Conversation with prof. Glenn Diesel
Let us start with a very basic question: are we already dealing with the retreat of Ukraine and active in the conflict of Western powers, not only due to the entanglement of the notorious Ukrainian counteroffensive, but besides due to the emergence of further conflicts within the Ukrainian leadership, as well as the tensions between Kiev's allies? Are we closer to the end?
– I think we're just reaching that point. Many of the analyses of this conflict were incorrect, as they were limited to estimating the size of the territory occupied. In the meantime, from the beginning we had a conflict of destruction, both sides, Western-Ukrainian and Russian. Therefore, it is not essential to focus solely on the territory, due to the fact that erstwhile the real aim is to destruct the armed forces and human reserves of the opponent, more offensive action, if possible, is avoided, focusing alternatively on a strengthened defence. It seems that it was the West that was obsessed with mastering territories in this case, and that is why the Americans demanded Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive which proved destructive, but for the Kiev side, which lost so many people, gaining only scraps of land. Meanwhile, a feature of the war on demolition is that erstwhile 1 side loses its strength, the another takes its position anyway. We have watched what has happened over the past year: NATO has armed Ukraine, mobilized the masses of the population, carried out a catastrophic counteroffensive, increased losses in people and equipment. As a result, Ukraine starts to deficiency both, and even NATO admits that there are no more ammunition to send (which is why depleted uranium and cluster ammunition were sent there). "We cannot send more supplies," said Biden himself, and this is simply a key problem. erstwhile Ukrainians themselves increase their own losses, on the another side the Russians retained their mobilization capabilities, their production of military equipment is growing, already exceeding NATO's industrial capacity; they besides import arms from abroad, expanding powerful armed forces in the back of the front. Russia now has all chance to yet defeat Ukraine; it has more powerful artillery, better electronics, more missiles, drones, more human power, reigns in the air. The failure ratio of both parties is clearly beneficial to Russia, and I believe it is only a substance of time. We have increasingly clear doubts about the West, which has lost interest in this war and is clearly ready to step down. So I agree that the last chapter of this war is most likely already beginning. The Ukrainians are exhausted, their defence is weakening, so everything is coming to an end, although of course it won't happen 1 night, may pass another month, but there won't be any return. Russia will yet win this war and – as I repeat the second year – negotiations are necessary, uncovering the best way out for Ukrainians. Of course, the Russians besides suffer, but mostly the Ukrainians are the victims of this war, so after the Russian triumph we will gotta sit for talks.
However, the West inactive seems to have a problem accepting the obvious: the principles of "earth for peace", which is an apparent starting point for all akin negotiations. In fact, we are now dealing with 2 peculiarly delicate moments. In Ukraine's interior political situation, we are seeing an expanding conflict between president Zelenski and General Załużyny, to which the mayor of Kiev, Vitali Klickko, has joined for years been regarded as a man of trust of German interests in Ukraine. At the same time, there is besides a crisis in financing Ukrainian resistance. The U.S. legislature suspended another tranche of abroad financial assistance, including over $60 billion for the Kiev regime. At the same time, however, the European Commission reiterated the announcement of a 50 billion euro transfer to Ukraine. So is the centre of gravity of Western aid moving to Europe, while America's interest is already clearly moving to the mediate and Far East? And if so, will Europe, Germany and the European Commission be curious in sustaining this war?
– That's 3 crucial issues. As regards the "earth for peace" mechanism, it could initially have been avoided. It is adequate to mention the Minsk agreements, which presume the membership of Donbas to Ukraine, but on the basis of cultural and linguistic autonomy of eastern, Russian-speaking Ukraine. specified autonomy would besides mean the anticipation of keeping Ukraine outside NATO, as it provided for an agreement that Ukraine and Russia had already negotiated after the invasion. Russia's insurmountable condition was only Ukrainian neutrality, everything else was up for discussion. It did not start at all with territorial demands, it is only now that Russia seems to believe that territorial expansion is the only way to halt NATO from controlling all Ukraine.
