Rusophobia is based on prejudice and stereotypesAversion or even hostility towards Russians, their cultures and their countries. The end of "-phobia" besides indicates that this feeling is from the sphere of interferencesocial, as emotional states, which like any phobia produces, are not based on reflection, but on uncritical, culturally shaped perception and assessment of what Russian with—or contemptible superiority, or simply fear.
In the article Polish rusophobia will be analysed in 3 aspects. Firstly, according to the author, rusophobia is an imported product produced by Western culture. At the time of the adoption of Christianity, and more specifically its western version, or Catholicism, Poland began to see itself as a associate of this cultural group and accepted besides russophobia, its constitutional elements with all the benefits of inventory. The aim of the article is to look at 3 dimensions of Polish rusophobia. They are: 1) rusophobia as an effect of Polish belonging to the cultural sphere of the West; 2) rusophobia as an effect of Polish superiority complex; and 3) rusophobia as an effect of Polish inferiority complex. The apparent contradiction of the second and 3rd dimensions stems from the fact that Polish-Russian relations developed differently and was a reasonably long period around the mid-17th century, the end of the alleged silver age of the Republic, in which Poland was clearly the top in these relations, which generated – and this is 1 of the articles – a superior, contemptible attitude of Poland to backward Russia within the meaning of all form of this country. In the article I usage a word triumphant or triumphant rusophobia. Later, let's say from Saxon times and Russia from Peter the Great, due to the fact that Poland in relations with Russia turned out to be the weaker side – there was a inferiority complex resulting from sufferings or humiliations which he created, as I call it, a martyrdom rusophobia.
In the first place I will deal with Polish rusophobia in terms of Poland's membership of Western culture. In this dimension, russophobia will be shown as a permanent feature of this culture standing in hostile opposition to Byzantine culture and perceived as the heir to that culture of Russia.
In the second place, I will analyse Polish rusophobia as an illustration of the Polish superiority complex. The 3rd dimension will be the rusophobic perception of Poland as a victim of Russian violence. This 3rd dimension now dominates, and since its binding is an irrational sense of inferiority, we are entering stereotypes and inventory the harm that justifies it.
I would besides like to begin by explaining why I was curious in the subject. Well, we are not rusophobias, due to the fact that it is in our interest, whether social or national, due to the fact that we have tangible benefits. No, we are, due to the fact that our historically and culturally shaped attitude generates anti-Russian sentiment. In the author's opinion, this has consequences that harm both the Polish state and Polish interests. The author's goal is not to cultivate pro-Russian propaganda, but to vote in a discussion that may lead to to erase or at least limit the thought of "phobia" from common Polish-Russian relations. Never head that for the minute it looks like turning the river with a stick, but the problem of the “disruption” of Polish-Russian relations lies in our vital interest and so I have tried a rational, I hope, explanation of this phenomenon.
The improvement of Western Russophobia
Guy Mettan in his book Creating Russophobia (this book very powerfully influenced my reflections) writes that Western rusophobia is simply a character of the learned reflex of the dog Pavlov, who drools over the sound of the bell due to the fact that he was taught to associate the same sound with the meal. It does not substance whether this meal will actually be given to the dog, it is crucial that the dog was taught to respond in this way to this stimulus. By the way, now it's called brainwashing. My goal in this part of the article is simply a historical analysis of the process that deprived the West of the rational perception of its relations with Russia, due to the fact that the feature of Pavlov's learned reflex is an uncritical consequence to stimulation. Stereotypes and schematics take the place of intellectual consideration, russophobia becomes in 1 line with racism.
Western russophobia has a long past and paradoxically, its roots date back to the origin of the Russian protoplast, or Kiev Russian. Rusi wasn't there yet, and there was already russophobia. It's a small overgrown. The roots of the problem lie in the Roman Empire, which has shaped the geopolitical reality of Europe for over 1,000 years. In 286 Emperor Diocletian for the purposes of more effective management of the vast territory of its country it divides them into the western and east parts. The alleged tetraarchy was formed, whose western part, besides called Latin, retained Rome as a capital and the east part, besides called Greek, by the emperor's decision Constantine She built her own, which in honor of her creator was called Constantinople. A rivalry for leadership in the Christian planet shortly arose between the 2 centers, which lasted over 1,000 years with changing happiness. Initially Constantinople, later called Byzantium, was a mountain, but yet Rome came out of the clash victorious. The struggles of Rome and Constantinople consequently generated competitive political forms, specifically: the West and Russia. The West and Russia are utilized here as concepts signaling political ideas, not concrete state structures. The competition had 2 stages. First, doctrinal, 1 can say religiously-politically, in which the content of the evolving Christianity was concerned. And secondly, the military in which the Ottoman Turks yet destroyed the Byzantine Empire at the silent approval of the West.
Conflict Rome – Constantinople
One can hazard thesis that if Christianity had not politicized itself, it would never have reached the position of the world's most many religion. He owes his career to the Roman Emperor Constantine I, who in search of ways of integrating a vast, though decaying empire, had the thought of utilizing this religion as the forerunner of his multiethnic and multicultural empire. From the point of view of the needs of the dominant state throughout the Mediterranean, and not only has the thought proved to be a good panacea. However, it had its decaying grains. Differences in the perception of the constitutional elements of Christianity, specified as the dogma of the Holy Trinity, the nature of Jesus,definition in credo Nice being of the Holy Spirit, or alleged dispute about Filioque,Finally, the way in which the Church was directed (autokephal and ecumenical in the East, authoritarian in the West) led the western part after many problems, including the fight among others the alleged Arian heresy, to make Catholicism, while the Byzantine part to adopt a more conservative kind of Christianity, alleged Orthodoxy. Of course, the dispute over the content of Christian religion besides had a political dimension. As long as the western part of the Roman Empire was a mess, being a victim of interior conflicts and of the opposing Germanic tribes, serving inConstantinople the emperor considered himself and was considered by those who wanted to, as the leader of the full empire. However, in the West political chaos ended with Charles the Great, whose coronation in 800 by the Pope Leona III as emperor of the western part of the erstwhile Roman Empire, she emancipated the West as a strong competitor of the Byzantium. The east Empire, on the another hand, entered into a period of strong turbulence as external as the conflict with Arabs exuberant with the enthusiasm of the fresh religion of Islam as well as the interior one, above all the conflict of iconoclasm, that is, disputes on how much the graphical presentation of God is, or is not an idol. Iconoclasm was a typical Byzantine phenomenon. civilian war against this background for the pragmatic West was alternatively incomprehensible, but this was the orientation of the East – idealistic. This does not change, of course, the fact that the Byzantine State has suffered greatly in this conflict.
Byzantine evangelization of Kiev Russian and Slavic countries
This clear separation of 2 Christian spiritual camps created a fresh field of competition, which was the Christianization of pagan Slavic countries. So Rome and Constantinople led an evangelization action, the effects of which were not onlyReligious, but political. Thanks to 2 outstanding linguists and missionaries, brothers Cyril and Method, who during the second half of the 9th century led the evangelization of the east and confederate Slavs, Constantinople greatly expanded its spiritual influence. It must be stressed that their activity was not only missionary but besides linguistic. Well, they developed the alphabet, the alleged Glagolica, which became the basis of the written form of many Slavic languages. Unlike the Christianized peoples in the Roman Catholic rite, where the language of the Bible was Latin, whose influence negatively affected the improvement of native languages, including Polish. It took the 16th century for a Protestant to wait Santa Rej he started to make in Polish. Thus, the Christianized people in the Orthodox rite had access to God’s Word in their own language, and the alphabetization in their native language allowed early improvement of their own writing. In 988 the prince led to the baptism of Rusi Kieva of Constantinople The large Vladimir. Half a century later, growingThe contradictions between the 2 churches led in 1054 to the alleged large Schisms, in which the patriarch Constantinople and the pope mutually flung each another with anatema, definitely separating Christianity for over 1,000 years and laying the foundations of russophobia. Rus Kiev took this form of Christianity, which was excommunicated by the Pope. Let us note that Ruś Kiiowska had 2 prominent rulers: Vladimir the large (958-1015) and Yaroslaw the Wise (978-1054). The global importance of Kiev's Rusi has been seen in the effective dynastic policy of Jarosław. His daughters became queens. Anna, called Kiev, Queen of France, Elizabeth, married the king of Norway and Anastasia married the king of Hungary. Moreover, the Polish king Kazimierz Renovator married his sister Jarosław Maria Dobroniega. I quote these facts due to the fact that they show that no russphobia has occurred until the large Schism. Russia was treated as 1 of many Christian states and Ostracism towards it was not practiced by the West. About Anna KievIt's her communicative that finds the modern extension. Well, Ukraine, which is treated as the heiress of the Kiev Rusi, decided to usage in 2024 the name Anna as the name formed and trained brigade in France in the current war with the Russian Federation. The brigade's individual condition was 2,000 soldiers. However, despite the large propaganda momentum (the highest political authorities participated in its creation),Something must have sounded false due to the fact that after little than a year of existence it was solved due to mass desertion.
Returning to the mainstream, we reached the point where the doctrinal dispute between East and West reached its final character, both sides stopped talking to each other. However, russophobia is not yet present. Interesting that it appeared at the minute (this is the thesis of this article) of the demolition of the Byzantine Empire, more specifically erstwhile the Duchy of Moscow, the heir destroyed by Mongol Rusi Kiev, declared himself heir to the Byzantine Empire, that is, in the 15th century. Before this happened, however, it is worth looking at how the West destroyed the east part of the erstwhile Roman Empire. This is crucial due to the fact that schizmatic separation is not demolition yet. It was military.
