The election run before the accelerated elections to the Bundestag in 2025 showed that German democracy is in the deepest crisis in its history. The premature end of the government's "road signal" [SPD-FDP-Green coalition] However, in November 2024 it is only an indirect manifestation of it, as governments sometimes neglect and their change is 1 of the key advantages of democratic governance. Also, the fact that many parties had the chance to join Parliament and the outgoing government left many dissatisfied citizens is not a direct proof of the crisis of democracy. After all, the expansion of political offer and change of moods revive democratic competition. The main symptom of the crisis should be the successes of the following parties, primarily the far-right and proputin AfD, as well as the pro-Russian political start-up, centered around Sahra Wagenknecht. Her BSW organization sits even in the government of 2 states, although the constitution-written intra-party democracy is for this hierarchized group a concept with abroad land.
That's not all. Populist, and in the case of AfD, the openly xenophobic attack on the core values of German democracy was supported during the run by the richest man in the planet who owns a social platform shaping opinions across the globe. Elon Musk recommended AfD. The fact that he is even discussing his unequivocally fascist greeting or the pure nonsense of AfD candidate Alice Weidel (according to her, Hitler was a Communist), shows clearly how susceptible conventional public space has become to the influences of extremist opposition elements associated with the widespread neofascism. At the end of the election campaign, the leading opposition candidate broke his earlier promises, announcing his willingness to cooperate with the AfD to get a parliamentary majority. CDU president Friedrich Merz thus showed that the utmost right does not gotta inhibit its radicalism at all in order to find a partner to cooperate. This voluntary breakdown of the democratic center surely cheered the Kremlin authorities, Budapest and the White House. Alice Weidel immediately met Viktor Orban, both forming European pillars for Trump-Putin axis.
These processes in Germany are part of a favourable global situation. The net and technology oligarchs adapt – as could be expected – to any government, and even are ideological drivers of executive authoritarianism. Putin's war drains western budgets, and his propaganda finds its counterpart in the Trump space, in which there are post-truths and decisive rejection of the division of power in the state. The overlap of social and migration issues has led to cracks inside classical parties, and democratic conservatism is measured by the emotional and hateful rage of the fresh right. According to Alice Weidel, even Donald Tusk is simply a “leftist”. The word “woke” functions in these circles as a pejorative concept, under which, in case of doubt, all supporter of equal human rights falls.
However, there is besides a national regression. The current crisis of German democracy and extremist polarisation are an expression of an exaggerated and disintegrating reaction to the reverse phenomenon, which in the early 2000s long shaped the local political system, namely apolitical consensus. Of course, this is not the only origin of today's fierceness, due to the fact that media transformation besides plays a crucial role. However, looking back makes it clear to us that the attractiveness of uncompromising attitudes, now represented by politicians, is besides a consequence and counter-product of the consensusal deficiency of alternatives. Policy fragmentation to the fundamental rejection of competition is due to a applicable test rationalist policy regulation of alternatives. The second of the opposing poles was comparatively innocent, but its consensus reflects present in a peculiar identity thought that besides embraces democratic parties. Emphasis is placed on attitudes and principles, although we could usage more negotiating capacity. In this way, those with whom a democratic compromise is simply a priori impossible are strengthened, due to the fact that their extremist attitude seeks to overthrow the system.
Long time of no alternative
W Germany's disintegrating consensus began with Schröder's regulation and his neoliberal reforms in the early millennium. It is frequently forgotten who participated in the 2010 Agenda and the Hartz reforms. First, the then Green Government and the SPD set up an expert committee to make migration, free marketplace and social safety reforms. The alleged "Hartz Commission", led by VW manager, developed free marketplace solutions in 2000, with which trade unions initially agreed. Their representatives in the committee were promised to defend jobs in transforming old employment offices into the national Labour Agency.