This is my basic reservation, due to the fact that erstwhile Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg says, “After this war is over, we will accept Ukraine into NATO”, what can they think in the Kremlin? If this is an existential threat, since the neutrality of Ukraine is inactive being rejected, and alternatively Ukraine's accession to NATO is being announced – the only solution seems to be to extend the safety zone, to seize the area from Kharkiv to Odessa, together with the main economical centres and natural resources, and of course with Russian-speaking and friendly Russia's population. It was not the only possible scenario, but there is no another 1 at the moment. These must be territorial empires, even if any part of the population considers it unfair, which, of course, should be understood, but that is the reality. I agree with the fact that the Ukrainian authorities are divided, and it is easy to predict, given how different political forces we are dealing with there. Zelenski's political leadership is challenged by the Decent, which nationalist leaders specified as Klikko want to benefit from; elements of civilian society have besides survived. specified different environments temporarily united alien intervention, but the first increase passed. erstwhile key issues are lost, 1 is looking for who to blame for the failure and who is entitled to talk about the future of Ukraine. Therefore, all these groups will be increasingly divided and these tensions will grow with the increasing awareness of Ukraine's loss. So far, colleagues will turn violently against each other.
As for America's failure of interest in Ukraine, it must be remembered that Israel will always be a precedence for Washington. I besides do not think that Europeans will be able to take over the burden of supporting Kiev without adequate potential. Without full American support, Europe will be much more restrained. I can see that from my Norway. The way our authorities are talking to Russia would be unthinkable if the United States were not standing behind our 5 million-dollar state. Gradual withdrawal of the US will besides lead to the sinking of European policy. This is primarily a question of potential. The United States is simply a large military power, Europeans – no. Unanimity is lacking even in the European Union itself, where Hungary and Slovakia disagree. A tempered attitude toward war clearly gains supporters, with increasing doubts. Let us take the slogan "defeat Russia". What, in fact, would it mean present to overcome the world’s top atomic power? Anyone think NATO would be able to march in Crimea? Or is the Pact going to start a atomic war to do that? So not so much consciousness as uncertainty.
In fresh times, many analysts, even supporting the Kiev regime, have accepted the anticipation of changing American politics, primarily tying it to the expected change in the White House. Do you think that even if Donald Trump were re-elected, we would be dealing with a qualitative change, or would it just be a transfer of American engagement to another global battlefields, specified as Southeast Asia? Does the global proxy gotta go on, and only its location will change?
"Unfortunately, I fear there is no peace organization in the US, both major parties present a militaristic attitude. Nor do they disagree in the designation that the United States should be the only and indivisible power that organizes the full planet around it. So they repeat “This is our responsibility!” So I do not see in American policy the possible that it is time for the US to reduce its global presence, and to address its own interior problems, especially economical ones. No 1 mentions it, but possibly the marginal libertarian mainstream. Democrats and Republicans disagree only in what they consider to be a precedence war. Democrats, not only in relation to RussiaGate, are determined to conflict with Russia, while China is more crucial to Republicans. So I do not anticipate any peace initiatives from the US. Global conflicts tend to expand, and since the end of the Cold War they have been an crucial part of building a planet order on a single-polar basis, which means that the United States would organize the planet on the basis of neoliberal ideas. Meanwhile, the planet is moving towards multipolarity and it is increasingly hard to ignore it. Look at Chinese technology and economics, that's superpower. And this is victorious, given how effectively it resists external pressures in the global system. So we're at the minute of moving from the single-polar system, organized around the hegemon, to the multi-polar system. Of course, this means many movements in the global environment, in different directions, which creates chaos, due to the fact that China and Russia's desire to become independent geopolitical poles necessarily leads to conflict. So no substance who wins the American elections, there will only be more conflicts. I may be a pessimist, but I besides see many interesting movements within the Republican Party, specified as Tucker Carlson's views, the attitude of many supporters of Donald Trump, and Vivek Ramaswamy's campaign. They all talk a very different language present – they reject the American way of organizing the global system. possibly that is in the best interests of the United States. So I'm pessimistic, but I agree that if anyone could bring an end-to-end empire to rational size, it would most likely be Republicans.
By the way, I like the answer to the question: – Why are you a pessimist? - due to the fact that I like to be right!
- Good answer! As for the "winner" considerations, remember that Clinton won Bush by ensuring that he would bring peace, while the process of striving for hegemony only accelerated. Obama besides announced a fundamental "change", and alternatively we only got an increase in the expansion of the American empire. There was no wind for a peace platform that many Americans would most likely support. So Trump turned out to be the 1 who didn't start any fresh war.