Crusaded Evangelization
The first phase was the alleged Western Crusades, whose declared geopolitical goal was to regain Palestine for Christianity. The second phase has led to the abandonment of assistance to Constantinople attacked by the Turks. In the first stage, contrary to their declarations, the Crusaders were more curious in creating their own states in conquered areas than in creating a pilgrimage sanctuary in the Holy Land. The Crusades well support the well - known proverb that good intentions are the atrium of hell. It's hard to say that anything too the declarations was beautiful in them. The march of the Crusaders by countries which had the misfortune of lying on their way to the Holy Land was a scope of robberies, murders and pogroms, all under the slogan "God wills so." The capture of Jerusalem by I Crusade ended with the plunder of the city and the slaughter of its inhabitants. All of these events took place outside the political or any control of the Byzantine Empire, thus importantly lowering its authority. Especially severe from the point of view of the endurance of the Empire was the 4th Crusade, during which the object of interest was not to reflect the Holy Land, but simply to exterminate Constantinople, which since the looting of 1204 became the capital of the Latin Empire, or created by the Crusaders of a fresh political creation. Incidentally, crusades were a common method of geopolitical evangelization carried out by Papacy. In addition to the 7 aimed at the Holy Land, they were besides going to destruct the colds and the alleged Northern Crusades that will inactive be mentioned. The Latin Empire, named after the inhabitants of Constantinople by the Latin occupation, survived for about 50 years, after which for about 200 years the Byzantine Empire was recreated to be definitely destroyed by the Turks in 1456. Failure to supply effective assistance to the Byzantine Empire exposes the West to a low assessment of its strategical thinking. alternatively of a weak friend, or at least not an enemy, specified as the Byzantium, the Osman Empire appeared in its territory, which subjugated southeastern Europe, creating a permanent threat for it for about 300 years. However, the crusade to grow power and gain wealth was not limited to harassment of the east Empire.
Northern Crusades
Northern Crusades began in the 12th century. Their goal was to conquer pagan tribes of the confederate Baltic, Prusai, Finns, Latvians... but not only. The Christian Russian, under the pretext that she is not Christian, was besides attacked. In the 13th century, hard times for Russia came. Mongols Under Leader Genghis ChanaThey completely destroyed Kiev's Rus. Kiev was destroyed in 1240. Russia was under Mongolian regulation for almost 300 years. Rurykovich, a dynasty ruling in Kiev Rusi, moved to Moscow, which became their fresh capital. So in the 13th century, the geopolitical situation of Russia was difficult. The existential threat of Mongolia was linked to Western crusades that sought fresh territories of expansion including the first conquest of the merchant's Republic of Novgorod. In 1241, an crucial conflict took place at Lake Peipus, in which the fresh Kingdom led Alexander Newski They beat troops of the Order of the Knights of Swords, who together with the Order of Teutonic Knights pursued the intent of building a state in areas conquered in Gentiles and in Rusins, or – as they were called – schismatists. The triumph conflict gave Rusi a period of rest. Aleksander Newski deliberately chose specified a battlefield due to the fact that in the wet terrain the main asset of the Crusaders – the charge of dense driving – could not take place. The Sword's Cavaliers were not the only Crusaders who, under the pretext of spreading fire and the sword of the only actual faith, attempted to conquer Russian lands for economical purposes. In 1240 Alexander Newski won the nickname Newski, beating over Newa the invasion of Swedes who de facto Entering a very unholy alliance with pagan Mongols, they opened a second front to fight a Christian country. Newski's victories crossed these intentions, but these events confirm what had already been signaled in the case of the confederate Crusades that their real intent was to destruct Byzantium as a contender for leadership of the Christian world. Russia became the subject of western expansion, due to the fact that its demolition allowed to gain fast fortunes, and the bonus was the demolition of Orthodox seclusion. due to the fact that she defended herself, it aroused a sentiment in the West, which sometimes evolved towards russophobia. However, the hope of destroying Russia remained alive. This was to be done with the hands of the Mongols, analogous to the demolition of the Byzantine with the hands of the Turks. Hopes were not baseless due to the fact that Mongolian domination of Russia lasted 3 centuries and was definitely concluded with the conflict of Moldovain 1572 in times Ivan the Terrible. The failure of the Crusades and the failure of the Mongols to destruct Russia has become a origin of political frustration for the West. Slavic countries west of Russia surrendered to his cultural, political and military infiltration. The consequence of Russia's keeping separate was russophobia. However, the three-century Mongolian dominance had irreversible effects in the form of a civilization delay. Medieval Russia did not meet either Gothic or later Renaissance. It was only in the 18th that it was incorporated into the European mainstream Peter the Great (1672–1725). This functioning on the margins of a dynamically developing Europe and apparent backwardness justified the Western sense of superiority. Tumorous russophobia took on the form of contemptible fear of an east barbarian.
The Birth of Polish Russophobia
The Mongolian demolition of Kiev Rusi had 2 crucial consequences. Firstly, in place of Kiev Moscow gradually began to build the position of the Rusi administrative center, secondly, the political vacuum caused by the annihilation of Kiev's Rusi enabled a tiny Lithuania to make an extraordinary expansion, which occupied the area from the Baltic to the Black Sea, became the largest European country. However, in this vast country the Lithuanians became a minority, accounting for about 1/6 of the population. In addition, Moscow did not forget its place of origin and, by strengthening its position towards the Mongols, announced a programme to collect Russian lands. He laid the foundations for this policy Ivan Kalita (1288–1340), which not only established Moscow capital, but consistently by political and financial methods, e.g. by buying territories from insolvent debtors, enlarged the area of the Duchy of Moscow. The program of collecting Russian lands has gained momentum during the reign Ivan the Great (1440 – 1505), who not only refused to pay taxes to the Tatars, but did not hesitate to militaryly reflect the areas of western and confederate Rusi captured by the Allied Lithuania. And so Poland, not only as a associate of the cultural community of the West, becomes rusophobic, its individual territorial interests enter into conflict with the energetic Duchy of Moscow. In addition, Ivan the large announces Moscow as the heiress of the destroyed Byzantine and proclaims that Moscow is the 3rd Rome, taking as his wife the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor. Thus, the thought of Orthodox Christianity takes on fresh dynamism, while Moscow, becoming its bearer, does not alleviate western rusophobia. In general, in the Western perception, the Duchy of Moscow was a backward country, legally disorderly and adhering to superstition. Of course, it was omitted the fact that if it had not been for Rusi's resistance, the Mongolian aggression on Europe at the conflict of Legnica in 1241 would not have stopped.
Poland's triumphal phobia in full
Moscow was aware that Western Europe was much ahead of it culturally and materially. To catch up and velocity up the improvement of their country, Moscow rulers tried to attract Western specialists, for example the Moscow Kremlin was designed in the late 15th century by Italian architects. And here you can mention a communicative illustrating the very popular Western sanctions now. In the first halfThe 16th century Tsar Ivan Terrible attempted to bring together a group of Western experts who would work to accelerate the improvement of Russia. To this end, he active the German with his name Hans Schlitte, to whom he entrusted the function of engagement of a comparatively large group of specialists, in which architects, doctors, ludwizards, teachers, geometers, exegets of the Bible were to be found (for example). Schlitte received considerable resources and managed to gather a large group of about 300 adepts of various teachings. However, Poles and the Knights of Swords ruled in the Inflantas learned about the operation. Neither Sigismund August, the last Jagillon on the throne of Poland, nor the master of the Order Gotthard Kettler The thought of upgrading Rusi did not appeal. Specialists and Schlitte were illegally detained and imprisoned. After any time they were freed, but they did not go to Russia anymore. Thus, sanctioning Russia to hinder its improvement is not a feature of modern times. The double morality of these behaviors strikes. On the 1 hand, Russia is criticized for being primitive, and on the another hand, everything is done to keep her in this state.
On the case of Ivan the Terrible, the first Tsar of Russia and the last of the Rurykowicz dynasty, whose expiry on it was to drive Russia into a very serious interior crisis which was utilized in the form of so-called. Dmitriad through Poland – a small later. Now I will item Ivan the Terrible's modernisation efforts in terms of interior and external situations. The common feature of these reforms was that they antagonized the West. In the case of external policy, it was a large success to deal with the Mongol threat. After the alleged standing over Ugra in 1480, where the Moscow troops under Ivan the large faced the Tatar troops without carrying out military actions and over which over a period of non-military confrontation the Tatars first withdrew due to (notablely noted) the deficiency of assistance of Polish troops, which our king promised them Kazimierz Jagielloński. spiritual considerations, as we can see, one more time did not matter, as the troops of Muslim Tatars in a covenant with the branches of Catholic Poland were to fight the armies of Christian Moscow. Although the confrontation over Ugra is considered to be the beginning of the end of the Mongolian yoke, The Tatars inactive represented an existential threat to Moscow. Only nearly 100 years later was the situation to change Ivan the Terrible, whose troops in 1572 at the conflict of Moldova, about 50 km from Moscow, defeated the Crimean Khanate army. From this conflict a military Tartar problemceased to be for Moscow. In addition, the elimination of the Kazan and Astrachanic Khanates was not adequate to complete the elimination of the Tatar threat, it inactive made Volga a Russian river and opened Moscow's way to the Caspian Sea. The territorial expansion of Moscow besides went east. JermakAtaman Cossack, began exploration and conquest of Siberia. The Moscow Creature became a power. In 1547, Ivan the Terrible was crowned with a Tsar.
Polish reaction to the first Russian attempts to scope the Baltic
However, looking south, looking east, he could not escape his attention that Russia had no access to the Baltic. The Baltic was an crucial trade route, and geopolitically, erstwhile the threat disappeared from the confederate direction, it continued to be north-west. The Kingdom of both Nations, Sweden, Orders – Teutonic Knights and Knights of Swords, Denmark – in Russia's access to the Baltic saw a threat to themselves. For Ivan the Terrible, the issue of access was crucial, with the unfortunate Hans Schlitte, whose expert groups were detained in the Inflanca areaToday's Latvia yet convinced him that access to the Baltic is crucial for Russia's economical and cultural development. This brings us to the conflicts in which the Republic of both nations first seriously clashed with the Russian Empire. There were 2 conflicts. In the first (1563–1570), the last Jagiellonian Sigismund II August faced Ivan the Terrible, in the second (1577–1582) the first of the real events election king Stefan Batory He fought against the same Ivan the Terrible. In the First Northern War, in which the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Sweden fought for dominance over the Baltic, and Russia for access to it – the geopolitical interest of Poland is little clear, it is possible that it aimed at countering Russia's intentions, due to the fact that if Russia wants something, it is surely bad for us. Kind of like a gardener's dog, which he won't eat himself, but he won't give another 1 either. We had the unresolved problem of Gdańsk and naturally Polish coast, from which previously the Teutonic Order, and later its successor – the Duchy of Prussia cut us off and alternatively of looking for implantation on the Baltic we chose to face Russia.Warended in a three-year truce. As a result, both sides were unhappy, and that is why Sigismund Augustus' successor, Stefan Batory, was forced to fight Moscow. pacta conventa, i.e. the commitments he had to accept to become king of Poland, he became active in another conflict. Stefan Batory came out victorious, the northern ambitions of Russia were not realized, while Poland and Lithuania through peace in Jamie Zapolski in 1582 maintained status quo. However, Ivan's biggest failure was a violent interior policy. In his desire to modernize his state, Ivan considered the Russian nobility – the militants whose privileged position became an obstacle to the creation of a modern state. To this end, he formed a apparatus of panic and repression known as pripicin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mostly speaking, Ivan's fresh years (died in 1584) damaged the affirmative image of his earlier reign.
