The “SAN” program, the function of tanks in the modern battlefield, the mobilization capabilities of the Polish Army, the restoration of compulsory military service and the drone revolution are referred to by General Piotr Fajkowski, the fresh Inspector of the Army of the Land Command of General Forces. “There will be a drone company in all battalion,” says the general.
You're breaking up with the 11th Lubuska Armored Cavalry Division. How do you feel about this change?
General Piotr Fajkowski: First of all, I'm arrogant to be the commander of this division. I think I've been able to do a lot about it over the last 3 years and I've achieved a lot. Unfortunately, it is in the military that the time comes erstwhile you take a position and the time erstwhile you think it is. In colloquially speaking, from the first minute
In the division, my days were numbered due to the fact that I had a term.
Now it's time for fresh challenges. You are the Inspector of the Land Forces in the General Command of the Types of Armed Forces. What are your plans and the direction in which land troops will shortly follow?
There is simply a large process of modernization of this kind of armed forces. These are not only armoured and mechanized troops, as an inspector I will besides be liable for rocket and artillery and aerodynamic troops, so it is simply a immense area in terms of changes in structures, modernization and implementation of fresh equipment. We are facing major organizational changes: additional battalions in brigades, further brigades in divisions, change of artillery regiments in brigades, and above all the introduction of so-called. drone companies to the Land Army battalions.
This is the main task I will continue. Since the introduction of unmanned systems there is no retreat and yet in all mechanized battalions, motorized, and even in tank battalions there are to function companies of unmanned weapons systems. Without the operation of drones and drone systems, there is no modern battlefield.
The drone company in the tank battalions? What are their assignments?
Exactly the same as the motorized battalions. The first is to admit the forces of the enemy, and the second is to destruct them over a distance of up to a fewer twelve kilometers. This is done to prevent the enemy's subdivisions from physical contact with our tanks or BWPs. So it needs to be destroyed by drones and artillery in the alleged grey zone. If the opponent inactive gets through, then it is only then that we decision on to conventional defense, that is, with the usage of gunfire and combat vehicles.
Can we talk about the timetable for these changes?
Everything will decide after certification of pilot drone companies. It will be specified a litmus paper showing whether the assumptions adopted in the General Command and General Staff of the Polish Army are correct, or whether certain modifications of these structures or changes of equipment should be made.
We are checking the structure of the sub-section, based on the experience of Ukrainian soldiers. We are investigating what unmanned sub-units and what capabilities will be the most optimal: whether the recognition, designation and fire itself, the demolition itself, the combat of drones? Is that expected to be just drones or electronic combat units that will support them? We are waiting for the final consequence of these tests and their summary. Then the drone companies will enter the army in the next battalions, that's for sure.
And what do you think of the frequently emerging opinion that the tank is already a fading weapon and that the Ukrainian conflict has proved the inadequacy of this weapon in the modern battlefield?
I disagree with that view. Practically since the Israeli-Arab Wars of the 1970s, we have heard from time to time that the end of tanks has come due to the fact that anti-tank guided missiles (and better with each generation). And it turned out that the answer was first introduced reactive armour, then passive systems disrupting soft kill and tanks managed with these missiles. Later came self-propelled rockets "shoot – forget" type, and again another passive systems of protection against them kind Shtora or Trophy or yet hard kill active systems.
In turn, in Ukraine, the deficiency of anti-tank missiles led was supplemented by drones. They have precisely the same task, only they act a small differently. And here, too, we find better and better defenses to counter them. The effectiveness of drones is not as advanced as at the beginning of the conflict. This is simply a technology race all the time. The better the attack system, the better the consequence system. Tanks won't get off the battlefield so quickly, due to the fact that there's no means yet that would have specified a combination of firepower, armor and maneuverability as the tank gives.
Yes, but Ukrainians, not only do they, gradually "build" tanks and another armored vehicles with anti-drone systems. What's it like with us?
We are well aware of this direction. Work continues. By the end of next year we want to start implementing specified systems on our armored vehicles. The Abrams and K2PL will most likely be implemented Trophy system, i.e. the Israeli Active defence System, designed primarily to defend armored vehicles against anti-tank missiles. Talks are ongoing. In K2PL, this strategy will not only origin electronic interference with drones, but besides detect and harm them (hard kill). The formation of a kinetic strategy to combat the unmanned opponents. As for Leopardy, there is besides a choice of adequate weapons.
Another solution that we're going to scope for will be the drone grids as the penultimate barrier, due to the fact that the last 1 is the extra reactive armor. On the next parade on the occasion of the celebration of the Polish Army, anti-tank wagons are to be presented. So we are full aware of the requirements of the modern battlefield and these systems will gradually enter into our midst.
The army is preparing to introduce drone companies in land troops, but should knowledge, even in the basic dimension: how to usage a drone, how to defend itself from it, not be supplied to all soldiers, even private soldiers at the basic training stage?
I confirm, and specified changes are planned. The drone and drone training will be implemented into the programmes already at the core training phase of soldiers of the voluntary primary military service. It's all a necessity. The arms manufacture is developing, among others, a specially dedicated drone ammunition for soldiers. Drones have become a full-fledged means in the field of combat, and everyone has to learn how to fight them and counter them.
The Ukrainian War, which we experience, is besides a trench war. Only late it seemed that this way of fighting was archaic. present it looks completely different. How does the army respond to specified changes?
