Russia was about to gain control in the air of Ukraine. Instead, there was an impasse in which standard air operations gave way to drones, glide bombs, and long-range rockets. Are the comments on “the end of classical aviation” justified and would the war with NATO look similar?
Ukrainian soldier of the 110th Territorial Defence Brigade with the Kvertus anti-gun. The town of Nowodarivka in the Zaporosk Oblast.
Before February 24, 2022, experts expected the air war on Ukraine to take a completely different course than in reality. I thought it'd be like the Persian Gulf. That there will be demolition of anti-aircraft defense, gaining air advantage and regular strokes of large aviation groups for purposes in the depths of Ukraine – admits Major Pil. Michael Fischer, military analyst. specified a script seemed logical besides due to the fact that Russia built for years the image of its air force as a modern formation. fresh aircraft, precision and advanced targeting systems were shown. – Meanwhile, part of this modernity was “potiomkinowska”. The Russians boasted about their own targeting tanks, and later it turned out that it was a "repacked" French solutions that, without service support, simply did not work," says Fischer.
Flying in the dark
It shortly turned out that Russian airspace control problems over Ukraine are not due to the quality of equipment. More crucial were doctrinal, organizational and systemic limitations. The Russians had comparatively modern aircraft and a large number of missiles, but they could not combine all elements into a coherent operation. – Their actions were isolated,” stressed Colonel Marcin Modrzewski, erstwhile commander of the 10th Tactical Aviation Squadron. – There was deficiency of synergies between aviation, reconnaissance, radio-electronic combat, anti-aircraft defence and land troops.
In the western model of flight operations, impact aircraft do not operate alone. They are accompanied by weapons of radio-electronic combat, early warning, reconnaissance platforms and specialized anti-aircraft defence systems. any aircraft do not attack ground targets – they are tasked with “blinding” their opponent, disrupting radars and creating a safe corridor for impact machines.
The Russians were incapable to carry out specified a campaign. Already in the first days of the war it became clear that they had tremendous problems with locating Ukrainian radars and fighting OPL. – Their anti-radio-location missiles frequently landed in random locations. At times it looked like Russian aviation was flying completely blind," said Major Fischer.
According to Lt. Lt. Modrzewski, 1 of the best examples of Russian problems became the conflict of Hostomel. On the first day of the war, the Russians tried to take over the strategical airport close Kiev, landing troops there by helicopters. The plan was to rapidly safe the runway and spread further dense troops Iłami-76. The Russians, however, wanted to carry out an airborne operation without gaining control in the air. “It was almost 19th century thinking,” the colonel says. “ NATO would never effort to execute specified an operation without incapacitating its opponent’s anti-aircraft defence and airspace safety before”, he adds. afraid “from above” Ukrainians regained control around the airport. The Ily-76 did not land in Hostoml, and the Russian plan of the Kiev business – intended to lead to the fast conclusion of the run – failed at nothing.
Problems with control of their airspace and exchange of data between various elements of the Russian combat strategy have besides begun to emerge. “If there is simply a situation in which your own anti-aircraft defence shoots down an early informing aircraft A-50, the quality of the ‘your/foreign’ strategy is questionable and the situation awareness is low,” says Marcin Modrzewski.
War on the Distance
Long to mention another weaknesses, it is adequate that Ukrainian S-300 sets, Buk, and later besides Western Patriots or NASAMS rapidly took distant the Russian's ability to conduct deep operations on Ukraine. But the Ukrainians couldn't afford deep flights. – Russians have a dense, layered anti-aircraft defence system. In addition, MiG-31 aircraft armed with R-37M missiles arrive. These are rockets that can harm targets from a distance of 200 km – says Michał Fischer. Ukrainian aviation must so act very carefully even far from the front line. Its activity can already reduce the appearance of Russian fighters on their own territory. – Ukrainian machines were shot down from immense distances. The pilot was frequently unaware of where the rocket was launched," says Fischer.
As a result, both sides began to collide from a distance, utilizing missiles and maneuvering missiles. The Russians with strategical aviation, able to attack from over Russia, inactive have a strong advantage. Although specified attacks are aimed at critical infrastructure, costs and limited supply of "smart" weapons systems find this. The front "małwa" requires cheaper solutions. This is how 1 of the most crucial adaptations of this war was born: the mass usage of glide bombs, allowing the support of land troops from a safer distance. The trial was initiated by the Russians. The old FAB bombs began equipping with UMPC modules – unfolded wings and satellite navigation systems. Thus, a heavy, originally undirected bomb could be dropped even a fewer twelve miles from the target. The attack method itself is somewhat archaic – Russian aircraft fly low, trying to hide from radars and shorten the time within range
Ukrainian OPL. “The device practically “sews the earth”, then makes a violent hill, makes a drop and an immediate turn with a departure”, describes Fiszer. The pilot can't see the target, the bomb's on programmed coordinates. These bombs are very effective. A well-prepared shelter is hard to destruct with a drone, but a glide bomb can wipe out specified a position from the face of the earth, says Fischer.
