When on April 4th 1949, 12 states signed a founding treaty in Washington, giving birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an alliance of like-minded states committed to collective defence and common protection, fewer would have expected that this transatlantic pact would endure for so many decades. More than 75 years later, 32 members of this Alliance – including the newest, Finland and Sweden – met in Washington again for the anniversary summit. NATO at 75 could be considered as an anomaly, as alliances are typically short-lived formations that dissolve or become obsolete after serving their first purpose. However, against all the odds and predictions, NATO has defied this tendency and not only survived the end of the Cold War but also, thanks to Russia’s imperial policies and invasion of Ukraine, grown stronger and larger. In the words of Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s abroad minister: “NATO was created to deter an aggressive Russia. Russia is aggressive again. NATO won the first time; it will win the second time too.”
Advancing NATO’s priorities
The NATO strategical Concept, which the Alliance announced during the summit in Madrid in 2022, serves effectively as a compass for the group, outlining their main objectives and basic tasks. The 3 core tasks around which contemporary NATO has been built include deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. While the Vilnius summit last year was the next step in implementing NATO’s strategy, the Washington summit provided another occasion to further execute the allies’ plans. It is worth remembering that NATO yearly summits are not regular meetings, but crucial junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making process.
The summit in Washington did not bring revolutionary decisions but alternatively followed a pattern of crucial yet gradual changes. For the last 10 years, NATO has been on a transformational path. What seemed like a wake-up call for the Alliance with Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula resulted in shifts within NATO to embrace its conventional defensive posture. These were only intensified by the shocks of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. always since then, NATO has turned its focus towards the most robust defence and deterrence. In Washington, NATO addressed a number of issues and challenges at the heart of Alliance strategy, including dealing with Russia; the future of Ukraine in NATO; the threat of terrorism; and concerns about China’s increasing menacing role. 3 common threads were present in both pre-summit talks and in the summit’s final declaration: the question of assistance to Ukraine; advancement in defence and deterrence; and NATO’s global partners.
During the summit in Washington, the Alliance reaffirmed the request for more robust and fast changes in NATO’s efforts to meet the fresh standards required by the current safety environment. The emphasis on burden-sharing was besides rather clear, as presently two-thirds of members have fulfilled their commitment to spending at least 2 per cent of their GDP on yearly defence spending (before Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, only 3 associate states met this criteria). Moreover, as NATO continues its transformation to modernize for a fresh era of collective defence and the anticipation of an attack against the Alliance’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it underlined strengthening deterrence and defence posture. Hence, in Washington, the Alliance pointed out its success in deploying in-place combat-ready forces on NATO’s east Flank, including implementing the “Integrated Air and rocket Defence Rotational Model” across the Euro-Atlantic area.
As air defence remains 1 of the most vital aspects of defence and deterrence, NATO besides announced the “NATO Ballistic rocket Defence Enhanced Operational Capability”. With the transportation of the Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland, which complements existing assets in Romania, Spain and Turkey, NATO’s “missile defence shield” has become a comprehensive defence strategy over the European sky. The summit declaration made it clear, though, that while rocket defence could complement the function of atomic weapons in deterrence, it could not be a substitute for them. In the context of Russia’s continuous atomic sabre rattling, the message from Washington was clear: as long as the threat of atomic weapons exists, NATO will stay a atomic alliance.
Deterring Russia, strengthening Ukraine
There is no question that assisting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression is simply a fundamental task for NATO. In this context, the Washington summit began with president Joe Biden announcing that “the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Italy will supply Ukraine with equipment for 5 additional strategical air defence systems.” This move, eagerly anticipated by many, signals that the NATO Washington summit prioritized the pressing challenges to Euro-Atlantic safety over celebrating the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. In a joint statement, the US, Germany and Romania announced that each would supply Ukraine with a Patriot rocket battery. The Netherlands, in collaboration with another nations, will facilitate an additional battery. Italy will contribute by providing a SAMP-T long-range air defence system.
The emphasis on air defence support for Ukraine was no accident. The day before the announcement, Russian airstrikes in Ukraine claimed the lives of at least 42 people and injured 190 others, including an attack on the country’s largest children’s hospital. While the support for Ukraine’s air defence comes from NATO individual associate states, not from NATO itself, this announcement at the beginning of the summit signalled the Alliance’s commitment to place Ukraine at the front of its current agenda.
