Partnership gives strength

How do the Baltic States respond to the increasing threat?

First of all, the Baltics modernise the armed forces. Estonia was the fastest among the Baltic States to scope the level of 2% of the gross home product of defence expenditure recommended by NATO by the Hague Summit last year. Latvia plans to earmark more than 5% of GDPabove the fresh ceiling agreed at that summit. In Lithuania too, defence spending is said to be above 5% of GDP, and in Estonia there are plans to scope 5% from 2026. This is simply a immense effort for countries that have many another needs, and the Latvian and Estonian economies are already 4th year in stagnation or even in crisis. Despite this society they are mostly behind advanced defence spending, due to the fact that there is awareness of the Russian threat.

Each of these countries is working intensively on its own, and what does cooperation between them look like?

In a very stereotypical way, they talk about Baltic UnityBut she's not truly here. Each country has any different interests, so they compete with each another in the economical field in terms of trade or attracting abroad investment, but besides political investment, among others, in terms of position in the European Union. There is full agreement with Russia and Belarus. However, political-military cooperation seems insufficient. An example of this is, for example, the issue of arms purchases, which the Baltic States could implement together due to their tiny budgets, due to the fact that they frequently buy the same systems, specified as HIMARS rocket launchers.

Bartosz Chmielewski is an analyst for the Baltic States in the German and Northern European squad of the Center for east Studies. photograph by Michał Niwicz

What weapons and from whom do the Baltics buy?

The conclusions of the war in Ukraine have a large influence on the choice of ordered weapons. Therefore, the Baltics invest in air defence systems, barrel artillery and rocket artillery, and more frequently talk about armored vehicles. Most purchases are made in Europe. For Lithuania Germany is simply a key partner in Latvia. Latvia besides has close ties with Finland through the Commonwealth Armored Vehicle System. Estonia buys arms from European countries, but also, like Poland, in South Korea. Moreover, they are eager to invest arms companies from this country. Estonians would most likely like to have a Korean ammunition mill in their territory.

Despite the differences, 3 countries agreed on strengthening borders with Russia and Belarus by establishing the Baltic Defence Line (BDL) and denunciation of the anti-personnel mine ban convention.

However, each of them sees this line somewhat differently. In Lithuania and Latvia, these are mainly anti-access warehouses, specified as anti-tank barriers, barbed wire and mines, which will be deployed in the event of a crisis or war. The Lithuanians are talking about fortifying the full border, and the Latvians are talking about blocking the main roads on the East–West lines. Only the Estonians want to build combat shelters on the border with Russia. There are besides differences in the planned BDL depth in individual countries.

What are the advancement in this regard?

Unfortunately, the authorities do not uncover much, so it is unclear what the state of work is in Latvia or Lithuania. In the case of Estonia in early December, an article was published in the press, in which 1 of the institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Defence officially admitted that the work was delayed by a year – a test counter-tank was created on a tiny section of the border.

At the end of 2025, the first construction work on shelters on the south-eastern border of the state was besides to begin. These reports rise the question whether the deadline adopted by the 3 countries to complete the work on the BDL for 2030 is realistic. In this situation, we gotta ask where the money will come from, due to the fact that its backing from state budgets is short-term, and only the Estonians officially announced that part of the funds they will receive from the EU safety Action for Europe – SAFE) will be designed to grow defence infrastructure at the border.

In addition to fortifications and weapons, the communication infrastructure essential for military mobility is important. How is it in the Baltic States?

Not the best, as they are inactive mostly roads and railway lines created in the times of the russian Union. This is why most of them are East–West communication lines, and erstwhile it comes to railways, it dominates the wide track spacing. North-South transport infrastructure is only being created and it is best in Lithuania, where European-standard tracks have been brought from the Polish border to Kowna and there is simply a second parallel track built within Rail Baltica. Railway infrastructure is now being upgraded north of Kowna. From this city you can besides get to Poland via the highway. The Lithuanians are building fresh roads and bridges in the North-South corridor, but in Estonia and Latvia they are only at the planning stage. Therefore, for the transport of NATO troops are crucial and for years there will be seaports – Klaipeda in Lithuania, Lipawa in Latvia and Tallinn in Estonia.

In Estonia, conscription to the military was never eliminated. About 4,000 people are appointed to service each year. photograph by DWOT

Why have fresh roads and railways not been built despite access to EU aid funds?

