NATO vs ZBIR – A strategy of intimidation

krzysztofwojczal.pl 1 year ago

The fact is that Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine have found NATO unprepared for a appropriate response. But it is not that the Alliance was not prepared to defend itself. This is only a half-truth, due to the fact that Russia on the another hand was not and is not prepared to attack and fight the Alliance. In this context, the weakness of the alleged east flank of NATO – especially before 2014 – did not make large safety concerns. In addition, it should be pointed out that as shortly as the threat from Russia came to light – not "showed", due to the fact that there always existed what we Poles knew well about – in the West the full political-official-military machine, which aimed at preparing to neutralise this threat, was launched. On the 1 hand, sanctions were imposed on Russia, on the another hand, the process of deploying the Alliance's troops on the alleged east flank began. global quotas appeared in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The process of strengthening the buffer state of Ukraine has been strengthened (vide military training).

Thus, in the context of NATO security, reservations, comments and critical opinions could be expressed as to whether the Alliance, and especially its individual members, was organising at a timely stage. But the fact is that we felt and inactive feel safe in NATO. The United States responds to the Kremlin decision-makers.

The biggest charge with NATO's actions in the context of fresh years is that of the Alliance's inactive attitude. They reacted to Moscow's actions, and then waited for the effects in the form of the respite of Russians that were not coming. It was for this reason that Vladimir Putin had the initiative for many years and could easy prepare his attack plan, choose his place and time. It was Vladimir Putin who made demands to the West late in the fall of 2021. Of course, this was partially due to the fact that the Russian Federation was under the influence of sanctions after 2014. She was politically isolated. Meanwhile, the West continued to function without any negative consequences (until Putin cut off gas supply to Western Europe). So the Kremlin authorities, on their own request, were under force and sought escalation.

It should besides be taken into account that in 2014, the United States was completely absorbed by conflicts in Afghanistan (talibs) and the mediate East (ISIS), where large military forces were involved. Therefore, it can be assumed that the comparatively mild attitude of NATO (US) towards Russia after 2014 resulted from the fact that they tried to play on time. The alleged east flank was slow organized, while at the same time wondering how to reduce engagement in Asia. Europe's dependence on Russian energy resources was besides recognised. Poland built a LNG terminal in Świnoujście. The decisions to build Baltic tube were about to collapse.

However, it is 2023 and we are observing the struggles during the second Russian invasion of Ukraine. Europe has mostly become independent of Russian natural materials. Russia declared an informal NATO war on February 24, 2023, as I wrote in the text: "#This is our war". In the mediate East, after defeating ISIS on the battlefield, there is simply a kind of ceasefire and the United States has withdrawn from Afghanistan. At the same time, many European NATO members have changed their attitude towards Russia, understood the threat and demonstrated their willingness to show firm attitude. Public acceptance has increased as regards hard safety decisions. It is time to consider whether the approach to Russia and its elite should be corrected. Apply a more active deterrence strategy not only to deter but besides to intimidate. possibly NATO should increase its ability to carry out offensive actions so that the Russians gotta start reasoning about defense. This should distract not only their attention, but besides the resources that can now be rather freely directed towards the chosen direction (now Ukrainian).

It is worth examining the existing options for causing force on Russia erstwhile dividing into individual sections of the "front" (as the SSG says General Rajmund Andrzejczak).

North Front

In the context of the alleged northern NATO flank, the most changed on a political level. Finland entered NATO, and Sweden will be joining the Allies any minute. This creates respective fresh strategical options that were not available erstwhile these countries had the position of "host countries".

OBJECTIVE: Murmansk

So far, quite a few attention has been drawn to GIUK. So the sea spaces between Greenland and Iceland and the United Kingdom. due to the fact that these 2 "gates" of the Russian North Fleet could have penetrated the Atlantic rather unfettered.

When we look at the map, the GIUK area is within about 1,300 nautical miles of the Russian port in Murmansk.

Why does the Russian fleet have easy access to these gates in the Atlantic? And that's erstwhile the Norwegian coast is besides along the territories of the NATO countries? The Norwegian Sea is simply a large reservoir which cannot be controlled through Norwegian fjords, Greenlandese ice cover or even Iceland. due to the fact that this sea is very deep (average approx. 2000 m), which facilitates the operation of submarines. Its coasts are frequently unpopulated, and the operation of large ports and military bases is hard due to the Arctic climate.

