The operation of the alleged shadow fleet is calculated to accomplish a certain effect. It is about hitting the West, distracting from current events in Ukraine while remaining hidden. Dr. Dariusz Bugajski, a specialist in the law of the sea, speaks about how to effectively fight specified hybrid threats.
It's what we all expected. In the second half of May a ship suspected of membership of the Russian shadow fleet performed different maneuvers close the power cable connecting Poland and Sweden. He was spooked by a plane sent to the scene.
Yes, but remember, the ship had all right to be there. The incidental occurred in an exclusive economical zone. There is freedom of navigation – the routes are open to all ships regardless of flag and cargo. In its own economical zone, Poland has the right to exploit surviving resources specified as fish and inanimate, specified as oil and gas, conducting research, building artificial islands, and is besides liable for protecting the environment. However, it cannot freely halt and control ships unless, for example, 1 of them flows without a flag or damages critical infrastructure. But the suspicion itself is not enough. Our naval consequence was correct. but there wasn't much more we could do but watch the fishy unit.
Therefore, if we have the facts in order, let us answer the basic question. What precisely is simply a fleet of shadows?
It is an armada in most old tankers that supply services to Russia. They let the Russians to circumvent Western sanctions on oil exports. The natural material goes to the hold in the Baltic ports, and is then repeatedly transhipped, frequently in the open sea. Ships themselves have a complicated legal situation – most frequently they flow under alleged inexpensive flags, while their owners are companies with a complex ownership structure. All of this makes it hard to accurately trace and block the way of oil.
You mentioned a complicated legal situation. Meanwhile, the media is writing straight about the Russian shadow fleet...
This is, of course, a simplification. Legally, the relation between a suspicious ship and Russia is usually hard to confirm. All due to the global nature of shipping and complex regulations. Each vessel may engage in shipping provided that it is entered in the registry of a peculiar State, giving the right to bear its flag. The differences in registration fees, which are required by individual countries, do not should be large, but the costs related to insurance, wages – as it is. So the owners are looking for the cheapest options. They registry ships in Liberia, Panama, the Marshall Islands, although they have nothing to do with these countries. But it is not the end – in countries not subject to sanctions, shell shipping and logistics companies are registered. A chain of shipping companies is being created. The crew itself is usually multinational.
Thus, the Eagle S, which in December 2024 broke the power cable between Finland and Estonia, was registered in the Cook Islands, was owned by a company with capital from India based in the United arabian Emirates, the captain had a Georgian passport, and the crew was formed by Georgians and Indians. Where is Russia in all this? uncovering and proving specified relationships is truly not easy.
Is this a fresh phenomenon? After all, there have been many countries in the planet for years that have been sanctioned and then tried to celebrate them in various ways.
It's true. Just replace Iran, North Korea or Libya Gaddafi. The seaways were and are smuggled natural materials, weapons, various types of components for the production subject to sanctions. For the shadow fleet fresh is the scale of the phenomenon. According to the calculations of the global Maritime Organisation, up to 300–600 tankers may stay on Russian services.
But I don't think that's it. The names of ships suspected of belonging to the shadow fleet are increasingly emerging in the context of incidents that bear the signs of diversion. But smuggling likes peace and quiet. Logic suggests that the crews who work with him should do anything to avoid attention. Don't you think there's a contradiction?
At first glance, of course. Logic suggests that the tanker's engagement in the smuggling must take place with the consent and cognition of the shipowner. The financial aspect is crucial. simply put, you can make good money smuggling oil. Although it is besides impossible to exclude additional factors – blackmail or control of the company by Russian services. Meanwhile, simply dragging a ship into a hybrid war can take place at a lower level. Just convince or force the captain to harm the cable or pipeline utilizing an anchor. For the tanker's owner, the share of the diversion is risky adequate that the unit can be stopped and immobilized for long weeks, which means million-dollar losses. But the Kremlin doesn't gotta pay attention. They will accomplish a certain effect – they will hit the West, distract from current events in Ukraine, and themselves will stay hidden, which is typical of hybrid activities.
Why is fighting the shadow fleet so difficult?
And here we go back to the beginning of our conversation. In its territorial waters, the State has a basis for action against abroad vessels. But even here, he can halt and check a abroad flag unit only under global law. In addition, territorial waters extend only 12 Mm, or about 22 km, from the shore. We inactive have an exclusive economical region and an open sea. As I mentioned, ships can only be stopped and controlled in exceptional situations. The legal position quo would be hard to change, and even if appropriate mechanisms could be activated, the change process itself would take many years. Moreover, far-reaching adjustments would entail risks, as they would open the way for a possible opponent to troublesome control of ships sailing to Poland, for example. It is so essential to operate under the current rules. The monitoring of critical infrastructure should besides be strengthened. Take advantage of the possibilities offered by modern technology, although, of course, the installation of surveillance systems over the full dimension of pipelines and cables seems difficult. There's just besides many of them. In addition, they frequently extend to hundreds or thousands of miles.
The hydrographic vesselORP ‘Hewelius’ checks that the underwater infrastructure has not been damaged.
In this context, therefore, patrol activities are crucial – for example Operation Baltic Sentry, which NATO has been moving since January in the Baltic, or older yet Bay Operation Initiated by our jacket. The presence of allied ships may discourage the enemy from hybrid activities, and in the event of a diversion act, however, increases the chances of stopping the perpetrators in practically red-handed action. This does not solve the problem, due to the fact that the actual initiators of this kind of action are hard to reach, but the specified punishment of the crew or the immobilization of the ship for any time hits any part of the mechanism...
Except you're talking about hybrid activities. What about oil smuggling? This process is much more difficult.
That is correct, due to the fact that – let us repeat again – it is hard to control a ship that passes through global waters and does not violate any regulations.
So what do we do?
Some action is being taken by the European Union, which, in the 17th package of sanctions announced in May, extended the ban on access to Community ports already for 342 vessels active in Russian oil transport. The United Kingdom is taking akin steps.
Denmark went further, which announced the confiscation of tankers passing through its waters without valid insurance and current data on the flag.
A extremist step, but let us be clear: the starting point for this is the existing rules.
Is that enough? After all, ships from the shadow fleet seldom commit specified gross violations, and most of them besides travel in open waters without calling European ports.
Reflectable is the road that the United States set out after 2003 as part of a programme to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to halt the smuggling of specified materials, they began to sign agreements with the countries of the inexpensive flag. If the Americans suspected that a ship registered, for example, in Liberia or in the Bahamas was carrying a prohibited cargo, they informed the administration on the basis of the agreements. Depending on the agreement, the flag State had 48 hours or 72 hours to protest. At that time, the ship was evidently being tracked. If there were no objections, the U.S. forces would conduct a check and, if necessary, halt the ship and launch an investigation. In my opinion, it is besides possible to implement specified a mechanics for the shadow fleet. Only that it requires many diplomatic treatments that will convince the low-cost flag states to join in or force them on them.
