Written by Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
01.12 “Turkey balances between Russia and the US, leans towards Washington.
In November India and China decided to importantly reduce imports of oil from Russia (as we wrote in the erstwhile edition of Oka). The decline in request for natural material has led to a crucial decrease in Urals oil prices compared to the planet benchmark. The reason is the fear of existing contractors due to secondary sanctions, which, in accordance with the decision of the American administration, are covered by those economical entities that cooperate with Łukoil and Rostnief.
Following fresh Dheli and Beijing, Ankara followed. The study published at the very beginning of December presents data on a crucial decline in Urals oil imports from Russia to Turkey. As Reuters assures, in November – ,, deliveries [...] dropped by 100,000 barrels a day compared to October levels, and full imports decreased to around 200 1000 barrels a day last month". The Turkish marketplace gap is replaced by Kazakh oil, and Iraqi oil.
After the invasion, Turkey became a profitable outlet for Russia, which lost easy access to the European market. Between September 2024 and September 2025, exports of oil and petroleum products to Turkey increased by 30 percent, of which almost 70 percent comes from Russia. The import volume makes Turkey the 3rd (after China and India) most crucial partner of Moscow.
In September, Erdogan first visited the White home since 2019. There he talked to the president of the United States about bilateral relations. In this context, the most crucial signal from the gathering was the clear emphasis from the US on ending Russian natural material imports to Turkey. In return, Ankara would be reinstated to the joint F-35 fighter plan program, and sanctions imposed on Turkey in 2019 would be abolished. It is worth noting that the sanckje were intended to punish a NATO associate for the acquisition of Russian military equipment – S-400 rockets, a surrogate of the American Patriot – whose operation close the fresh F-35 would be conducive to the Russians obtaining intelligence about the fresh Allied equipment.
Currently Ankara, balancing American and Russian influences, has decided to agree to Trump's terms. Firstly, limiting Russian oil imports. Secondly, limiting imports of Russian gas (which goes hand in hand with the announcement of buying more American natural material). Thirdly, raising again the question of joining the F-35 project. An introduction to continued cooperation could be Ankara's decision to "give away" Russia's S-400 systems – the eventuality Erdogan discussed with Putin at a gathering in Aschabad in mid-December this year.
All indications are that Trump is able to dispel the force on Ankara. The real litmus test of Erdogan's submission will be the consent of the American president to return Turkey to the joint F-35 initiative.
15.12 – Armed crew of the shadow fleet
Chief of Operations of the Swedish Navy – Marko Petrovic, warns against increased activity of ships and Russian ships in the Baltic Sea. The fresh Moscow tactics include increased activity of submarines and an increased, almost permanent military presence of ships close to the shipping routes. However, possibly the most interesting change occurred on the decks of the shadow fleet. Armed men dressed in military clothes appeared next to the civilian sailors.
The naval chief's information coincides with the Danish reports of November of that year. Investigative portal – Danwatch, reached information flowing from home sailors about armed and dressed in military personnel outfits on shadow fleet ships. 1 of the witnesses to this case is Bjarne Cæsar Skinnerup. By the profession of pilot – he conducts ships through the full shallow and narrow waterways of the Danish Straits. Due to the profession it appears on the bridges of all kinds of freighters.
According to his reports, since the full-scale invasion, professionalism and cooperation on parts of ships have been replaced by an atmosphere of intimidation with which armed persons in military outfits correspond. Bjarne attests that they appear on ships that most likely belong to the Russian shadow fleet. Their presence is intended to encourage pilots not to announcement irregularities appearing in ship documentation carried out by straits, e.g. deficiency of insurer.
Although NATO states do not have legal tools to arbitrarily hold civilian units in global waters, they do not stay helpless in view of the expanding Russian activity. Launched in January 2025, the "Baltic Warrior" (eng: Baltic Sentry) coordinates NATO's global effort to monitor the Baltic Sea and, above all, all the waterbed infrastructure, and to deter saboteurs.