The Barents Sea is different. The depth of this water is not large (average 230m), and the bottom sculpture can be compared to the underwater plain. In specified conditions, the detection of even Russian atomic submarines, whose dimension oscillates from 110 to 170 metres, is not so difficult. specified immense units are – in appropriate weather conditions – easy visible even from the air, even erstwhile immersed.

And while we associate the Barents Sea with the Russian impact zone, it should be remembered that Norway has direct access to it. For example, through the Svalbard archipelago and its largest island Spitsbergen, whose location marks the northwest end of the Barents Sea. There are respective Norwegian settlements and airports on the island. The second could service as a base for civilian investigation aircraft (recognitions) or unmanned aircraft if versions were created that could service under hard peri-arctic conditions (civilised due to the demilitarized position of the archipelago). It is surely hard to observe Russian activities with Spitsbergen, but in summertime time it could be an crucial part of the full designation chain in the area.

The most crucial reflection point of NATO on the Barents Sea is Vardo, the easternmost municipality of Norway. There is simply a tiny port and airport and, above all, a large radar station with GLOBUS II radars (operation since 1995) and GLOBUS III (operation from 2022) built by the American company Raytheon for partially American means. It is speculated that these systems have the ability to observe space and airspace and can be utilized to identify and track objects present in them (including ballistic missiles). Importantly, radars were built on the east (from the Russian territory) coast of the island where Vardo is located. This is most likely why the Russians included the Vardo radar systems on the list of precedence targets to destruct at the beginning of a possible NATO conflict. The bomb attack on Vardo was rehearsed in 2017. In addition, Russia deployed ground-to-earth rocket launchers in 2019 about 70 km from the location of the aforementioned radars.

Given the geographical location, topography of the area, low population, climate and circumstantial state boundaries in the area, it has been hard to think of its usage in order to exert strategical or even operational force on Russia. The coasts of northern Norway may have been utilized as reflection bases, but not as operational basis for military activities. As a result, it has not been decided to deploy more forces in the area so far, which fundamentally causes Vardo and the surrounding areas to be susceptible to air-racite attacks, or even to land invasions from Russia.

Finland's accession to NATO changes that.

Finnish territory greatly facilitates land access to the Norwegian Varanger Peninsula. The Lapland region creates a common operational space with this peninsula, which gains appropriate depth. It allows the construction of appropriate military infrastructure (although airports) that would give possible to make an aperture of air for northern Norway and Finland. Finally, In Lapland, ground-to-earth rocket launchers can be deployed (HIMARS) more than 300 km from Murmansk. Threatening the main Russian seaport, airport and thus regional Russian air force and North Fleet. Finland's Laponia could be utilized by NATO as an operational basis for possible offensive actions against Russia on the Kolsko Peninsula. At the same time, the integration of Lapland into NATO's borders creates real opportunities to defend the Norwegian border with Russia. This has an additional political impact in the context of president Joe Biden's declaration that NATO will defend all metre of territory. In the context of Norway, thanks to Finland's accession to NATO, this announcement can be supported by the real capacity gained through investments and the appropriate distribution of resources.

Speaking of Finland, thanks to its territory NATO is gaining an operational base to make an impact on the only land road connecting Murmansk to the remainder of Russia. A road of nearly 800 km, which is easy blocked by the demolition of 1 of the many crossings through smaller or larger watercourses. specified a task could be done with HIMARS rocket launcher kits and by aircraft utilizing Finnish airports specified as Rovaniemi or even Oulu.

OBJECTIVE: Petergarden

Even more force could be exerted on Russians in the south, where the Finnish-Russian border divides only 150 km to St. Petersburg. The Finns could fundamentally shoot for targets in Piotrogrod from systems located close Helsinki (about 300 km). This means that the second largest city of the Russian Federation, and thus 1 of the 2 main Russian ports in the Baltic, a military air base and a civilian airport, and at the same time 1 of the main decision-making centres could be threatened at 1 time by a rocket attack from 3 different directions. From the north and north-western (Finland), western (Estonia) and south-western (Latvia). beginning the northern directions of a possible attack is highly important, as anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses do not work around. recognition systems (including radars), as well as frequently effectors (launchers) must be directed towards possible hazards. If there is no appropriate saturation of defence systems, then the defence must dilute resources and consequently becomes more susceptible to penetration.

