NATO summit in The Hague – Trump's return and two-component 5% of GDP on defence

The NATO summit in The Hague (24-25 June) – the first led by the fresh Secretary-General Mark Rutte – was minimalist in form and content. It was followed by a evidence brief five-point declaration. This approach to the gathering of NATO Heads of Government and Heads of State was intended to avoid discrepancies and points of dispute between European allies and Canada and the fresh US administration with Donald Trump at the head. The summit so focused on programming an unprecedented increase in associate States' defence spending with a fresh mark of 5% of GDP in the 2035 position (3.5% of military strictly and 1.5% of another defence needs), responding to the demands of the American President. This commitment, in peculiar by the old NATO states, will depend on credible allied deterrence and defence.

The Hague did not item as much as in erstwhile meetings the threat from Russia, the policy of open doors towards Ukraine, or the request to deepen cooperation with indopacific partners (South Korea, Japan, Australia and fresh Zealand). The reason was the force of the United States administration to hold talks with the FR aimed at the end of the war in Ukraine, Moscow's opposition to NATO membership for Kiev, and possibly the deficiency of the will to combine 2 theatres of action – Europe and Indo-Pacific.

Despite concerns about president Trump's attitude to the Alliance, the summit went amazingly well. However, another test for transatlantic safety relations will be the fall decisions of the U.S. Department of defence regarding the U.S. military presence in Europe.

Trump Management

The Hague Summit preceded tensions in transatlantic relations, including uncertainty about the future of United States military presence on the Old Continent, Trump's crew force on Kiev and talks with Moscow, hostile rhetoric on Canada, force on Denmark on Greenland and Washington customs policy. In order to reduce the hazard of friction, the programme of the event was preventively reduced and European allies and Canada yet responded positively to the strong call of the US administration to increase defence spending so that the gathering would be a success for it. A akin maneuver was adopted already during Trump's first word – the 2019 Declaration of the London Summit has 9 points. Talks in The Hague were besides influenced by the situation in the mediate East – an Israeli armed attack on Iran, an attack by the United States on atomic installations there and a call for an American leader to suspend weapons between Israel and Iran.

Despite first concerns about the advancement of the summit and speculation about the anticipation for the US to decide to importantly reduce its engagement in NATO, the Hague Declaration confirms the allied guarantees under Article 5 that are crucial for Europe. Moreover, even before the meeting, the United States indicated, and the North Atlantic Council approved the fresh commander-in-chief of the NATO Alliance Force in Europe. This was contrary to erstwhile reports of alleged consideration of Trump's resignation from this post. This function will be carried out by U.S. Air Force General Alexus Gregory Grynkewich – presently the manager of Operations (J3) at the Joint Chiefs of Staff College^[1]. The ongoing military cooperation between Washington and European allies within NATO and bilateral is standard, but it is overseen by the ongoing review of the US military presence in the planet by the Department of defence (Global Posture Review), which is due to end in early autumn 2025.^[2] It will likely consequence in the failure of its military presence in Europe.

Difficulty of compromise and two-component 5%

Proposed by the Secretary-General and accepted by the North Atlantic Council, the fresh defence spending mark is the consequence of a compromise between American pressure, the political and financial capacity of the countries of the Old Continent and the needs resulting from the Natov defensive planning and the request for reconstruction of the military potentials which have been besides reduced after the Cold War. The Allies committed themselves in The Hague to increase defence efforts to 5% of GDP over the next decade, i.e. by 2035.^[3] Defensive expenditure is expected to be 3.5% of GDP and will be calculated according to the current flexible NATO methodology^[4]. This will be complemented by 1.5% of GDP for another defence-related purposes. These will include investments in dual-use infrastructure that is crucial for military needs, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, arms manufacture expansion, civilian defence and resilience. At the same time, allies were obliged to present credible plans to accomplish these 5%, with yearly expenditure increases. This is intended to prevent the situation from a decade 2014–2024, erstwhile a sharp increase in defence spending took place only in the last 2 years, and a crucial part of the countries achieved the goal of a "tape throw", i.e. in 2024.