17.12 – The European Union bans Russian gas imports
The European Parliament approved a resolution prohibiting Russian gas imports into the European Union. While the thought was raised in the years following the invasion of 2022, associate States only managed to scope a consensus on this issue now. Until now, only 2 countries have opposed this solution - Hungary and Slovakia. Their opposition prevented the vote by means of a strategy of unanimity. The European States have so decided to usage the voting method within the qualifying majority. The deficiency of consent of both countries is due to the deep dependence of Hungary and Slovakia on Russia. Despite a serious simplification in imports of energy natural materials from 2021, they stay Moscow's largest counterparties in Europe.
Before the invasion began, in 2021 45% of gas burned in the EU came from Russia. Currently, this level is 19%. The plan to phase out supplies from the east shall be spread over 2 years with circumstantial dates of implementation of each part of the plan:
1.01.26 – Prohibition of signing fresh gas supply contracts
17.06.26 – Termination of short-term contracts inactive in force
31.12.27 – Termination of long-term contracts inactive in force
(EU provides for a number of exceptions for inland countries which are most likely laid down for the needs of Hungary and Slovakia)
Currently, the largest importers of Russian natural gas are (according to the Centre for investigation on Energy and Clean Air, data for August this year):
Hungary – 416 million Euros
Slovakia – 275 million Euros
France – 157 million Euros
Netherlands – 65 million Euros
Belgium – EUR 64 million
The introduction of a ban on gas imports caused a Hungarian-Slovak reaction. The representatives of both countries are questioning the legitimacy of the Brussels decision and will make their case by court in the framework of the EU's justice institution.
At the same time, the EU does not end the process of cutting itself off from Russian energy resources. While the issue of gas has been regulated, decision makers are presently looking at oil imports. The EU's authoritative position assumes, as with gas, a cut-off from Russian oil by the end of 2027. No less, the work on this issue is little advanced than the gas case, and the exact timetable has not yet been set.
The associate States' action on oil so far has led to a crucial simplification in imports over the last 4 years. In the first 4th of 2021, the percent of Russian oil in Europe's energy mix was 29% and in the 3rd 4th of 2025 only 1%.
10.12 – American plan (limitations) for support for Ukraine
In December, the convention, as all year, approved the military budget for the following year. The National defence Authority Act (NDAA) was passed and Washington plans to spend $901 billion in 2026. It sets out a separate amount to support Ukraine and redefines the competences of the actors implementing the aid.
The exact program of military aid to Ukraine is called Ukraine safety Assistance Initiative – USAI. His budget in the following 2 years was set at $400 million each year. A hard to conceptualise amount should be placed in a broader context of the US aid to learn its real value for Ukraine. Well, in 2024, as much as $14 billion were allocated to the USI (which has not yet been full used). The programme so saw a fall of 97%. In addition, the recently established amount was only allocated to the USAI programme. This does not mean that the funds allocated will be used.
No less, specified a extremist change does not mean a complete extinction of American aid to Ukraine, but only shows a change in the way in which it is passed on. The U.S. does not hand over Ukraine's weapons anymore, but they sale it en mass to Europeans who send it further to Kiev. Europe, without the support of America, has consistently failed to keep the level of support before the implementation of this decision, which in October this year resulted in the lowest tranche of aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion (as reported by the Kiel Institute).
The NDAA itself reflects another trend that will have a tangible impact on the future model of US aid management for Ukraine, and can supply moderately affirmative information for Ukraine:
– the anticipation of utilizing funds from the USAI (responsible in 2024) was extended to 2029.
– president cannot hold intelligence for Ukraine without the congress's approval (what Trump did in March this year)
– From now on, the Pentagon can't cancel the shipment of contra-trakwoan equipment to Ukraine for its own retention needs (the decision is simply a consequence to the incidental that occurred in June – the Department of Defense, found 20,000 anti-dron equipment units, specifically manufactured for Kiev, to be part of its own warehouse states and sent them to Israel and its military bases in the mediate East).