The creation of a threat to Petersburg may be an crucial component of pressure. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that in the framework of NATO's defensive tasks (which I will not devote much space to in this article) the possible for closing the Gulf of Finland for ships and ships coming from Kronsztad should be ensured. Which would be comparatively easy with Helsinki and Tallinn. Although we remember the deployment of Polish anti-ship rocket systems on the Estonian island of Hiuma, from which we can control the exit from the Gulf of Finland to the Baltic.

OBJECTIVE: Dogs

When moving to the Baltic States and Estonia, this country (like Latvia) must, of course, guarantee the creation of air defence over its territory and safe the border with Russia. Especially in the northern section between the Gulf of Finland and Pskowski Lake (K. Narwy).

In the south, in the area of Pskov, the situation may be comparatively easy to control. If NATO had distributed the appropriate possible in Latvia or Estonia, then it would be possible to effort to damage/destroy the crossings on the Wielikaja River.. 4 bridges (including 1 railway) are located in Pskov, 1 close Ostrów and another 3 (including railway) in Ostrów alone. They are all about 30-50km from the border. specified an operation would require large artillery or aviation resources, nevertheless The damage/destruction of these infrastructure would importantly limit the Russian area of manoeuvre at the interface between Estonia, Latvia and Russia.

By neutralising the threat on the above-mentioned section of the front, Latvians – during the war – could focus on defending the Rzeżyca-Dyneburg line without the request to engage much of the force towards Psków-Ryg through a patch of Estonian territory (road E77).

At the same time, it is worth remembering that the Polish military bases could be within the scope of artillery systems deployed in Latvia and Estonia (such as rocket barrels). The distribution of specified possible in these countries would be another point of emphasis in the concept of exerting force on the Russian side.

OBJECTIVE: North of the Baltic

Assuming Sweden joins NATO soon, it is worth considering how this country could aid the Alliance to show Russia's weak position. Sweden needs to increase its naval capacity in the future, but it will take time.

What can be done comparatively rapidly is to make from Gotland a large Baltic fortress, or alternatively an unsinkable carrier. The location on the island of anti-aircraft systems, anti-ship launchers, aviation as well as ground-to-earth rocket systems would give possible to control air and water space in the heart of the Baltic Sea. Importantly, Köniwiec and the Baltic port could be within scope of the HIMARS located in Gotland (less than 300 km). This would give the anticipation of a rocket strike on Russian bases in the Könivetsky Oblast from the northwest direction. With an additional threat from Lithuania and Poland, the defence of the Królewiec would be highly extended, and thus more susceptible to any penetration.

In addition, Swedes should guarantee that their own land forces to Estonia, Latvia and Finland can be deployed by sea.. What would should be done under an air umbrella that could be provided by Swedish aviation. As Swedes do not have a border with the Russian Federation, their army should focus on expeditional capabilities. Especially in the area of historical interest in Stockholm.

Tasks on the Northern Front

In view of all the above-mentioned objectives that NATO should set for itself on the North Front, achieving readiness to implement them would make NATO able to do so in the event of a possible war in its first hours and days:

  1. Attack bases in Murmansk and destruct the most crucial Russian seaport in Western Hemisfer.
  2. Cut Murmansk off from the remainder of the country on land, reducing the anticipation of supplying this town and troops located in that area.
  3. Defend the Norwegian-Russian border, thanks to an operational basis in the form of Finnish Lapland.
  4. Strike from many directions on the base in Petrograd (including the port in Kronsztad), the gross second largest city center in Russia and the strategical objectives there.
  5. Close the Gulf of Finland and the North Baltic Sea for the Baltic Fleet and Russian aviation.
  6. Neutralize the Russian threat of land invasion from Pskov towards Estonia and Latvia.

Eastern Front

Certainly, many readers have already seen a red lamp in their head, linked to the fact that NATO's active activities on the North Front can origin very tense reactions in Russians. surely the east Front objectives described below will make even greater controversy. But don't forget that So far NATO has not deployed close the border with the Russian Federation offensive systems. Meanwhile, Russia has been deploying rocket launchers and atomic weapons in the Oblast for years, and it is now doing so in Belarus. If anyone thinks that a cautious/ passive attitude will discourage Putin from scaring the NATO states with his rocket arsenal, then he should remember the above mentioned fact. The activities described in this analysis do not constitute crossing the border which the Russians themselves have established by their decisions. It should be remembered that if the NATO-Russia war broke out, regardless of whether there would be offensive systems in Poland or not, Polish cities would become 1 of the first victims of the war (unless we could build our own rocket shield, which is already under trial).

