About Polish knighthood fighting in Vienna and the sense of help

myslsuwerenna.pl 1 year ago

“My [husband] is bound to go to war. There is no way I can talk him down.”¹

Anna from Stanisławski Zbąska wrote about her 3rd husband, under the Lublin subchamber Janie Zbąski, who in 1683 moved with Jan III Sobieski to free Vienna.

The motivation of the Polish nobility

In 1677. For the 3rd and last time Anna stood on the wedding carpet. She was happy due to the fact that her matrimony was very successful. However, to her despair, the lord of Lublin subcommissioners had the same "fail" as her father (Michael Stanislawski) and second husband (Jan Zbigniew Oleśnicki) who died as a consequence of war struggles. As a Polish nobleman, he placed his work in the first place to service God and his country, so erstwhile John III Sobieski went to Vienna's rescue in 1683, Mr Zbąski pulled behind him. Anna wrote about his motivations:

‘I do not accept persuasion,

A greedy man of reputation.

Free to mention it,

What was in his youth.

It's full of desire.

And this inherent virtue,

Especially on bisurmanin,

Such a large pagan.

Also in my [husband] said,

That she was inactive there

The virtue that counseled him,

I'd like her to put it in this square.

I don't perceive to [my husband] my persuasion,

I don't want to give her a spot.

He says, "I'm fortunate I'll be,

I'll lose my life there, though,

Where my religion goes,

Because I want to pour my blood on her!

And if Allah permits,

It'll set me free.

What do you want me to do?

And she's sorry?

Let it ruin itself.

I cut myself!²

So you went to war with the lubel subcommissioners, and Anna wrote:

"I am more and more sad, remembering that I have lost my husband to the army and to my father, and I am afraid of him [the 3rd husband]."³

Turns out Anna's fear was justified. True, the triumph at Vienna was permanently entered into the pantheon of the fame of the Polish weapon, but Zbąski, not saving himself in the battalion, was injured in the leg. It seems harmless. However, after a long time this wound led to his death.

The Polish Knights who saved Vienna from the muslim storm were people of blood and bones. They had families and property. The second allowed them to enjoy life without getting hurt, death, or even separation from their loved ones. Yet so many Polish nobles, bearing large costs, enlisted in the army and went to defend not even their own borders, but others' borders. Why? What guided them? I have long been fascinated by this subject, as I am intrigued by the motivations of the people of various eras serving in the military. The second were and are very different. For example, in an army day created by a draft, you went to the army in fear of the consequences of a refusal. The State had appropriate means of coercion. But since “there is no good individual from the slave,” so there was seldom a good soldier from the conscript. Better was 1 who went into combat without being forced to do so, or volunteer.

Volunteer motivations were varied. This can be seen, for example, by reading the memoirs of Jerzy Konrad Maciejewski, who voluntarily volunteered on 21 November 1918 to service in the ranks of the 1st Warsaw Volunteer Baon of the Lviv Defence Branch, that is, the unit that was sent to aid Polish defenders of Lviv. As he wrote erstwhile he appeared in the barracks:

"I have already found 4 military candidates. 2 advanced school slobs, 1 hebrew who enrolled out of poverty, and 1 szewski apprentice, a hot socialist who had no thought of socialism – joined the army only due to the fact that the fame proclaimed that in Lviv during street fights 1 could be richly hunted. Besides, there were many more specified “patriots” as it turned out later.”⁴

It was no different in the 17th century. The very fact that he joined the army as a volunteer did not mean that individual was doing it for patriotic or more general reasons: ideological or ethical. I wrote about this extensively in the books “Husaria close Vienna 1683”⁵ and ‘Husaria. Pride of Polish weapons”⁶Where I send everyone who wants to deepen the subject. Here I will only callback the opinion of Hussar's captain Jan Dobrogost Krasiński, who took part in the Vienna campaign. After that, he stated that the crown soldier “will own these centuries with a substance [a possession] serves”⁷. He added that the Polish knighthood for the expedition of 1683 "without payment, of its cost," longing for fame, and for the sake of the love of his homeland went forth, "for for this there is simply a reward for all man"⁸. As you can see, this coincides with the motivations that pushed Jan Zbąski to the war under the Lublin sub-chamber. However, we should remember that Krasiński and Zbąska wrote about the elite of the Polish army – the company of the national author. The motivation of the elite cannot be automatically extended to another soldiers, and even more so to a loose household. Besides, even as part of the company itself, you could meet people serving for different reasons...

