Comment summary:
- Currently, the atomic sharing programme participates in: Italy, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany. These countries have about 20 U.S. atomic warheads made available.
- The atomic launch program has a more political dimension than military ones, as the warheads stay under strict US supervision, and it is up to them to decide whether to usage them in the event of a conflict.
- The Russian Federation is developing military infrastructure in Belarus, which can enable the retention and usage of atomic weapons. As in the Natov atomic rocket program, however, Moscow has full sovereignty.
- Due to the expanding threat to NATO's east flank by Russia's expansionist policy and simultaneous modernization of the Polish Army, Warsaw aspires to join the atomic sharing program in order to intensify cooperation with the Alliance and strengthen the possible for deterrence.
The atomic weapons sharing program is derived from the early Cold War of the 1950s. In consequence to the threat from the russian Union and the expanding atomic arsenal of Soviets, American atomic weapons were to be stored on the territory of allied states. This was to show the full commitment of the United States to the possible defence of the capitalist part of Europe and to act as a deterrent to the opponent.
In addition to American atomic guarantees, the alleged atomic umbrella, which ensures the safety of NATO members who do not have specified weapons in the event of an attack, continues the atomic sharing concept. presently participants are Italy, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany. The number of heads is estimated to be 20 in each country. These States have adequate military infrastructure in the airbases adapted to the retention of atomic warheads. atomic weapons made available to the Allies by the United States are B-61 missiles that can be both tactical and strategic, however, a tactical version of the rocket is distributed within a atomic sharing framework. These weapons are attached to various types of aircraft of the air force, including fighter planes, bombers or multi-purpose fighters. peculiar certified pilot training is needed to accomplish the ability to exercise or maneuver with atomic weapons. The most popular weapons-carrying machines are F-35, F-35A and F-16 [1].
Nuclear missiles stored in the countries participating in the programme are not owned by them, they are inactive invariably owned by the United States. During the peace, missiles are supervised by U.S. Air Force personnel. Even the codes deciding on atomic weapons are under American control. This situation is linked to the current Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of atomic Weapons. Under the agreement, atomic weapons are not owned by the State in which they are stationed but are strictly under US jurisdiction. There are criticisms and controversy about atomic sharing's non-proliferation. However, the United States and NATO officials explain that atomic weapons are becoming an arsenal of fighting states where they are only held at the minute of the war, erstwhile the treaty ceases to be and to apply. Precautions in the context of the usage of missiles by a associate of the program are retained even erstwhile the conflict begins, and the final decision to carry out the attack besides belongs to the US authorities. Care for safety and control of atomic weapons is so advanced, as in the event of war, the United States cannot afford an accidental, unexpected usage of atomic weapons by an ally. specified a situation would endanger an uncontrolled atomic escalation that Washington would most likely want to avoid [2[3].
Since the start of the full-scale war by Russia in Ukraine, Poland has been seeking to join the atomic sharing program. This decision is linked to the expansionist policy of the Russian Federation and the expanding threat on the east flank of NATO. Another aspect that affects the placement of atomic weapons in Poland is the participation of Belarus in the Russian equivalent of the provision of atomic missiles. The Russians have plans to build infrastructure and systematically increase atomic possible in Belarus. This decision is more political than military, as the Russian Federation will have full control of the warheads.
To show the readiness to defend NATO's east flank and the full commitment, crucial and expressive consequence should be to include Warsaw in atomic sharing. This would be a political signal to Moscow that the deployment of missiles in Belarus did not go unanswered by the Alliance. Another argument of Poland, which is connected with joining the program is the acquisition of F-35 fighters and already held F-16s.
These American aircraft are designed to carry tactical atomic warheads. Polish pilots in the F-16 are trained to cover atomic cargo carriers. Poland is so building future capabilities for the usage of atomic weapons. Joining the atomic sharing program is more political than military, which means that they can be considered in the symbolic sphere. specified cooperation would strengthen alliance ties and deepen the cooperation of the Polish Army with Americans [4[5[6].
However, Poland's accession to the sharing of atomic weapons within NATO is simply a distant and uncertain prospect. Many Western countries presently participating in the programme are opposed to Poland joining it. The main argument that appears on the global phase is the Act on common Relations, Cooperation and safety signed in Paris in 1997 between NATO and the Russian Federation. Under this agreement, the Alliance committed to non-locating atomic weapons in countries admitted to NATO after 1997. However, in the east states of the NATO flank it is argued that in the situation of the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia's violation of global law, this act should not be taken into account in the discussions on atomic sharing. In Western countries, however, this paper is inactive a fundamental argument in discussions about the possible deployment of atomic weapons in Poland [7].
Bibliography:
1. atomic Sharing for Poland. Will atomic weapons scope the Vistula River?, Forsal.pl, 06.05.2024, https://forsal.pl/country/security/Articles/9499263, nuclear-sharing-for-Polish-or-bron-jadrow-trad-nad-wisle.html, [accessed 13.05.2024]
2. What is it about atomic sharing?, Poland and atomic sharing, strategy and Future Team, 26.04.2012 https://www.youtube.com/embed/5TLhhXHiGl4 , [accessed 13.05.2024]
3. atomic sharing and European rocket shield. What's behind this? Justyna Gotkowska, OSW, 29.04.2024, https://www.youtube.com/embed/YBKT1X2Hi1o, [accessed 13.05.2024]
4. Poland’s bid to participate in NATO atomic sharing, global Institute for strategical Studies, 09.2023, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/polands-bid-to-participate-in-nato-nuclear-sharing/ [accessed 13.05.2024]
5. U.S. atomic weapons in Poland? atomic sharing and NATO deterrence policy, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 03.04.20124, https://www.pism.pl/pism_in_medias/podcasts/bron-jadrowa-usa-w-polsce-nuclear-sharing-a-polics-scaring-nato , [access 13.05.2024]
6. NATO atomic adaptation. Grounds for expanding atomic forces in Europe, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 29.11.2023, https://www.pism.pl/publications/nuclear-adaptation-nato-message-for-examples-nuclear-in-europie , [accessed 13.05.2024]
7. The French defence minister believes that the deployment of atomic weapons in Poland would undermine the Russian-NATO Act, Defence Portal, 25.04.20124, https://portalobronny.se.pl/defensive policy/French-minister-defensive-considers-the-dislocation-arms-in-polska-substantiated-act-constitutive-Russia-nato-aaa-s2ji-e9TK-Knows-html, [accessed 13.05.2024]
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