This construction of the fresh defence financing commitment has facilitated political support for members. Making up to 3.5% of GDP represents a crucial increase in spending for many "old NATO" countries, but spread over a decade, far beyond the current parliamentary word and budgetary framework. On the another hand, 1.5% of GDP for defence spending will let the accounting of investments not subject to defence departments. Achieving the second goal will be easier for countries with advanced civilian protection systems (Nordic) and allies on the east flank implementing and planning crucial infrastructure double-use investments (airports, roads, bridges, railways, ports). This besides applies to countries located on the North Sea that take up US forces and supply logistical support for them (Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium).

Despite the fundamental agreement to set a fresh defence spending mark (it has broken out of Spain)^[5]) there was a discussion among allies up to the last minute on the rate of enquiry up to 5% of GDP and the definition of expenditure entering an additional 1.5% of GDP. The most aggressive of Russia's Baltic states spoke about 2030 and declared that they themselves would scope the ceiling next year. The secretary-general originally proposed 2032. Most countries, however, preferred a longer term, indicating – as with the erstwhile mark 2% – a decade (2035). Implementation of the commitment will besides face political and financial challenges in many capitals, and delays in this respect are expected. Already today, criticism from opposition, experts and the media is heard in the associate States. They concern the deficiency of parliamentary consultation on specified a strong increase in defence spending and the unrealisticness of the 5% mark in the light of the budgetary and fiscal situation.

European pillar of NATO, i.e. fresh targets for the improvement of military capabilities

The crucial increase in defence spending announced in The Hague is intended to enable allies to meet ambitious military capacity improvement objectives (capability targets) as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process. They were adopted by NATO Defence Ministers on 5 June. This is the culmination of the landmark four-year planning process of the MRLs since 2023.^[6]. It is intended to supply adequate strength and resources for the NATO summit in Vilnius regional defence plans of the Alliance and a fresh NATO power model^[7]. National capacity packages are divided into short-term (0-6 years) and medium-term (7-19 years). Although they are not public, the statements of the Secretary-General and defence ministers may be based on the scale of the investments needed and the shortages in arms, equipment and military personnel. For example, Germany must recruit 50–60,000 additional professional soldiers. In addition to air defense, investments in further scope artillery systems, logistics, communications, intelligence, designation and tracking of targets (ISTAR) and the armoured component of land troops are peculiarly urgent. This is confirmed by media leaks, according to which the size of individual categories of equipment and capabilities is expected to increase by an average of 30% (in the case of ground-based air defence systems up to 5 times) and the Alliance needs an additional 49 brigades, 14 divisions and 9 corps^[8]. The fresh targets for the improvement of military capabilities include the Arctic for the first time, not just the European Far North.

The starting point for the implementation of national capacity packages in the MRLs puts European allies and Canada in a hard position. Objectives from erstwhile planning cycles have not been achieved in any areas. The Allied Transformation Command reported that the inherited capacity gap was 30%. According to the Secretary-General, Washington provides 44% of NATO's military capabilities, which is inactive a crucial change compared to earlier years erstwhile this disproportion to the disadvantage of Europe was greater. The fresh investments and the expansion of military capabilities in the following years are expected to consequence in a change to 30% (US) to 70% (Europe and Canada)^[9]. The creation of the European pillar of NATO is so a process "sewn" from 2023 in an allied defence planning process.

Catching up in the arms industry

The fresh Military Capacity Guidelines and the request to support Ukraine require a crucial increase in investment in the European arms industry. The allies had already committed themselves to this at last year's summit in Washington, D.C., and this subject was put in the foreground in The Hague. Unmanned systems, drone systems and artillery missiles for Kiev are now important. NATO Secretary-General besides encourages allies to order and invest straight in Ukrainian ‘armours’ according to the alleged Danish model. An crucial decision from the position of motivating governments to stimulate the defence sector is the anticipation of including expenditure on this intent in a pool of 1.5% of GDP of supplementary expenditure in NATO (construction of production lines or fresh plants).