OBJECTIVE: Rabbit

The Köniewski Oblast should become a NATO hostage. To date, it was the Russians who utilized the enclave to exert force on Poland or Lithuania, and even Denmark (a possible landing on Bornholm). However, geography is conducive in this area to Allies. Strategic targets in the Köniver region should be targeted for artillery systems (missiles and barrels) located around the compartment. So that the attack could come from all direction: north (Sweden), west and south (Poland), north-east (Lithuania). At the same time, the anticipation of establishing a maritime blockade in the Baltic should be demonstrated, in which fleets could participate: Danes, British, Americans and Poles. At the same time, Poland has the anticipation to deploy anti-shipping systems over the Gulf of Gdańsk.

NATO is able to close the air region over the Kölevice Oblast, thanks to the deployment of anti-aircraft and rocket systems in Poland and Lithuania. Which, in turn, would make it easier for NATO-wish aviation to attack targets in OK. Which missions should be trained in a demonstration.

All of this would force the Kremlin command to calculate whether, in the event of tensions and conflicts with NATO, it would be better to operate on its own from airports in the Kölevice Oblast, or due to the advanced hazard of aircraft being electrocuted and their backdrops, it would be better to decision valuable machines to airports in Belarus or Russia. If she had chosen the second option, NATO would have already been won at the start, as it would have reduced the area for manoeuvre even before the hot conflict, and during that time would have eliminated the threat of an air strike. In turn, which would besides have a beneficial effect on the safety of the Alliance's marine units.

Demonstration of the possible to cut the Królewiec from supplies from Russia/Belarusi would gotta coincide with readiness to defend the borders of Lithuania and Poland. So as not to leave the Russians with illusions as to whether they would be able to penetrate the land road from Belarus to their enclave.


“#This is our war” – about Polish interests in the context of the war in Ukraine, threats to relations with Kiev in the future and about the large strategy of Poland in the context of the construction of the Polish Armed Forces. “Third Decada. The planet present and in 10 years" – find out how the planet and individual countries worked by 2020, and besides check future forecasts, any of which (i.e. the second invasion of Ukraine) have already worked. inexpensive package! All books ordered on the author's website will be signed

Package: #This is our war + 3rd Decada


OBJECTIVE: Minsk

The deployment of appropriate forces to defend Vilnius and the alleged Suwałski Strait (also OPL) would give emergence to the deployment of offensive systems in Lithuania. specified as HIMARS, which can be targeted not only towards Królewiec but besides Minsk (long 150 km). With increased directions of danger from Latvian Dyneburg and Polish Białystok, Alexander Lukashenko would surely gain motivation to think more soberly. The Belarusian capital could become a NATO hostage.

OBJECTIVE: Brest and Grodno

At the same time, Poland should have the possible to rapidly deploy crucial forces in the directions of Grodna and Brest. In formation ready to attack. We are not reasoning about NATO-Russia war and defending borders against a possible invasion from the East. We inactive request to remember that Russia is fighting in Ukraine and that the Belarusian army can join this conflict at any time. If specified a script were to be seen, the Land Forces must be deployed in specified a way that the Lukashenko government is afraid of sending troops to Ukraine and must safe its own borders.

It should besides be remembered that Brest may be the operational basis for the attack on the western part of Ukraine. In this context, It will be worth demonstrating the abilityfor the isolation of Brest with artillery fire. Both Brest and Grodno – due to the course of borders and geography – can be possibly attacked from 3 sides. Grodno is peculiarly susceptible to isolation due to the course of borders with Poland and Lithuania, as well as the Niemno stream.

It is besides worth noting that from the vicinity of Biała Podlaska it is possible to effectively control the space from the Polish-Belarusian border in Polowce to the Belarusian-Ukrainian border in Domanów. However, at the same time it is the most delicate and discovered area on the Polish side of the border. In this context, if we talk about the preparation of the area for military activities, it is the region of Międzyrzec Podlaski-Biała Podlaska that should be given priority. This is 1 of the most demanding sections of the Polish border in terms of defensive tasks. So it would be possible to deploy both the OPL defence and artillery rocket systems. This would limit freedom of action against the enemy of aviation and at the same time let fire to be fired on the zones behind the another front lines. In the back of Belarus.