A year ago, a training inspector in DGRSZ, based on the conclusions of training Ukrainian soldiers in Poland as part of the mission EUMAM Ukraine with the command of CAT-C in Żagań, he recommended to make trench systems and tranches on the ground, and practically most of the trenches have already been built. Command stations are now being created, including underground, at brigade and battalion level. Thanks to them, the commanders will be able to conduct training in specified conditions as it will look on the battlefield, that is, in full underground hiding.
What is the biggest pain of the Polish Army in terms of equipment?
Our top deficiency is the anti-drone and anti-aircraft defence at the lowest levels, the alleged last line of defense. We have an effective defence against aircraft, helicopters and rockets – so far the essential means of aerial assault, but we deficiency consequence to, for example, Shahed drones/Geran or FPV type. We request to complete this. Our answer will be SAN system, thus the largest and most modern anti-drone defence strategy (C-UAS class). His squadrons will gradually enter all anti-aircraft regiments.
What is the timetable in this respect?
SAN squadrons are already formed. most likely if the manufacture can supply them with equipment, including so-called. Tarnow monsters, i.e. the strategy of combating unmanned aircraft, then by the end of this year we will have the first 2 squadrons equipped, and by the mediate of next year there should be another two. That would close the first stage, or anti-aircraft regiments. This is an absolute priority. By the end of next year, the squadrons will be ready for action.
Speaking of units, I'll ask for their readiness. Currently, the Polish Army counts 4 divisions, 2 more (1st Legion Infantry Division and 8th National Army Infantry Division) are formed. How many troops would we be able to put up if there were, for example, aggression from the east today?
We are able to phase all 4 existing squadrons with full equipment ready to fight, both 2 "Western" and 2 "Eastern" on time.
Are we talking about a deadline of 7 days?
That depends, due to the fact that each individual has a different time to accomplish readiness, but it is surely not 30 days as it appeared in the media. I can't uncover what the terms are, but I assure you, they're definitely shorter.
It's not from present that it's said that the army's pain is the deficiency of instructors. How will you address this, and are there any plans in this regard?
The situation improved through access to sub-office courses. It's about providing adequate squad leaders due to the fact that they're liable for the training. Therefore, an full strategy of basic sub-office courses conducted in tactical unions was created. Divisions train as many officers as they request to fill the positions they need. And this trial has accelerated. The officers' corps is now truly, compared to the officers', well completed.
And now the question that I have the impression is coming back all the time, but more and more recently, is it essential to reconstruct compulsory essential military service?
From my point of view, the question is not “whether” but “when”. There are 2 key factors. First: in the current strategy voluntary services, in the demographic crisis, the labour marketplace and the fight for workers are emerging. Unfortunately, the military (like uniforms) is incapable to compete with the economy, due to the fact that we will never offer a rate higher than the private sector. Second thing: the army can't just be based on volunteers. Unfortunately, at any point volunteers may not be able to attend and the state must be prepared to defend itself. It cannot be that we will have 300,000 people "on the drink", but in reality only 200,000 in barracks and 100,000 vacancies, due to the fact that there will be no volunteers for the service.
The only way out is to reconstruct the draft. Then we'll choice the best ones we'll pay well, who'll become instructors and commanders, and we'll take Privates from the draft. And we won't compete with the economy, due to the fact that the entrepreneur will know that this man will return to the labour marketplace in six months or a year. It must not be forgotten that conscription is besides a way of building a resource of individual reserves and thus creating real conditions for deterring the opponent. It's like saying, "Look, we have 300,000 soldiers in the barracks, but we besides have 3 million trained reservists that we can arm."
How long should specified compulsory military service last?
There are different opinions. any people number 3 to 4 months, and I think the service should last 12 months. Why? due to the fact that the state functions in the yearly system. It's a school year, a budget year, etc. If a man comes into the army, the strategy can be akin to the school year. Recruit could have a vacation, a vacation, a paid vacation. He besides doesn't should be in the barracks 24 hours a day, due to the fact that there's no request for that – unless he's on duty. And after a year, a trained man, as a reservist to truly supplement these 100,000 vacancies, returns to the labour market. The army has soldiers secured for wartime, and the workers' economy for peacetime.
You said that the question was not whether, but when. erstwhile then?
Of course, we must reconstruct the ability to accept essential military service, but from my point of view, the answer to your question is gradually, but as shortly as possible.
Gen. Dyw. Piotr Fajkowski She's 53. He graduated from the Tadeusz Kościuszko Higher School of Officers in Wrocław and from the Faculty of Management and Command of the National Defence Academy. He began his officer's career in the 1st Armored Brigade in Happy. In 2005 and 2007, he served in the Polish continuation in Iraq, as part of V and IX changes. He then commanded the 3rd Zamosc Mechanized Battalion in 2009–2012, besides during the 7th change of Afghanistan's PKW.
In 2013–2014 he graduated from the AON Management and Command Department. After them, he began his service at the General Command of Armed Forces Types as a elder specialist in the Training Division and then head of the Exercise Branch. He then served as deputy commander of the 1st Armoured Brigade and commanded the Polish RSM military contingent during the 6th shift in Afghanistan.
Upon his return to Poland, he was the head of training of the 16th Pomeranian Mechanized Division. He graduated from the Postgraduate Defence Policy Studies at the Academy of War Art and an elite course for NATO leadership executives Paris global Capstone Course at the Paris War School. From 2021, he commanded the 15th Giżycka Mechanized Brigade, and 2 years later he headed the 11th Lubuskie Division of Armored Cavalry. On 1 July 2026, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, appointed Gen. Dyw Fajkowski as Inspector of Land Forces in DGRSZ.













