Eastern Europe is simply a region that is highly hard and, above all, full of contradictions, which have its origin in the past system, which makes it highly unpredictable.
As the dust settles after the shock caused by Russia's aggression into Ukraine, uncertainty about the improvement of the conflict at its first phase gives way to asking what its end will look like. The ongoing war broke so far status quo, which inevitably means changes in east Europe. Despite the tragedy of the full situation, many people see it as an chance and hope for a new, better order in the region. Finally, the inclusion of Ukraine in the Democratic West, through EU or NATO membership, has never been so real. likewise in the question of Russia's demise as a planet power. However, east Europe is simply a region that is highly hard and, above all, full of contradictions, which have its origin in the past system, which makes it highly unpredictable.
Although Russia's strategy has changed over the years, there was always, in 1 way or another, individual acting as a Tsar at its head. The top successes as leaders were those who proved to be strong enough. Putin fulfilled these criteria. A erstwhile KGB officer successfully created a network of dependencies allowing him to keep the full country in check. The court replaced parliamentary halls and the origin of the promotion ceased to be decided on. However, the nature of internal, political competitions has not changed much. The oligarchs leading the most crucial companies and institutions, in exchange for the anticipation of multiplying assets in a way that is not necessarily legal, were to make decisions, if necessary, to service the political objectives of the leader. Those who did not realize the rules of the game, allowing themselves besides much freedom, were punished “for example”, like Mikhail Chodorkowski. Furthermore, this form of forcing obedience has become very common in Russia. punishment for acting against power is inadequately severe for doing what is done to effectively discourage others, even reasoning about doing something similar. An example are activists from Pussy Riot (held in custody for trial, and then sentenced to 2 years of a simple-security penal colony for organizing happenings in a church that is allegedly offensive to spiritual feelings), or current penalties for talking about war alternatively of a "special operation" (a threat of 14 years in prison). It is besides not a secret that those most uncomfortable are quietly eliminated, as evidenced by the assassination of Boris Niemcow and Anna Politkowska or attempts to poison Sergei Skripal and Alexey Navalny. Nevertheless, Putin is not indestructible, and even being the undisputed king of Russian political gameplay, he must take care to preserve this position.
There's no telling erstwhile or how the war's gonna end, but it's gonna last a long time. There is no hope that the Russian troops will perceive to the appeals of the West and retreat from Ukraine. Putin can't give up. Russia's triumph is no longer at stake, but its survival. The protracted war, which does not produce satisfactory results, slow turns into a death sentence. The leader of Russia realizes that many of his supporters rub their hands on the anticipation of failure on the front in hopes of taking power. He cannot show weakness, for this will surely be used. Even if his immediate surroundings stay loyal, the chances of Russian society forgiving his failure. If he pulls out, he'll gotta leave. At the same time, Putin is well aware that in his case, too, the regulation of "rubel for entry, 2 for departure" is applied, which was referred to by erstwhile russian military intelligence officer GRU, Viktor Suvorov, presently a dissident resident abroad. For the Russian President, the possible retirement will most likely be final. The desperation of his position can be felt, for example, in what stubbornness and no substance the cost of taking Bachmut. The acquisition of the city will not strategically change the situation at the front, but it will be purely political, which is crucial for Putin.
Western societies may wonder why individual so much breaking all the rules enjoys consistently advanced support, but for the Russians a strong leader is besides a safety issue. Last century revolutions, planet wars, perestroika, the dissolution of the russian Union swept through Russia. Things were changing. All of these events brought chaos and a fresh order, for many, an adverse order, which is why a large part of the Russians are afraid of change. Putin may let corruption, is simply a cruel and authoritarian leader, and in many regions there is poverty, but has proven to be a protector holding the country in 1 piece. During the Second Chechen War, Chechen separatists conducted a series of bloody assassinations which terrorized the full country, among others, at the Moscow Dubrovnik Theatre in 2002 or at the Bieslan simple School in 2004. Although there were many misdemeanors on the part of the services during the storms, they were rapidly forgotten. Putin utilized fear and a sense of danger to make changes in the law expanding his influence, as well as to fill power in Chechnya supporters of the Kremlin. The leader put an end to the bombings and put order in place. The people appreciated it, and due to the fact that it wanted stableness to a large extent, Putina began to adore it.
It doesn't should be any better for the Russians tomorrow, but it should be at least certain. It is simply a goal which Putin has given dispensation for many abuses against democracy and the regulation of law. Ramzan Kadyrov, now in Chechnya, can be easy compared to a bandit. Chechens hatred him, they live in fear, but the Kremlin will keep him in his position. For the West, it is another frequently incomprehensible mystery why many Russians accept this state of affairs. The explanation of this issue is, unfortunately, rather prose. In a large, diverse country like Russia, there is simply a division. Russian i.e. ‘core’ The Russians are in the social hierarchy higher than representatives of hundreds of national minorities, called Rossijanami. A strong leader shall guarantee that this balance is not shaken, pacifying the danger of this order, if necessary. Although it is usually thought in this context of representatives who disagree in culture or religion, specified as Chechnya or Buriacs, the same aversion can be felt in relation to peoples outside the Federation, e.g. Ukrainians, called by the Russians who are being asked in the street contemptuously chachłami. This word has long functioned, and in the first thought it was expected to mention to the Chachłatsk sound created by the confusion of Ukrainian language with Polish, Belarusian or Russian (Russian), which for Russians was a careless, unclean pronunciation of their language. Similarly, pejorative determination of Poles wheat, it besides came from an offensive mention to how the Russians received the pronunciation of the Polish language.