Modern border control in Ukraine The Domans would be crucial given the shielding of a possible peace mission towards Kiev (as below).

Ukraine — Sanitary cordon

NATO should in future make fast consequence forces that would be able to enter the right-wing Ukraine in order to defend it from invasion by Belarus and Russia. The Alliance should clearly and clearly show Russia's failure to accomplish its strategical objectives in the war (reception of control over all Ukraine). NATO should express its readiness to enter Ukraine in the event of Kiev being threatened, or if the Russians would approach Dniepr, or hit from the north (from the period of Belarus) to western Ukraine.

NATO forces should be capable of resisting or attacking them, including own mobile anti-aircraft and anti-missile shields (as well as a drone). In order to enable its own aviation to operate in Ukraine's airspace to show air domination and shield its own troops. The request to get ready for this kind of operation has already been described many times on the blog.

South Front

It is 1 of the most hard regions for NATO to exert direct force on Russia. First of all, there is no NATO-Russia land border, which, on the 1 hand, should be considered an asset, but it is precisely in the substance of trying to exert force on Moscow that is simply a major obstacle.

At the same time, it should be remembered that since 2014 – erstwhile the Russians took control of the Crimean Peninsula – the Black Sea Fleet dominates the Black Sea with support from Russian aviation.

Moreover, there are political and formal and legal constraints. Turkey is rather assertive and frequently problematic allies in NATO. This would depend mainly on the attitude of Ankaran authorities to take the circumstantial initiatives described below.

However, under the conditions described above, NATO could paradoxically exert very strong indirect force on Russia. By targeting political actors with unclear position under global law. frequently not covered by Moscow atomic umbrella. In view of this, threats on this front may prove to be the most credible. And that's actually the point.

OBJECTIVE: Transnistria (+ confederate sanitary cordon)

Transnistria, from the point of view of global law, is treated as part of Moldova. Only Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognised the sovereignty of the region, meaning that it does not be as an independent state even for Moscow.

In this context, a possible NATO intervention could even be legal if it were carried out at the request of the authorities in Chisinau. Request for the pacification of the ‘rebellied’ — a de facto controlled by the Russians – the region by NATO would be all the more legitimate that the Republic of Moldova does not have armed forces that could deal with the problem.

With all this in mind, NATO should have the appropriate military force deployed to Romania, which would be able to aid Moldovan partner rapidly and regain Transnistria. The main burden for preparing specified possible should remainder with the Romanians themselves.

The subject of the liberation of Transnistria should be leading in terms of neutralising Russian threat in Ukraine. NATO should signal through unofficial channels that specified a threat would have been made if Russia had not abandoned plans to take Kiev. In another words, if the Russian side wanted to launch another major offensive in the future aimed at breaking the Dnepr line and threatening the Ukrainian capital, NATO should show that it is ready for a much more decisive response. Including the immediate liberation of Transnistria and the introduction of troops to Ukraine to make a sanitary cordon.

Operation in Transnistria should be planned as a major part of the initiative and forces beyond Dniestr would not gotta stop. Their aim should be to safe southwest Ukraine. It seems that Ukrainians – even if the situation on the front turned out to be bad for them – would be able to destruct or defend most of the crossings through Dniepr (Cania, Cherkasy, Krzemieńczuk, Kamieńskie, Dniepr and Zaporoże). Therefore, the precedence of the confederate part of NATO's peacekeepers should be to safe the Ukrainian coast, including at least Odessa and the Santas.

OBJECTIVE: Crimea

Romanian Constance shares with Russia's annexed Sevastopol nearly 400 km across the Black Sea. It's a beautiful crucial distance. From the mouth of the Danube – on the Romanian-Ukrainian border – to the Russian naval base is about 300km. It's inactive a long way, especially since that part of the coast is mostly swampy terrain, not conducive to the deployment of costly and dense rocket launch systems. However, from the Odessa area the distance to the Russian port is already somewhat little than 300km, and the coast is rather urbanised. Thus, the deployment of NATO rocket systems in that area, while putting up a sanitary cordon, would pose a threat to the Russian side. However, we are writing about future opportunities that cannot be achieved today.