Opening the confederate Front against Russia
The Rurykovich dynasty ended in Ivan, which became the origin of the very serious crisis of the Russian state. The search for his successor opened the way for Polish intervention in Russian matters, which more than any another affected Polish-Russian relations. However, before Dmitriads, due to the fact that specified a name was given to these interventions in Polish historiography, it is essential to mention the Lublin Union of 1569, which, in real terms binding Poland with Lithuania, created a fresh state – the Republic of Both Nations. As a result, a fresh front for the Polish-Russian confrontation appeared in the south. This was due to the fact that a large part of the land of the erstwhile Kiev Rusi, which was in control of Lithuania as a consequence of the Lublin Union, was under the Polish management, which, in the context of the Russian policy of collecting Russian lands, would consequence in many wars. In addition, the reminiscence of the Orthodox-Catholic conflict was inspired by the Jesuits Brzeska Union of 1596, constituting the so-called. The Unity Church, with the Greek-Catholic time, aimed at capturing the faithful Orthodox Church and mostly its disorganization. The Brzeska Union, as an expression of the thought of schism of 1054, did not accomplish its intended aims, as the attachment to the Orthodox Church proved stronger than expected, but provoked large conflicts within the framework of orthodoxy, dividing its followers into Unity and Disunite. Poland, whose intentions have been noticed, in this confusion, which it caused under the Orthodoxy, lost alternatively than gained. However, being full of her Golden Age and seeing itself as a dominant at least regional power, the aftermath of the geopolitical consequences of the Brzeń Union underestimated, preferring to cultivate the Polish superiority complex in relation to the inactive backward Russia. The dynastic crisis of Russia and the political confusion that it generates, on the 1 hand, seems to have justified the sense of Polish superiority; on the another hand, it hatches ideas of how the crisis will aid to definitely get free of the political competition of the Russian cities.
Dmitriades and large Sadness
And so there are Dmitriadas, or events, which are so amazing that they could be considered as a creation of a writer's fantasy, but being a historical fact, they are a product of a very fantasy of our geopolitical thought. The hard political situation - the dynastic crisis and the effects pripicin – linked in Russia to economical and social problems. The large Hunger of 1601–1603 led to the outbreak of discontent with the peasantry and the uprising Ivana Bolotnikova (1606-1607), the decline in the importance of power, and the militants fighting among themselves contributed to the improvement of anarchy. These times are called large Sadness in Russia. 2 Polish interventions, known as Dmitriadas, were active in interior problems. Why Dmitriada? due to the fact that erstwhile the Rurykovich dynasty expired on Ivan the Terrible, actually on his sick boy Fyodor I, in Poland there were contenders to the Russian throne claiming to be sons of Ivan the Terrible. In 1603 a man appeared who introduced himself as a tsarevich Dmitri I. Dmitr I, in Russian historiography called Lze-Dmitr, received the support of Polish magnatery, especially the Mnishech family, and was a short-lived success. In 1605 he won Moscow and was crowned with a Tsar. His reign, however, was not based on lasting foundations. Almost the full Russian society felt horrified by the Polish presence in the Kremlin. Fighters Under Leadership Shusky vassila, townspeople, will drink in the care of the protection of Orthodoxy, the army, alleged gunmen – everyone saw the favouring of Poles. In May 1606, there was an open revolt which resulted in Dmitri I being killed, his body burned, and the ashes were symbolically fired from the cannon towards the west, giving Poland an knowing that its presence in Russia was not desirable. However, Poland ignored the signal. Another Lying-Dymitr appeared and in 1607-1610 took placeAnother Dmitriada. Lying-Dymitr II claimed to be Lying-Dymitr I and as specified he was recognized by his spouse Lying-Dymit, due to the fact that I don't know how to put it, Marina the Monks. Lying-Dymitr II suffered death as a consequence of a dissension in his own camp. The consequence for Russia was the extension of the large Sadness period, the consequence for Poland – its engagement in the conflict, which in the first period of Dmitriada was officially considered a private venture of Polish magnatery. II Dmitriada persona hetmana Stanisław Żółkiewski She brought the Polish state into the game for the Tsar's crown. Hetman Żółkiewski won a large triumph at Kłuszyn, which resulted in the car Shusky vassyl (He remained there after the assassination of Lże-Dymitra I) was imprisoned and transported to Poland, where he legitimized Polish intervention and presence in Russia with his tribute and speeches. However, despite Żółkiewski's efforts to make a individual union of Poland and the Moscow Czarka through the individual of the prince Władysław, the thought was burned down. The main reason proved to be Russian expectations that Władysław would accept Orthodoxy, Polish demands that Russia accept Catholicism and expectations of King Sigismund III, who had his own plans for the Russian throne. Thus the situation became stalemate and in 1611 another anti-Polish uprising broke out, which led to the Polish crew leaving Moscow in 1612. Incidentally, the day of the Republic's troops leaving Moscow, on November 4, 1612, became Russia's national vacation from 2005. This event besides symbolically ends the large Sadness period. In 1613A fresh Romanov dynasty was chosen. The first tsar of this dynasty Michael I begins a period of stabilisation of Russia and, to be said, a permanent confrontation with the Republic. The Dmitriades in Poland justify rusophobic feelings based on the feeling of superiority of civilization and misunderstanding how we could not usage specified an exceptional situation and Russia inactive exists. A good image of the look at Russia at the time is the alleged Moscow Kolęda by Paweł Palczowski. Palczowski was a courtesan of Zygmunt III Vasa and a political activist. He traveled a lot, studying at the University of Frankfurt on Oder and Padua. It is so natural that he shaped his imagination of the planet under the influence of Western culture. He even wrote a book dedicated to Venice. He believed in the Polish civilization mission to the east. In 1606, he joined the first Dmitriada. After the overthrow of Lying-Dymitra I he was in a Russian prison where he stayed for 2 years, until 1608. In 1609 he wrote a propaganda work entitled Moscow Roundabout,in which he motivated Polish society to exploit the weakness of the Moscow State and conquer it. He compared defeating Russia to Western colonial conquests. The demolition of the Russian state was expected to supply Poland with an infinite patch of land and open trade routes to India and China. It cannot be said that Paweł Palczowski was an unimaginative person, but his conviction about the civilizational level of Russia illustrates the Polish russphobia of that period. Poland has suffered from a superiority complex towards Russia and has taken for granted that its cultural superiority gives it the right to treat the neighbouring country as a possible colony. PalczowskiHe took part in II Dmitriada and somewhere on the immeasurable areas of Russia after 1610 he disappeared. Colonial projects turned out to be sharing skin on a bear. Dmitriades can be considered the main origin of Russian polonaphobia. Their rowing and clear submission to the peculiar interests of the rulers seemingly did not reflect the authoritative policy of the Polish state. However, Sigismund III Vasa, who wanted not only to be the king of Poland, Sweden and Russia, but besides to defend actual faith, or Catholic form of Christianity, lost his count. Exit outside the riotous staff of Dymitriad tried to find hetman Żółkiewski, who after a large triumph at Kłuszyn in 1610 negotiated an agreement offering Poland a individual union with Russia in the individual of the prince Władysław. Unfortunately, the intentions of the large statesman and patriot of Żółkiewski were undermined by the Jesuit surroundings of Zygmunt III, and he himself was not blameless, desiring the Tsar's crown for himself. As a result, Poland won a classical Pyrrus victory. She demeaned Russia by obliging Tsar Shujski to pay tribute and as a consequence of the peace in the Divina reached the largest territorial scope of nearly 1 million square km. However, it was a façade size and half a century later the territory of the Republic became a place of interior and external conflicts, which led our country to a state comparable to the Russian large Sadness. Well, possibly it wasn't specified a large sadness, due to the fact that we didn't last the famine, but about the remainder – i.e. organization weakness, conflicts within the spheres of power, folk uprisings and external interventions – compose Russia between 1600 and 1613. The point is that Russia has overcome the difficulties, while we under the facade of corrupt democracy have led to self-destruction. I would add that, unfortunately, an intolerant spiritual policy completely contradicts the compositionReligious (the number of Orthodox was 25-40%) was an crucial origin of Polish anarchy. With respect to the Western general view of Russia, the large Sadness period only deepened the sense of self-predominance over the devoid ability to self-organize barbarian Russia. It is crucial to remember that the 16th century is simply a continuation of the alleged large geographical discoveries, which in the beginning of colonization processes incredibly enriched the countries of western Europe and– as we have seen – gave Polish strategical dreamers ideas to apply a akin approach to Russia. The affirmative perception of Russia was only to bring about the reign of Peter the Great, while unfortunately Poland was falling increasingly.