Subsequent reforms of the 2010 Agenda, specified as the combination of unemployment benefits with the lowest social assistance and the general deregulation of the labour market, yet gained the support of all the parties of the Bundestag at the time. Political content was considered to be without alternatives, since competitiveness had to be ensured. Keynesism supporters were practically invisible. Due to the deficiency of transparency of consensus, opposition votes were lacking in parliament, which led to the fragmentation of the organization system. In place of the then-lost post-communist PDS party, the German organization of the left emerged – Die Linke, who has been in the Bundestag since 2005, but due to a critical stance towards pro-Western orientation has so far not been able to coalition at national level.
The weakening of the largest parties was immense and lasting. The SPD has no longer seen as a working party. Green [Bündnis 90/Die Grünen] It was abruptly seen as a organization of Western German elites, although they besides have their roots in the East German civilian movement. The FDP has established its free marketplace image. The CDU/CSU besides lost the components of the welfare state to economical liberalism despite Merkel's triumph over Merze.
The organization dimension was the long years of the large coalition, which were interrupted briefly between 2009 and 2013, erstwhile the CDU created a government with a dysfunctionally progressing FDP. any neoliberal reforms were phased out and minimum wage introduced. Between 2005 and 2021, a large coalition between CDU and SPD was established 3 times. However, the way in which the mill was governed remained water for those who lacked alternatives in the prevailing political system. Political constellations at the time of the crisis became a German state model, in which parties in a pluralist parliament were inactive competing, but for citizens no longer substance who is in charge now and who is in opposition. The negative communicative about the ‘old batches’ that allegedly formed a compact block was successfully utilized by the highly populist AfD. Prior to its establishment in 2013, the first informing signals in the form of successes appeared, which were highly right-wing parties in individual lands. besides on the another side of the political scene appeared symptoms of radicalization. While AfD was gaining importance, Sarah Wagenknecht became co-chair of the left (2015-2019). For a time, she became the leader of the opposition before AfD grew up to be the largest opposition faction in 2017.
During the 4 term, a large coalition was established 3 times, Germany was led by a exile crisis, coronavirus or euro, but the democratic core of politics was lost. From the point of view of citizens, the aim is to control power through electoral votes and to have different alternatives to choose. Sarah Wagenknecht and then AfD were the leading alternate to government policy in 2015-2021. Thus, in the pluralistic shell, those forces that favour Putin's ideological attack on the democratic strategy or even, like AfD, actively support him.
A longing for a organization identity
After the 2017 Bundestag election there truly was a chance for a rational division of government and opposition. The consequence gave parties a democratic center the chance to show work to prevent AfD from taking over leadership against the opposition. However, a organization centered around 1 leader, who after 4 years of absence again entered the Bundestag, did not do so. This is about the FDP.
The first to see electoral possible in practicing anti-consensual strict policy was the FDP chief Christian Lindner. In 2017, he behaved highly selfishly, breaking up for no clear reason the negotiations on the CDU-FDP-Green coalition. The CDU and SPD were again forced to establish an unliked large coalition, most of which shrinked. Lindner's success was short-lived. By 2021, the FDP presented itself as faithful to the principles of opposition, while leading parties were tired of ruling. In 2021, the FDP again achieved two-digit support (11.5%). Lindner was credited as the party's savior, considered almost dead in 2013. The consequences were seemingly indifferent to him, and were that right-wing extremists Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel took over the function of opposition leaders, and in addition the FDP lost its image of a government stabilizer.
In 2021. Lindner couldn't avoid cooperating anymore. Meanwhile, the 2017 coalition would be much simpler in terms of programming than the light signaling coalition. Lindner besides decided not to compromise in the government. Spiral was going on: the worse the ratings, the stronger the organization put on a clear profile. The FDP behaved increasingly as opposition in government. In the fall of 2024, even the ultimat was given to coalition partners. Related to FDP media, Springer-Verlag and another fresh libertarian-right media praised this inflexibility. The organization long and consistently prepared – secretly aiming for it – at the end of the coalition to later take a better starting position during the parliamentary elections. However, Lindner could not fishy that the Transport Minister Volker Wissing, who originally was the author of the coalition of "light signalization", would refuse to obey and leave the party. Wissing remained in the government. Uncompromising, expected attachment to his own beliefs, proved to be an opportunistic filter with right-Libertarian press and a possible electorate focused around it. After the break-up of the coalition, Lindner even fantasized about Mileiu and Musku before Weidel (a disruptive original) willingly picked up this message.