Subsequently, NATO’s announcement that it would establish the “NATO safety Assistance and Training for Ukraine” (NSATU) programme was a crucial step in aid. NSATU will coordinate the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine by NATO members and partners. According to the summit declaration, its aim is “to place safety assistance to Ukraine on an enduring footing, ensuring enhanced, predictable, and coherent support”. This fresh format, as it was underlined in the communiqué, will support Ukraine’s self-defence in line with the UN Charter. This signals a crucial change in NATO’s responsibilities. NATO has so far refrained from straight providing lethal assistance to Ukraine, alternatively allowing individual associate countries to take the lead bilaterally and through the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group, besides known as the Ramstein format. However, since most of the military support for Ukraine has come from individual NATO members anyway, coordinating these efforts under the NATO umbrella makes more sense in terms of logistics and strategy. Consequently, NATO announced plans to establish a training and support facility in Wiesbaden, Germany, staffed with 700 personnel. This fresh centre will coordinate training and equipment donations to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities. In addition, NATO associate states announced a pledge of long-term safety assistance for Ukraine regarding the provision of military equipment, assistance, and training to support Ukraine in building a force capable of defeating Russian aggression. Alliance members pledged to supply a minimum baseline of backing of 40 billion euros within the next year, and to supply sustainable levels of safety assistance for Ukraine to prevail in its defensive war against Russia.
Ukraine, as expected, did not receive an authoritative invitation to join NATO, only a repeated pledge that NATO continues to support the country on “its irreversible way to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership”. The Alliance reaffirmed that it would be ready to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO “when Allies agree and conditions are met”. While this definitely did not meet Kyiv’s expectations, the 2 aforementioned decisions to support Ukraine heralded NATO’s more crucial commitment to assist in dealing with Russia’s war of aggression. Overall, NATO’s primary work is the defence of its members and its own territory. While there is crucial support and sympathy for Ukraine, NATO is not positioned to straight engage in combat on Kyiv’s behalf. However, there is simply a delicate balance to be maintained regarding how NATO can further assist Ukraine’s efforts to win the war without becoming straight active in a conflict with Russia. This issue is peculiarly complex due to the fact that NATO associate states hold differing views on the degree to which the Alliance should assist Ukraine.
China’s challenge and the Indo-Pacific partners
In a notable shift, NATO has taken a firmer stance towards China, as reflected in the language of the Washington summit declaration. The Alliance identified the People’s Republic of China as “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” through its “no limits” partnership and extended support for Russia’s defence industry. NATO peculiarly criticized China’s transfers of dual-use materials, including weapons components, equipment, and natural materials that bolster Russia’s defence sector.
This marks a crucial change in NATO’s tone, as the Alliance not only acknowledged China’s function in undermining European safety but besides issued a veiled informing to Beijing. NATO emphasized that China cannot support the largest war in Europe in fresh past without facing negative repercussions regarding its interests and reputation. While, predictably, China’s official response to the NATO summit declaration was to dismiss it as “biased, slanderous, and provocative”, it is hard to deny China’s increasing influence in Europe. 1 fresh example included joint military exercises with Belarus, held on Monday 8th July. These were held just a fewer kilometres from the border of Poland and occurred just 1 day before the Alliance’s summit in Washington.
While NATO maintains that China poses a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security”, it does not mention to Beijing as a threat. Yet, the language of the summit declaration is rather stronger in relation to China. Even if the word “threat” does not appear directly, NATO members seem to agree publically that China is hostile to the West. This is simply a striking departure from perceptions of China in erstwhile years. Consequently, NATO acknowledges that to bolster its own safety it needs partnerships not only within the Euro-Atlantic area (such as NATO’s partnership with the EU) but besides beyond the transatlantic realm. NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, fresh Zealand and South Korea – constitute a pillar of this partnership. The Alliance’s relation with the “Indo-Pacific Four” could aid tackle more complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic safety that have a global dimension and require cooperation with partners across the globe, including those in Asia.
Even though NATO does not frame these partnerships as anti-Chinese, Beijing clearly perceives them as such. While any critics claim that NATO should stick to the Euro-Atlantic territory in its political and diplomatic activities, others argue that today’s global safety strategy is besides complex and besides volatile for NATO to ignore another regions. Arguably, building and strengthening a network of partners across the globe has been a pillar of NATO’s strategy for almost 2 decades. How the Alliance intends to benefit from this network in Asia-Pacific is simply a different question.