Polish social conflicts andincreasingly hard relations with Russia
Social conflicts arising from the attached Lublin Union, but not the territories of the Kiev ex-Rusi, or present Ukraine, are peculiarly crucial here. The most celebrated among them will emergence Bohdan Chmielnicki was a tragedy and a disgrace to the Republic. For Russia, it was an chance to become an arbitrator in a dispute that should be an interior dispute, a Polish dispute. And erstwhile we effort to make a retrospective between the Northern Wars, victorious thanks to Bator, Dmitriads, Żółkiewski's proposals, Dywilin's success, another war with Russia and peace in Polanów 1634 – we observe that this conflict, geographically started in the north with a dispute over access to the Baltic Sea, gradually moved southward towards the Black Sea to consequence in the 4th Polish-Russian War of 1654-1667, a full of 1 of the longest conflicts in the past of the First Republic. The Chmielnicki uprising was the introduction to it. The origins of this uprising were, among another things, the consequences of the Brest Union, social and cultural repressions discriminating Orthodox people. The uprising became a powerful movement that the Republic of Poland could not cope with, especially as Chmielnicki gained global support and concluded in 1654one year agreement with Russia, the alleged Perejeslaw settlement. This settlement opens a fresh chapter in Ukrainian history, which ceases to be an interior Polish matter. In order to defend themselves against Polish repression and the final military defeat with the stronger Republic, Chmielnicki and the Kozack Council asked Russia for an alliance to defend the rights and freedoms of the Cossacks. In exchange for the protection of Orthodoxy and the preservation of autonomy, Cossacks committed themselves to military cooperation with Moscow. In all, it is hard to imagine a stronger stimulant for already powerful Polish rusophobia. Of course, another Polish-Russian war broke out, as if after the Swedish flood there were fewer of these conflicts, and it belonged to any of the longestwars in our history. It did not bring a definitive solution. The peace in Andruszów, which ended it, led to the division of Ukraine, taking into account the course of the main Ukrainian river Dniepr, to the Polish-Legal and Russian-Left Coast. Moreover, Russia's global position has strengthened and Poland has suffered significantly. GivenThe reason for the situation was that Cossacks tried to bring together a fresh social policy, the flagrant act of which was to be the Hasidic Union concluded in 1658 between Poland and Cossacks, whose aim was to improve the spiritual and national situation of the Russian society by establishing the Grand Duchy of Russia and transforming the Republic of the 2 Nations into the Republic of the 3 Nations. However, with all its pompousness, the opportunism of the fresh union rapidly after the Perejaslav settlement did not resurrect the social, both Polish and Ukrainian support. As if the polarophobic and rusophobic forces had taken a coordinated effort to reject it. The Hasidic Union so remains an example of a sterile Polish pathos, whose verbal size is not reflected in reality. And so we are approaching a point which historically can be considered a turning point in Polish-Russian relations. This event is the alleged Grzemułtowski area of 1686, whose name is derived from the name of the head of the Polish delegation Krzysztof Grzymułtowski for talks in Moscow. This peace, seen as eternal, which did not happen for the first time in Polish-Russian relations (this kind of peace was besides the peace of 1503 contained in Moscow), opens up a period in past in which Poland not only loses its dominant position in relations with Russia, but becomes clearly weaker. Poland loses the fight for hegemony in east Europe, loses control of a large part of Ukraine, diametrically weakens its global position and falls into expanding interior chaos. Of course, it is not meaningless for Polish rusophobia, which, increasing, changes its character. From a triumphant, Western-based superiority complex ("we will colonize and civilize the barbarian East") it gradually adopts a martyrdom ("we endure due to the fact that the east barbarian is stronger"). Although the sense of suffering is undeserved, it generates an expanding inferiority complex, which will proceed to lead to more or little sensible fast reactions in the form of e.g. uprisings which unfortunately do not have a chance of success. However, before this form of rusophobia ("we suffer, even though we are better") in the Polish historical mentality will be strengthened, there is simply a period of suspension. Governance Jan III Sobieski raises the global authority of Poland. But the death of the second Tsar Alexi I in 1676 from the Romanov line plunges Russia into another conflict of power struggle. Interesting fact: 2 factions of the Romanov household are fighting for power, led by women, both ex-wives of the deceased Tsar and both Carevich mothers. The conflict leads to the revolt of the elite military unit of alleged gunmen, who force a political compromise to bring to power Sophia, the older sister of the future Peter the Great, who as regent will regulation on behalf of 2 juvenile careviches Ivana V and Peter I. Despite the comparative effectiveness (as regent Sophia had been operating for 7 years), she was removed from power, and after being full taken over by Peter I the gunmen as a political force were destroyed. So the political situation of Russia in the late 17th century, unlike Poland, was orderly. In general, the full ageThe 18th century of Enlightenment and the end of feudalism in Europe is simply a construction of the power of Russia and the deconstruction of Poland. Peter the Great, from whom this age in Russia begins, knows that Russia is inactive a backward country in relation to the West. To make up for this backwardness, he decides to modernize his country in a Western way. It is celebrated for his journey across Western Europe, the alleged large Message of 1697-1698, in which, taking part incognito, he learns boating, acquires cognition of navigation and studies Western institutions. In order to remove Russia from its conservatism, it gives it a fresh capital – Saint Petersburg, which in place of Moscow becomes a fresh site of Russia. In his time the conflict with Sweden is ending, Russia is definitely achieving its geopolitical goals related to the Baltic. yet – and this is highly crucial – during the Enlightenment period the Western perception of Russia changes. Enlightenment is 1 of the fewer moments in past where the West looks favorably at Russia. Starts with Wilhelm Leibniz, which, though, saw Russia as a little developed country than the West, saw its economical and intellectual potential, which could make erstwhile appropriate reforms were introduced. another thinkers and philosophers of Enlightenment who had a affirmative attitude toward Russia were François Voltaire and Denis Diderot. Both admired Peter the large as a reformer of Russia and Catherine the Great (1729–1796), which ended Russia's unique Enlightenment Period, was seen as an archetype of enlightened absolutism.
Helplessness and the Republic. Beginnings of martyrdom
As far as Poland is concerned, although in a cultural and educational sense this period has brought a number of progressive changes, the chaotic socio-political situation did not let effective modernisation of the country. Polish military weakness has made us the subject of a geopolitical game of leading players of this period, namely Sweden and Russia. Each of them has its own imagination of the Polish political order. Commitment Augusta II, Saxon King of Poland, on the Russian side, caused action Charles XII in Poland. As a result, although Poland was not a organization in the large North War, its territory was occupied and destroyed by war. In addition, the society shared in support of Polish protagonists of this conflict. The part that supported August II supported Russia; those who were in favour of the Swedish candidate Stanisław Leszczyński, they advocated Charles XII. Poland has clearly become the subject of a power game and has lost its influence on its own fate. And erstwhile Peter I defeated the Swedes under Poltava in 1709, we were under Russian control. In 1717 the alleged The mute parliament, which received that name due to the fact that it was under the control of the Russian troops, and Members were prohibited from speaking. Of the most crucial decisions: August II was confirmed as King of Poland, the right to private magnatery troops was abolished, methods of financing the army were established, veto liberal remained in force and Russia was guaranteed this supposedly improvement of the Polish state. In total, Poland has become more and more formally under the control of its east neighbour, and the mute Seym has become a symbol of changes aimed at improving external control and maintaining our state in a state of permanent weakness. In this way we scope the last chord in the past of the First Republic, which was the partitions which liquidated Poland as a sovereign entity. erstwhile assessing the function of Russia, Prussia and Austria in the demolition of the Polish statehood, the first partition was motorized by the king of Prussia Frederick the Great. For Prussia, whose pedigree resulted from the Northern Crusades, and which from the Arch Catholic Order of the Teutonic Knights into the first Lutheran state had opportunistly re-examined, the demolition of Poland was a justification for their controversial creation. For Russia, the existence of Poland, unlike Prussia, was not an existential threat, although historical settlements were named at least Dmitriad may not have been entirely in their sense of reckoning. In addition, Russia submitted to Polish institutions so much that who knows whether maintaining an independent Polish state was no better geopolitical solution for it. As for the Habsburgs, those who owed us due to Vienna's Victoria in 1683 had no conflicting developments with us. Among the possessors were for territorial benefit and to reduce the growth of potential, both Russian and, above all, their main competitor in the German-speaking planet – Prussia. From the point of view of the problem of rusophobia as a consequence of dissections, it is it, not Germanophobia, even though 2 German states participated in the dissection process, that has intensified. The message is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the east territories of the Republic are the place of top increase in the various mutually opposing social movements which will disorganize anarchical situation. On the 1 hand, this points to the weakness of state structures, but on the another hand to the increasing social frustration that is manifested in all aspect of social life. Bar Confederations, Targowiecka, peasant protests, Humana massacre with national-religious background, attempts at educational reforms, and of course the site of the modernisation effort in the form of Constitution 3 May, the undecided position of the king, who from the modernization force of the Polish state moves to a position to combat reform, does not improve the situation of trying to attract the peasants into the conflict for national liberation with uprising Tadeusz Kościuszko And his Polaniecki University. Interesting, even though the problems of the state and peasant freedom afraid the full territory of the Republic, the effort to fight for national liberation based on the peasantry afraid only Russia and she besides fought the insurgents. I am thus stressing the increase in the legitimate rusophobic argument. Since the applicable effects of all the changes attempted were nothing, but the increase of social disorganization – the possessive states concluded that the liquidation of the Polish statehood would lead to social peace, which proved to any degree right. In addition, the Committee on National Education, the Mayan Constitution and the Kościuszko uprising became timeless symbols of Polishness and incorrect in the moral sense of destiny which met Poland. Polish martyrdom rusophobia gained rationale.
Polish gambit in Napoleonic Game
The enlightened departure of the West from russophobia was in full short-lived. This period gave the intellectual basis for the French Revolution 1789–1799, which sparked a vigorous reaction of monarchist Europe. Russia besides joined the anti-French coalition, sending troops and the most prominent commander, Aleksandra Suvorova, to fight her. As a result, the perception of Russia in France began to change, while the interception of power by Napoleon and clearly hostile to him Russia's position strengthened the common negative attitude. In Napoleonic times, 2 states persisted in opposing French domination. They were England and Russia. Napoleon, building his fresh post-feudal social order, resorted to helping countries, specified as Poland, which were destroyed under the erstwhile order. This is how Polish Legions appear on the historical phase Henryk Dąbrowski. Napoleon, fighting against all the Polish invaders who, in addition to England, were the main defenders of the monarchy of Europe, as if they were fighting for the freedom of Poland. I compose “as if” due to the fact that legionaries and Józef Wybicki in his own Mazurk Dąbrowski, they attributed to Bonaparte propolskie intentions which he did not have. The Polish case was for him a propaganda argument to mobilize the soldier to fight the monarchy Europe. A manipulative attitude about the French colonies in Haiti was clearly revealed, where our legions were utilized to fight insurgents fighting under the direction of Toussaint Louverture (1743–1803) dependency on France. This, of course, had nothing to do with the Polish case, nor with the fight for our freedom and yours, as we like to talk about ourselves. In a sense, our Legions became a model for the French abroad Legion formed about 30 years later. And this is simply a tool. par excellence French colonialism. However, after all, it must be admitted to Napoleon that to any degree he fulfilled his promises, creating in 1807 a substitute of the Polish state in the form of the Duchy of Warsaw, which for him had the value of a chess gambitic pawn, which could be sacrificed to gain a better position. To change Europe, Napoleon had to destruct both England andAnd Russia. The economical continental blockade of England due to the cooperation of the second with Russia was ineffective. So if the main recipient of British goods – Russia will be destroyed the economy of large Britain will be weakened in the position ofThat's France's hegemon position. With this in mind, Napoleon began preparing for the large invasion of Russia. In addition to building a large military force, so-called. Grande Armee, he made a large propaganda effort in which the image of barbarian and backward appeared againRussia. Enlightenment thaw is over. The 18th century, in which the foundations of the Russian power were built, came to an end, and with its passing France and mostly the West returned to the way of russophobia. And here the Polish general was a large aid to Napoleon Michał Sokolnicki, which produced the alleged will of Peter I, a paper depicting the imperial aims of Russia, as the creator of modern Russia supposedly presented them in his last will. This paper presented Russian expansionism as a threat to the full of Europe, and its mention was to justify Napoleon's preventive attack on Russia. Although the forgery of the paper had already been demonstrated in the second half of the 19th century, almost 150 years later, as Mettan writes, he was able to invoke it as the then president of the United States. Harry Trumanto justify a restraint policy (container) to the USSR. In fulfilling Napoleon's expansionist goals, the small Duchy of Warsaw exhibited under Prince JPoniatowski's cerepha For its capabilities, a immense 100-thousandth army, making up 1/6 forces of the French large army. It is interesting that during the pre-seasons the exhibition of the 30-thousandth army was a problem for more than 7 times the Republic. As we know, the participation of the Polish army in this reportedly besides in the interest of Polish aggression against Russia did not bring the expected results. The expedition ended in defeat, and 3 years later Napoleon I was stripped of power. Polish hopes of freedom related to France have lost the right of existence.