Glenn Diesen
I agree. 1 of the biggest disappointments not only of the American left was the fact that Clinton and Obama's policies were just as linked to the fresh planet Deal task as well as the Bush strategy. But likewise disappointing to the global right was Trump's policy towards Iran, dangerously close to the start of a war which was prevented virtually at the last moment.
"Yes, it was a minute of widespread media coverage of Syria's bombings. But let's note, this war was already going on before Trump arrived. Even the execution of General Sulejmani by him was not equal to starting a fresh conflict. He was not a man of peace, but in comparison to the others he was moving American politics in the right direction.
It was rather akin with the fresh hopes of the left with Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders, who may not have proved to be as determined allies of Israel as another politicians in chief, but inactive effort not to deviate besides far from the dominant message. Peace talks in Ukraine are much weaker. Years ago, we have observed mass actions against, among others, Britain's engagement in the Iraqi conflict, while present the same environments are much more passive. Of course, 1 can blame the censorship and unilaterality of media coverage for this, but is there no anticipation of rekindling anti-war awareness of the West?
– With respect to Ukraine – I think the problem is limited to mediocre cognition of this subject. As far as the war in Israel is concerned, however, people know much more, and they have already developed an opinion on it, and there is no double optics: on the 1 hand, we have a powerful Israeli army, supported by the Hegemonic United States, crushing civilian population. Despite the U.S.'s efforts, it is hard to say that "just fighting terrorism" due to the fact that there is simply a wider problem: what will happen to the Palestinians in general, which will be their future in the country only for Jews. The public sees cultural cleansing and massacres. The awareness of the magnitude of war crimes facilitates the activity of the peace movement. The Ukrainian conflict is much little understandable, making people more susceptible to propaganda. Let's see what happened after the Russian invasion, in February 2022. 1 day a immense condition of Western public opinion condemned this act, without reasoning why it happened. Although fewer another than Poles could find Ukraine on the map, especially in the US, and erstwhile almost no 1 knew anything about the origin of this conflict, it was easy to make specified unilateral outrage. For erstwhile there is no cognition of the facts, propaganda enters the action. It convinces the public, without speaking to reason, saying “this is simply a conflict of Good with Evil!” and all information is decently filtered to confirm it. There is, for example, talk about the emerging democracy that is trying to appear from the shadow of Russia, and about Russia that is trying to rebuild the russian Union. erstwhile specified a communicative is adopted, all peace seems a nightmare, due to the fact that if Russia wants only fresh unlimited territories and rebuilds the USSR, then we must send weapons, regardless of the cost and, of course, say no to negotiations, due to the fact that it is simply a war on expansionism.
However, if the public knew more, if they even knew the statements of even those American politicians and diplomats who admit that Russia has always considered NATO's expansion a threat to its own existence, then the invasion of Ukraine could easy be understood, which does not mean that it is justified or supported. knowing Russia's attitude, it is apparent how this conflict escalated and how it led to the threat of atomic conflict. The same would have been the case erstwhile Russia or China tried to install their military bases in Mexico: war. And by the way, without supporting the US bombing Mexico in this situation, I would consider it a predictable effect. It is so decided not to know, people are told that peace will be a kind of reward for Russian imperialists. I besides see it in my own country. Anyone who tries to explain Russian motifs is immediately listed as a "putinist", with questions "how much does the Kremlin pay you?", or a threat of dismissal, especially academic. It's very toxic and it's hard to build peace in these conditions.
I think this is simply a common experience of Poland and Norway, as NATO border countries. The increase in rusophobic propaganda and censorship is very akin here. You wrote a very crucial book on rusophobia, as an example of the information war and the function of information wars in global relations. How crucial is this propaganda component to present and future wars?