From the position of the US and the associate States of the Alliance which do not belong to the EU, it was crucial to emphasise in the Hague Declaration the request for the fast improvement of the "transatlantic" cooperation of defence industries and to step up efforts to remove barriers to the acquisition of arms and military equipment between allies. The context sets out the increasing EU support for the expansion of the European defence manufacture and the concerns of the US against protectionist trends in this area (Buy European). Between 2020 and 2024, 64% of NATO members in Europe had imported military weapons and equipment. For the US, the European marketplace accounted for 35% of arms exports during the same period^[10].

The summit was so preceded by the defence manufacture forum with the participation of the Secretary-General of NATO, the Head of the European Commission, the president of Ukraine, representatives of the civilian and military structures of the Alliance and the arms sector.^[11]. On the occasion of this event NATO revealed an updated 1 adopted in February Defence Production Action Plan. It identifies 8 actions in respective key areas: aggregating procurement, production and industrial base, interoperability and standardisation, and the fast deployment of innovative technologies^[12]. In addition, an agreement was signed during the Forum on the joint acquisition, storage, transport and management of strategical mineral reserves essential for the defence industry, specified as lithium, titanium and uncommon metals. Today, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom participate in this Natovian project^[13]. In agreement with the industry, a fresh strategy for cooperation with private space companies was besides established and plan to accelerate the implementation of fresh defence technologies^[14].

Russia and Ukraine in the background

Article 5 was explicitly confirmed in the summit declaration and Russia was mentioned as a long-term threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.^[15]. In addition, the Alliance adopted an updated strategy to combat hybrid threats at the Defence Ministers gathering on 5 June (the erstwhile was prepared in 2015). Finally, contrary to media speculation, there has been no discussion on the reopening of the NATO-Russia Council on the American initiative^[16]. At the same time, however, the U.S. did not want to make a harsher declaration to the Kremlin. In this context, the Alliance did not draw up recommendations announced at the Washington Summit on a strategical approach to Russia that could consequence in the authoritative denunciation of the NATO-Russia Act of 1997.^[17]

Given the hard relations with the administration in the White House, the extinction of American military aid and the first reluctance of the United States to invitation Ukraine to the Hague, Kiev may be pleased with the course of the summit. president Volodymyr Zelenski attended a number of meetings, among others, spoke to Trump^[18]. Although the declaration does not contain key from Ukraine's position the wording of the Washington paper (the irreversible way to the Alliance's membership), their absence does not mean that the NATO's current line towards Kiev has been crossed out, as clearly indicated by the Secretary-General and many leaders of the associate States. The 3rd point of the declaration is peculiarly valuable for Ukraine, confirming the continued commitment of allies to support this country, as well as maintaining the anticipation of including military aid for Ukrainian armed forces in military spending. This will motivate European allies to increase and discount it at the time of the Natovian ‘accounting periods’ on the way set by 2035.

As regards assistance to Ukraine, allies implemented their provisions from the Washington Summit of 2024. Last year NATO members announced military support for Kiev worth EUR 50 billion, of which nearly 60% fell to Europe and Canada. This is EUR 10 billion more than the commitment. In the first half of 2025, allies – without the US and Hungary – already declared €35 billion further support. extended US subsidies and the deficiency of fresh supply force further engagement in Europe. However, it seems that the availability of arms and equipment for transfer and limited production capacity, alternatively than financial issues, are now major challenges. Since the end of 2024, there has been an allied NSATU initiative (NATO safety Assistance and Training for Ukraine)^[19]. It is liable for coordinating the supply of arms, ammunition and military equipment, training of Ukrainian soldiers in the territory of the associate States (including synchronisation with the EU training mission EUMAM Ukraine) and repair of the equipment supplied, as well as supporting the long-term planning of the improvement of Ukraine's defence capacity and its interoperability with NATO. NSATU is besides subject to logistical hubs serving assistance to Kiev, including the main one, in Polish Jasionka since March 2025. As part of the allied arrangements, the Americans withdrew from its securing, and the rotating shield is implemented by Europeans (now Germany and Norway)^[20].