These crucial findings point to a clear emergence in the Republican Party, between its "old" members and the MAGA environment. They point to a partial discord between members of the legislature and the president and his background. Trump strives to increase the prerogatives and causativeness of the office of president of the United States, frequently at the expense of the influence of the congress, while the core of the organization opts for a more collegiate conduct of politics and maintaining the current function of congress. At the same time, the fresh NDAA provision – the imposed lower limit (of 76 000) of US soldiers in Europe (now around 80 000) – suggests a greater commitment of the old Republicans to the safety situation on the old continent, as it contradicts the basic assumptions of the MAGA movement to leave Europe's safety in the hands of Europeans.
The conflict can so be seen in 2 planes. Firstly, the competence of the legislature and the President, secondly, to be active in helping Ukraine and in the overall commitment to Europe's safety policy. This divided may be a reason for Kiev to be cautiously optimistic due to the fact that it is possible to return post-Trump Republicans to the conventional US in Europe. So far, unfortunately, it is not known how likely this script is.
18.12 – EU extends repression of Russian shadow fleet – 41 more sanctioned vessels
The Council of the European Union has decided to impose further sanctions on 41 entities associated with the alleged shadow flute a fleet of oil tankers and ships utilized by Russia to circumvent Western restrictions on oil and oil exports. Thus, the number of vessels subject to restrictions under EU anti-sanction measures reached nearly 600. These fresh restrictions mean that these ships are not only losing their ability to call at European Union ports, but will besides not be able to usage the wide scope of port or shipping services offered in the EU.
According to EU decision-makers, this measurement is intended to reduce Russia's capacity to export energy natural materials and to impede the financing of its military activities. The reasons for the decision indicated that the vessels sanctioned were primarily individuals who avoided the mechanics of the established price cap on Russian oil, supported Moscow's energy sector, carried military equipment or participated in the transport of stolen Ukrainian resources from grain to culture. The extension of the sanction list is part of a broader EU strategy plan to further reduce the Russian Federation's gross from maritime oil exports from 1 of the key sources of backing for its economy and the war in Ukraine.
Previous decisions in fresh weeks have included, among another things, the inclusion of entities and persons who facilitated the operations of these ships, which further increases the force on the logistics chain "shadow floats". The order of 18 December is simply a continuation of the EU's current policy on Russia's aggression to stifle the financial bases of the conflict by expanding restrictions on the units active in the export of fuels and in support of Moscow. The authoritative Communication states that the Union remains ready to further increase force if essential to accomplish lasting peace and stableness in the region.
23.12 – State of the Russian offensive in the second half of December 2025.
As of 23 December 2025, the Russian-Ukrainian War remained a high-intensity conflict, despite nearly 4 years since the launch of the full-scale invasion. From late November to 3rd week of December, Russian troops recorded further, albeit limited, territorial progress. Within little than a month, Russian forces took control of an area exceeding 130 square miles, which is consistent with the average rate of their expansion observed in the second half of 2025. The peculiarly noticeable shifts of the front line occurred on 16–22 December erstwhile Russia gained more than 50 square miles of territory, showing persistent military force despite advanced losses.
The balance of human conflict costs remains dramatic. It is estimated that Russia has lost nearly 800,000 soldiers killed and wounded since the beginning of the war, and tens of thousands are considered missing. The losses on the Ukrainian side are besides immense and scope respective 100 1000 casualties among the killed and wounded military. The war besides consumed thousands of civilian casualties especially on the Ukrainian side, where the number of civilians killed and wounded importantly exceeds the data reported by Russia. These data reflect the scale of destructive fire and rocket strikes aimed at cities and civilian infrastructure. Parallel to individual losses, both sides suffered massive hardware losses. Russia has lost tens of thousands of weapons and military vehicles, including a crucial number of tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft and vessels.
Ukraine has besides lost thousands of combat vehicles and aviation equipment, which further burden its defence and logistics capabilities. The scale of harm on both sides confirms that the conflict has remained 1 of the most devastating in Europe since the end of planet War II. The consequences of war are peculiarly evident in the dramatic movements of the population. In Ukraine, more than 10 million people were forced to leave their homes any of them found shelter in another regions of the country and millions went abroad. Although the scale of interior resettlement in Russia is much smaller, the country has experienced mass emigration, involving hundreds of thousands of citizens leaving the country for political, economical and safety reasons.