The Society of National Authorship, namely Petyhor, Armoured and Cossacks (this is about a light ride, not about the Zaporoski Cossacks) and especially Hussars, has always been more valued than the remainder of the soldiers, and even more so than the ciurus, or loose hosts. His morale was usually higher, and his motives for military service were higher. It was no different in Vienna. And since the advanced morale of the society influenced the lower ranks of standing warriors, on September 1, 1683, Lieutenant of Husar's rota, Stanisław Potocki, wrote to his mother:

“A large desire in all for this voyna.”⁹

As a result, September 12, 1683:

‘Poles who [...] there [to the mountains around Vienna] climbed, fell [down] like crazy and fought like lions.”¹⁰

And for what?

As I wrote in the book Husaria close Vienna 1683:

“The comrades, without the large expense they had to bear, set out to rescue the imperial capital in a longstanding number. On their way to Vienna, as well as on the battlefield itself, the Hussars maintained exemplary discipline. Before they clashed with their opponent, they crossed a very difficult, woody area of the Viennese mountains. In conflict itself, they fought bravely. John III Sobieski was more pleased with them than with them, since on October 6, 1683, in a letter to his wife, he wrote “about any of ours, over all the world's expectations, you would gotta compose wonderful things.”¹¹. They besides gained designation in the eyes of allies.”¹²

Recognition, recognition, but many Poles inactive ask themselves why Sobieski went to Vienna in the first place? These doubts are not the domain of our time. Jan III Sobieski in his life had an opposition that sought to discredit the sense of run 1683. respective months after the battle, her participant, Jan Dobrogost Krasiński mentioned above, did so.¹³. Later it was only worse, and erstwhile Austria took part in the partitions of Poland, critics of the king's actions got wind in the sails. Already in the 1970s, arguments were spread that remained well to this day, that even if the Turks had captured Vienna in 1683, they were besides weak to control the full country. besides weak to even hold the city. Polish aid to the emperor so accelerated the fall of the weak state and strengthened our future possessor.

However, this criticism is based on incorrect assumptions. The war fought in 1683-1699 showed that the Ottoman Empire was not as weak as a fewer decades later claimed. The best evidence is that the coalition of Christian states (the Empire, the Republic of Poland, Venice and the Moscow State) needed as many as a twelve years to win it. The consequence of the Russian-Turkish war from 1710-1713 is even more meaningful. In the process, even though Russia had just shown its power, it would seem the invincible Swedes of Charles XII, but it succumbed to the Ottoman Empire.

It is besides crucial to realize that Jan III Sobieski made an anti-Turkish alliance with the emperor erstwhile it was not yet known who the Sultan would choose to mark for his troops. The situation in 1683 was alarming for the Republic. During this time, thanks to the acceptance by the insurgents of Imre Thököly of the Sultan's sovereignty, Turkish influences reached the alleged advanced Hungary, or Slovakia. And there was only a step to Krakow from there. So if the Muslims wanted to hit Poland, the fights could be fought not far distant on Podol (as in 1672-1676), but on the Polish capital¹⁴Oh, my God! It was a deadly threat to our country. All the more so, that this war of 1672-1676 showed that, yes, we were able to defend the existence of the state, but only at the expense of major territorial losses.

At the time of the Ottoman army becoming emperor, did it make sense to disobey the allies? say Sobieski had either not mobilized the army in time or mobilized it, but he had not reached Vienna before it fell. What would all European courts then see? The weakness of the Republic and its king! Quotations of Poland as an ally would fall on their heads. The ally is valuable as long as he is strong and honours his obligations. erstwhile he does not do so, the question arises, why associate with specified a individual at all. And the anti-Turkish alliance was as crucial to Poles as it was to Austrians. due to the fact that at the 1683 campaign, it surely wouldn't have ended. John III Sobieski understood all these conditions perfectly, so in his letter to Nicholas Sieniawski in July 1683, he clearly stated that “better in another people’s land, about another people’s bread, in the assistance of all the forces [assigned] to fight than to defend ourselves about their bread, and erstwhile we are inactive friends and neighbors will depart.”¹⁵.