Conclusions

1. The agreed increase in expenditure is intended to reconstruct the military possible of Europe and Canada in the face of threats from Russia and the possible of reducing the US military presence. The implementation of these plans would lead to the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO. However, it may be hard for any allies to scope the 5% of GDP ceiling in 2035. Rather, it is expected to increase the division of 2 speeds into Europe in the area of defence and deterrence – the countries of the north-east flanks, the most susceptible to aggression, will keep advanced defence costs, the more distant ones from Russia will most likely be halfway, and those located in the south-western part of the continent will most likely neglect to comply with the Natovian recommendations, although they will besides increase spending on this purpose. In 2025 – at the threshold of a ten-year commitment – the proposed 3.5% of GDP strict on defence exceeded only Poland and Lithuania among European allies. Close to erstwhile Latvia, Estonia, Denmark and Norway. Much will depend on the improvement of the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian front, as well as on the autumn American decisions to reduce military presence on the Old Continent. If the cuts turn out to be large, this will boost investment in European security. On the another hand, a not very realistic script of ceasefire in Ukraine present and normalization of Washington-Moscow relations could have a demotivating effect on the determination of many allies to keep an expanding defensive spending trajectory.
2. In the coming years, the precedence for European NATO members will be to make the possible of the arms industry. It is dependent on the possibilities of upgrading the method forces, as well as the pace of transportation of support to Kiev. In view of the ongoing Russian aggression and current U.S. policy, emphasis should be placed primarily on strengthening Ukrainian defence capabilities by Europe and not only on debates about Ukrainian membership in the Alliance.
3. The Hague summit will be seen by Trump's administration as a success and under conditions constantly generated by Washington tensions in relations with NATO allies will service as a origin stabilising transatlantic relations. However, customs issues between the United States and the EU stay unresolved, and transatlantic relations face a challenge in the form of autumn decisions to partially reduce US military presence in Europe as part of the review of US armed forces worldwide. specified a step, especially if it touches the east flank, will weaken Russia's allied deterrence.
4. Trump's crew seems little curious in NATO's commitment to stopping China on Indo-Pacific than the erstwhile one. The entries concerning the challenges for the Alliance from the PRC did not even appear in the summit declaration. In this context, the NATO partnership with the AP4 group which has been developed so far may be of little importance from Washington's perspective. It seems to be moving distant from the paradigm of the 2 combined theatres of action (European and Indo-Pacific) and to focus on encouraging Europe to take work for its own safety while refocusing its attention and forces on Indo-Pacific in cooperation with partners from this region. This means that European allies who inactive see the rationality of this commitment will do so bilaterally – either through the EU or in another formats.
5. W The Hague lacked a clearer political mention to the current urgent challenges and threats and the announcement of stronger action in this area. It should be mentioned, for example, that Russian Navy escorts the alleged shadow fleet in the Baltic, responds to Russia's escalation of alleged hybrid actions against allies, as well as the request to strengthen allied deterrence in front countries, in peculiar Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In particular, however, the second are inactive discussed in the Alliance, but at lower levels.
6. NATO has besides not sent a fresh signal on strengthening atomic deterrence policy. It is crucial that, during the summit, London announced a plan to get at least 12 F-35A aircraft capable of carrying tactical atomic weapons under the Natovian programme of its sharing (nuclear sharing) – erstwhile returning to the deployment of American B61-12 gravity bombs in the UK. These decisions reenforce the Nath atomic deterrence and, interestingly, have not raised much discussion in the Alliance.