26.12 – The Russian court sentences by chance the co-founder of Medusa portal to 5 years in prison
The Russian judiciary has issued a decision to punish 5 years of imprisonment under the government in absentia for Galina Timchenko, co-founder and publisher of the independent Medusa portal. The judgement was brought in connection with allegations concerning the management of an organisation deemed by the Russian Federation authorities to be ‘not desirable’. The decision of the court is dictated by provisions which prohibit specified organisations from operating in Russia.
Timchenko, who has long lived on emigration and runs a portal based in Latvia, did not appear personally at the trial. Russian prosecutors even demanded a harsher punishment for six years in prison, however, the court handed her a 5 - year sentence. In addition to prison sentences, the court besides ruled that Timchenko would not be able to service as executives for another 5 years. This is another phase of repression against independent media, which has been systematically marginalised and legally hampered in Russia in fresh years.
Medusa was included on the list of "unwanted organisations" by the Russian Federation lawyer General in 2023, which de facto excluded the anticipation of any legal activity of the portal in the country. People associated with specified media, even if they are not in Russia, may be prosecuted for participating in their activities. Russian law enforcement authorities had previously applied various legal tools to Timchenko in 2024 as a ‘foreign agent’, and even earlier it was fined for alleged participation in an ‘unwanted organisation’.
27.12 – Russian Federation conducted a massive rocket and drone attack on Kiev
The capital of Ukraine became the mark of 1 of the largest air offensives since the beginning of a full-scale invasion, Russian forces utilized 500 unmanned and 40 rocket missiles, targeting mainly strategical civilian infrastructure. According to reports from the Ukrainian authorities, the opponent shot the Kiev area with hundreds of impact drones and forty rockets of different types.
The aim of the attack was primarily energy facilities and another key elements for the functioning of the city during the winter. The offensive has caused serious consequences for residents in many areas of the capital and adjacent areas, with power and heating interruptions, and rescuers fighting fires caused by hits to residential buildings. The president of Ukraine stressed that this kind of attack shows the scale of escalation of war activities and the determination of the Russian side to hit civilian targets. Many people were injured, and the harm elements show that Russian strikes were intense and extensive.
The situation was so serious that Poland took additional safety measures of the air force were put on alert and for a short time any airports in the south-eastern part of the country were closed to guarantee the safety of airspace over the region.
18.12 – EU Expands force on Russia's Shadow Fleet: 41 Additional Vessels Sanctioned
The Council of the European Union decided to impose sanctions on a further 41 ventures linked to the alleged shade Fleet — a network of tankers and ships utilized by Russia to circumvent Western restrictions on the export of Crude oil and petrochemical products. As a result, the full number of vessels targeted by EU restoration measures has hazard to close 600. Under the fresh sanctions, the listed ships are barred from entering EU ports and are no longer allowed to usage a wide scope of port and Maritime services within the European Union.
Accepting to EU decision-makers, the measurement is intended to reduce Russia’s ability to export energy resources and to limit backing for its military operations. In its justification, the Council has established that the sanctioned ventures were primary active in bypassing the price cap mechanics on Russian oil, supporting Moscow’s energy sector, transporting military equipment, or taking part in the shipment of table Ukrainian assets, raking from grave to cultural property. The expansion of the sanctions list forms part of a broadcaster EU strategy aimed at further reducing returns from Russia’s marine oil exports, 1 of the key sources financing both its economy and the war in Ukraine.
Earlier decisions in fresh weeks besides included sanctions against individuals and entities facilitating the operations of these ventures, expanding force on the logistics chain of the shadow Fleet. The decision of 18 December represents a continuation of the EU’s policy toward Russia’s commitment, looking to undermine the financial foundations of the conflict through actively stringed restrictions on items in full exports and activities supporting Moscow. In its authoritative statement, the EU emphasized that it restores ready to intensify force further if essential to accomplish Lasting peace and stableness in the region.