READ ALSO: Unused triumph. The defeat of the abroad policy of Jan III Sobieski

As Poles, present we have a problem, expecting Austria to thank us for the aid we gave it in 1683. This is not a fresh problem. erstwhile black and even ungratefulness was experienced in the form of Austria's participation in the partitions of the Republic, this issue grew almost to the top level. besides in the 19th century, they tried to play a politically grateful card, an interesting evidence of which is the diary of Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz. Well, when, after the defeat of Napoleon's troops in Russia, Poles begged the Austrian chief stationed in the Duchy of Warsaw, Fr Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg, to defend Warsaw against the coming Russians, this was:

"All the motives were utilized to get the Iraqi chief to dissuade Moscow from Warsaw, reminding him that it was the only time to pay Austrians out of Polszcze's debt for saving Vienna. In vain [...]’¹⁶

The Austrians skillfully avoided fighting, so that Warsaw shortly fell into the hands of Moscow.

While in political games reaching for different, even emotional arguments, there is any sense (especially erstwhile we effort to influence individuals and societies that are easy emotional), it is crucial to realize that in serious politics gratitude is not a bargaining chip. States do not act on the basis of paying out of the real or alleged benefits they have received. Serious politics include a game of interests and a force of cause. It was in the Polish interest to participate in the Vienna aid, so Sobieski went there with the army. Not that the emperor, the pope, or anyone else would be grateful to him! And due to the fact that the Polish king was aware of the power of propaganda, he skillfully covered his actions with a fight for faith. specified an argument led to his popularity and among Poles themselves, and among Christians in Europe. In those days monarchs and countries defending Christianity against Islam were valued. So the Polish knighthood may have believed that it was actually going to holy war, which helped greatly in its mobilisation. In fact, however, it went out to fight in the most vital interest of its country, which it did not gotta realize so well. But it would be good for Poles to realize this after so many centuries.

[1]Anna Stanisławska, Transaction or describing the full life of 1 orphan by pathetic training since the same written year 1685. Wyd. Ida Kotowa. Kraków 1935. p. 180.

[2]Ibid., pp. 179-180.

[3]Ibid. p. 181.

[4]Jerzy Konrad Maciejewski, Zawadiak. Front Journals 1914-1920. Warsaw 2015. pp. 112-113.

[5]Radosław Sikora, Husaria close Vienna 1683. Warsaw 2012. pp. 169-201.

[6]Radosław Sikora, Husaria. The pride of the Polish weapon. Kraków 2019. pp. 35-71.

[7]Jan Dobrogost Krasiński, Relatia seu Description of the War of Vienna, under Strygon and further Campania A. 1683. actual in defending the fact and honor of the knighthood of Poland study on the past year 1683 in Rakusie and Hungary campania, develop. O. Laskowski. "Historical-War Review" 1930, Vol. 2, z. 1, p. 162.

[8]Ibid.

[9]The evidence of King John III’s past of the year 1683o and the peculiarly explaining Viennese expedition. Opp. Franciszek Kluszycki. Kraków 1883. p. 332.

[10]Translated by Krzysztof Jagusiak. Za: Eugeniusz Sabaudzki (Eugène de Savoie), Mémoires du prince Eugéne de SavoieLondon 1811. p. 12.

[11]Jan Sobieski, Letters to Mary. Opr. Leszek Kukulski. Warsaw 1970. p. 553.

[12]Sikora, Husaria close Vienna, p 243.

[13]Anna Czarniecka, Nobody listens to me erstwhile I'm alive. Jan III Sobieski in a waltz with opposition propaganda (1684-1696)Warsaw 2009. pp. 110-115.

[14]It is essential to explain here that it is Krakow and not the residence city of kings (Warsaw), which was inactive the capital of Poland.

[15]Quote for: Maria Kazimiera and Jan Sobieski. Letters from the Vienna Relief PeriodWarsaw 1983. p. 12.

[16]Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, Diaries of My Times, Vol. 2. Opr. Jan Dihm, Warsaw 1958. p. 277.

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