But what you can do present is deploy ground-to-earth rocket launchers and earth-to-water missiles on the northern coast of Turkey. From where the distance to Sevastopol in a consecutive line is precisely the same as from Odessa.

In addition, it is crucial to remember NATO-WW aviation capabilities, which, erstwhile operating from airports in Romania, could be approached at a distance of effective demolition of targets in Sevastopol utilizing JASMM missiles (or about 370km, let alone JASMM-ER with a scope of close to 1000km).

In order to gain an advantage in the Black Sea, it would be essential to deploy the appropriate air component NATO in the area. Yes, to endanger the Russians with an air strike against Black Sea Fleet units, even if this 1 had Russian aviation support.

NATO should besides have ship squad (stationed in Greek ports?) ready to enter the Black Sea and neutralize the Black Sea Fleet, as well as the rocket threat of Russian coastal targets (especially Sevastopol). The problem here, however, is the legal nature, specifically the provisions of the Montreux Convention governing the Law of the Sea in the Turkish Straits and in the Black Sea itself. However, the Convention's provisions give area for interpretation, on the 1 hand, and on the another hand, the "host" of the Straits, i.e. the Turkish authorities, who belong to NATO.

OBJECTIVE: Sochi

It is besides worth remembering that the Russian coastal town of Sochi is little than 300 km from the Turkish coast in the Trabzon area. Which besides gives area for manoeuvre erstwhile it comes to the threat of earth-to-earth missiles.

CELE: Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The North Atlantic Pact states should not only make a Russian feeling of readiness for an immediate conventional blow at selected locations. The front with Russia should be stretched as far as possible. It should be remembered that while the Russian Federation must safe the full dimension of its long borders extending across 2 continents, allies can share work for the concrete cuts of the front. Consequently, it is comparatively easy to disperse Russian: attention and resources.

To this end, NATO should not only think about its own action, but besides anticipate or plan operations with 3rd countries. Like Georgia. Georgia has territorial claims against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are protected by Russia. It is clear that Tbilisi alone cannot challenge Moscow. On the another hand, with the favorable circumstances and weaknesses of Russia, Georgians might be tempted to regain the disputed territories. They would be more likely to act if NATO guaranteed sovereignty and integrity of Georgia's existing borders, which would be supported by the deployment of allied forces in North-East Turkey in the Batumi area. In particular, anti-shipping and anti-aircraft rocket launch systems that would extend – even during area time – a protective umbrella over the main Georgian seaport. It would besides be crucial to have NATO's forces transferred rapidly to the Georgian capital – Tbilisi.

SUMMARY

It should be stressed that all the above-mentioned actions are not intended to prepare for the attack on the Russian Federation. So it's not about the first blow and the atomic war. On the contrary, by creating concrete opportunities and building the possible to exploit them, it should be made clear to the Russians that NATO's consequence to the Russian attack – besides on a conventional level – would be devastating for Moscow.

The NATO doctrine to date – very defensive and conservative – did not work. besides due to the fact that modus operandi The Russians rely, among others, on uncovering the weakness and passiveness of the rival and then utilizing them through frequently aggressive and decisive actions. Which makes it impossible to feel that a NATO-ski police officer is at the scene of a crime, but alternatively of pulling out a gun, unseal it and point it at the bandit at the shout: "stop due to the fact that I'm shooting," he looks at the full situation, pulls in more units of uniformed services, assembles victims of robbery, but himself does not even show the readiness to usage force against the attacker. Whatever it takes to get the last one.

For example, NATO has so far focused on the problem of defending the Baltic States against the Russian attack. However, it is worth considering whether it is not to treat Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia but besides Finland as an operational basis for possible strikes in Russia. Which would convince Moscow that if it had attacked, already in the first hours of the possible war, Russian troops could have lost the most crucial military bases, supply warehouses and infrastructure facilities within the scope of decently deployed NATO-wish weapons.

The example of Ukraine shows that the Kremlin authorities are ready to wage war on the territory of the opponent to the effect. It is so crucial to ask the Russians, through appropriate preparations, whether they would be prepared to conduct the conflict even if it were on their own territory?

Krzysztof Wojchal

geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog

Read Entire Article