Moldova: Russian gas crisis game in Transnistria

On 1 January, Gazprom suspended the supply of gas to Transnistria, the separatist territory of Moldova, as a consequence of Ukraine's failure to extend its transit agreement. At the same time, Russia refused to send it via an alternate route, utilizing TurkStream and the trans-Balkan gas pipeline, conditionaling on Moldova's consent to this option to settle the alleged debt, amounting to, according to the Russian side, $709 million.

As a result, all gas boilers in Transnistria were shut down on 1 January. Gas heating and hot water have been deprived of residential housing, as well as public institutions, including schools, kindergartens and hospitals. Moldawska GRES, a major power plant in the area of ‘republica’, located in Dnestrovsc, and belonging to the Russian company Inter RAO, has been supplied with de facto free gas (the main fuel of which is its main fuel), has switched to coal burning, but this will not cover the region's electricity needs. In addition, the stocks collected close the unit are expected to last only for about 50 days.

Russia's Parastate Crisis is simply a way of reducing the popularity of the pro-Western Action and Solidarity organization (PAS) in Moldova before the planned summertime or early autumn parliamentary elections. Moscow hopes that the increase in electricity prices associated with the cessation of supply of gas to Transnistria, which produces most of the electricity for Moldova's needs, and the possible humanitarian crisis in the "republic" will discourage the electorate from the authorities and encourage it to turn towards pro-Russian forces.

Comment

• The interruption of gas supply resulted in a major crisis in Transnistria. utilizing alternate fuel – coal – Moldova's GRES is not able to full meet energy needs in the region, where there are about 300 000 people, especially since many of them are presently heating their apartments with electrical stoves and air conditioners. As a result, the local energy network operator must ration the available power, which involves temporary power outs (from 7 January to 8 hours a day). The cessation of gas supply and the simplification of electricity production besides led to the closure of all major industrial plants.
• Right-shore Moldova (i.e. without Transnistria) suffers the consequences of stopping the transmission of gas by Ukraine. Although it no longer consumed Russian natural material since 2022, it utilized the current produced from its combustion in Moldovan GRES . By 1 January, this gym covered 80% of Moldova's electricity request – the remaining 20% came primarily from the CHP plant in Chisinau and Bielce and from renewable sources. However, supplies from Transnistria were halted, which forced the Chisinau to bring at least twice as costly electricity from Romania and (if available) from Ukraine. This forced increases in electricity tariffs for consumers by about 75% from 3 January. Although imports mostly cover Moldova's right-front request for electricity, in exceptional situations – with large increases in consumption or the Russian bombings of stopping the supply of energy from Ukraine – there may be power outages.
• Moscow is liable for triggering the ongoing crisis. It may have maintained the supply of gas to Transnistria through an alternate route, but it has deliberately chosen not to. She was aware that the request for repayment of debt not recognised by Moldova to Gazprom (according to an independent audit commissioned by Chisinau in 2023 was not 709 million but $8.6 million) could not be accepted. This movement is intended to let the Kremlin to throw work for the situation on the PAS government, accused by both Moscow and Tiraspol of pursuing a humanitarian and economical crisis in the parastate. In fact, it was Transnistria who rejected Chishinev's offer, which in fresh days declared their willingness to aid him.
• Moscow hopes that with the crisis it will weaken the position of PAS before the parliamentary elections. The surge in electricity prices (especially severe during the winter period) combined with possible interruptions in its supply, as well as possible destabilisation of the situation in Transnistria will hit the – and so damaged – image of the ruling party. This 1 presently has no chance of repeating the success of 2021, erstwhile it gained an absolute majority. The effects of the interruption of gas supply are provided by propaganda fuel linked to the opposition Russia. It may convince that the Moldovan government is inefficient, as it could not negociate a favourable agreement with Ukraine and Russia to proceed its supply, and that the crisis (and so advanced energy prices) would have been avoided if the authorities had developed neutral or pro-Russian policies.
• The crisis in Transnistria is likely to deepen, and in the close future it can become a humanitarian disaster. A key problem is the possible cessation of electricity production in the region (within a period and a half), resulting in a collapse of the economy and public finances. As a result, a wave of migration to the right-wing Moldova can take place, which will seriously burden the budget and administration.