– Propaganda is crucial, but it has its advantages and disadvantages. It is not only my opinion, but Walter Lippmann himself pointed to her leading function in the American government. The most crucial is the positioning of political actors on the side of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, that is, in relation to Russia, ‘civilization’ against ‘barbarism’, ‘Europeans’ against ‘Asians’, now ‘liberal democracy’ versus ‘authoritarianism’, or ‘good’ versus ‘bad’. This helps to mobilise public opinion, so it was with Germany during planet War I, due to the fact that if they are “bad” – then you gotta fight them, it seems obvious. But erstwhile there is the anticipation of peace, even if it is mutually beneficial, it is hard to accept, due to the fact that how do we tell societies that peace must be made with evil? “Would you agree with Hitler?!” it always ends with a reminder of the policy of concessions and Munich, with the conclusion that it is not allowed to negotiate. This is the problem with propaganda, it makes it hard to presume that common knowing can be utilized to mitigate global conflicts. In specified a situation, rationality comes to a second place, and stereotypes and demands of group loyalty prevail, according to the “we” versus “they”. In Norway, in public debate, no 1 cares what you say or what facts you bring up. It all comes down to checking whether what you preach confirms 1 side or the other. due to the fact that the most crucial thing is whether you are “our”. And if so, play like others, repeat the same slogans. It's very disappointing.
Let us return to the issue of multipolarity in global relations. Do you think that the period of undisputed monopolarity has actually ended? Are we already in the multipolar world, or is this inactive a state to be achieved in the future?
– Good question, due to the fact that how do you measurement this multipolarity? global relations frequently compare military power. However, the balance of political economics is besides important, as the economy defines a number of factors of multipolarity. So let's look at the historical distribution of economical power. This is well seen in the example of an American strategy based on 3 pillars. These are strategical industries, control of transport corridors and financial instruments. The real transition from single to multipolarity takes place in these 3 areas. The Hegemon, formerly the United Kingdom, and then the USA, were based on the most developed manufacture in a given historical period, controlled transport corridors through their own maritime power and had a leading currency and a dominant influence on the banking and financial sector. By moving this strategy to the multipolar world, it should be noted that China in peculiar has made a breakthrough, gaining technological leadership in many fields, building the Belt and Road initiative, as a mostly terrestrial alternate to the existing transport corridors, created its own independent banking and expanded global designation for its own currency and its own payment system. Russia is doing the same: it secures control of its own digital system, builds its polar silicon valley, connects its own corridor with Iran and India, strengthens its separate ties with the East, independent of the routes controlled by the West, creates its own insurance system, and departs from settlements in dollars and euro, depriving its own banking and necessarily leaving the SWIFT system. economical hegemony is gone, and the faster it was, the more aggressive the United States reacted and reacted, especially militarily. However, the more the link between economical and armed shares increases, the more the remainder of the planet tries to separate. It is so the economy that indicates that the monopolarity has come to an end.
We besides see this on the example of Ukrainian. They wanted to defeat the Russians militarily – they failed. They tried to destruct them economically, destabilize the currency – besides without success. Russian economy grows faster than German, Russian currency is stable. They have their own technologies, they copy them from the West or make them in cooperation with non-Western countries. All this indicates that multipolarity is already becoming a fact.
The problem is that there are inactive opposing forces. erstwhile the United States continues to insist on monopolarity – what is multipolarity expected to be? A strategy of sovereignty and equality, and this is the other of a situation where only sovereign is actually sovereign. Not only the U.S., but in general the collective West usurp the right to intervene in any country, “in the defence of democracy and human rights”, to usage the armed force and seize another's territory, as in Kosovo. Everything is up for discussion, sovereignty outside the alleged civilized planet can only be recognised conditionally. That's the full monopolarity mentality. In a multipolar system, which is already being addressed by most non-NATO countries, among many centres, global law cannot be based on systemic inequality, and this implies, among another things, the rule of non-interference in the interior affairs of another state. However, I am not saying that the multipolar strategy has already appeared in an undisputed way. From the military and economical sides, we are almost there, but the rules of action are inactive not defined. The West inactive demands unequal sovereignty, legitimacy of its abroad interventions, interference in another people's interior affairs, of course not accepting that, for example, the Russians could do the same for Western countries. At this point we are, the change has not yet been full accepted, we do not know all the fresh rules, but the change, especially under military and economical account, has already taken place.
Thank you, Professor, for this conversation.
He was talking. Konrad Hand
photo of cremlin.ru
Prof. Glenn Diesel – Norwegian political scientist, lecturer at the University of South-East Norway, specialist in global relations and security, author of excellent works specified as “Russian geo-economic strategy for the large Eurasia”, “EU and NATO relations with Russia”, “Russian conservatism” and “Rusophobia – propaganda in global politics”.
Think Poland, No. 1-2 (1-7.01.2024)