The Kingdom of Poland as a paradoxical Russian effort to eradicate Polish rusophobia and its consequences
Organized in 1815, the Vienna legislature made a restaurant of the erstwhile order. What is worth emphasizing, despite Poland's participation in Napoleonic forces, the position of our country not only did not suffer, but besides improved interestingly. Vienna Congress, after accepting the main winner of Napoleonic France – Tsar Alexandra I, formed in the Russian partition the Kingdom of Poland, i.e. an organism with a position higher than the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw. In general, we have 2 cases of external attempts to recreate Polishness. It is clear that both forms – let us call them – of Polish states are puppets of their creators and are set up to service their interests, i.e. France in the case of the Duchy and Russia in the case of the Kingdom. What is interesting is the comparison of what was hidden under both facades and which better matched their Polish social substance. Indeed, the similarities between the 2 forms of statehood were great. Both had a liberal constitution. In the case of the Principality, it was given by Napoleon, in the case of the Kingdom developed by the Prince Adam Czartoryski, Polish abroad Minister Tsar Alexander I. In both, the power was organized according to the Montesque rule of 3 divisions of authorities and both had limited freedom in the field of abroad policy. They had different external connections. The Duchy was Napoleon's will related to the Saxon monarchy of the Wettyns, the Kingdom was to constitute a individual union with Russia. The authoritative language in both cases was Polish. The code which regulated civilian issues in the Principality was the celebrated Napoleonic civilian Code mostly preserved in the Kingdom. Both organisms developed well economically. possibly an effective policy Franciszek Drucki-Lubecki, the Minister of the Kingdom Treasury, was peculiarly effective, but in both cases it was a period of unchangeable development. I would add that in 1816 the University of Warsaw was founded historically the 4th university after the Jagiellonian, Vilnius and Lviv, created on Polish lands. In summing up the effort to compare both forms of pseudo-stateism of Poland, it must be concluded that they did not disagree excessively. What is amazing is the comparison of modern legislative solutions in Poland with the self-rental of Russia, which had to wait for its first constitution until 1905. As you can see, at least during the post- Napoleonic period Russia tried to reckon with the political tradition of the Republic. It is besides interesting to see how political, civic, cultural and economical rights were in another elections against the Russian background. Well, in the period analysed, i.e. in 15 years after the end of the Napoleonic era until 1830, i.e. until the outbreak of the November Uprising, the situation of Polish society in the Russian partition was incomparably better than in 2 Germanic partitions. The Polish Kingdom had its own constitution, legislative power in the form of the Sejm, its own government in the form of the Council of State, its own monetary strategy based on the Polish gold, its own bank thanks to the Minister of the Druck-Lubeck Treasury, and something rather extraordinary – its own well-trained army based on officers, veterans of Napoleonic wars, e.g. general Joseph Bunny, politician of the Kingdom and future dictator of the November Uprising, General Józef Chodicki They were doing their military career in the Legions, fighting, among others, Russia, which seemed to be okay with their anti-Russian past. Furthermore, Polish was an authoritative language and the constitution guaranteed freedom of speech. In conclusion, the most constitutional rights and thus the top independency were enjoyed by the people of Congress, at least until 1830, and thus the paradox seems to be that in the Russian election the hatred of the possessor was the top and that in the territory of the Polish Kingdom the biggest uprising against the invaders broke out, the November uprising. Looking for the causes of this independency spur which the uprising has become, it is hard to find them in the persecutions of Russian, specified as it simply was not. The Kingdom was a part of freedom not only compared to another occupations, but besides to Russia, which functioned best according to the principles of the self-employed. In this sense, political solutions adopted in Poland were a clear bow to the expectations of Poles. It was as if the Russians had made an effort to eradicate Polish rusophobia. However, the forces which led to the outbreak were based on Poles' quest to gain full independence. The freedoms that the Kingdom brought were insufficient. The most serious factor, which prevented a rational assessment of the situation, was our russophobia. Poland, a country with a higher democratic, western culture, cannot be dependent on an east barbarian, who owes only strength to his position. In general, however, at least during the first period, and surely during the infamous November night of 29-30 November 1830, the Russophobic attitude of society had difficulty materializing. The benefits of the situation were besides much to take on a losing struggle. Let's see how the game is tied. Its origin was founded by Fr. Constantine Romanov, brother of Tsar Alexander I, Podchorzech School educated for the needs of the Polish army of lower officers. Its leader, better said based on the subsequent behaviour of conspirators – the leader, was Lieutenant Piotr Wysocki, which, by virtue of what was called patriotism, led to an uprising. Amazingly, the game organizers had no individual or organization imagination of the uprising.It was not known who was to direct the uprising and in what organization forms its authorities should function. The consequence of this astounding failure to prepare was the chaotic search for the rebel leader the night of her explosion. Leaders were not found, and under the influence of patriotic frenzy the conspirators – and this is flattering to them, overlapping with the practiced historiographical line – murdered (sounds criminal, so they better shot) six generals and 1 henchman who refused to join their venture. Shot officers had previously been active in Napoleonic wars and it is hard to fishy them of rusophile. They just either saw that the operation didn't make sense or refused to act under duress. On the night of 29 by 30 November, they were left in an act of "patriotic" (because specified a sound is trying to give it, which is an apparent abuse) ecstasy shot by generals Stanisław Potocki, Stanisław Trębicki, Maurice Hauke, Józef Nowicki, Ignacy Blumer and Tomasz SiemiątkowskiThe colonel was besides killed. Filip Meciszewski. The murdered tsarski scales built a monument in Saski Square in Warsaw. General Haukego was murdered in front of his household and 19 bullet and bayonet wounds were found in his body..After the monument was erected, the first qualification of the killed officers, who in the fight against Tsarsk Russia as skeletal and legionaries built careers with loyalists was changed to villains. He circled a poem referring to the structure of the monument “Eight lions and 4 birds defender 7 villains”.Looks like a martyr'srusophobia has become uncontrollable, and for giving it an outlet for deficiency of arguments it was resorted to names. However, the social attitude was rusophobic and in conflict between common sense and patriotic frenzy, emotions prevailed. The Adversary of Gene formation. The peasant became his dictator and the Polish army created by the Russians began to fight those who called her to life. Although the Polish army was well trained and had an experienced officer's staff, the result of the conflict could not be different than a defeat. Reflecting on the causes of the uprising and why manipulated youths initiated them, I have the impression that the intent of calling it was to destruct the liberal institutions of the Kingdom and replace them with more compatible creations, both with the Russian Empire and another conservative invaders. To the Spring of the Peoples was inactive far distant and wanted in Europe to keep the unthreatening monarchy order. The outbreak of the uprising was an chance for the modernist Polish-Russian social experimentation in the form of a Kingdom to simply eliminate. Especially erstwhile the Tsar after Alexander I died Santa Iwho, unlike his brother, was neither pro-Polish nor pro-social. And so it did. The Constitution was replaced by the alleged Organic Statute, the function of the Sejm and the Council of State was weakened, the Polish military liquidated, censorship and police supervision were strengthened. It was in the organization sphere, in the social sphere, and after the fall of the uprising many were sentenced to death, thousands were sent to Siberia, there were confiscations of the property of the nobility incapable to legitimise noble origins and large Emigration, in addition to intensifying Polish political activity on an global scale, in the country brought drainage of educated elites, which negatively affected social and economical life.