The mass usage of gliders became 1 of the most crucial elements of Russian tactics from 2023 to 2025.
FAB-500 bomb, equipped with UMPC glider modules, suspended Su-34 Bombership Su-34. The area of Awdijiwki in the Donetsk region, March 2024.
Air Force Democratisation
However, the massive usage of unmanned systems brought a real revolution. They began to take over more and more of the tasks of classical aviation – from the designation and guidance of artillery to targets hundreds of kilometres from the front. The most many category utilized for tactical action was FPV drones. Both sides began utilizing them on an industrial scale.
At the same time Russia expanded the production of Shahed, utilizing them to hit further distances – to Ukrainian cities, energy and military infrastructure. At highest moments, the Russians were able to send against Ukraine respective 1000 specified drones per month. It's a way to overload anti-aircraft defense. The thing is, Shahed is cheap, and the rocket to the Patriot road – noted Major Fischer. Ukrainians could not shoot down drones with rockets, so they built a strategy based on mobile groups utilizing barrel artillery, device guns, anti-drone systems and radio-electronic combat tools. They besides responded to their own drone war. Initially, they reached for improvised structures attacking frontal targets. In time, better Ukrainian drones began to regularly hit Russian refineries, airports, fuel retention facilities and industrial plants located hundreds of kilometres deep in Russia. “There has been a democratisation of air force,” says Colonel Modrzewski. "Until recently, countries with strategical aviation had the ability to strike deep. Today, any of these tasks can be performed by comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems.
In parallel with the improvement of drones, there is another duel – for signal, data and orientation in space. Both sides usage radio-electronic countermeasures on a immense scale: they disrupt GPS signal, usage spoofing, that is, dropping off false navigational data, and effort to take control of enemy systems. The consequence is “blinding” drones, breaking communications, taking over machines or forcing them to crash distant from the target.
Operation Maintenance System
The war on Ukraine has sparked a wave of comments about the "end of classical aviation", which is frequently accompanied by the reflection that NATO is not ready for a conflict with Russia. According to both interviewers, specified conclusions are premature. Western armies and arms companies are now intensively developing anti-drone capabilities – from radioelectronic combat systems to comparatively inexpensive kinetics and microwave weapons. – In the shadow of “dronosis” the anti-drone weapon is rapidly developing – confirms Colonel Modrzewski. “It will besides be produced in bulk,” he adds. Above all, however, the conflict over the Dnieprem does not show a model NATO–Russia war, but a conflict in which neither organization was able to gain a lasting advantage in the air. – The Russian Air Force is derived from the doctrine of front aviation. Their aircraft are characterized by comparatively tiny scope and limited situational awareness of pilots – explains Modrzewski. In practice, this means that it is essential to operate close to its own bases, radars and anti-aircraft defence.
This is simply a fundamental difference in NATO's M.O. Western forces are building an advantage not only of the higher quality of individual aircraft, but besides of the full operating system. “In NATO, air work is essential,” says Modrzewski. Planes can execute multi-hour missions, respond dynamically to the situation and operate hundreds of kilometres from the bases. – In the case of the Mission Reactive SEAD (Subpression of Enemy Air Defenses) machines wait for hours in the air to launch the enemy radar. erstwhile this starts to “light”, there is an attack on the OPL launcher – he explains. Nor is the Western Air run limited to sending a squadron of fighters over the target. This is simply a coordinated strategy including satellites, early informing aircraft, SIGINT platforms (radioelectronic recognition), radio-electronic combat and precise long-range weapons. However, specified actions require a immense method and organisational base – tankers, reliable communication and the ability to integrate data from multiple sources. This is what the Russians lacked in Ukraine – and they are improbable to make up for.
This does not mean that NATO could anticipate an easy victory. The inactive many OPL remains 1 of the most dangerous elements of the Russian army. – For the Alliance, it would be much more hard to win an advantage in the air over Russia than over Iraq or Yugoslavia – says Major Fiszer. But that's not what should worry us. According to Fisher, the Kremlin understands perfectly well that an open military clash with NATO would be highly risky. It is more profitable to gradually weaken the opponent – to fuel information chaos, to hit western political cohesion, to destabilize democratic processes or to test the resilience of states to migratory and energy pressures. – If we can paralyze the decision-making process or divide societies, then the classical war may simply be unnecessary. This is simply a bigger threat for us than Russian drones, aircraft and launchers – the Fisher estimates.
