On October 1, Iran carried out a second rocket attack this year on Israel's territory, justifying it by killing Hezbollah's leader and Israeli operation in Lebanon. The scale and advancement of the ballistic missiles utilized were larger than during the first attack on April 13–14 of that year, which could consequence in a more decisive retaliation of Israel. Iran's policy towards the rival and another inflammatory points in the region will be derived from Israel's actions, its own limitations, and attempts to legitimise the deterrence and reconstruction of the leader's image, «axis of resistance’.
Why did Iran strike Israel again?
The Iranian authorities have for many months been incapable to prevent Israel from acting in an effort to weaken and disassemble the pro-Iranian "axis of resistance", linking Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Yemeni Hutch and Syrian authorities. Therefore, the reasons for maintaining the position and prestige built for 4 decades by creating and sponsoring extremist movements and terrorist organizations in the mediate East are of paramount importance for Iran's motivation. The additional motivation of Iran's spiritual and military authorities is individual and household relationships with any of the killed Hezbollah leaders, a origin absent in Iran-Hamas relations. Despite erstwhile caution, Iran now feels compelled to further show the capabilities of its rocket arsenal, the main component of Israel's deterrence. The Iranian authorities are besides struggling with the request to preserve the image of a unchangeable government in the face of external force and public discontent. Iran, as in April, referred to self-defense rights and diplomatic channels at the UN, attempted to discourage the US and arabian countries from providing military aid or diplomatic support to Israel.
Rockets launched by Iran over Jerusalem, 01.10.2024.
How was Iran's attack different from the 1 before?
According to first estimates, Iran utilized about 180–200 ballistic missiles in the latest attack, of which at least a twelve exploded in Israel close selected targets – intelligence, military and atomic centers. The only victim of this attack was a Palestinian on the West Bank killed by a falling fuselage of an Iranian rocket (in April, 1 was killed and 31 Bedouins were injured). Due to the ineffectiveness of the April many-hour attack Iran utilized different tactics and means of robbery. The usage of comparatively easy to intercept kamikaze drones and maneuvering missiles was discontinued. Iran besides did not usage the rockets or drones it delivers to Shiite militias in Yemen and Iraq. Much indicates that the latest attack reduced the number of demanding long preparation for launch of liquid fuel-powered ballistic missiles (at that time 120) for the wider usage of Fateh household missiles. They have solid fuel drive, further scope and more precise heads than their basic versions. The fresh tactics and means utilized have considerably complicated Israel’s ability to detect, track and defend against the Iranian volley early. During the attack, the main weight of the defence took over Arrow-3 rocket systems (captures of warheads in space) and Arrow-2 and Proca David (captures in the atmosphere) and the support was again provided by US systems present in the region (Patriot and Aegis).
What could be the further development?
Due to the greater scale and effectiveness of Iran's second attack, Israel will most likely be stronger than before. In April Israel's consequence to Iran was limited due to US force on deescalation and yet proved symbolic – a single radar was destroyed for the S-300 kits protecting the atomic facility in Isfahan. Israel's rhetoric is now sharper, and its determination has been confirmed by further raids in Syria and Yemen and land operations in Lebanon. Israel was besides to study to Iran through arabian intermediaries about the planned impact on its military, oil and atomic installations. Israeli calculations can take much little account of Joe Biden's outgoing administration. The Iranian atomic centre in the Ford, which has long seemed a possible mark for Israel, is well prepared to last Israeli raids, and part of the rocket arsenal is protected by silos and deep tunnels. Iran, on the another hand, would have a serious problem with the removal of harm caused by Israeli oil raids or with the suppression of a larger cyber attack run on administrative and economical centres.
Has Iran's rivalry with Israel entered a fresh stage?
The strategical initiative now remains on the side of Israel. Although Iran has been reactive so far, it is now willing to take a greater hazard to save its influence and image in the region. Iran's open confrontation with Israel has previously hampered the geographical distance and various types of military capacity constraints of both parties. However, the fresh strong determination of the rivals increases the hazard of repeating Iran's rocket attacks and Israeli raids all fewer months, even with the fast completion of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and Syria. Depending on the scale and impact of specified attacks, Iran may besides change its approach to the atomic programme, which has so far been based on maintaining uranium enrichment capability, but without deciding to build operating heads and test them. Although Iran declared its readiness to negociate atomic weapons with the US and the EU before the latest crisis, the low effectiveness of its rocket strikes may in time besides prompt it to resume its work on atomic warheads to balance Israel's advanced capabilities. In this unfavourable scenario, Iran's safety interests could even outweigh its request to abolish US and EU sanctions which are severe to its economy.