Another installment of martyrdom. January Uprising
As if there were small sad November experiences, a generation later the Polish Kingdom breaks up again. On January 22, 1863, the alleged Provisional National Government proclaimed the outbreak of the uprising, the abolition of the serfdom, and the appropriation of peasants whose planned emancipation was to guarantee the emergence of a recruit. Unfortunately, the peasantry did not very much believe the power which had self-proclaimed qualities, in addition to not being able to execute their declarations and the peasants did not follow the call. They preferred to wait for the “real” abolition of the serenity, which the Tsar showed a year later Alexandra II. It is good to stress that the Ukrainian peasantry has taken an offensive initiative, and in the case of ethnically Polish lands we can talk about indifference. On Ukrainian lands, the agricultural improvement of the Provisional National Government took the form of the alleged Golden Hramota, whose attempts to materialize led to tragic consequences. According to Wikipedia, in the village of Solowiejówka (near Żytomierz) an effort to explain and incarnate the improvement led to the bloody self-righteousness of peasants on about 20 temporary government emissaries arriving with an agitation mission. 12 emissaries were murdered and the remainder of the badly injured were given to the Russian authorities. As we can see,Mostthe layer of Polish society – the peasantry – had a relation either indifferent or hostile. It remained knowledgeable, but not intelligence capital, and – how to do itIntentionally, he sees – a refuge of Polishness, or nobility. But she rememberedThe repression following the November uprising, in peculiar the confiscation of assets and its attitude towards the uprising, albeit positive, was overflowing with fear of consequences. Consequently, the motor force of the uprising was intelligence, a fresh forming layer, which the fresh Spring of Peoples had fulfilled with the ideas of social justice, and which was so easy to let for radicalism that due to the tiny state of possession they were not afraid of property losses.In another words, the attitude of society to the uprising was not unequivocally positive. erstwhile we look at the uprising through the military prism, and he was to decide, we will see the complete inadequacy of intentions, which, to remind you, was the liberation of Poland, to its resources. Artillery was non-existent, respective light guns captured in the skirmishes were insufficient to carry out regular field action, firearms long, first of all tiny in quantity, second of all – besides diverse to constitute a weaponry of more many troops, ammunition for medicine, and the diversity of firearms was a logistical nightmare. In any sense, the white weapon was a lot, especially the scythe set up as the Raclavice over half a century earlier proved to be any military potential, but those who would have these scythes over half a century later to use, peasants, lacked... The number of militant insurgents is between 10,000 and 30,000. Given that there was a regular army other with a force of over 300,000 soldiers, the question arises as to why we are discussing in general the issue of the military success of the uprising, which had no chance to appear victorious from this fight. Let's take a look at both lines. What unites them is the fact that both took place in the Russian partition. What distinguishes is the fact that the November uprising had resources in the sense of an armed and trained army, but did not have social-political goals at the time of the detonation (beyond the want to be free), nor the power to accomplish these objectives. In the case of the January uprising, the situation was precisely the opposite: the power and political intentions before the uprising were defined, but there were no measures. Simplifyingly, the November uprising, due to the shortcomings identified, did not know how to usage its resources, while the January uprising did not know how to accomplish the intended objectives. In the first case, the uprising was pointless, while in the second case it was impossible to implement. Generalizing the November uprising as well as the 30 years later undertaken have no advantages, but in the memorial, in the sense that future generations were reminded that their ancestors were fighting for independent Poland and thus retained the thought of independent Poland. Assuming that the national memory is stored thanks to the armed struggle, the question remains, nevertheless, why the fight was fought primarily in the Russian partition, while the Prussian and Austrian ones experienced only symbolic spurs. And it cannot be said that in these occupations the memory of Poland has expired, as the fight against Bismarckovsky proves Culturekampf Or Hakata in the Prussian partition.In the case of the Austrian Presidency, the fight for Polishness was conducted by political, cultural or economical methods (e.g. the Stanians, the Society of the School of People, the cooperative movement or the patriotic-sporting Sokol). In 1867 Galicia obtained her own National Sejm. Polish language became an authoritative language in administration and education. Notabene Such powers were obtained by Poles in the Russian partition 50 years earlier, plus their own army, and who knows if that is why it did not detonate only the Polish romanticist historical communicative uprising. I devote quite a few attention to both uprisings, but I think that their background was historically shaped rusophobia, and their defeats strengthened these negative feelings, making us suffering rusophobes, whose aim was to retaliate on the east "barbarbarites". And small changes, as I wrote earlier, that Polish rusophobia is not native farming, that this racist sentiment in the complicated process of building a Catholic and Protestant Europe was implanted in us.
Black Sea Russian politics. Crimean War
As I tried to show, during the Enlightenment period, russophobia lost much on aggressiveness. However, Catherine the Great's successful quest for the Black Sea led to Crimea's conquest in 1783. Russia became a power in the Black Sea, and Turkey besides accepted Russia's position as the protector of Orthodoxy. A large group of Orthodox believers lived in Turkey due to the subjugation of the Balkans. The position of their defender allowed Russia to influence the interior situation of the Ottoman Empire. The right to care for Orthodox people became an component of Catherine's abroad policy, as well as a tool that could be utilized to legitimize expansion. This emergence in the geostrategic power of Russia, as well as the strengthening of its diplomatic status, sparked a consequence from the West for which this meantTo diminish your own dominant planet of position. Russia has allowed itself besides much. As a result, Napoleonic Europe has made a fruitless effort to degrade Russia's position, achieving, as is known, the other effect to that intended. Russia's influence grew. Who knows whether this fact should not be attributed to the exceptionally favourable position obtained by the Kingdom of Poland, which unfortunately was not taken seriously by Poles. Either way, Western rusophobia began to grow. Russia proved to be a very skillful player, naturally combining the protection of the interests of Orthodox Christians with the geostrategic goals of gaining control of the Dardanelle Strait, the Marmara Sea and the Bosfor. These 2 themes, geostrategic and protection of Orthodoxy, intertwined in Russia's abroad policy, leading among another things to the military and diplomatic support of uprisings in Greece and Serbia leading to Greece's independency and autonomy by Serbia in 1830. The increase in influence and position of Russia in the Balkans, as well as its closeness to the strategical nonsubjective of the straits, which was due, among another things, to the weakening power of Turkey, afraid the Western powers, whose consequence took on the character of rusophobic propaganda. However, this propaganda was not adequate to halt the Russians, who in 1853 convincingly destroyed the Turkish fleet under Sinope. This fact convinced France and England, with the support of Austria, to militaryly detain the Russians. The war called Crimean materialized. Its media justification was the Western right to humanitarian intervention and the fight against Russian tyranny. Does anyone uncertainty that Ottoman Turkey was an oasis of democracy and human rights? The Crimean war completed in 1856 by the triumph of the French-British troops is seen as the first modern military conflict in the logistical sense (use as a steamer transport and railway), military technology (use of artillery firing explosive missiles),information and propaganda (use of a common telegraph and for the first time photography for building an authenticated media narrative). As a consequence of Russia's failure, its expansion was halted. For the West this success was a confirmation of its own supremacy. For Russia, it became a cold shower that stimulated her to reform.
Organic work and its impact on the content of rusophobia
In this global context, a January uprising must be seen. Another failed feed generated an organic work strategy. The society lost combat animus, but found motivation for economical and cultural activity. 1 of the most crucial were agrarian reforms, which not only changed the structure of land ownership, but besides increased agricultural productivity and improved agrarian life. Furthermore, through the improvement of the textile manufacture in Łódź with a immense marketplace in Russia and mining in the Dąbrowski Basin, the Kingdom, although besides called the Nadwiślanska Country, entered the industrialisation path. This brought about the improvement of rail and road transport. In general, the social tissue has been strengthened. technological and cultural societies were established, which supported both technological and cultural activities. It is besides crucial to emphasize the improvement of literature, painting and music, which took on topics related to Polish past and identity. During that time many works were created which constitute today's canon of Polish art. In conclusion, the strategy of organic work proved to be a much more effective method of caring for Polish national identity than uprisings. However, this does not mean that russophobia has disappeared. On the contrary, it took a different character, inactive martyred, in 2 forms: positivist and independence. The positivist movement, although critical of uprisings and trying not to show resentment towards Russia, unofficially, e.g. in private talks, followed rusophobia. As far as art is concerned, 1 might point to Boleslawa Prussiais Dolls He spoke rather ridiculously about the institutions of the Czarskis, as well as on Stanisław MoniuszkaWho in his opera Scary Court he referred to the passing size of the Republic, in which censorship read the nationalist and anti-Russian message and removed it from the aphis. In the spirit of veiled criticism of the Tsar, he besides spoke Aleksander Świętochowski. And it's hard not to mention here. Roman Dmowskiwhich was a reasonably interesting synthesis of rusophobia and rusophilia. His rusophobia was expressed in the feeling that Russia is culturally lower, while rusophilia in the belief that it is strategically better to cooperate with Russia and it is much little dangerous than to make something with Germany, which he perceived as historical enemies of Poland. The second, let's call it independence, expressed his rusophobia in a much more open and extremist way. For example, for the purposes that he set himself, he had to overthrow the Tsar. In addition, although the anticipation of insurrection in the close future was not seen, his request for independency was constantly seen and conspiracy activities were developed to this end. Finally, in the communicative of independence, Russia was Poland's top enemy and only its defeat could return freedom. 1 of the representatives of this kind of reasoning Louis Varyński, Józef Piłsudski and Stanisława Brzozowski, a literate for whom the carat was a strategy of social slavery. He expressed his opinion that autocracy is contrary to the thought of civilian society and that Russian culture does not service human freedom but represents state ideology. I besides have the impression that despite the peaceful formal rusophobia of organic work, it was in the second half of the 19th century that it was installed permanently in the Polish mentality. And it must be said that Russia's russification policy has clearly contributed to it. As if 2 uprisings were adequate to end attempts to find a common language with Poles. It is interesting that, in total, rather limited reforms in the Austrian election, leading to his autonomy from 1867 onwards, in full generated the impression that it was a partition in which Poles felt best. The image and the story over time Francis Joseph (1848–1916) as a harsh but just emperor, he was fond of Galicia, and although it was mostly shaped by propaganda, it allowed better than in another occupations to endure restrictions on freedom.