Building South-North connections seemed 10 years ago not necessarily economically reasonable, as the Baltics were geared towards trade with the East, for example, the bulk of cargo passing through the port of Klaipeda by 2020 came from Belarus, and Estonian ports provided facilities for northern Russia. Furthermore, Latvia mostly adopted in the 1990s as a improvement model to be an intermediary between East and West. Faster investments in fresh transport routes in Lithuania consequence from the fact that she had previously seen the possible of economical cooperation with Poland and the remainder of Europe. It now benefits her due to the fact that the Lithuanian economy is increasing by 3% of GDP per year, as is Poland's GDP, which has become Vilnius's most crucial trading partner, displacing Russia.

And where are we erstwhile it comes to political-military partnership?

If we look at the European partners, we look at the other. The Lithuanians anticipate that in the event of a war, Poles will be the first to come to their aid, but they put the Germans, who decided to deploy the armored brigade in Lithuania and are crucial investors and suppliers of weapons.

What countries are Latvia and Estonia's main political-military partners?

For Latvia the most crucial is Canada, which is the framework state of the NATO brigade stationed in the Latvian territory. The second is Sweden, which has increased military presence in the country in fresh months. In the case of Estonia, the most crucial partner is officially the United Kingdom, which is simply a framework country erstwhile it comes to its alliance presence. Unofficially – France, and the very good relation is shown by the fact that with the support of Paris Kaja Kallas she became the most crucial diplomat of the European Union. However, the United States is simply a key strategical partner of all 3 countries, due to the fact that whether their military presence is large or small, it is of large political importance and is an crucial component of deterrence in the region.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia agreed on strengthening borders with Russia and Belarus through the creation of the Baltic Defence Line. photograph by MO Latvia

Allies are important, but how do they build their own defence capacity of a state that together has only over 6 million inhabitants?

Each Baltic State is based on a different organizational concept of the military, but all the closest are patterns from Scandinavian countries, which, like them, have fewer inhabitants comparative to the size of the territory and cannot afford to keep many armies. In Estonia, conscription to the military was never eliminated. About 4,000 conscripts are appointed to the service each year, so that the country has built crucial reserves for its demographic capacity. These are besides rather many in the most populous Lithuania, where the draft was restored a decade ago. In Latvia, however, the army is volunteer and it was only after 2022 that any form of state service was introduced, partially restoring the intake. Apart from regular armed forces in each of these countries, there are akin volunteer formations of respective to respective 1000 members.

Scandinavia is celebrated for preparing for war not only troops, but besides society as a whole. Are the Baltic States looking for patterns in this area too?

There's been any news about the introduction of drone maintenance in schools, which is media catchy, but for now, it just seems like an idea. For this reason, a discussion on civilian protection, including shelters for the population, has been taking place for many months. For example, a paper article in Latvia echoed that people with disabilities do not have access to shelters in the centre of Riga due to the fact that there are no wheelchair ramps. Providing shelters to civilians is simply a serious problem that requires time and money to solve.

If we are talking about social awareness, about how to behave in crisis situations, it is at a advanced level. These are tiny societies, and almost everyone has individual in their environment who is simply a associate of the uniforms or volunteer defence organizations. This awareness is besides trying to build a state. In Lithuania, an informant explaining to people what to do in the event of a crisis or war was already issued around 2015.

Is it considered, for example, the evacuation of the people of the Baltic States, since due to their tiny size they could be a battlefield?

These ideas arise, but for now it is not known how it would proceed and whether concrete plans were created. Theoretically, Lithuanians can choose a land road to Poland, and Estonians can choose a reasonably short sea way to Finland. Latvians are in the most hard position due to the fact that they do not have convenient connections with larger neighbours. The real anticipation of specified evacuation would depend on the military situation in the Baltic and in the Suwałki gulf.

If the Baltics are compatible with the direction of the threat, have akin problems and needs, will they decide to deepen trilateral political-military cooperation?

It seems to be an optimal scenario. In circumstantial cases and projects, this is already the case, even with respect to certain purchases of military equipment. The obstacle to deepening this cooperation is that governments of each of the 3 countries frequently disagree politically. The biggest barrier, however, is that in many cases each capital competes with each another for akin resources. The possible for cooperation between the Baltic States is far from exhausted, and it is hard for the governments of these 3 countries to fill this field.

Bartosz Chmielewski is an analyst for the Baltic States in the German and Northern European Group of the Center for east Studies.