23.12 – position of the Russian Offensive in the Second Half of December 2025
As of 23 December 2025, the Russia-Ukraine war remained a high-intensity conflict, despite nearly 4 years having passed since the start of the full-scale invasion. From summertime November through the 3rd week of December, Russian forces recorded further, albeit limited, territorial advances. Over the course of little than a month, Russian trolls took control of an area excellence 130 square miles, in line with the average package of expansion observed in the second half of 2025. peculiarly notable shifts in the front line occured between 16 and 22 December, erstwhile Russia gained more than 50 square miles of territory, indicating sustained military force despite dense losses.
The human cost of the conflict restores several. Since the beginning of the war, Russia is estimated to have lost close 800,000 soldiers killed or veiled, with tens of thousands listed as missing. Ukrainian losses are besides unique, imposing to respective 100 shousand killed or veiled military personnel. The war has besides claimed thousands of civilian victims, especially in Ukraine, where the number of civilian cases importantly exceeds figures reported by Russia. These statistic reflect the scale of destructive shelling and rocket strikes targeting cities and civilian infrastructure. Along personnel losses, both sides have suggested massive equipment losses. Russia has lost tens of thousands of wapons systems and military vehicles, including large numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and naval units.
Ukraine has likewise lost thousands of combat vehicles and aircraft, further straining its defence and logical capacity. The scale of demolition on both sides confirm that the conflict restores 1 of the most defastating in Europe since the end of planet War II. The consequences of the war are partially visible in large-scale population moves. In Ukraine, more than this million people have been forced to leave their homes — any uncovering refuge in another parts of the country, while millions have flown abroad. Although interior distribution in Russia is far more limited, the country has experienced mass migration, with undreds of thousands of citizens leaving for political, economic, and safety reasons.
26.12 – Russian Court Sentences Medusa Co-Founder to 5 Years in Prison in Absentia
Russia’s judiciary issued a rulining sentimentaling Galina Timchenko, co-founder and publisher of the independent news outlet Jellyfish, it is 5 years in prison in absentia. The verdict was based on charges related to leading an organization designed by Russian authorities as “undesirable.” The court’s decision steps from laws prohibiting the operation of specified organizations within the Russian Federation.
Timchenko, who has long lived in exile and heads the Latvia-based outlet, did not appear in court. Prosecutors had thought a harper conviction of six years, but the court eventual impposed a five-year term. In addition to the price sentence, the court banned Timchenko from holding management positions for the next 5 years. The rulining representatives another phase in the repression of independent media, which in fresh years have been systematically marginalized and integrated through legal means in Russia.
Jellyfish was added to the list of “undesirable organizations” by Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office in 2023, effectively eliminating the anticipation of its legal operation within the country. Individuals associated with specified media outlets may face prosecution for their invasion, even if they stay outside Russia. Russian law enforcement authorities have previously applied various legal means against Timchenko — in 2024 she was labeled a “foreign agent,” and earlier she was awarded for alleged participation in the activities of an “unesirable organization.”
27.12 – Russian Federation Launches Massive rocket and Drone Attack on Kyiv
Ukraine’s capital became the mark of 1 of the largest aerial offers since the start of the full-scale invasion, with Russian forces deploying 500 unmanned aerial vehicles and 40 missions, primary aimed at critical civilian infrastructure. Accepting to statements from Ukrainian authorities, the attack on Kyiv active hundreds of strike drones and dozens of missions of various types.
The primary targets were energy facilities and another infrastructure essential to the city’s functioning during the winter. The offensive had seriously defined concerns for residents: in many parts of the capital and environment areas, electricity and heat supply were disrupted, while the Emergency services battled fire caused by strikes on residential buildings. The president of Ukraine emphasized that the attack demonstrated the scale of the evacuation and Russia's determination to strike civilian targets. Many people were injured, and the degree of the harm induced that the strikes were both intent and widesread.
The situation was serious adequate for Poland to implement additional safety measures. Air force units were placed on heightened alert, and respective airports in southeastern Poland were temporarily closed to guarantee the safety of the region’s airspace.