Plus, there's a large propaganda machine. For provincial residents, government tv is usually the only origin of information. author Maj Free while travelling across Russia in late 2022 she checked how Russians approached the war in Ukraine. She met with a large dislike of Poland and Poles, to whom until late the attitude was not bad adequate to affect a hazard of aggression. In fact, the majority of people questioned by Maya Wolna did not consider themselves aggressors, and the invasions were regarded as a reaction to an alleged NATO threat. They besides claimed that the West would endure from expensive, shortages of petrol and the deficiency of anticipation of heating its homes, convinced of Russia's crucial influence in this sector. The sanctions are not so visible, either, due to the fact that abroad goods are imported from countries specified as Turkey or China, and their prices have not risen adequate to afford them only a narrow group of chosen ones.
The success of Russian propaganda best confirms its reception abroad. east Europe in the West does not have the best press, but Russia has always seduced social opinion as a powerful country, a bit oriental, incomprehensible, producing the same large culture as the rich. Just as Poles and Ukrainians were seen as contractors of low-paid works, so the Russians were an integral part of the scenery that would deepen luxury in the most fashionable cities in the world. You can't see poorness due to the fact that it stayed in the country. No 1 who lives in a deep state in poorness can afford to start surviving abroad.
Many people in the West admired Putin's force shows, following Russian news channels until they were blocked like Russia Today. any saw the world’s saviors in Russia. Canadian scientist Jordan Peterson, an idol of the right, world-renowned controversial statements, defended the aggressors, describing Russia as a remedy to degenerate the West and defend Christianity. In January 2023, the French Institute of Public Opinion published the results of a survey according to which all another young Frenchman aged 18-24 blames the Ukrainian authorities for organizing the massacre of the civilian population in Buczy and accuses Trump's opponents of faking the march on Capitol. Given the suspicious relation between the erstwhile U.S. president and Russia and the convergence of his policies with Moscow's political goals, this can besides be seen as a spectacular success of the Kremlin's propaganda.
Certainly not all Russians are supporters of the war, and 1 cannot forget dissidents who endure tremendous consequences for their activity, but most Russians inactive live a dream of a large imperial, powerful state like the USSR. erstwhile you don't have what you like, you like what you have – says a well-known proverb. The state may not supply citizens with prosperity, but it gives them a sense of greatness and pride in their country. Putin promised his voters from the very beginning to carry out this bold dream of power, and he built his popularity and the consequence is the ongoing war. It is worth noting that this social request is understood by his main opponent, Alexey Navalny. Russian oppositionist, treated in the West as a hero, did not condemn the annexation of Crimea. Although it can undoubtedly be an chance and hope for a fresh quality of Russia's leadership erstwhile the current strategy of power falls, it should not be forgotten that it is seeking the support of most of the same people who have been, or remain, supporters of the President-in-Office.
No 1 knows erstwhile and under what conditions the conflict in Ukraine will end, but surely the geopolitical situation in this region will not return to the 1 before 24.02.2022. For Russia, the end of the war means nothing good. No sympathy. No more images of Russia as a planet power with a rich culture. The deepening of the recession exacerbated by sanctions will weaken the position of this largest country territorially. The shrinking economy will translate into an increase in poverty. Russia as an aggressor will not be able to number on returning to past business relations. The deficiency of fresh territorial gains will most likely be the end of the current Russian leader and at the same time the beginning of interior power struggles. Military failure threatens to break the state, and fragmented Russia is another threat to the world.
Unlike Russia, the ending of the conflict for Ukraine is simply a fresh hope and prospects for a better tomorrow.
The war importantly changed the attitude of the West to Ukraine. Firstly, she realized that Ukraine is not Russia, and that the ongoing war is not an interior conflict. Secondly, president Volodymyr Zelenski had an unprecedented advantage over Putin, which did not win in any another head of state. Thirdly, Ukraine undoubtedly has a chance to become a leading democracy in the region after the war, and the imagination of joining the European Union has never been so close. However, it is impossible to clearly foretell what will happen in the future. The heroic pull has the possible to become both a driver of the state's development, and it can only be temporary stimulation. Corruption, the influence of oligarchs, or problem with the regulation of law will not magically disappear. If Ukraine does not begin to solve them now, there is simply a hazard that it will “sleep” a strategical minute in the implementation of systemic changes, which the absence of which could make much more hard and even bury the chances of becoming a western state. As a good omen announcing Kiev's engagement in the fight against corruption, it is possible to treat the arrest of Konstantin Bożwa, a Ukrainian oligarch suspected of misappropriation of private bank funds, money laundering and concealing proceeds from the crime. But it depends on whether this determination will last.
There will besides be problems straight related to the end of the war. Control of the weapon so it does not circulate throughout Ukraine and does not power criminal groups is 1 of them. The challenge will besides be visible nationalist tendencies, specified as the commemoration of Stepan Bandera's 114th birthday by the Ukrainian parliament. Delicate problems are besides reports of fraud of social benefits to refugees in Poland. The scale is advanced adequate that the deputy chief of the Ministry of abroad Affairs, the typical of the government for war refugees from Ukraine, Paweł Kiebernaker announced the system's sealing in October. Many will depend on average people. Post-communist countries of east Europe do not change easily. After the fall of communism in Poland, akin opportunities were besides seen, and the bright future of the democratic state was foretold. But it took 30 years for the pathologies of the communist strategy to begin returning at the will of the citizens themselves. Today, Poland and Hungary's membership of the European Union would not be obvious. But will Ukraine learn from the mistakes of its east neighbor? Unfortunately, it's impossible to predict.
