NATO improvement and the future of deterrence

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Introduction

W Washington's debate on the future of the alliance has entered a fresh stage. The issue of the U.S.'s strategical retreat from Europe is no longer doubtful, the question of NATO's form remains an open question after the partial withdrawal of the US. This is peculiarly evident in the context of the fresh announcement of the withdrawal of 5,000 soldiers from Germany, the resignation of the long-range precision strike battalion to Lithuania, and the halting of the armored brigade rotation in Poland [1]. In addition, Washington reported a possible simplification in the quota volume sent to Europe in the event of Russia's attack, at the same time ensuring that the atomic umbrella was kept over Europe. The current administration is trying to force the transfer of the burden of defending Europe in connection with the focus on the conflict with China.

How is that seen in the United States?

The American think tank Council of abroad Relations draws attention to the issue of NATO as part of the United States force projection and to the unpopularity of the communicative of the current NATO-critical administration and allies. James M. Lindsay suggests that leaving NATO would be a strategical mistake weakening Europe and the US. The main conclusion of his article for CFR – Trump does not gotta formally leave NATO to weaken it, the communicative itself conducted by the current administration weakens the strategical signalization of the alliance, which is mainly based on belief in deterrence. The deterrence in NATO's past turned out to be its main success in the years of the Cold War, the current challenge of alliance cohesion which is based on American safety guarantees undermines the foundations on which NATO was created. According to James Lindsay, the current conflict no longer stems from the issue of defence spending, which among all the countries of the alliance reached or reached 2%, only the reluctance of allies to engage in conflicts presently being conducted by the US [2].

The Atlantic Council draws attention to the issue of changing the alliance expression due to different perceptions of threats. The authors – Léonie Allard and Torrey Taussig draw attention to the dominant point of view among the American elites and administrations that Europe must take greater work for its security. The text stresses that Europe should proceed its efforts to increase its defence spending, build its arms industry, form a coalition of willing, work together to make the capacity that has been provided by the US so far and prepare for action with limited US support. The main thesis of the Atlantic Council article says that Europe's greater work for safety is not to save NATO from disintegration, alternatively than let the distribution of transatlantic relations [3]

In a message of May 22, 2026, Marco Rubio emphasizes that “NATO must be good for all allies” puts this ground in further discussions on the redefinition of allied commitments within NATO. As part of his statement, he draws attention to the conditionality of U.S. commitment – American support is not “automatic” but depends on allied efforts. Finally, the message serves as the preparation of the ground for the Ankara summit, where the talks are to establish a fresh framework for NATO action and a redefining of defence burden sharing mechanisms [4].

According to Reuters, the Pentagon gave European diplomats a date – 2027, erstwhile European states should take greater work in the field of land troops, air defense, intelligence and logistics. Washington considered the European collection and increase of expenditure to be insufficient and expected to presume work for most capacities and operational issues by 2027. According to Reuters, this is not just a substance of changing the burden-sharing and responsibilities but an effort to redefine the NATO model within the format: Europe – the main supplier of conventional forces, the USA – strategical atomic deterrence and ISR capabilities [5]. Washington is presently planning to limit the availability of US conventional forces in the event of an armed conflict. The planned simplification includes the forces available under the NATO Force Model – an allied force pool in crisis. This is another component of the effort to form a fresh NATO format in which the US limits its operational guarantees to Europe, leaving the distribution model with strategical effectors (the effector is simply a measurement or strategy capable of affecting the mark detected for destruction, damage, overpowering or disrupting) [6]. Washington fears the decision-making chaos in NATO in connection with administration policy, defence bilateralisation and the formation of many regional mini-formats. This may lead to the erosion of Article 5. Therefore, Reuters provided information on the anticipation of reducing the number of yearly peaks to limit controversy around the communication presented by Donald Trump [7].