The Trump effect?
Among the vital issues for NATO’s future is the evolving function of the US in the Alliance. Since the United States has been reorienting its abroad policy focus to China and the Asia-Pacific region more broadly, any European allies are worried about being left isolated during highly dangerous times for security. This fear of abandonment seems to have been increasing in 2024, a year of presidential elections in the US. 1 unspoken concern loomed large over the Washington summit: what if Donald Trump wins the upcoming election and returns to the presidency? While NATO, for clear diplomatic reasons, avoids taking positions on political candidates within its associate states – considering specified matters as interior affairs – this issue was not officially discussed during the summit. Nevertheless, the apprehension among many NATO members is palpable.
Their concerns are well-founded, given Trump’s erstwhile tenure during which he expressed scepticism about NATO’s relevance to US safety interests. He not only criticized European allies for not contributing more to defence spending but besides infamously suggested that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell it wants” to them. In addition, Trump’s position on Ukraine and continued support for Kyiv’s defence has been questionable at best, if not outright negative. The erstwhile president is said to have privately stated that he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine by pressuring the country to quit any territory. For Ukraine and many European members of NATO specified remarks herald a possible geopolitical disaster. This is why the spectre of Trump loomed large over the Washington summit.
Additionally, his unpredictable approach to abroad policy has encouraged NATO associate states to brace themselves for all possible scenario. Europe is facing the gravest safety crisis since the end of the Second planet War. An unpredictable US partner, ready to retreat its troops from Europe and its support for Ukraine, is the last thing the old continent needs. possibly the only silver lining in this situation is that a possible Trump second word might motivate and mobilize any European NATO members to spend more on defence and prepare themselves to trust little on the US. To build a Trump-proof Alliance, many in Western Europe request to change their attitude, which remains stuck in the Cold War mentality of over-relying on the US’s safety umbrella.
Future challenges
Russia and its devastating war against Ukraine inactive ranks number 1 on NATO’s list of concerns. There is no peace on the European continent as long as a atomic power wages a war of aggression against a sovereign state, creating the most volatile safety situation in Europe since the end of the Second planet War. Hence, there is no surprise that NATO in 2024 repeated its erstwhile statements that Russia remains “the most crucial and direct threat to Allies’ security”. This is besides reflected in the Washington summit declaration as Russia is mentioned there 44 times, while NATO stresses that Moscow bears full work for the war against Ukraine, including violations of global law, war crimes and attacks on critical infrastructure.
Along with NATO, the EU is besides facing hard realities and fresh challenges. any of them have a global dimension, like a multilayered geopolitical competition and a shift towards a “world of blocs” in which states increasingly little friendly to the West will be forming their own partnerships. any challenges are regional, like global terrorism and transnational criminal organizations. These should not be underestimated as NATO faces the threat from the East. Others, like Russia’s war against Ukraine, originated in Europe, straight affecting Euro-Atlantic safety yet besides having the possible for global repercussions.
The return of a major war in Europe could have devastating results not only for the full continent but besides for its well-established institutions like NATO and the EU. Here might lie an additional challenge to the transatlantic Alliance’s long-lasting success in the future: societal resilience and the ability to adapt to a changing safety landscape. So far, and for way besides long, it seemed that most Europeans have lived in a fairy tale planet convinced that war happens somewhere else, distant from wealthy European societies.
Now, in the face of Russia’s bloody war against Ukraine, it is inactive highly hard for any to wake up from this comfortable model of life to bear the burden of deterring the adversary. NATO seems to realize the stakes and political consequences of the Russian war for transatlantic security. The decisions taken in Madrid, Vilnius and Washington reflected this logic as NATO consequently follows its strategy adopted in 2022. The Alliance – at least at the policymakers’ level – recognizes that “what happens in Ukraine does not stay in Ukraine.” The question is whether NATO associate states’ societies are ready to accept this and act upon it in the long-term perspective.
This commentary is the consequence of a peculiar seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by fresh east Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.
Wojciech Michnik is simply a 2023-24 Fulbright-NATO safety Studies Fellow. He is besides an assistant prof. at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) and the Transatlantic task Coordinator of the Central and South-East Europe Programme at LSE IDEAS at Jagiellonian University. He is simply a contributing editor with New east Europe.