Rhenophobia and comparative germanophobia
Given that the period of business is coming to an end, it is interesting to answer the question in which of the 3 occupations the policy of the possessor was most anti-Polish and thus generated rusophobic or germanophobic feelings. As indicated above, the increase in the processes of combating Polishness in the second half of the 19th century was comparatively weak in the Austrian and very intensified in Prussian and Russian. Let us look at Prussian / German and Russian partitions. The russification and germanization methods utilized were very diverse. The differences concerned, among others, who implemented the policy, why it was implemented, what methods and what short-term and far-reaching effects it was. The first of these problems concerns the question of who carried out the Germanization and who implemented the rusification. The Russian institutions were liable for the rusification, while the Germanization was carried out in the Prussian business by both the state administration and social organizations. For the Russians, the goal was more or little to assimilate Polish society; for the Germans– creation of a German society in Polish territory, for the price of displacement of Polish.Consequently, the Germanisation spectrum was much wider than the rusification spectrum. Bismarcovsky Kulturkampf It was a fight against Catholicism. The Settlement Commission, established in 1886, sought to undermine the economical position of Polish society by purchasing land. The work of Poles in the state service was limited, while the social organization Hakata (officially called the German Association of east March, operated since 1894, informally its name was derived from the initials of the names of its foundersFerdinand von Hansemann, Hermann Kennemann and Heinrich von Tiedemann; is the most celebrated example of how German society supported the German state in the shaft with the Polish element. another examples are Grenzschutz Ost and Bund Deutscher Osten) built a propaganda affirmative image of German society and demolishing the image of Poles. As a result, Germanization was both prospective and systemic. For her efficiency, she resorted to methods as hard as soft, to avoid the impression that she was violent. specified characteristics cannot be applied to rusification, which, unlike German policy, was not so systemic as a share. There was a problem and it had to be solved. Secondly, social organizations fighting Poland were not, thirdly, although Orthodoxy was promoted, Catholicism was not combated. Finally, unlike the German occupation, there was no Russian colonization action on Polish lands. Rusification was based on repression and was much more violent. Germanization of Prussian occupationIt was based on degrading the position of Polishness and promoting the German. Rusification was more affluent in an immediate sense, but Germanization, albeit little brutal, was far more effective in its planned and global character. Rusification bore opposition, germanization, naturally giving emergence to opposition, due to the undercutting of the roots of the Polish identity, it had a more serious depolonization effect. Different from these 2 tough politiciansthe Austrian system. Since the Spring of the Peoples, this policy was not hard, where the story of the good Emperor Francis and Austrian tolerance flowed; it developed a model of social engineering utilizing the "divided and ruled" method. The Habsburg Empire was a conglomerate of nationalities and social classes. His rulers have noted that a top-down, forceful consequence to the manifestations of social rebellion brings him radicalization and, erstwhile he becomes besides large, external intervention is needed. As happened in the case of the Hungarian Uprising 1848–1849, which, however, importantly reduces global prestige, and in the case of Austria, it inactive had to number for the competition of Prussia for primacy in the union of German states. So the Habsburgs concluded that in conflict it was better to be an arbitrator than a party. The social and national diversity of their monarchy has opened up to the Habsburgs infinite opportunities for social manipulation, in which conflict arbitration was a primary tool. An example is the alleged Galician robbery (the name of the robbery derives from the German word ‘rauben’ meaning ‘grab’. Who first utilized this name – it is not known, reportedly, that was the name of the peasants themselves participating in the events). In 1846 there is an independency run in Galicia, the alleged Krakow uprising. The Austrians do not usage the army to fight it, but they usage anti- nobility sentiments among the peasants they themselves created. And so the peasants learned that the nobles wanted to reconstruct the serfdom and return to slavery. So they were encouraged to attack noble courts, promising a salary. As a result, the uprising can be said to have no effect at all. It was said that it lasted 9 days, which was adequate to deprive Krakow of the position of a free city acquired during the legislature of Vienna. Another area of Habsburg social engineering was religion. The Catholicism and Orthodoxy were powerfully supported by the Unity, which, after the Austrian rule, acquired the noble name of the Greek Catholic Church. A painful awakening was the revival of Unity first in Ukrainian nationalists and later fascists. Another area was the national policy, which tried to favour the Russians at the expense of Poles. Throughout the period of the partitions, Lviv was the capital of Galicia, which clearly diminished the function of the erstwhile capital of Poland, Krakow. Generalizing, the manipulation of Austrian politics was not repressive as Russian, it was not as damaging cultural and economical identity as Prussian, but it was impossible to recreate or make a sense of national bond between Poles. The Austrians did not want to deal with 1 united national group, and specified effects were experienced by Russians and Prussians. They preferred to fuel particularities, make them to conflict levels, and laterto execute a mutually beneficial arbitration. Masters divide et impera. All in all, we have a paradox: the Russian policy appears to be the least effective and even the other of the effects leading. As a result, Polishness is strengthened. Did the Russians not realize that repressive politics would have specified consequences? The Polish Kingdom in 1815-1830 showed that they are able to conduct a very "soft" policy, with the consequences of their grief.Or did the Russians have no policy of reparation, and their actions had an order, from their point of view, character? As a result, specified a police-repressive policy was counterproductive, strengthening the sense of national identity and russophobia. Unlike the Russian, Austrian and Prussian invaders, they conducted a policy on the consequences of major consequences for Polish identity. However, it was better accepted, even accepted for Austria. Question: Why? I think that not very critical reception of their behaviour by Polish society is due to their belonging to the admired West.
The power performance is over. Polish independency Hopes
The end of the century brought serious tensions between the possessors, which resulted in their division and consequently the creation of antagonistic military alliances (Entent in which the Russians found themselves, and the block of Central States, whose axis was the alliance of Germany and Austria). This was a change that gave Poles the chance to win conflicting interests of countries previously representing a single front against the Polish case. However, it is characteristic that no political force has emerged in the partition of Poland that would want to win independency based on Russia. And this happened erstwhile the possessive states made an effort – let us call it – to seduce Poles. They started the Russians; just after the war broke out, the chief commander of the Russian army on 14 August 1914 issued a manifesto in which he announced the unification of the Polish lands within the Russian Empire with his own self-government, freedom of language and culture. The consequence of the Central States did not take long: on 5 November 1916 they announced the creation of an independent Polish state with hereditary monarchy and constitution. As for the territory, there was a problem due to the fact that it was to happen on the territories of Russia, not on the territories of their partitions. The gaining power by communists in Russia in a declarative sense did not change the Russian approach, and they even went further than the carat, due to the fact that in August 1918 the Bolsheviks issued a decree on the independency of Poland, in which they formally recognized the independent Polish state. 2 leading politicians of this period, Piłsudski and Dmowski, although they represented different approaches to how to regain independency and how Poland has to look after regaining it, did not do so in cooperation with Russia. Piłsudski introduced his concepts of conspiracy and military combat based on Austria and Germany, while Dmowski implemented his ideas on a diplomatic road, negotiating with France and England. Unlike Piłsudski, who saw Russia as the main threat to Poland's independence, Dmowski felt that Germany was the primary danger to our national existence. As a result, he was oriented towards Ententa and thus did not exclude cooperation with Russia. However, his view of Russia changed substantially after the Bolshevik Revolution, which mostly rekindled russophobic sentiments, both in the West and in Poland. Poland's independency and its sanction by the Treaty of Versailles were primarily a consequence of the defeat of the possessive states. The ideas of territorial, historical reconstruction of the Polish state represented by different concepts of Piłsudski and Dmowski had their political consequences. Piłsudski's imaginations were based on Vasovian, east and northern imperialism. Contrary to what is thought of the Jagillons and their east imperialism, it must be stressed that it was the Jagillons who stopped the expansion of the German into our lands. The conflict of Grunwald, the Thirteen Years' War, the Prusai tribute – these are the works of their politics. Moreover, during their reign the celebrated Polish tolerance was generated, which later on the wave of the Jesuit counter-reformation, whose strength was destroyed for the period of the Wazów, which clearly contributed to expanding the strength of conflicts on the line of Polish Catholicism – Russian Orthodoxy. MeanwhileDmowski's ideas referred to the hub state in the sense of ethnically pure Poland. However, he and his ideas, especially after the assassination of the president Gabriel NarutovichThey were politically marginalized. As a result, Piłsudski wanted Poland more or little recreating the Republic of Both Nations, which he succeeded to any degree after the Treaty of Riga crowning the victorious Polish-bolshevik war and the action of tandem Piłsudski-Żeligowski forcefully joining Vilnius with its proximity to Poland. The problem is that the restored Neo-Jagiello Republic with boundaries as before the second partition was a multinational and multicultural state. The difficulty of managing specified a country, which the First Republic could not cope with, returned with repeated force in the Second Republic. At their origin was Piłsudski's rusophobia, under which it was reproduced as an anti-Russian state. This was due to the fact that the areas which in his concept should constitute the restored Polish state, in addition to being of interest to Russia, had their own state-generated aspirations. Meanwhile, Piłsudski functioned as if the period of business did not be and the Republic of Poland had rights to the territories over which it erstwhile ruled. Piłsudski, however, realized that his imagination would not meet the approval of Russia, whether Red or White, and so he constructed anti-Russian geopolitical projects specified as the Inter-Mediterranean Federation or prometeism. The Inter-Mediterranean Federation was to combine Poland with the countries in the Baltic-Black Sea Belt, namely Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine and Romania, with a kind of defensive, federalized alliance with applicable anti-Russian and theoretically anti-German blades. In relation to the importance of Poland, it was a concept that was besides ambitious, and the countries covered by it had suspicions that it was the cover of Polish imperialism. In the case of Lithuania, Żeligowski's action confirmed these suspicions, and in the case of Ukraine, the only country with which the Republic of Poland signed the applicable agreement ended as Piłsudski said erstwhile visiting soldiers interned in Kalisz of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the alleged petlourists, on our side in the war against Bolsheviks fighting: “I am sorry, gentlemen, it was not meant to be like this”. How was it expected to be? Ukraine and Poland were to form an alliance of 2 independent states. And it turned out that Poland and Russia by the Treaty of Riga carried out a partition of Ukraine, which resulted, among others, in the terrible destiny of Poles settled in the supposedly Polish part of Ukraine, and, of course, in the Ukrainian-German rapprochement. Prometheism was a concept resulting from the perception of Russia as an empire that its statehood in its vast territory built against the will of the societies that entered it. Thus, the offensive defence against the imperial tendencies of Russia should trust on weakening Russia by stimulating the instincts of national societies forming it. The ensuing national conflicts may weaken Russia so that it will not only not have the strength to further expand, but may self-destruct. Well, 1 can only say without going into item that from time to time any national problem occurs locally, but so far it has never reached a critical mass threatening the whole.