Ankara Summit

The American public debate is dominated by the perception of the Ankara Summit as a “test” of Turkey's loyalty to the collective west. Turkey, which has been moving a multi-vector policy for many years, has increased its influence in the close east and the Mediterranean (Mavi Vatan). The Atlantic Council underlines that the Ankara summit may be a strategical chance to reset relations between the US and Turkey. Relations stay strained due to Turkey blocking any of the decisions in NATO (e.g. Sweden's accession to the alliance), tensions on the Turkey-Israel line, Turkey's relation with Russia, and Erdogan's building his own regional safety system. Washington and Ankara are presently trying to build relationships based on functional compromise, Turkey's designation as a “problematic ally” is now changing to a hard yet strategically irreplaceable ally. Washington is aware of the multi-vectority and unpredictability of Ankara's policy [8]. Turkey has an extended defence manufacture to besides support the US in its policy of disbursing Europe's defence burden and acting as a stabilisation function in the mediate East.

According to current analyses, the Ankara Summit is expected to: further increase European financial commitments, reorganise the architecture of the sharing of resources and safety burdens, increase the emphasis on the confederate flank (the close East, the Black Sea) and keep the political dominance of the US in NATO despite reducing military engagement. European allies (in peculiar Germany and France) may not be willing to join the US's further political primacy in reducing engagement in Europe.

Allocation of deterrence obligations

The ambiguity policy pursued by the current administration leads to a weakening of the deterrence which is closely linked to the signals sent by the administration under the individual actions. Negative signals include among others: weakening the contigents in Europe and giving up the rotation of troops, thus saying that the atomic umbrella should be maintained. The deterrence should be understood holistically, weakening any of its elements has a negative impact on the full of the deterrence activities. The “burden sharing” policy is justified by Europeans' usage of the peace dividend in the years preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but now the form in which this policy is carried out has a negative impact on transatlantic relations, NATO's credibility and deterrence. The simplification of US conventional forces in Europe takes distant the current administration of 1 of the policy instruments towards Russia. The basic conclusion of investigation into deterrence in the years of the Cold War – conventional deterrence is the strongest form of deterrence, because, apart from the ability to prevent the opponent from possible actions (deterrence by denial), or his punishment (deterrence by punishment) – allows flexibility in consequence to threats. Maintaining conventional forces by the US enables certain capabilities to be maintained in the European theatre of activities that allies do not have – these include capabilities specified as precise long-range shocks from land, sea and air [9]. The possession of these capabilities by the fighting Ukraine proved to be very costly to the Russian Federation, and especially to its fuel infrastructure. Russia did not engage its full possible against Ukraine, many abilities hold in reserve against possible opponents from NATO. Maintaining the presence of the American (especially in terms of the ability to strike in the back of the opponent) effectively deters Russia from utilizing these abilities. This is crucial until Europe's allies have developed the essential capabilities that could partially replace American engagement on the continent.

Reliable deterrence is based on strong signaling of defence intentions and support for allies, strategical communication that limits action in this area besides affects the calculation of possible opponents encouraging them to hostile action. It is besides based on capacity at each level of multi-domain operations. Restricting to strategical atomic effects takes escalating and deescalating freedom and encourages possible opponents to take risky action.

Summary

Analyzing statements from American think tanks and members of president Donald Trump's administration, you can see attempts to make a fresh format for sharing commitments within NATO. Americans keep effectors and sensors (sensor is simply a device or strategy for detecting, observing, identifying and tracking objects and collecting information about the environment) strategical but conventional actions are mostly taken by Europeans. According to Washington, a fresh division of responsibilities is intended to defend transatlantic relations from decay, but maintaining the American primacy is closely linked to its contribution to Europe's security. The Ankara Summit will supply answers to whether a fresh format of cooperation can be developed for the coming years, whether transatlantic relations will be further degraded. Washington, while encouraging allies to take greater work for security, takes action in the interests of NATO, reducing the possible of conventional troops (especially in terms of capabilities that allies do not have) takes the essential escalating freedom and credibility for Washington.

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