However, others have besides late fallen into a trap of longing for a organization identity, which promises short-term success, but in the long word prevents coalitions in a democratic center, strengthening extremists. The trend is determination, and distancing from caricature political opponents becomes a goal in itself, which stems from the publicistic customs of right-wing conservatism. For example, CSU president Markus Söder seems to be yielding to the sentiments loudly promoted by media people specified as Julian Reichelt ("Nius") and Ulf Poschardt (the publisher of Die Welt). According to them, coalitions with the Greens are mostly excluded. Just a fewer years ago, Söder hugged the trees to present himself as a possible candidate for Chancellor with a "green" option, and during the election run he put force on Merz, who did not exclude the coalition with the Greens, but due to the rhetoric of CDU/CSU it would be highly difficult. Lindner, on the another hand, formally ruled out the coalition with the Greens. Thus recklessly limited coalition options in advance, hoping to mobilise their own electorate. organization identity is above state responsibility.
This may make a fatal impression that there is an equal distance between the conservative camp on the 1 hand, as well as utmost right-wing and left-liberal liberalism on the other. This is where Merz pulled the CDU. As early as 2023, he declared the Greens to be a "major opponent" to then – as usual in his case – retreat from it. His breaking of the word from the end of January, or effort to exert force on the number government of the SPD and the Greens through his previously excluded cooperation with the AfD, fits into this tradition. Motivated by the desire to show organization determination, the candidate for Chancellor abandoned earlier declarations of non-cooperative with the AfD. Meanwhile, his task had no chance of being accepted by the Bundesrat at all. Merz lost due to missing CDU/CSU and FDP votes and Angela Merkel criticism. Nevertheless, the media, including the "Bild", praised the CDU candidate for his actions, which he himself announced in the essence of the "trump" style. Mr Merz stated that on the first day of office he intended to exercise his constitutional power to specify policy guidelines [‘Richtlinenkompetenz’] to issue certain directives. In the Bundestag, he intends to show that he takes the implementation of his programme seriously. “I don’t look right or left. I look only straight”, his announcements sound rather like presidential decrees.
A man with large opportunities for a chancellor should decently realize where uncompromising tactics can lead in the parliamentary system. The balance of the ‘road signalling’ coalition and the subsequent number government of SPD-Greens, and in peculiar their ineptitude, clearly justify a change of power. However, the logic of tightening divisions and obstructing coalitions in a democratic center and presenting AfD as a majority option is irresponsible. At a crucial minute in German and European history, focusing on uncompromisingness threatens a balanced and holistic assessment of the situation.
This remains valid besides after the election, even though Lindner and Wagenknecht suffered defeat with their parties, and the only realistic coalition option is the CDU/CSU and SPD alliance. The utmost right, anti-democratic and thus by definition incapable of integration, has been importantly strengthened. On the another hand, the reborn Left presents itself as an anti-fascist project, but at the same time leaning towards left-wing populism, which lacks, above all, a realistic view of abroad policy.
This "professional" opposition has been successful due to the fact that the SPD has not indicated its presence in its key area of competence, which is social justice, and appears to be programme-exhausted. The CDU/CSU, on the another hand, includes voices advising Merz to make blackmail related to the joint vote with AfD the norm. organization historian and intellectual Andreas Rödder sees in this “enlargement of the maneuvering field ... besides after the formation of the coalition”. However, specified a game with fire, loosening of close organization identity, would again benefit only AfD. It is the opponents of democracy who benefit most from the developments outlined here. Whether their performance towards the president of Ukraine in the Oval Office will prove to be a saving shock in the long run remains an open issue.