Inter-war recurrence of triumphalist rusophobia
As we can see, in its most refined, which does not mean effective, the geopolitical concepts of the II Republic was rusophobic. And for the first time in possibly over 200 years, this russophobia was not martyred. As in the Jagiellonian and Vase period, it became arrogant again, based on a superiority complex. This arrogance was not only due to the fact that Tsar's Russia was destroyed, and that the Bolshevik Russia was created on its ruins was a novelty, whose endurance was not obvious, but above all from the constitutional story of the Second Republic, which was a successful Warsaw battle. The conflict was the consequence of aggressive implementation of the concept of the Intermarine and in Piłsudski's head the first component of this geopolitical puzzle was to be an alliance with Ukraine. To this end, Polish troops undertook an offensive against Kiev to aid make friendly Poland (i.e. hostile Russia) Ukraine and as a consequence start to implement any form of the Inter-Sea Federation. It is hard to recognise Kiev as an old Polish city, although after the Lublin Union for more than 100 years we ruled it, but in the state (now it would be said) we went to Kiev in April 1920, in May we captured it, filmed it and in the same May as a consequence of the russian counteroffensive we rushed out of it to halt at Warsaw and defy there. Piłsudski liked the policy of facts made. The action of Żeligowski in weak Lithuania proves this. However, in the case of a stronger adversary, specified an undertaking may have had tragic consequences. And it almost did. The destiny of Poland depended on 1 battle. As a consequence of Piłsudski's brawl, Poland was about a hairline from the failure of independency again. To a large extent, accidental triumph allowed Poland to proceed independent existence. Thus the fact of the Victoria was of large importance for the formation of national identity and pride in being a Pole. That was the plus, the minus was arrogant rusophobia and the actual loneliness in global relations. Only Romania was a friendly country, seemingly friendly France saw us as usual in terms of whether we would be useful to it. Talking about the conflict that it stopped Russia from attacking Europe does not correspond to the feeling of theoretically threatened states. Both Germany and Czechoslovakia were so afraid of Russian invasion that they refused to deliver deadly weapons to Poland. As far as Germany is concerned, they had destroyed Spartacus' communist movement a year earlier in a way that, incidentally, did not bring them glory. Thus, another proletarian revolution, like October, would not have taken place. Worse for russian Russia, her triumph over Warsaw would lead to this time a decisive action by Ententa states to destruct communist Russia. In another words, the most crucial effect of the conflict was to save the Polish state from oppression, in which it should not be found. In addition, the triumph develops the feeling that Poland is like erstwhile a foregroundprotecting the civilized Western planet from this time a communist threat. In general, russophobia identifies with patriotism and confuses society adequate that it has difficulty imagining that an existential threat will come from the West. Stalinist atrocities distract from openly proclaimed Aryan theories of racial inferiority The Slav and the request to gain surviving space for Herrenvolk, meaning the German breed of gentlemen. Even worse, erstwhile Adolf Hitler through the Munich Conference in 1938, at the acceptance of France and England leads to the inclusion of Czech Sudetens under the pretext that they are inhabited by the Germans, oportunistly takes part in the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, utilizing the same argument in the corp of Śląsk Cieszynski. Furthermore, erstwhile Stalin, seeing in the capture of the Sudeten dangerous Germans reinforcement, proposes military intervention in defence of Czechoslovakia, Poland prevents the passage of russian troops. Of course, russian Russia did not have a strong army to start a war with Germany at the time, but a joint action with France and England would most likely have stopped Hitler. However, they did not intend to search an alliance with the communist country, and in opposition to Poland in utilizing its territory the Russian thought burned down. From the position of the historical shortsightedness of the Polish policy of that time, as well as the wholeWestern politics, it's amazing. little than a year later, Germany began utilizing a akin argument about the persecution of the German number in relation to our country. As with Czechoslovakia, it was just a pretext. In fact, it was a materialization of an old German idea. Drang nach Osten To gain a surviving space, as they said Lebensraum. However, this time Russia and Germany would face face-to-face and Hitler wanted to make certain that the Red Army would not intervene. So he offered Stalin a pact in which the russian Union will not intervene in the German-Polish war at the price of participating in the partition of Poland and another territorial benefits. As you know,The isolated Russia went for a short-sighted and immoral solution, as it first allowed it time to improve the state of its army and manufacture before the war was expected, and secondly, it gained territorial benefits. The pact took place just a week before the German invasion of Poland. Despite their agreements with England and France, these have, as we know, done with their aid phoney war or unusual war and lonely Poland was virtually crushed by an attack coming from the west and east. The losing September run began the darkest period of our history. The Germans built concentration camps in our territory, the Russians made Katyn and organized exports into their vast country. The demolition of the Polish substance was alarming. As Poles, we were besides destroyed by Ukrainians, and even friends of Lithuanians organized a concentration camp in Ponarach. It is hard to find a more grim summary of the twentieth interwar period. A nightmare threatening the Polish nation with biological annihilation thanks to the russian Union's triumph in a gigantic clash with Nazi The Reich did not materialize.
Pax Russiana and rebellious-martyrological rusophobia of People's Poland
However, the peace that brought russian Russia is Pax RussianaThat's peace on their terms. Euphemistically speaking, in Polish society he did not arouse enthusiasm. The established communist system, despite its first successes, specified as the alphabetization of society and ensuring the right to free education and the implementation of the right to employment through dynamic industrialisation, has lost its attractiveness rather quickly. It was not possibly the weakness of the strategy as such, but the fact that it was and is seen as a tool of national slavery. For example, in Cuba and Vietnam, this strategy persists, and in Vietnam the economy is flourishing, and Cuba's problem is historically taking the longest-lasting US economical sanctions in the world, but unlike Poland, there communism merged with national liberation, which determined its social acceptance. In addition to the sense of enslavement, despite the comparative economical successes in the field of the dense industry, our society was surviving in a state of sub-consumption compared to the Western. Our consumer goods marketplace did not satisfy expectations born in comparison with the marketplace offer of Western countries. The reflection led to the diagnosis that the socialist strategy was to be blamed, due to the fact that in countries that were successful in terms of satisfactory consumption, the capitalist strategy prevailed, and who was liable for not only enslaving but besides inefficient management? Yeah, russian Russia. It was adequate for russophobia to begin to return, immediately after the war a bit extinguished (in total, they saved us), but as the shortages of the People's Poland became more and more felt, more and more intense in their initially suffering form, but as the PRL fell more triumphant. And in 1989, as is commonly known thanks Francis FukuyamaThe communicative was over and it was only expected to be better. Triumphous rusophobia has taken on challenging common sense forms. But as they said, it's time to be crazy. Is this not best confirmed by the first presidential elections of the alleged 3rd Republic, in which legend of NSZZ "Solidarity" Lech Wałęsa with the nickname “Bolek” clashed in the second, so decisive circular with the arrivedfrom the West Tymin StateHe didn't tell me how to become a rich man. And it's not precisely a comic book event. Bertold Brecht, unkindly portraying capitalism in Opera for 3 cents. or withabsurd Paragraph 22 Joseph Heller. No, it was all fatally serious, as evidenced by the unexplained killings in 1992 by the Prime Minister Peter Jaroshevich with her spouse, head of NIK prof. Valerian Pańko in 1991, chief of chief police Mark Papala in 1998, or Andrzej Lepper, president of Self-defense in 2011.
III Republic of Transformative-Triumphalistic Russophobia
Unquestionably, according to a fashionable term, the affirmative negative of this period was the alleged systemic transformation. Its primary tool was privatization leading to profit-abuse and socialisation of losses, which, as is known, led to large unemployment and forced real large Emigration. Additionally, the political commissioner of capitalism Prof. Leszek Balcerovich not only destroyed the socialist economy, the justification for what was the claim that social property was nobody's property, but besides the PRL's right to be as a form of the Polish state was denied. Almost 50 years of the existence of this form of the Republic were considered to be unforeseeable becauseApparently, it was 50 years of russian occupation. The nonsense of this claim is apparent erstwhile the Nazi business is set up, during which about 6 million Poles died, or about 1 million a year, with the alleged russian occupation, during which our demographic growth was about 0.5 million a year. So after the interwar Poland has appeared since 1990 Deus ex machine 3rd Republic... However, there is simply a broader perspective. And this position allows us to see that the collapse of the monarchy strategy in Europe, confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles, was the main origin in the creation of the Second Republic, and the subduing of the disorder with this treaty created led to another Yalta-Potdam order, which restored to us global subjectivity and territorial-ethnic cohesion. It can be said that with any surplus, the hub territorial concept was implemented. In terms of the durability of this order, it proved to be more permanent than the Vienna power concert, due to the fact that it is hard to find specified a long period of peace in the past of Europe. Named Long Peace (1945–022) is after Pax Romana (between 27 B.C.E. and 180 C.E.) the second longest period of peace in Europe. Returning to our benefits, we received tremendous access to the sea, suffocating the presence of a German in the north, which for 700 years we could not cope with, disappeared, Earths Western became part of Poland, and after more than 500 years of Poland's absence in Silesia it was restored to us. It is unusual that despite specified a large geopolitical achievements of the Polish People's Republic, it does not have the right to a place in the catalogue of the Republics. The basic component explicating this aberration is not the inflated occupation, but the internalized, established russophobia. After all, it is not hard to imagine that if the USSR wanted to, our restored western lands would stay east lands of the first russian business region and later the GDR. And no theories about the compensation of our lost Ends change that possibility. It is said that Polish Kresy are now territories of independent states created after planet War I and II. Polish factThe presence on those lands is not well remembered.In addition, it is hard to imagine that without the approval of the USSR, the unwilling but essential action of the “Wisła” which ended the insurrection of the Bieszczady region would be possible. I am writing this to emphasize that the policy of the russian Union was not unfavourable to Poland; rather the contrary, much has been done to make a large and strong Polish folk state, as was erstwhile said and written. In conclusion, the Yalta-Popdam order, contrary to social perception, was not unfavourable for Poland, but on the contrary.
Completion
It should besides be apparent that changes made by him do not make everyone happy and that there are forces that strive to change it. As the guarantor of this order is Russia, its weakening will lead to a revision of the east European geopolitical situation. The wars that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, as well as the velvety, against social will, the elimination of Czechoslovakia are an example of this. Both states, created by the Versailles Order and sustained by the Yalta Order, were broken up in 1990. of the last century, at the minute of Russia's top weakening. The eventual defeat of Russia in Ukraine will open a can of Pandora of geopolitical changes in east Europe, which will in any order besides affect Poland. However, as the latest past of the agreement between Russia and Germany shows can be very harmful to Poland, our anti-Russian alliance with Germany and the West mostly does not gotta bring affirmative results. The Ukrainian defeat of Russia is beginning the way to geopolitical chaos, which will be the victim of weaker members (and thus us) of the victorious Western alliance. And contrary to what the Russophobes say, Russia's triumph will hold European status quo, and will besides aid transform Ukraine's young statehood into a self-respecting organism. Ukraine is inactive a state in the process of self-determination and in this process it cannot ignore its neighbours. Returning to Polish rusophobia, it is an intellectual-emotional filter that blocks a healthy assessment of the situation. Healthy, i.e. based on an analysis of the profits and losses that the behaviour brings. erstwhile this analysis is based on patterns, prejudices, and stereotypes, it ceases to be adequate to reality, and is an expression of culturally established and assimilated assessments that simply obscure the image of reality. The consequence is not only the incorrect decisions, but besides the anxiety states generated by the misunderstanding always richer than the schemed reality. The dynamics of faulty cognitive processes and their created fears lead to escape into rituals and the usage of conceptual grid incapable to describe the problem facing us. Rusophobia limits us, due to the fact that alternatively of looking for a solution, we are looking for confirmation of what we think we know. It prevents and surely hinders dialog between both cultures and a simple culture of dialogue. And regardless of whether it is experienced triumphantly, as an expression of the superiority complex or martyrdom – as an expression of the inferiority complex is unfortunately an expression of infantilism.
Andrzej Nowak-Klucznik
