poland as a country active in assistance, without which it will be hard to implement further political concepts. The comparative form is to exposure the number of Ukrainian citizens who have decided to operate in Poland as well as the opportunities offered to them. It is worth emphasizing the position of those who have arrived as a consequence of the conflict, with private refuge. Moreover, among the number of abroad students, the largest group are Ukrainian citizens, which can besides service as an argument in this regard.
It is equally crucial to exposure the importance of the geopolitical position of Poland and the infrastructure we have. The experience so far with the operation of the railway station in Przemyśl, Rzeszów-Jasionka airport and road border crossings can be capital not only in negotiations on further logistical support of Ukraine, but besides in financing the expansion of these elements and in securing air protection by Euroatlantic partners.
